General Clothing Corp. (U.N.I. Corp.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 31, 1987

285 N.L.R.B. 596 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

596 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
General Clothing Corporation (U.N.I. Corp.) and
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Internation-
al Union Local 3-951. Case 10-CA-21906
31 August 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND
STEPHENS
On 23 March 1987 Administrative Law Judge
William N. Cates issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and
conclusions,2 to modify the remedy,3 and to adopt
the recommended Order as modified.4
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, General Clothing Corporation (U.N.I.
Corp.), Erwin, Tennessee, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Order as modified.
Add the following as paragraph 1(c).
"(c) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the Act."
i The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951)
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings
The Respondent also has requested oral argument The request is
denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues
and the positions of the parties
2 In agreeing with the conclusions of the judge, we note that at the
time of the Respondent's refusal to reinstate the employees, the Respond-
ent relied solely on its assertion that no strike settlement agreement had
been reached with the Petitioner on 17 July 1986 In so doing the Re-
spondent, in effect, foreclosed a determination as to whether the Petition-
er would abide by the terms of this agreement.
3 Interest will be computed in accordance with our decision in New
Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987) Interest on amounts
accrued prior to I January 1987 (the effective date of the 1986 amend-
ment to 26 U S C § 6621) shall be computed in accordance with Florida
Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977)
4 With respect to the make-whole order , we note that under the strike
settlement agreement Kay Allen was required to take a "one week vaca-
tion." We leave this matter to the compliance stage of this proceeding
The judge inadvertently omitted the narrow injunctive language from
his recommended Order
Milton D. Jones, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Judith Fain, Esq., of Erwin, Tennessee, and Jacob Oliner,
Esq., of New York, New York, for the Company.
Larry Abel, of Johnson City, Tennessee, for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge. This
proceeding was heard by me in Erwin, Tennessee, on 16
and 17 December 19861 and on 26 January 1987,2 on an
unfair labor practice charge filed on 28 July by the Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union
Local 3-951 (Union). A complaint and notice of hearing
issued on 31 October alleging that General Clothing
Corporation (U.N.I. Corp.) (Company) violated Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act
(Act). More specifically it is alleged the Company has
since on or about 21 July in violation of Section 8(a)(5),
(3), and (1) of the Act, repudiated a strike settlement
agreement it reached with the Union on 17 July and that
it has thereafter, failed, and refused to reinstate its em-
ployees'3 who engaged in the strike on that date. It is fur-
ther alleged that the Company in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act on or about 5 August and 4
September failed and refused to accept grievances filed
by the Union pursuant to the parties collective-bargain-
ing agreement.4
In its duly filed answer the Company denied that any
unfair labor practices were committed. Following close
of the trial, counsel for the General Counsel and counsel
' Unless stated otherwise all dates occurred in 1986
2 This proceeding was originally closed on 17 December Thereafter it
was discovered the record was incomplete in that certain portions of
Charles Oliner's (Oliver) testimony given on 16 December was not re-
corded, transcribed, or included in the official transcript I reopened the
record on 26 January 1987 for the limited purpose of allowing the parties
to reexamine Ohner on matters not transcribed at the original hearing.
3 Those employees alleged to have engaged in the strike and subse-
quently denied reinstatement are Kay Allen, Linda Shelton, JoAnn
Lyons, Velma Nelson, Nancy Shelton, Shelby Artrip, Judy Hawkins,
Tammy Lovette, Virginia Worley, Lanna Harris, James Morton, and Lisa
Kegley.
4 The Company in its answer, at trial, and in its posttrial brief contends
the complaint is not within the scope and purview of the allegations con-
tained in the charge giving rise to the case sub judice The Company's
contention is without merit A review of the 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) charge
reflects it contains allegations that the Company, in order to discourage
membership in a labor organizat'on, refused to honor an agreement it had
with the Union to return to work certain named employees who had en-
gaged in a strike The Company contends its actions did not discourage
union membership I reject that contention It also contends the com-
plaint contains allegations of wrongdoing that occurred subsequent to the
filing of and outside the scope of the charge The complaint does contain
two allegations that the Company, at dates subsequent to the filing of the
charge, refused to accept grievances filed by the Union pursuant to the
parties collective-bargaining agreement The grievances in question, how-
ever, grew out of the Company's failure to return to work those employ-
ees who had engaged in the strike at the Company. It is clear these com-
plaint allegations are directly related to matters specifically raised in the
charge and are not so completely outside the charge that it might be said
the General Counsel initiated proceedings on its own Furthermore, the
Board, with court approval, has long followed the principle that the con-
tents of the charge do not limit the scope of the complaint, that the
charge merely sets the Board's investigatory machinery in motion See,
e.g, Cathey Lumber Co., 86 NLRB 157 (1949), enfd 185 F 2d 1021 (5th
Cir 1951), vacated on other grounds 189 F 2d 428 (5th Cir 1951)
285 NLRB No. 79
GENERAL CLOTHING CORP.
for the Company filed briefs, the contents of which have
been carefully considered.
