GCC/IBT Local 137C (Offset Paperback Manufacturers)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 27, 2012

359 N.L.R.B. 265 (N.L.R.B. 2012)

GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE/ TEAMSTERS LOCAL 137C 265

359 NLRB No. 22
Graphic Communications Conference/International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 137C (Offset
Paperback Mfrs., Inc.) and Bobbie Jo Stonier.
Case 04–CB–010663
November 21, 2012
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS GRIFFIN
AND BLOCK
On May 17, 2012, Administrative Law Judge Michael
A. Rosas issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Acting
General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions
1
and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,
2
and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.

ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Graphic
Communications Conference/International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Local 137C (Offset Paperback Mfrs., Inc.),
Shavertown, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, and repre-
sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order as
modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
“(a) Threatening employees that (1) it would fail or re-
fuse to process a grievance of any employee who com-
plains about temporary workers performing bargaining
unit work, and (2) employees would be subject to disci-
pline or discharge if they discuss union-related matters
with other employees.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

1 There are no exceptions to the judge’s denial of the Acting General
Counsel’s motion to amend the complaint to allege three additional
8(b)(1)(A) violations.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge’s finding that the April 26, 2011 comments by
the Respondent’s chapel chairperson, Michael Timek, violated Sec.
8(b)(1)(A), we find that his remarks threatened discipline and discharge
generally, and on this basis were unlawful. We will amend the judge’s
recommended Order and notice in accordance with this finding.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT threaten to fail or refuse to process your
grievances for complaining about temporary workers
performing bargaining unit work.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discipline or discharge
for discussing union-related matters with other employ-
ees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE/
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 137C (OFFSET PAPERBACK
MFRS., INC.)
David Faye, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Ira H. Weinstock, Esq., of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for the
Respondent.
Linda Dwoskin, Esq. (Dechert, LLP), of Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL A. ROSAS, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, on February 6 and 28,
2012.1 Bobbie Jo Stonier, an individual employed by Offset
Paperback Mfrs., Inc. (the Company), filed the initial charge on
May 20, 2011. In the amended complaint, filed November 18,
2011, the General Counsel alleges that Graphic Communica-
tions Conference/International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Lo-
cal 137C (Offset Paperback Mfrs., Inc.) (the Union or Re-
spondent) violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act) by: (1) threatening an employee in late
March 2011 that the Union would remove her from a class
action grievance if the employee did not stop complaining
about temporary employees; and (2) threatening employees in

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 2011.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 266
late April 2011 with intraunion discipline and discharge by the
Company if they talked with other employees about union-
related matters. In its timely filed answer, the Union denied the
material allegations.
The General Counsel moved to further amend the complaint
to allege three additional 8(b)(1)(A) violations. In the first
instance, counsel moved at trial to add an allegation that “[o]n
or about April 25, 2011, at the Laflin plant, Respondent, by
Michael Timek, threatened an employee that employees would
face intraunion discipline by Respondent and discharge by the
Employer if they talked with other employees about Union-
related matters.” As I stated at trial, that motion was untimely
and prejudicial to the Union.2 As argued by movant, allega-
tions involving events occurring more than 6 months prior to
the filing of the charge are considered timely if those allega-
tions are “closely related” to the allegations made in a timely
charge. Seton Co., 332 NLRB 979, 982–983 (2000); Nickles
Bakery of Indiana, 296 NLRB 927 (1989); Redd-I, Inc., 290
NLRB 1115, 1116–1118 (1988). In this situation, the new
allegations relate to the same type of violation allegedly com-
mitted on April 26, involve similar facts and would likely trig-
ger a similar defensive posture by the Union. See Raymond
Interior Systems, 357 NLRB 2174 fn. 21 (2011); Bruce Packing
Co., 357 NLRB 1084, 1085 (2011); cf. Continental Auto Parts,
357 NLRB 840, 843 (2011); Salon/Spa at Boro, Inc., 356
NLRB 444, 464–466 (2010).
On the other hand, such a delay raises a due process dilem-
ma. See New York Post Corp., 283 NLRB 430, 430–431
(1987). Under Section 102.17 of the Board’s Rules and Regu-
lations, an amendment may be granted “upon such terms as
may be deemed just.” In determining whether an amendment is
“just,” the Board has traditionally evaluated three factors: (1)
whether there was surprise or lack of notice, (2) whether there
is a valid excuse for the delay in moving to amend, and (3)
whether the matter was fully litigated. Cab Associates, 340
NLRB 1391, 1397 (2003). Counsel waited until after two gov-
ernment witnesses testified and had been subjected to cross-
examination before attempting to slip in testimony relating to
another alleged unfair labor practice. During the pretrial con-
ference, it was revealed that the Union’s counsel would be ac-
tually engaged in another proceeding during the days following
the designated trial date and would be unavailable for a period
of time thereafter. I was assured by both counsels, however,
that this was a 1-day case. As such, the consequences of the
General Counsel’s delay caused the Union to have less than a
fair opportunity to prepare and present its defense as to the
additional allegations. Under the circumstances, I reaffirm my
ruling denying the General Counsel’s motion to amend the
complaint to allege that the Union unlawfully threatened an

