Gates Rubber, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 16, 1972

199 N.L.R.B. 739 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

GATES RUBBER, INC. 739
Gates Rubber, Inc. and Local Union No. 670. United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC. Case 26-CA-4154
October 16, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
PENELLO
On May 31, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
James M. Fitzpatrick issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions, cross-
exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the
rulings, findings,2 and conclusions' of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended
Order,4 except as modified herein.
1. The Administrative Law Judge found, and we
agree, that Respondent suspended, and thereafter dis-
charged, employee Donald Copass, president of the
Union, and chairman of the grievance committee, in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.'
2. The Administrative Law Judge also found, and
we agree, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act by refusing to recognize Copass as the
Union's representative; by refusing to negotiate with
Copass as chairman of the grievance committee; by
refusing to negotiate with Copass on all matters rela-
ting to the collective-bargaining agreement; and by
refusing the Union's requests for information neces-
sary to process grievances. Respondent admitted that
it refused to deal with Copass as chairman of the
grievance committee, but claimed it was not legally
obligated to do so since Copass was no longer an
employee, and that the chairman was required to be
an employee by the terms of the agreed-upon griev-
ance procedures .6 In refusing to accept Respondent's
defense that the language of the agreed-upon griev-
ance procedures supported its position, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge interpreted the agreement in a
manner contrary to Respondent's assertions, and
found that the president of the Union was a mandato-
ry member of the grievance committee and that only
a stand-in for the president was required to be an
employee.
While we agree with the Administrative Law
Judge's result that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) by refusing to deal with Copass as chairman of
the grievance committee, we find it unnecessary to
pass upon or adopt the Administrative Law Judge's
interpretation of the agreed-upon grievance proce-
dures. Instead, we find that Respondent acted at its
peril in claiming that Copass could no longer act as
chairman of the grievance committee under the terms
of the agreement following his suspension and dis-
charge. Since Copass was discharged in violation of
the Act, it follows that he at all times remained in the
status of an employee and, even assuming
Respondent's interpretation of the agreement was
correct, Respondent was obligated to negotiate with
him as chairman of the grievance committee'
ORDER
i The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972.
2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions were incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544,
enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and find
no basis for reversing his findings.
3 The Respondent contends, inter alas, that it should be awarded costs and
attorney fees because of the frivolous position taken by the Charging Party.
In view of our disposition of this case , we find no merit in this contention.
4 The General Counsel has excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's
failure to recommend a broad order which would restrain Respondent from
in any other manner engaging in conduct violative of the Act. We find merit
in this exception . As an unlawful discharge goes to the very heart of the Act,
we shall modify the Administrative Law Judge' s recommended Order to
include a broad cease-and-desist order and shall conform the notice accord-
ingly.
3 Chairman Miller agrees with his colleagues that Respondent violated
Section 8(axl) of the Act by suspending and later discharging Donald Co-
pass for engaging in protected activity when he protested lack of union
participation in the United Givers Fund campaign. However , Chairman
Miller would find it unnecessary to reach the 8(a)(3) allegations . Resolution
of that issue would in no event affect the remedy.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified
below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Gates
Rubber, Inc., Nashville, Tennessee, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order, as so mod-
ified.
1. In paragraph 1(d) of the Administrative Law
Judge's recommended Order, delete the words "In
6 The pertinent provisions of the grievance procedures considered by the
Administrative Law Judge are set out in his Decision.
7 The General Counsel excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's dis-
missal of an additional allegation of 8(aX5 ) violation While we do not accept
the Administrative Law Judge 's reasons for dismissing that particular allega-
tion, we deem it unnecessary to decide whether Respondent engaged in the
alleged unlawful conduct . The additional allegation is similar to and encom-
passed within the scope of the violations of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act which
we have found and, if found , would, in any event, not enlarge the scope of
our Order.
199 NLRB No. 108
740 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
any like or related manner ... " and substitute in lieu
thereof the words "In any other manner ...."
2. Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's notice.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
cordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Clifford Davis Federal Building,
Room 746, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennes-
see 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161.
The National Labor Relations Board having found,
after a trial, that we violated Federal law by suspend-
ing and firing Donald Copass, by not recognizing and
negotiating with him as union president and chairman
of the union grievance committee, and by not answer-
ing the Union's requests for information needed to
process a grievance:
WE WILL offer Donald Copass full rein-
statement to his former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent one,
and pay him for earnings lost as a result of his
suspension and termination, plus 6-percent inter-
est.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
with Local Union No. 670, United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC, and recognize and negotiate
with Donald Copass as the president and chair-
man of the grievance committee of that Union,
and WE WILL answer requests of that Union for
information needed to process grievances and
furnish such information.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
with that Union.