On the entire record in this proceeding5 including my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor I make
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
The Company is a Tennessee corporation with an
office and place of business located at Erwin, Tennessee,
where it is engaged in the manufacture of clothing. The
Company during the calendar year preceding issuance of
the complaint herein, a representative period, sold and
shipped from its Erwin, Tennessee facility finished prod-
ucts valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers lo-
cated outside the State of Tennessee. The complaint al-
leges, the Company at trial admitted, and I find, it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, the Company admits,6 and I
further find that the Union is, and at all times material
has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Material Facts
Following a strike, the Company in early April recog-
nized the Union as the collective-bargaining representa-
tive for its full-time and regular part-time employees.7
On 17 April the parties entered into a collective-bar-
gaining agreement that, by its terms, expires on 30 April
1988.8 The collective-bargaining agreement in pertinent
part provides:
Article 15
No strike or lock outs.
There shall be no work stoppage, strikes or picket-
ing and no lock-outs by the company. If this provi-
sion is violated by an illegal strike, the employees
5 The Company urges that the instant matter be deferred under the
Collyer Insulated Wire, doctrine (192 NLRB 837 (1971)) to the grievance
and arbitration procedures of the parties collective-bargaining agreement
Deferral is inappropriate because the Company has prevented a resolu-
tion of the matter in that forum by rejecting on 5 August and 4 Septem-
ber the Union's attempts to file grievances on the underlying dispute The
4 September rejection came at a time after the Regional Director for
Region 10 of the Board had on 26 August initially deferred this matter to
arbitration
6 The Company in its answer did not specifically admit, deny, or ex-
plain any of the facts alleged in par 3 through 8 of the complaint Nor
did it contend it was without knowledge to respond to those allegations,
nor did it advance at trial any good cause for not doing so. Accordingly,
I deem those complaint allegations to be admitted See the Board's Rules
and Regulations , Sec 102 20
4 At material times, the Company employed approximately 24 such
employees
6 The collective-bargaining agreement was signed by Company Owner
Olmer, International Union Representative Larry Abel (Abel), Union
Steward Sandra K Allen (Allen), and Union Steward Linda Shelton
(Shelton)
597
participating in such strike shall be deemed to have
quit their employment.
At midmorning on Thursday, 17 July, approximately
12 employees concertedly ceased work and engaged in a
strike at the Company. According to the credited testi-
mony of Union Steward Allen, the employees went on
strike over disputes with management on pay and work-
ing conditions, and because Company Owner Oliner had
stated he was not going to recognize the Union any
longer. After the employees commenced to strike, Allen
and Union Steward Shelton tried, at Oliner's request, to
persuade them to return to work. The employees would
not do so at that time. That afternoon Allen notified
International Union Representative Abel of the strike.9
Abel told Allen the Union did not approve of or con-
done the strike and that the striking employees should
return to work. t ° Abel then telephoned the Company
and was told by Company Vice President Williams that
Oliner had left the plant and was en route to a local air-
port for a flight to New York.' I Abel left negotiations at
an unrelated company in Elizabethton, Tennessee, and
went to the local airport to see if he could speak with
Oliner about the situation at the Company.I2 Abel locat-
ed Oliner at the airport. It is undisputed the two of them
discussed the situation at the Company and what had
brought about the strike. Abel told Oliner he thought he
could persuade the striking employees to abandon their
strike and return to work. Abel asserts he and Company
Owner Oliner then arrived at a strike settlement agree-
ment whereas Oliner insists they only discussed possible
terms for such an agreement. Oliner contends he told
Abel he would have to consult with his lawyer in New
York and that he would make suggestions and recom-
mendations to those in New York who make the deci-
sions for the Company, but he could not agree to a set-
tlement at that time.