2 I denied the motion based on the General Counsel’s concession that
he knowingly delayed proposing the amendment until after he called
two witnesses and was presenting testimony by employee Daniel
Pinkowsky. (Tr. 80, 84–86.) In any event, Pinkowski subsequently
testified on rebuttal and I found him more credible than Timek. Timek
told Pinkowsky on April 25 that he would threaten employees the fol-
lowing day with intraunion discipline and discharge if they continued to
talk with each other about certain employees, instead of bringing all
union-related concerns to his attention. (Tr. 241, 256–266.)
employee on April 25, 2011, that members would be disci-
plined and possibly discharged if they discussed union related
matters with other employees.
The General Counsel also seeks to add the following allega-
tions: (1) that Union Representative Griffith repeated to Boobie
Jo Stonier, the charging party, and another employee, Vanessa
Burkhardt, that Union President John Brown informed him in
March 2011, that if Stonier did not stop complaining about
temporary employees performing bargaining unit work he was
going to drop her from the class action suit; and (2) that Union
Representative Michael Timek told two employees, several
days prior to April 26, that he did not want union members
discussing union business without him, no one except he could
give advice to union members, and warned that members who
talked about union matters or the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of other members would be disciplined, including
discharge.
Both allegations arose in the course of direct or redirect tes-
timony elicited by counsel for the General Counsel, involve
matters closely related to extant charges and the matters were
fully litigated at the hearing as background evidence. Redd-I,
Inc., 290 NLRB 1115, 1115–1116 (1988); Hi-Tech Cable
Corp., 318 NLRB 280 (1995). Under such circumstances, a
motion to amend the complaint to assert these two additional
8(b)(1)(A) allegations would typically be granted in order to
conform the pleadings to the proof. Once again, however, it
would not be “just” to permit the late amendments. The parties
rested and were directed to file posthearing briefs. In his brief,
for the first time, counsel for the General Counsel raises the
motion to amend and briefs the issue. He offers no explanation
as to why he did not raise the motion before the record closed.
As a result, there was no notice to union counsel that he would
need to address such an issue in his brief. Since it is the
longstanding practice of the Board’s Division of Judges to pro-
hibit reply briefs, the Union is prejudiced by its inability to
oppose the Government’s motion and related legal arguments.
The Board has denied similar postevidentiary amendments
under similar circumstances. See Stagehands Referral Service,
LLC, 347 NLRB 1167 (2006) (General Counsel’s offer to allow
respondent to put on more evidence did not cure the problem
and the reasons for the delay were unacceptable); Consolidated
Printers, 305 NLRB 1061, 1064 (1992) (delay not explained,
delay was “of consequence” as respondent had presented its
defense, and giving respondent time to submit further evidence
would not cure the prejudice); New York Post Corp., id. (no
explanation why counsel for the General Counsel waited until
the last minute to add this allegation to the complaints). More-
over, findings with respect to these additional allegations would
be cumulative and, given the conclusions of law herein, would
not materially affect the remedy. Teamsters Local 886 (United
Parcel Service), 354 NLRB 370, 373 fn. 3 (2009). According-
ly, I deny this motion to amend the complaint as well.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses,3 and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and the Union, I make the following

3 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct the transcript,
dated April 17, 2012, is granted and received in evidence as GC Exh. 8.
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE/ TEAMSTERS LOCAL 137C 267
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, is engaged in the
printing and manufacturing of paperback books at its facilities
located in Dallas and Laflin, Pennsylvania. During the past
year, the Company purchased and received goods valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from points outside Pennsylvania.
At all material times, the Company has been engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act. I further find that the Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE COMPANY’S OPERATIONS
Employees at the Company’s Laflin facility are assigned to
one of three weekday shifts—a midnight shift (11 p.m. to 7
a.m.), a day shift (7a.m. to 3 p.m.), and an afternoon shift (3 to
11 p.m.). As a term and condition of their employment, em-
ployees are required to adhere to a set of rules and a code of
conduct. The rules handbook contains several provisions deal-
ing with employee misconduct, the violation of which “will
result in appropriate disciplinary action up to and including
termination.” The pertinent rules include:

7. Threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering with em-
ployees or supervision at any time.

15. Making or publishing of false, vicious or malicious
statements concerning any employee, supervisor, the compa-
ny or its products.