WE WILL NOT suspend, discharge, or discrim-
inate against any employee in order to discour-
age membership in that Union.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the National Relations Act, as amended.
GATES RUBBER, INC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
We will notify the above-named individual, if pre-
sently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States, of the right to full reinstatement , upon applica-
tion after discharge from the Armed Forces, in ac-
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES M. FITZPATRICK, Trial Examiner: This is a pro-
ceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended (herein called the Act), arising from
charges filed November 1, 1971, by Local Union No. 670,
United Rubber , Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC (herein called the Union) against
Gates Rubber, Inc. (herein called the Company or Respon-
dent). Based on these charges a complaint issued December
10, 1971, alleging that the Company had committed unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(3), (5 ), and (1) of
the Act. The Company filed an answer admitting some
allegations of the complaint , denying others , and denying
that it had committed unfair labor practices.
The spring from which this litigation flows is the sus-
pension and discharge of employee Donald Copass, the
umon president. The complaint alleges that the Company
acted for discriminatory reasons. The Company contends it
had good cause. The complaint also alleges that after the
termination the Company refused to recognize and deal
with Copass as umon president and as chairman of its griev-
ance committee, and that when he submitted a grievance
because of these refusals, the Company rejected the griev-
ance . The Company denies it has refused to recognize Co-
pass as union president or deal with him as such or
improperly rejected his grievance. But it admits that it has
refused to negotiate with him as chairman of the grievance
committee , its position being that he could not be so recog-
nized after his employment ceased . The complaint also al-
leges that the Company unlawfully withheld from the
Union the contents of Copass' personnel file which were
necessary in processing a grievance based on his suspension
and discharge. The Company position is that it furnished no
material from his file because nothing in it related to his
suspension and discharge.
In its posthearing brief Respondent moves for an
award of attorney's fees and costs against the Union on the
ground that this litigation is frivolous, citing Tzidee Products,
Inc., 194 NLRB No. 198. The motion is denied. In my view,
the litigation is not frivolous.
The case was tried before me at Nashville , Tennessee,
on February 14 through 18, 1972. At the conclusion of the
GATES RUBBER, INC.
evidence Respondent renewed an earlier motion to dismiss
the complaint because of insufficient evidence to sustain a
finding of a violation . Having reserved ruling , I now deny
that motion except as noted hereinafter . As detailed below
I find that the Company has violated Section 8(a)(3), (5),
and (1) of the Act.
Upon the entire record , my observation of the witness-
es, and consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, I
make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I THE EMPLOYER INVOLVED
Respondent is a corporation with its principal corpo-
rate offices at Denver , Colorado , and plants located in vari-
ous States , including the plant (involved in this case) at
Nashville , Tennessee , where it manufactures and sells auto-
mobile and truck tires . From this plant , in which it employs
approximately 500 persons , it annually ships to places out-
side Tennessee products valued at over $50,000 . It is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a local labor organization affiliated with
the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC, an International labor organiza-
tion. Its membership (and until the termination of Copass,
its officers) consisted entirely of employees at the
Company's Nashville plant. It is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The unit of employ-
ees which it represents includes all production and mainte-
nance employees and millroom batch control employees at
Respondent 's Nashville , Tennessee , location, excluding all
office-clerical employees, professional and technical em-
ployees , technical compounders , watchmen , guards and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act. This unit is appropriate for
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act. The Union has been the exclusive
representative of these employees since March 12, 1962,
when the Board certified it. Following certification the
Company and the Union executed a series of collective-
bargaining agreements , the most recent effective for the
period June 15, 1968 , to June 14, 1971. In anticipation of the
expiration of this agreement the Company and the Union
began negotiations in April or May 1971 resulting about
July 3 in agreement on new terms and conditions of employ-
ment which are now in effect but which at the time of the
hearing were not incorporated in a signed agreement. On
June 15, with the expiration of the old agreement , the em-
ployees went on strike . Although no contract was signed
after the strike , the parties have followed the established
grievance procedure agreed upon in the bargaining. Under
this system the union representatives on the grievance com-
mittee include the union president , a vice president , a stew-
ard, and the aggrieved employee.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
741
A. Suspension and termination
of Donald Copass
1. His employment and union positions
Donald Copass, a tire builder , was employed by the
Company from April 24, 1963, until his discharge on Octo-
ber 18 , 1971. His work record was good , he having received
only one written reprimand , back in 1966, regarding an
entry on his timecard . However , the Company removes all
written reprimands from an employee 's personnel file after
1 year if there has been no repetition . In terminating Copass
the Company did not base its decision on the 1966 repri-
mand or on any material contained in his personnel file.