A resolution of what was said at the airport is neces-
sary in order to determine what, if any, agreement was
9 Abel had been at the plant during the very early morning hours of 17
July to meet with Oliver, Allen, Shelton, and Vice President/Plant Man-
ager Charlotte Williams (Williams) on a number of outstanding griev-
ances. At that meeting Oliver told Abel he had heard rumors there might
be a strike Abel told him the Union would not agree to or condone any
strike activity, but added he had heard from the employees that Oliner
had threatened to not abide by the parties collective- bargaining agree-
ment.
1° On 18 July International Union President Joseph Misbrener sent the
following mailgram to the Company: I
I have been advised that members of Local 3-951 have, engaged in
unauthorized work stoppage against General Clothing Corporation
(UNI) at Erwin, Tennessee
This action is detrimental to the best interest of the members in-
volved, the Local Union and the International Union
Members of the Local involved are hereby instructed to return to
work as instructed without further interruption unless and until strike
action is official [sic] authorized and permitted by myself as president
of the International Union in accordance with proper procedures.
The Officers of Local 3-951 are hereby authorized and instructed
to exercise their full authority as officers and to take all steps neces-
sary to enforce compliance herewith immediately ,
The record reflects Company Owner Oliner lives in New York
12 Two of the Union's negotiating committee members at the unrelated
company, namely, Trula Ellis and Debora Lacaster, accompanied Abel to
the local airport.
598 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
arrived at between Abel and Oliner. Abel was a forth-
right and candid witness who impressed me as attempt-
ing to testify truthfully and with good recollection Ac-
cordingly, I credit his account of the airport meeting
with Oliner. In contrast I am persuaded Oliner's testimo-
ny was calculated to at least, mislead the court, or at
worst, to conceal the whole truth. For example, on
direct examination Company Owner Oliner testified he
was simply a consultant for the Company. His local trial
counsel even stated at the beginning of the trial before
Oliner had testified that Oliner would state he was not
"an officer nor a shareholder or whatever of the compa-
ny," that he was "a consultant to the company" with au-
thority to "sign" on behalf of the Company only when
he had been specifically given authority to do so from
New York. However, when Oliner was questioned by
the court about the ownership of the Company he ac-
knowledged owning 100 percent of the stock of the cor-
poration that owns the Company herein In addition to
the above facts, Oliner's testimony was confusing and at
times so disjointed that it was difficult to follow or be-
lieve. He gave expanded evasive dissertations even when
asked the simplest of questions. I am persuaded Oliner's
testimony cannot be regarded as trustworthy, accurate,
or reliable.
Abel testified Oliner, after some discussion about when
Union Steward Allen and employee Tammy Lovette
should be allowed to return to work, agreed that all of
the striking employees could return to work on Monday,
21 July except Allen Oliner insisted Allen take a week
off because he believed she started trouble at the plant.
Oliner, however, agreed that rather than have Lovette,
who had filed a grievance against the Company, take
any time off he would permit her to return to work with
a written warning Abel told Oliner he would recom-
mend the settlement to the striking employees and do ev-
erything in his power to have them back at work on
Monday. Abel said he and Oliner sealed their strike set-
tlement agreement with a handshake. i 3
Thereafter Abel contacted Union Steward Allen and
arranged for a meeting with the striking employees for
Sunday, 20 July.'' At the Sunday meeting , Abel ex-
plained the terms of the settlement agreement. Allen
agreed to having to take a week off from work, and Lo-
vette agreed to being given a written warning Abel told
the employees he did not want anything like this to
happen in the future and he asked them to report for
work on Monday morning 21 July. The employees
agreed to return to work but asked Abel to accompany
them the first day because the Company had obtained an
injunction barring them from its premises.
It is not disputed that Abel and 11 employees who had
been on strike appeared at the Company, prior to work-
time , ready to go to work on 21 July.' 5 Company Vice
13 During the weekend Olmer spoke separately via telephone with
Abel, Allen, and Shelton I have considered but find it unnecessary in re-
solving the issues herein to discuss those conversations
14 The employees ceased picketing on Friday, 18 July
is According to Company Vice President Williams, the group was ac-
companied by two local sheriffs deputies
President Williams said it surprised her that the striking
employees showed up for work. Williams told the group
they could not return to work because she had just been
on the telephone with Company Owner Oliner and he
had told her they were not to return to work. Abel ex-
plained to Williams that he and Oliner had an agreement
to return the employees to work. Vice President Wil-
liams then telephoned Oliner in New York, and Abel
spoke with him. Abel reminded Oliner of their agree-
ment and told him the employees had fulfilled all the
Company's requirements regarding their being able to
return to work. Abel asked Oliner why he had changed
his mind. Abel credibly testified Company Owner Oliner
told him he was a consultant to the Company, that he
had been overruled, and he was not going to live by
their agreement. That ended the conversation. Abel then
had the employees who had showed up for work sign a
letter indicating they were present for work. Company
Vice President Williams acknowledged receiving a copy
of the letter.