24. Wasting time or loitering in restrooms or anywhere on the
company premises during work hours.4

The pertinent provisions in the code of conduct handbook in-
clude two sections dealing with employee interaction:

Mutual trust & respect—We treat each other in a mutually re-
spectful and trusting manner at work and seek to create a
workplace environment that does not allow for discrimination,
harassment, bullying or intimidation. . . . Harrassment, bully-
ing or intimidation occurs when there is verbal or physical
conduct that denigrates or shows disrespect toward an indi-
vidual based on one or more of the aforementioned character-
istics with the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with the individual’s work performance or creating a coer-
cive, hostile or offensive workplace.

We encourage our employees to speak up freely and without
fear of retaliation. We do not retaliate against employees who
raise good-faith workplace concerns.5
III. THE UNION
At all material times, the Union has been the exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative of 475 members employed by
the Company (the bargaining unit):

All production, maintenance (including parts warehouse),
quality service and warehouse employees at its Dallas and

4 R. Exh. 1, pp. 73–75.
5 Id. at pp. 1–3.
Laflin plants, and excluding all office, clerical, watchmen and
supervisors as defined in the Act.

The Company and the Union have maintained and enforced a
collective-bargaining agreement effective by its terms from
November 1, 1993, through October 31, 2008, and by its terms
self-renewing thereafter, covering conditions of the employ-
ment of the unit and containing, among other provisions, a
grievance and arbitration procedure.
John Brown is president of the Union; he oversees the vari-
ous chapel chairpersons responsible for administering the Un-
ion’s business within the Company’s individual departments.
The chapel chairman’s duties include assisting employees with
any union business or work-related issues, answering their
questions and representing them in dealing with the Company.6
Michael Timik, a printer assistant at the Laflin plant, is the
chapel chairperson for the digital print services department
(prep department) at that location.7 Scott Griffith, a prep de-
partment employee at the Dallas facility, serves as that depart-
ment’s chapel chairperson. Griffith ran against Brown in the
most recent union election held in November 2011. Brown
won, but Griffin protested the election and an investigation is
pending. In the same election, Stonier, the charging party, ran
for recording secretary against Janine Daily. She also lost and
has challenged the election results. On January 2, 2012, less
than 2 months later, Stonier ran against Timek when he sought
re-election as chapel chairman. She lost again.8
IV. STONIER’S GRIEVANCES
Stonier has been employed by the Company in several ca-
pacities at both of its facilities since 2000. She is currently
employed as a cut sheet operator on the Laflin facility bindery
department’s afternoon shift. Burkhardt, also a union member
and Stonier’s friend, is employed as an assistant in the Laflin
facility prep department’s morning shift.
Stonier’s relationship with the Company has been a rocky
one over the past few years. While at the Dallas facility on
January 27, 2011, Stonier and several other employees were
temporarily reassigned from the prep department to the bindery.
Stonier responded to her reassignment by filing grievance
11291 on January 31.9 On or about that date, coworker Ronald
Coleman filed grievance 11292.10 Twenty more affected prep
department employees followed by jointly filing grievance
11293, labeled a “Class Act Grievance,” on February 5 (the

6 A chapel chairperson performs a role similar to that of a union shop
steward. (Tr. 32, 89, 152, 218, 248.)
7 The Union concedes that Brown and Timik served as agents of the
Union pursuant to Sec. 2(13).
8 The January 2011 elections revealed a union divide between
Brown and Timik as incumbents, and Griffith and Stonier as the chal-
lenging slate. (Tr. 27, 72–74. 89–90, 94, 136, 159, 186–187, 198, 216–
217, 221–222, 225.)
9 R. Exh. 4.
10 There is no indication in the record as to the date that Coleman’s
grievance was filed but, given the numerical designations of the griev-
ance forms, it is likely that it was filed prior to the filing of grievance
11293 on February 5. (Tr. 116.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 268
February class action), charging a breach of a 2007 agreement
relating to procedures for layoffs in the press department.11
Stonier’s January 31 grievance was not specifically included
in the February class action.12 Subsequently, however, the
Union sent mixed signals as to whether her January 31 griev-
ance would be pursued in conjunction with the February class
action. On several occasions, Brown told Stonier that her
grievance was separate from the February class action. On
other occasions, he mentioned that she was part of the February
class action.13 Counsel for the Union, however, treated Stoni-
er’s January 31 grievance as if it were consolidated with the
February class action. His letter to the American Arbitration
Association, dated January 21, states, in pertinent part:

Re: Graphic Communications International Union, Local 13-
C and Offset Paperback Mfgr., Inc.
Grievance: Class Action (#11293/Class Action, #11289/Ian
Henry,#11320/Ian Henry,#11272/Joshua Dickinson,#11292/
Ronald Coleman,#11291/Bobbie Jo Stonier, Pre Press

Dear Sir/Madam:

Please be advised that a dispute exists between the above par-
ties involving an issue regarding the above grievance. Please
send a panel of arbitrators to the understanding as attorney for
the Union. . . .14
V. ALLEGED THREATS DURING THE MARCH
TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS
Sometime in March 2011, Stonier and Burkhardt complained
to Griffith that two temporary employees, Gina Owens and
Nick Alterez, were performing bargaining unit work in the prep
department. Griffith responded by calling Brown to share those
concerns with him. Gina Owens worked on Stonier’s afternoon
shift, and Nick Alterez worked on the midnight shift. Brown
told Griffith, “You’ve got to stop listening to the chickens in
the hen house.” Brown responded that if Stonier “did not stop
complaining, he was “going to drop her from the class action
[grievance].” Griffin insisted that Brown could not do that and
urged Brown to “get Timick on board [so] that our people get
to run those machines, not the temp.” Brown, however, went
on to criticize Stonier for focusing on temporary employees

11 Stonier conceded that there were distinctions between her individ-
ual grievance and the allegations in the grievances subsumed within the
February class action. (Tr. 188; R. Exh. 2.)
12 It is undisputed that Stonier was not among the names on the list
attached to grievance 11293. (Tr. 91, 95–101, 109–110, 121, 132–133,
162–164, 170–173, 188–189, 224, 226–227, 230–231; R. Exh. 2.)
Stonier was one of four employees who were part of grievance 11443,
which was labeled a “Class Action.” That grievance, however, was
filed on May 10, 2011, and is irrelevant to this case. (R. Exh. 3; Tr.
163.)
13 I credit Stonier’s testimony that Brown sent mixed signals at vari-
ous times as to whether her grievance was connected to a “class action”
of grievances. (Tr. 138, 163–167, 169–171.) Brown, who was present
in court for Stonier’s testimony, provided the briefest of responses
regarding his conversation with Stonier about temporary workers in
March. He had little recollection as to dates and did not refute Stoni-
er’s contention as to the mixed signals that he sent her as to whether she
was or was not a part of a class action grievance. (Tr. 223–227.)
14 R. Exh. 5.
instead of prep department employees being laid off or trans-
ferred to much lower positions.15
Shortly thereafter, on March 31, Stonier called Brown and
asked about the status of the January 31 grievance. He replied
that he was going to remove her from the “class action suit” if
she continued to complain about temporary employees working
in the prep department. She insisted that he could not do that
and asked why he was allowing a temporary employee to be in
the prep department when six employees were displaced from
their positions. Brown said he would check with Timek and
call her back. A short while later, Brown called Stonier and
told her that Timek continued to deny that there were any tem-
porary employees in the prep department. Stonier disagreed,
noting that she saw temporary employees working there at
night. Once again, he threatened to “drop” her January 31
grievance from the February class action if she did not drop the
subject. Stonier hung up the telephone.16
Notwithstanding Brown’s threats, Stonier’s January 31
grievance, together with the February class action and three
other individual grievances, went to arbitration on August 10,
2011. Stonier testified in support of the Union regarding the
common issue in all of the grievances—the Employer’s alleged
displacement of employees from the Laflin prep department.
The proceeding was not completed, however, and was ad-
journed to March 1, 2012.17
VI. TIMEK ADMONISHES BURKHARDT AND PINKOWSKY
In addition to her pending grievances, Stonier, along with
Burkhardt, began complaining to Brown and Timik in or
around March 2010 that a coworker, Ryan Sullivan, was getting