In October 1967 he became president of the Union, a
position which he still holds , and to which he was reelected
on October 2, 1971 (less than 2 weeks before his suspen-
sion), for a third term running to October 1974. He is also
the Union's business manager , chairman of its grievance
committee , and has served as union treasurer, a member of
its negotiating committee , a member of its executive board,
and as a shift steward.
2. The United Givers campaign
The parties agree that Copass was suspended on Octo-
ber 13, 1971, and terminated on October 18. The decision
to terminate him was made on October 13 by Plant Manag-
er Lee Mitchell and other managerial personnel assisting
him at the Nashville plant , subject to veto by higher man-
agement in Denver . Pending final affirmation or rejection
of this decision , Copass was suspended. Management decid-
ed to suspend him because it was felt he had interfered with
management plans to launch a United Givers campaign
(hereinafter UGF), a purely management function , and that
for this reason alone his termination was warranted. He was
so advised at the time of suspension as well as by the denial
of a grievance based thereon.
The UGF campaign was an annual event at the Nash-
ville plant . The purpose of such campaigns was, of course,
to stimulate as many persons as possible to contribute as
much money as possible . According to UGF and company
officials , the most effective device in achieving optimum
results was the authorization by employees of regular pay-
roll deductions for the benefit of UGF. In the past the
Company had cooperated in administering a payroll deduc-
tion plan and was prepared to do so in this campaign.
The kickoff for the current UGF campaign at the Com-
pany was planned for October 13, 1971. Once in late Sep-
tember and again in early October Charles Wright,
personnel and labor relations manager at the Nashville
plant, invited Copass to be cochairman with him of the
UGF campaign. According to Wright, Copass flatly reject-
ed these invitations . Just why he refused is not entirely clear.
Copass' general attitude regarding UGF was that in the past
the Union had not been brought sufficiently into the plan-
ning and implementation of the campaigns , nor had it re-
ceived adequate credit for assistance which it and its
members gave UGF. He testified, "we have not been per-
mitted to attend all the kickoff luncheons and progress re-
742 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ports to UGF. The only time the Company has solicited our
help was when they wanted to collect the money, but they
didn't want us to participate otherwise." When asked if he
had discussed this with Company officials , he testified,
"Yes, Mr. Wright asked me if I would be co-chairman of
two departments for the purpose of collecting the money
and I told him under the circumstances, I did not want to
be co-chairman if we were not permitted to participate fully
in this program." When asked the extent of union participa-
tion desired, he stated, "We wanted to participate by attend-
ing the kickoff luncheons, the progress report luncheons;
then to have our committee to be equally recognized with
the Company as being a responsible group of people that
had the interest of the community and not just contacted for
the purpose of collecting the money and not receiving any
credit." He testified he advised Wright of this position prior
to his suspension , but did not indicate precisely what he
said , or when. I infer from Wright's testimony that they
spoke only briefly about Copass as a possible cochairman.
Considering the importance of the campaign and the func-
tion of both men in plant labor-management relations, it is
inexplicable that they did not pursue the matter further
before proceeding on separate courses . At any rate, plan-
ning for the campaign in the plant remained exclusively in
the hands of management, specifically Wright, and Copass
resented this one-sided arrangement.
To start off the campaign Wright arranged a meeting
on October 13 in the plant conference room of selected
management personnel whom it was hoped would work in
the campaign. At Wright's request UGF headquarters sent
out a volunteer worker, James Webb, to address the group.
They also provided a UGF promotional film, together with
projection equipment, to be shown to this group. It was
Wright's plan (which was not conveyed to the employees or
the Union) to then set up the projector in the plant cafeteria
on a 24-hour basis so that all employees who cared to could
view it.
UGF designated one of its officials , Edwin Bryan, to
bring the film and equipment into the plant on October 13
and show it to the assembled group. Bryan, for several years
a full time employee of UGF but previously a representative
of the Communications Workers of America, was respon-
sible for UGF's liaison with labor in Nashville. Bryan de-
scribed his mission as that of the go-between from UGF
agencies to the unions to create a better atmosphere for
giving and to enhance knowledge of, and participation in,
the UGF agencies.