It is undisputed that Abel and the employees returned
to the plant the following morning before the start of the
work shift ready for work. They were again told by
Company Vice President Williams they could not go to
work.
Thereafter, on 28 July, Abel filed the charge giving
rise to the instant case. Subsequent to his filing the in-
stant charge, Abel was informed by the Board's Regional
Office in Atlanta, Georgia, that the matter was going to
be administratively deferred to the arbitration procedures
of the parties collective-bargaining agreement. Thereafter
Abel contacted Union Steward Allen and told her to get
with Union Steward Shelton and file with the Company
grievances concerning the fact the employees were not
allowed to return to work. Abel then telephoned Compa-
ny Vice President Williams and told her two individuals
would be coming to the plant to file grievances and if
there were any problems to telephone him.
On 5 August Allen and Shelton went to the plant and
attempted to file the grievances in question 16 Company
Vice President Williams told the two they no longer
worked for the Company and she was not going to take
grievances from them. Allen told Williams they were
there representing the Union. Company Owner Oliner
then asked Allen and Shelton to leave the plant.
The Regional Director for Region 10 of the Board, in
a letter to the parties dated 26 August, advised them he
was administratively deferring the instant case for arbi-
tration However, he added he would revoke his decision
to do so if the Company impeded a prompt resolution of
the matter
Abel was contacted by the Board's Regional Office in
early September and informed the Company had said no
grievances had been filed in the instant matter. Abel con-
tacted Union Steward Shelton and instructed that she
and Allen again attempt to file grievances with the Com-
pany on the matter
iS Allen and Shelton testified Allen had the grievances in her hand
when they met with Company Vice President Williams Williams said she
did not recall seeing any grievances, but added she would not have taken
them if they had been offered to her
GENERAL CLOTHING CORP.
It is undisputed that Allen and Shelton went to the
plant on 4 September and again attempted to file the
grievances in question with Company Vice President
Williams. Williams told them she could not accept any
grievances. Allen asked why. Williams told her it was on
advice of counsel. Allen and Shelton left the company
premises unable to file the grievances in question.
Discussion and Analysis
The July strike was unauthorized by the Union and
those who participated in it engaged in conduct forbid-
den by the parties collective-bargaining agreement.
Therefore, their concerted activity that otherwise would
have been lawful and protected was,rendered unprotect-
ed because they breached the no-strike provision of the
parties collective bargaining agreement. Under the terms
of the collective-bargaining agreement; and absent any
subsequent agreement to the contrary, the employees
that engaged in the strike were deemed to have quit their
employment with the Company. However, the credited
evidence establishes the Company (with two stipulations)
agreed to return the striking employees to work and as
such condoned the strike and forgave the employees'
misconduct. Condonation takes place when an employer,
as in the case sub judice, demonstrates a willingness to
forgive the improper aspects of the concerted activity of
its employees and agrees to wipe the slate clean. See,
e.g., Packers Hide Assn. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.
1966), and Davis Coal Co., 261 NLRB 728 at 730 (1982).
As was noted by the court in Jones & McKnight, Inc. v.
NLRB, 445 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1971):
The key element of condonation is a clearly evi-
denced intention and commitment on the part of the
employer to overlook the misconduct and to permit
a continuation or resumption of the company-em-
ployee relationship as though no misconduct had
occurred.
The principle of condonation is not repugnant to the
Act, but rather advances the public' s interest in the
prompt settlement of labor disputes. See NLRB v. Cast
Optics Corp., 458 F.2d 398 at 405 (3d Cir. 1972). The
condonation in the instant case was conditional. It was
conditioned upon Allen and Lovette agreeing to certain
adverse actions being taken against them by the Compa-
ny. The doctrine of condonation may however be effec-
tively invoked after conditions for condonation have
been timely fulfilled. Jones & McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB,
supra . The conditions the Company insisted on in the in-
stant case were agreed to prior to the date and time for
the employees to return to work.