15 Brown did not rebut Griffin’s credible testimony regarding their
March telephone conversation. (Tr. 92–95, 102–105.) Moreover,
Timek contradicted Brown’s testimony on the issue of the temporary
employees. Brown testified that Timek told him that there were no
temporary employees in the prep department in March 2011. (Tr. 224.)
Timek, however, testified that Owens and Alterez were, indeed, tempo-
rary employees in that department during that period of time. (Tr. 208–
209.)
16 I found Stonier more credible than Brown regarding their tele-
phone conversations on March 31. Although combative at certain
points, she provided extensive testimony regarding her conversations
with Brown that day. Moreover, her conversation is consistent with
credible Griffin’s testimony regarding his earlier conversation with
Brown, which Brown did not deny. (Tr. 92–95, 102–105.) At first, it
seemed like she was providing contradictory testimony as to whether
she or Brown initiated the call. (Tr. 125–126, 134–136, 169, 174–180.)
However, Brown clarified during his relatively brief testimony that
Stonier called him first and he called her back after speaking with
Timek. (Tr. 223–225.) In any event, I did not attribute any weight to
Stonier’s testimony regarding her call to Griffin immediately after her
discussion with Brown. (Tr. 136–139, 179–180.) Such hearsay testi-
mony, which was not corroborated by Griffin’s earlier testimony, mere-
ly serves to bolster Stonier’s contention that Brown threatened to sever
her grievance from the February class action.
17 Griffin conceded that Stonier’s January 31 grievance was not sub-
sumed within a class action grievance. (Tr. 99–101.) Nevertheless, the
undisputed testimony established that all of the grievances related to the
same allegedly adverse action of January 27, and were essentially con-
solidated. They were heard before the same arbitrator and on the same
day. (Tr. 95, 106–108, 127–130, 227–230; R. Exh. 5.)
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE/ TEAMSTERS LOCAL 137C 269
special treatment. Sullivan, a former supervisor and union
member whose parents were, until recently, officials with the
Union’s parent organization, is an equipment operator at the
Laflin plant. Stonier and Burkhardt were especially annoyed
that he was permitted to work hours that were different from
others on the day shift.18
Sometime in April, Burkhardt called Brown to complain that
Timek was not effectively pursuing members’ grievances. One
such grievance was a wage classification issue involving David
Pinkowsky, also a bindery assistant on the day shift. Shortly
thereafter, Brown informed Timek about Burkhardt’s com-
plaints. Timek responded by summoning Burkhardt and
Pinkowsky into a meeting in Smith’s office. He admonished
Pinkowsky for discussing his issue with Burkhardt and then
chastised her for bypassing him and complaining to Brown
about specific grievances. He also admonished Burkhardt for
talking to other employees about union related matters.
Pinkowsky explained that Burkhardt had been with the Compa-
ny a long time and he was merely asking for advice. Timek
replied that Burkhardt should not be discussing union related
matters with other employees; that was his job. He asked
Burkhardt if she would like to take over his position as chapel
chairman. Burkhardt rejected that overture and responded that
she simply wanted Timek to perform his responsibilities. She
added that she would continue helping any coworkers who
sought her advice. Timek reiterated that workers needed to
refrain from discussing union related matters and warned that
they would be disciplined if they continuing doing so. He add-
ed that Sullivan’s work schedule was none of their business and
warned that employees could be disciplined and possibly dis-
charged for speaking about it.19
Nearing the end of his shift on April 25, 2011, Pinkowsky
saw Timek putting together a box. He asked him what was
going on. Timek explained that he was preparing for a meeting
the next day to have employees vote as to whether they wanted
him to resign or remain chapel chairperson. After Pinkowsky
told Timek that he would be absent from work the next day,
Timek briefed him about the purpose of the meeting. Timek
said he was going to provide attendees with copies of their
union oath and remind them of their obligation to report any or
all problems concerning the Union or other employees to him.
He stated that according to their union oath, employees were
prohibited from talking about other employees or reporting
misconduct by other employees. As a case in point, Timek
explained that he was going to inform employees that Sullivan