On the evening before he was to show the film he
telephoned Copass at home advising him that he was to
show the film to Gates employees the next morning and
would like to talk with Copass upon his arrival. According
to Copass, he told Bryan he was not aware the film was to
be shown and that he had no objection to Bryan showing
it. According to Bryan, whom I credit, Copass also said he
did not know what the Union's position was on UGF this
year, that the Union was having some problems being rec-
ognized for its work in the campaign.
About 7 the following morning (October 13) produc-
tion manager John Smith approached Copass at his work
station . In the conversation which ensued Copass told him
that Bryan had called him at home to clear the showing of
the film. Smith indicated surprise Bryan had called Copass
about a film to be shown to management . Copass then
explained that Bryan "was the labor representative with
UGF" and that he (Copass) had considered stopping him
from showing the film. Smith characterized this as petty.
Copass agreed, but said he was tired of being bypassed on
this matter of UGF; that the Union contributed all the
money and got no credit for anything at all , and that he was
pretty upset about it. Smith asked him not to do anything
rash and he promised he would not.
Also during the morning of October 13, Copass tele-
phoned Wright inquiring if he was showing the UGF film
to management people that morning, and if so, why he had
not checked with Copass before scheduling the film. Wright
declared it was not necessary to check with him because the
meeting was strictly designed for management personnel.
But he did confirm that the showing of the film was to be
the kickoff of the plant UGF campaign.
At the start of his shift that morning Copass had ob-
tained advance permission from his foreman to leave his
work to make telephone calls and to take care of other union
business. Somewhat later he went to the front of the plant,
made some telephone calls, and observed Bryan entering
the plant. He met Bryan at the front door. Bryan asked if
Copass was going to see the film. Copass replied that he was
not, that Wright had informed him it was to be shown only
to office personnel. Bryan observed that if only office peo-
ple were to see the film he did not have any business being
there. Bryan testified that in this conversation Copass did
not threaten to boycott the UGF campaign nor did he tell
him that the Union would take adverse action if he showed
the film. After talking with Copass he proceeded into the
plant to confer with management.
Because of his conversation with Copass at the front
door Bryan decided it would be better if he did not show
the film to the assembled management group. He conveyed
his views to company management and to Webb, indicating
there would be a problem with the Union if he did. Webb
testified that Bryan reported Copass' view that there had
been insufficient union involvement in planning the UGF
campaign. Bryan indicated his willingness to leave the film
and to set up the projector. It was jointly decided, in the
circumstances, not to show the film. Webb addressed the
meeting briefly, after which it was adjourned and further
programming of the UGF campaign was postponed to some
future time.
Frustration of the kickoff meeting was embarrassing
and upsetting to management, particularly to Wright and to
Plant Manger Lee Mitchell. As noted earlier, Copass was
fired because he caused this development. Specifically, ac-
cording to Wright, the Company took action against him
because he informed Bryan the film showing was for divi-
sion and department managers only, asked him not to show
it to such a group of managers because union people were
not involved in the showing, and suggested the possibility
that he (Copass) and the Union might boycott the campaign
if Bryan went ahead with the showing to management, and
because Bryan agreed with him.
In this litigation the company position is that the UGF
meeting of October 13 was a purely management event of
no concern to Copass or the Union. Consequently, his inter-
GATES RUBBER, INC. 743
vention was an unjustified interference with a purely man-
agement function . Actually management 's attitude had not
been so purist because Wright had earlier invited the union
president to participate as a cochairman of the campaign.
Moreover , it is patent that for the campaign to be successful
the bulk of the contributors must necessarily have been
bargaining unit employees represented by the Union. Fur-
ther , the specific object of the campaign was to persuade as
many of these employees as possible to authorize the Com-
pany to deduct from their pay regular contributions to
UGF. Thus, the campaign would have a direct bearing on
the net take-home pay of unit employees , a normal subject
of union concern , apart from any desire of union officials
to garner kudos for participating in the campaign.
In these circumstances , for the union president to take
a position involved the Union in a dispute with manage-
ment . When Copass left his work station on the morning of
October 13 for the purpose , among others , of meeting
Bryan, he was excused to perform union business . His influ-
encing of Bryan on a matter of interest to the employees and
the Union, and in protest of what he considered the inad-
equate roll allowed the Union , was protected activity under
the Act. See Red Top, Inc., 185 NLRB No. 138 ; Socony
Mobil Oil Co., 153 NLRB 1244, enfd . as modified 357 F.2d
662 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Choc-
olate Co., 130 F.2d 503 (C.A. 2). The fact that his interven-
tion was unacceptable , and the results thereof embarrassing,
to management is beside the point . Protected activity is not
defined by what management thinks is desirable.