In summary it is clear the Company, by agreement
with the Union, condoned the unprotected strike activi-
ties of its employees and it violated Section 8(a)(5), (3),
and (1) of the Act, when on 21 July it repudiated that
agreement and thereafter refused to reinstate the employ-
ees in question. i 7
17 I reject the Company's contention that the strike settlement agree
ment, even if made, would have constituted an amendment or modifica-
tion to the parties collective-bargaining agreement and as such would
have had to have been in writing in order to have been effective. The
599
The final issue to be considered is whether the Compa-
ny violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, when on 5
August and 4 September it admittedly refused to accept
the grievances the two union stewards attempted to file
regarding the Company's refusal to reinstate its employ-
ees who had participated in the July strike at the Compa-
ny.
The Company's rejection of the grievances in question
may have been consistent' with its contention that no
strike settlement was ever arrived at nevertheless its ac-
tions violated the Act. The Board in Storall Mfg. Co.,
275 NLRB 220 at 221 (1985), held:
It is well settled that grievances relating to terms
and conditions of employment, including discipli-
nary actions taken against employees, are proper
subjects of collective bargaining. An employer's ob-
ligation under the Act with respect to individual
grievances presented by the collective-bargaining
representative of its employees is no different from
its obligation with respect to contract negotiations.
That is, an employer is obligated to discuss and
process such grievances with the union in a sincere
effort to reach resolution.
I recognize that the situation in Storall involved a com-
pany's refusal to accept and process grievances until
such time as the parties therein had arrived at a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with grievance and arbitration
machinery in it . However, the principles in Storall are
applicable to the instant case. In the case sub judice, the
Union attempted to file the grievances in question in
order to set the parties grievance arbitration machinery
in motion . The Board had administratively deferred
processing the instant case so the parties could resolve
their differences pursuant to their collective-bargaining
agreement. For the Company to reject the Union's griev-
ances on the very subject matter that the Board had ad-
ministratively deferred processing this case on clearly re-
flects the Company had, no intention of dealing with the
Union in good faith or of having the underlying dispute
proceed to arbitration. Considering all the above, it' is
clear, and I find, the Company violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act when on or about 5 August and 4
September it refused to accept and process the Union's
grievances.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. General Clothing Corporation (U.N.I. Corp.) is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union Local 3-951 is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All full-time and regular part-time hourly paid em-
ployees, employed by the Company at its Erwin, Ten-
nessee facility, excluding guards, and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act constitutes an appropriate unit for the
agreement simply was not an amendment or modification to the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement
600 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
purpose of collective-bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Since about 1 April 1986 the Union has been, and is
now, the exclusive bargaining representative of all em-
ployees in the aforesaid unit for the purpose of collec-
tive-bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act.
5 Since about 17 April the Company and Union have
been parties to a collective-bargaining agreement, which
by its terms expires on 30 April 1988.
6. About 17 July and until about 18 July 1986 the fol-
lowing named employees of the Company concertedly
ceased work and engaged in a strike:
Kay Allen Judy Hawkins
Linda Shelton Tammy Lovette
JoAnn Lyons Virginia Worley
Velma Nelson Lanna Harris
Nancy Shelton James Morton
Shelby Artrip Lisa Kegley
7. About 17 July 1986 the Company and Union arrived
at a strike settlement agreement that provided for the
aforesaid employees to be returned to work.
8. The Company violated Section 8(a)(5), (3), and (1)
of the Act when on 21 July 1986 it repudiated the afore-
said strike settlement agreement and thereafter failed and
refused to reinstate the aforesaid employees.
9. The Company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act when about 5 August and 4 September 1986 it failed
and refused to accept and process grievances filed by the
Union pursuant to the aforesaid collective-bargaining
agreement.
10. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Company has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found the Company entered into and then un-
lawfully repudiated a strike settlement agreement with
the Union that called for the return to work of the em-
ployees that had engaged in the strike, I shall recom-
mend that it be ordered to offer Kay Allen, Linda Shel-
ton, JoAnn Lyons, Velma Nelson, Nancy Shelton,
Shelby Artrip, Judy Hawkins, Tammy Lovette, Virginia
Worley, Lanna Harris, James Morton, and Lisa Kegley
immediate reinstatement to their former positions, or sub-
stantially equivalent positions of employment, without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights, and make
them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered
by reason of the discrimination against them with inter-
est. Backpay shall be computed in accordance with
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), interest shall
be computed as prescribed in Florida Steel Corp., 231
NLRB 651 (1977). See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138
NLRB 716 (1962). Further, it is recommended the Com-
pany be ordered to remove from its files any reference to
its 21 July refusal to reinstate the above-named employ-
ees and notify them in writing that this had been done
and that evidence of its failure to reinstate them will not
be used as a basis for any future personnel actions against
them See Sterling Sugars, 261 NLRB 472 (1982). It also
having been found that the Company failed and refused
to accept and process grievances filed by the Union pur-
suant to the parties collective-bargaining agreement, I
shall Order that it accept, discuss, and process employee
grievances with the Union on request. Finally, it is rec-
ommended the Company be ordered to post a notice for
60 consecutive days in order that employees may be ap-
prised of their rights under the Act, and the Company's
obligation to remedy its unfair labor practices.18
On these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended"
ORDER
The Respondent, General Clothing Corporation
(U.N.I. Corp.), Erwin, Tennessee, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1 Cease and desist from
(a) Repudiating its strike settlement agreement with
the Union and from failing and refusing to reinstate its
employees Kay Allen, Linda Shelton, JoAnn Lyons,
Velma Nelson, Nancy Shelton, Shelby Artrip, Judy
Hawkins, Tammy Lovette, Virginia Worley, Lanna
Harris, James Morton, and Lisa Kegley who participated
in a strike at the Company in July 1986.
(b) Failing and refusing to accept, discuss, and process
employee grievances with the Union.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer Kay Allen, Linda Shelton, JoAnn Lyons,
Velma Nelson, Nancy Shelton, Shelby Artrip, Judy
Hawkins, Tammy Lovette, Virginia Worley, Lanna
Harris, James Morton, and Lisa Kegley immediate and
full reinstatement to their former jobs and if their former
jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions
of employment without prejudice to their seniority and
other rights and privileges and make them whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of this decision.
(b) Remove from its files any reference to its failure to
reinstate its employees named in subparagraph (a), above,
and notify them in writing that this has been done and
that evidence of its unlawful failure to reinstate them
will not be used as a basis for any future personnel ac-
tions against them.
(c) Accept, discuss, and process employee grievances
with the Union on request.
11 The General Counsel has requested that my recommended remedy
include a visitatorial clause authorizing the Board to engage in discovery
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so that it may be able to
monitor compliance with the Board's Order I am not persuaded such a
remedy is necessary in the instant case Accordingly, I deny the General
Counsel's request
19 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules , be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
GENERAL CLOTHING CORP.
(d) Preserve and, on request , make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying , all pay-
roll records, social security payment records , timecards,
personnel records, and reports , and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(e) Post at its Erwin , Tennessee facility copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix. 1120 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 10 , of the Board , after being signed by the Com-
pany's authorized representative , shall be posted by the
Company immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company
to ensure that the notices are not altered , defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional ` Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Compa-
ny has taken to comply.
20 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT repudiate the strike settlement agree-
ment we arrived at on 17 July 1986 with the Oil, Chemi-
601
cal and Atomic Workers International Union Local 3-
951, and WE WILL NOT refuse to reinstate our employees
who participated in July 1986 strike at our plant.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with the
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union
Local 3-951 as the collective-bargaining representative
of our employees in the following described unit, by fail-
ing and refusing to accept, discuss, and process employee
grievances filed by the Union:
All full-time and regular part-time hourly paid em-
ployees, employed by us at our Erwin, Tennesse fa-
cility, excluding guards and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL accept, discuss, and process employee griev-
ances with the Union on its request.
WE WILL offer immediate and full reinstatement to
Kay Allen, Linda Shelton, JoAnn Lyons, Velma Nelson,
Nancy Shelton, Shelby Artrip, Judy Hawkins, Tammy
Lovette, Virginia Worley, Lanna Harris, James Morton,
and Lisa Kegley, to their former jobs or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions of em-
ployment without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed and WE WILL
make them whole for any loss of earnings and other ben-
efits resulting from our failure to reinstate them less any
net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL notify each of them that we have removed
from our files any reference'to our failure to reinstate
them and that our failure to reinstate them will not be
used against them in any way.
GENERAL CLOTHING CORPORATION
(U.N.I. CORP.)