18 There is no evidence indicating that anyone other than Stonier and
Burkhardt complained about Sullivan. (Tr. 153–154, 225–226, 251.)
19 There is no dispute that Timek called Burkhardt and, subsequent-
ly, Pinkowsky, to a meeting in Smith’s office. Nor is it disputed that
Timek was concerned that Pinkowsky was seeking advice from
Burkhardt instead of him as the chapel chairperson. Timek expressed
that sentiment and told them that any concerns over wages or any other
problems were to be addressed to him. (Tr. 22, 27–28, 32–34, 36–39,
41–46, 52, 73, 76, 153, 203, 208, 210, 245–249, 269.) However, I did
not credit Timek’s testimony that Burkhardt told him that bargaining
unit members recently took a vote regarding his leadership since I find
it incredible that she would have mentioned that and then refuse to
divulge the results. (Tr. 205–207, 269–270, 328.)
was threatening to pursue harassment charges against cowork-
ers who were complaining about him. Timek said that mem-
bers, rather than discuss issues with each other, needed to bring
any union related problems to his attention. He added that, in
this instance, employees could lose their jobs if they continued
talking about Sullivan and the latter decided to file harassment
charges against them. Since Pinkowsky was not going to attend
the meeting the next day, Timek told him to cast his vote now.
Pinkowsky complied.20
VII. THE APRIL 26 MEETINGS
On April 26, Timek met with the Laflin facility’s morning
shift in the company cafeteria shortly after 7 a.m. Smith, the
foreman, required his employees, including Burkhardt, Robert
Lee Shupp, and David Kuckucka to attend. The meeting was
attended by approximately 20 employees. Timek started the
meeting by handing out the company rules. Rule 15, which
was highlighted, related to the “[m]aking or publishing of false,
vicious or malicious statements concerning any employee.”21
Timek said that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss
harassment among the employees. He warned that employees
could be disciplined by the Company, including discharge, for
making false statements about other employees. Realizing that
Timek was referring to complaints by some about the starting
time of Sullivan, who was also present at the meeting,
Burkhardt asked “[w]hy he gets to do this and nobody else
can?” Timek responded that Sullivan could press harassment
charges against anyone who persisted in complaining about his
work schedule and that could result in discipline. He charged
that certain people were trying to do his job and that, if any
employees had a problem, they needed to contact him, rather
than complaining to company management. Timek added that
he was the only employee in the facility who could discuss
union business on company time. Before concluding the meet-
ing, Timek explained that some members had expressed dissat-
isfaction with his performance as chapel chairperson, so he
wanted them to vote whether he should remain on the job.
Burkhardt protested that this was an inappropriate procedure
and she was not going to participate in the vote. She added that
she previously spoke to Brown about it, and he agreed that such
a vote would be inappropriate and would not take place. Timek
disregarded Burkhardt’s protest, proceeded to hand out slips of
paper, instructed members to write “yes” or “no” on their slips

20 Pinkowsky’s initial testimony sought to corroborate testimony by
Burkardt and Shupp regarding Timek’s statements the next day. How-
ever, it soon became evident that the General Counsel was actually
proffering such testimony in an attempt to establish grounds for a belat-
ed motion to amend the complaint to assert an additional 8(a)(1)
charge. Accordingly, I precluded Pinkowsky’s testimony at that point
as late and prejudicial. (Tr. 76–78.) However, I permitted it on rebuttal
after Timek testified that he asked Pinkowsky to cast an advance vote.
(Tr. 219–220, 234–236, 241–245.) Timek, in turn, denied that allega-
tion on rebuttal. (Tr. 249–255.) In any event, I found the spontaneity,
detail, and mixed nature of Pinkowsky’s testimony more credible than
the elusive testimony of Timik, who repeatedly went beyond the scope
of the question on cross-examination.
21 The portions of the rule that were highlighted on the handouts are
not disputed. (Tr. 40–41, 46–48; GC Exh. 4; R. Exh. 1.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 270
and insert them into a box. Timek designated Shupp and Ku-
kucka as vote counters.22
Timek’s meeting with 10–14 afternoon shift employees be-
gan shortly after 3 p.m. in the company cafeteria. Union mem-
bers in attendance included Stonier and Austin Knight. Timek
again provided the employees with copies of the Code of Con-
duct and union oath that employees signed when they joined
the Union. Timek mentioned a few highlighted items from the
Code of Conduct, including rule 15, which stated that an em-
ployee could be disciplined for making false statements about
another employee.23 In contrast to the previous shift meeting,
however, only Timek spoke at the afternoon meeting. He told
the attendees that they could not harass, intimidate, coerce, talk
about or call other employees names, and they could be fired
for intimidating or harassing other employees. Timek also
stated that members were not to speak at any time with tempo-
rary employees about union business, as they were not union
members. A violation of that decree, he warned, would be met
with discipline by the Company. He also warned that union
members would encounter a similar fate if they spoke with each
other about union business, such as grievances and wage dis-
crepancies, since he was the only one authorized to handle such
matters. Timek concluded that meeting as well by mentioning
that some employees were not satisfied with his performance as
chapel chairperson and, therefore, he was asking them to vote
whether he should remain as chapel chairperson or resign that
position.24 The final vote tally for the three shifts was 33 in
favor of retaining Timek and 3 opposed.25