As shown by the testimony of Wright , the Company
was first of all motivated to suspend and later discharge
Copass because he protested the film showing to manage-
ment without involving union people, and, according to the
Company, enforced his protest by threatening a union boy-
cott of the campaign . But when he was terminated on Octo-
ber 18 he was handed a letter stating the reasons for
discharge as follows:
(1) Your overall record of anticompany attitude
and behavior culminating in an incident of unjustified
and unwarranted interference with strictly manage-
ment business,
(2) Obtaining time away from regular job under
false pretenses to create incident referred to above.
I view the second ground stated as a legalistic afterthought.
He had permission to be away for telephone calls and union
business. Whether he engaged in false pretenses turns on
whether he was performing union business . I find he was.
This had nothing to do with his work . Nor did it involve any
interruption or interference with production.
Because his intervention was a protected activity and
it was the reason he was suspended and fired , it is clear he
was suspended and fired because he engaged in protected
activity . This discrimination on its face discourages mem-
bership in the Union and is an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Motive
is not in dispute here . The Company intended to discourage
the conduct Copass engaged in. If , as I find, it was protected
activity , the Company committed an unfair labor practice
in suspending and firing him. N. L.R.B. v . Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-229; N.L.R.B. v . Peter Cailler Koh-
ler Swiss Chocolate Co., supra.
In support of its contention that Copass was interfering
with a purely management function Respondent cites,
among other cases, Pathe Laboratories, Inc., 141 NLRB
1290, where a union steward ordered employees to alter
long established work practices which he considered con-
trary to the collective-bargaining agreement. When these
orders were countermanded by a supervisor, a quarrel re-
sulted. The steward was then discharged for insubordina-
tion and for threatening the supervisor. It is this last aspect
which distinguishes Pathee from the present case . Here the
UGF incident for which Copass was discharged involved no
conduct such as insubordination or threats to a supervisor.
He was discriminated against only because he engaged in
what management considered to be its exclusive preroga-
tive. Although the facts in Pathe are close to the present
case, the differences noted warrant a different result.
3. Other alleged misconduct of Copass
Although his conduct with respect to the UGF cam-
paign was the reason Copass was suspended and fired, be-
tween his suspension on October 13 and termination on
October 18 while company headquarters in Denver was
considering whether to veto or affirm the Nashville decision
to terminate, Nashville management, at the suggestion of
Denver, enlarged its investigation of his past conduct for the
purpose of marshalling additional derogatory data to sup-
port a discharge. Although there was no such derogatory
information in his personnel file, this investigation turned
up what management claims is derogatory information,
including the items detailed hereinafter. None of this was
told him at the time of suspension or discharge; he learned
the details at the unfair labor practice hearing.
a. Threats
Sometime in 1968, according to John Spalding who
was then an official in the company's industrial relations
department, Copass, while representing an employee at a
grievance hearing, became angry and shook his finger in
Spalding's face, threatening him that he had better not cross
his path outside the plant. It is questionable how seriously
Spalding took the threat because at times after this incident
he and Copass saw each other socially. Some hearsay evi-
dence also indicates that another incident occurred in Feb-
ruary 1971 when Copass similarly threatened a supervisor
named Pat Boyle. He was not disciplined for either incident.
A former supervisor, Horace Drake, also testified he
had reprimanded Copass in 1968 for threatening another
employee with loss of his job because he was circulating a
petition impugning the validity of a strike vote, but that
Copass was not otherwise disciplined.
b. Other misconduct at grievance hearings
On some other occasions Copass had become angry or
used strong language while meeting with management re-
garding employee grievances. For example, sometime in
1970 he was himself a grievant on the question of his being
excused from work for union business. At the grievance
hearing he used intemperate language. On another occasion
744 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in February 1971 an employee named Wilkinson, who was
discharged for sleeping on the job , was called to the person-
nel office and fired. Both he and Copass, who accompanied
him, were angered by this development. Copass called the
management officials present all bastards . No action was
taken against him for this.
c. Time studies
Copass would not cooperate. Instead he asserted that if
there was a drug problem, unit employees were not involved
but rather supervisors. Management considered his reaction
another indication of an uncooperative attitude. Copass de-
nied he refused to cooperate. He said he pressed an investi-
gation on his own and that he had a further discussion about
the problem with Production Manager Smith. I credit Co-
pass.