22 While Burkhardt and Shupp paraphrased much of what Timek said
at their shift meeting and were assisted by several leading questions,
their versions were more credible than the one offered by Timek. (Tr.
19–26, 28, 30–38, 46–47, 51–59, 70–71.) Timek testified that he made
the same brief presentation to each shift: that he heard there was some
conflict, which he did not specify, between employees and handed out
the Code of Conduct in order to prevent employees from being disci-
plined by the Company. (Tr. 199, 203, 214–215.) When asked, how-
ever, whether he threatened employees with intraunion discipline, he
appeared evasive, responding that he “addressed the whole union
body,” not “any individual.” (Tr. 203–204.) Moreover, when asked
whether he told attendees that “union business should go through
[him],” he initially denied it, but then proceeded to explain that “as
chapel chairperson, my responsibility is to handle any kind of problems
that may arise or if anybody has any questions about the union.” (Tr.
217–218.)
23 GC Exh. 4.
24 As previously discussed, I found Timek’s brief and generalized
versions of his shift meeting presentations less credible than those
provided by the attendees called by the General Counsel. (Tr. 199,
214–215.) Stonier and Knight provided fairly consistent and detailed
testimony regarding Timek’s concern over union members’ discussions
with temporary employees, as well as with other union members. Their
testimony was corroborated by Brown’s concession that Stonier called
him in March to complain about temporary employees. Brown fol-
lowed up by contacting Timek, who denied the existence of such em-
ployees. (Tr. 214.) At trial, however, Timek conceded that two tempo-
rary employees had been employed in his department around the time
of Stonier’s complaints. (Tr. 62–74, 148–152, 181–185, 198–204.)
25 I base this finding on Timek’s specific recollection of the vote re-
sults, which the other witnesses estimated to be within that range. (Tr.
203.)
Legal Analysis
I. THE MARCH 31 THREATS
The Acting General Counsel alleges that Brown, the Union’s
president, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by threatening to remove
Stonier’s January 31 grievance from the February class action
grievance if she did not stop complaining about issues at the
Laflin facility, including temporary employees performing
bargaining unit work in the prep department. The Union con-
tends that Brown simply responded to Stonier’s inquiry about
temporary employees and was not even aware that she was
involved in a class action. In the alternative, the Union asserts
that it avoided liability for Brown’s threats because his conduct
was effectively repudiated by the Union’s eventual pursuit of
Stonier’s grievance through arbitration.
It is well established that a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A)
when it resorts to threats or other forms of restraint and coer-
cion in order to restrict the right of an employee-member to file
grievances or raise complaints about working conditions. See
Warehouse Employees Local 20408 (Dubovsky & Sons), 296
NLRB 396, 403 (1989); McLean Trucking Co., 257 NLRB
1349, 1354–1355 (1981); United Steelworkers, Local 14997
(LaPorte Plastics Corp.), 244 NLRB 492 (1979)); Peninsula
Shipbuilders’ Assn. (Newport News Shipbuilding), 237 NLRB
1501 (1978).
In this instance, Brown’s threat was directly aimed at stifling
Stonier’s complaints regarding the diversion of bargaining unit
work to temporary employees. Such complaints clearly consti-
tuted protected concerted conduct. The Union’s overreliance
on a nuance—that Stonier was not a signatory to the February
class action grievance—is a poorly veiled attempt to evade the
fact that her individual grievance was essentially consolidated
with the class action grievance and several other individual
grievances for arbitration on August 10. Notwithstanding Ston-
ier’s concession that Brown gave her conflicting indications at
various times as to whether her January 31 grievance was or
was not part of a class action, the weight of the credible evi-
dence revealed that Brown threatened to “drop” or “remove”
Stonier’s January 31 grievance from the February class action
and other grievances which were scheduled to be heard by an
arbitrator on August 10. That statement reasonably indicated to
Stonier that, at the very least, the adjudication of her individual
grievance would be separated from the others and delayed be-
yond the scheduled arbitration date of August 10.
It is well settled that, under certain circumstances, a respond-
ent may relieve himself of liability for coercive conduct by
repudiating it. To be effective, however, a lawful repudiation
must be timely, unambiguous, specific as to the nature of the
coercive conduct; adequately communicated to the employees
involved, free from other illegal conduct, and accompanied by
assurances that the respondent will not interfere with employ-
ees’ Section 7 rights in the future. Passavant Memorial Area
Hospital, 237 NLRB 138, 138–139 (1978), citing Douglas
Division, Scott & Fetzer Co., 228 NLRB 1016 (1977). The
Union did, in spite of Brown’s threat, pursue Stonier’s January
31 grievance to arbitration on August 10. It did not, however,
come close to repudiating Brown’s coercive threats by com-
municating to Stonier that she was free to complain about tem-
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE/ TEAMSTERS LOCAL 137C 271
porary employees without fear of prejudicing her individual
grievance. Thus, while Stonier’s grievance may have gone to
arbitration, the Union did nothing to remove the coercive cloud
that remained with respect to her right to complain about tem-
porary employees performing bargaining unit work.
Based on the foregoing, Brown’s threat on March 31 to delay
the processing of Stonier’s grievance in order to restrain her
from exercising her Section 7 rights constituted a violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(A). Graphic Arts International Union 96B, 235
NLRB 1153 (1978); Teamsters Local 279, 218 NLRB 1392
(1975); Service Employees Local 50 (Aetna Window Cleaning
Co.), 204 NLRB 696, 698 (1973).
II. THE APRIL 26 THREATS
The Acting General Counsel also alleges that Timek violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) on May 25 when he met with day-shift em-
ployees, provided them with copies of the union rules and the
Company’s code of conduct, and warned them not to discuss
union business with each other on company time or else they
would face discipline, including possible discharge, for harass-
ment. Similarly, Timek met later that day with employees on
the afternoon shift and conveyed essentially the same warn-
ings—to refrain from harassing, intimidating, coercing, or talk-
ing about other employees. He also prohibited them from
speaking with temporary employees about any union-related
matters and reiterated that he was the only one that was author-
ized to handle any such issues.
The test for determining whether Section 8(b)(1)(A) has
been violated is an objective one that does not turn on evidence
that the particular employee was actually restrained or coerced
by a union agent’s statement but, rather, on whether the state-
ment would have a reasonable tendency to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their statutory rights. Letter Car-
riers Branch 3126 (Postal Service), 330 NLRB 587, 587–588
(2000); Steelworkers Local 1397 (U.S. Steel Corp.), 240 NLRB
848, 849 (1979).
On April 26, 2011, Timek met with each of the three prep
department shifts and prohibited employee-members from:
discussing union business, including grievances and wage dis-
crepancies on company time with anyone except for him; com-
plaining about the terms and conditions of employment, includ-
ing work schedules, of other employees; complaining about
temporary employees performing bargaining unit work; and
harassing other employees. He warned that anyone who violat-
ed those directives would be disciplined and possibly dis-
charged. He concluded the meetings with a show of strength
by directing employee-members to participate in an impromptu
vote as to whether he should remain or resign as chapel chair-
person. While the voting tactic is not alleged to have violated
any law or union rules, it could be reasonably seen as buttress-
ing his strong arm tactics at each of the meetings, including the
coercive statements.
All of the activities prohibited by Timek on April 26 consti-
tuted protected concerted activities protected under Section 7 of
the Act. Aside from Timek’s vague contention that he was
simply attempting to quell conflicts among employees in the
prep department, there was no credible evidence that this was
actually happening. There was no evidence of concern, much
less a verbal or written complaint, hinting at such conflict by
management, Sullivan or any of the temporary employees. Nor
was there any credible evidence in the form of a written Com-
pany rule that employee-members were not to discuss union
related matters while working. The only credible evidence of
adversity was that Burkhardt and Stonier were complaining to
Brown about Sullivan’s special schedule and temporary em-
ployees performing bargaining unit work.26
Under the circumstances, Timek’s remarks to employee-
members on April 26, which could reasonably have been inter-
preted as a threat if they engaged in Section 7 activities, violat-
ed Section 8(b)(1)(A). In re Teamsters Local 391, 357 NLRB
2330, 2330 fn. 5 (2012), citing Battle Creek Health System, 341
NLRB 882, 894 (2004), and Smithers Tire, 308 NLRB 72
(1992). See also Teamsters Local 507, 306 NLRB 118, 141
(1992).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce with-
in the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Union engaged in unfair labor practices by: (1)
threatening an employee of the Company in March 2011 that
the Union would remove the employee from a class action
grievance if the employee did not stop raising complaints about
temporary workers performing bargaining unit work at the
Company’s Laflin, Pennsylvania facility; and (2) threatening
employees on April 26, 2011, with intraunion discipline by the
Union and discharge by the Company if they discussed union
related matters with other employees.
4. The aforementioned unfair labor practices affected com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended27
ORDER
The Respondent, Graphic Communications Confer-
ence/International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 137C (Off-
set Paperback Mfrs., Inc.), Shavertown, Pennsylvania, its offic-
ers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from

26 Also lurking in the background was a potential inference that Sul-
livan, whose parents were present or former high-level officials with
the Union’s parent organization, was being afforded special treatment
by Brown and Timek. There was, however, no credible evidence to
support such a finding.
27 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 272
(a) Threatening employees that it would (1) fail or refuse to
process a grievance of any employee who complains about
temporary workers performing bargaining unit work, and (2)
discipline, and the Company would discharge, any employee
who discusses union-related matters with other employees.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its un-
ion office in Shavertown, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”28 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be

28 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
members are customarily posted. In addition to physical post-
ing of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electroni-
cally, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customar-
ily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasona-
ble steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, deliver to the
Regional Director for Region 4 a sufficient amount of signed
copies of the notice for physical and/or electronic posting by
Offset Paperback Mfrs., Inc., if willing, at all places or in the
same manner as notices to employees are customarily posted.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.