Incentive rates for various jobs in the plant were con-
stantly being reassessed and adjusted by timestudy engi-
neers . Following management timestudy of a particular job,
the practice was to automatically adjust the incentive rate
in accordance with the results of the study. Up to that point
the Union had no part in the adjustment process. Under
Copass the Union protested most, if not all, adjustments in
incentive rates . Under established practice and contract
procedures a joint company-union timestudy was then
called for. Arrangements for these joint studies were usually
delayed because, among other reasons, the Union used
timestudy engineers from its International who were not
always available. In 1971 during such a rate dispute Copass
informed the Company he was giving a 60-day strike notice
which he was going to continue to hold over management's
head. The contract, in certain circumstances, allowed
strikes in protest of incentive rates. Copass frequently de-
clared his intention to protest every company change in
incentive rates. Respondent was unhappy about the delays
in the adjustment of incentive rates and uneasy over the
continual strike threat.
In April 1970, when the Union and the Company were
conducting a joint timestudy of a tire building machine,
Copass was present as a union observer but not as a partici-
pant in the study. During the study he went to the back of
the machine and set the brake on the machine, which had
the effect of increasing the time consumed in the operation
under study. He was observed by a management official
who followed him and who then reset the brake to its nor-
mal position. Copass was not reprimanded or disciplined or
even told that he was observed. He denied he tampered with
the machine, but I do not credit his denial.
d. Warehouse incident
About 6 months prior to the UGF incident in October
1971 Copass, without prior permission of the warehouse
supervisor, had gone to the warehouse during working
hours to investigate a grievance. In the process he interrupt-
ed the work of warehouse employees. When the warehouse
supervisor objected to this interference without having ob-
tained prior permission from management, Copass replied
in a manner indicating that he would ignore company rules.
He was not disciplined because of the incident.
e. The drug problem
During the recent past management had reason to
believe drugs were being distributed in the plant, but it was
not known who was involved. Plant Manger Mitchell testi-
fied he called Copass for the purpose of discussing a joint
union-company approach to the problem. According to him
f. Instructing employees to punch out
during contract negotiations
Another company complaint against Copass was that
in July or August 1971, while the parties were engaged in
contract negotiations which Copass felt were proceeding in
unsatisfactory manner, he instructed plant employees to
punch out prior to their quitting time. No one followed his
instructions and there was no loss of production, but man-
agement considered the incident indicative of his attitude.
g. Alleged sabotage of
construction equipment
During 1971 contract negotiations the Company was
having a cooling system constructed. The work was con-
tracted out to a contractor who kept various equipment on
the jobsite inside the chain link fence enclosing the plant
facilities and, theoretically at least, under the surveillance of
Respondent's 24-hour guard service. During part of this
period Respondent's employees were on strike but the con-
tractor and his employees continued to work. After the
strike ended some unexplained damage occurred to the
contractor's equipment. To Respondent 's management it
appeared to be sabotage and Plant Manager Mitchell in the
course of negotiations sought the assistance of the,Union
concerning the problem. According to Mitchell, Copass de-
clined, asserting that no unit employees were involved and
that instead the problems were the fault of the management
and the contractor. Mitchell considered this a further exam-
ple of his lack of a cooperative spirit. Copass denied the
Union refused to cooperate. He testified they agreed to
cooperate, stated that the Union did not condone destruc-
tion of property, and, that if there was evidence, action
should be taken against those responsible. I credit the more
specific version of Copass.
h. The company picnic
A company picnic for all employees was an annual
event. In connection with the 1971 picnic the personnel
office invited, in addition to all company employees, the
employees of Queen's Security Service and Queen's Janito-
rial Service who provided those services to the Company.
Many of these were blacks. They had continued to work
during the 1971 strike. Wright testified that Copass discour-
aged company employees from attending because they were
invited, but Wright apparently had no direct knowledge of
this.
Wallace Fox, an employee of Respondent and a mem-
ber of the Union, testified that in connection with the picnic
Copass told him to tell various employees that some guests
GATES RUBBER, INC. 745
had been invited who had crossed the Union's picket line
and that Copass did not feel that union employees should
have to socialize with them. Fox then talked to various
employees, including Warren Brown, an acting steward,
saying that Copass had told him to pass the word that they
would not attend the picnic because Queen's employees
would be present. Brown did not pass the word further.
Copass agrees that he talked with Fox but according to him
Fox wanted to circulate a petition to boycott the picnic and
Copass told him no , that the Union would not take any
position on the picnic. Both Copass and his wife and Brown
attended the picnic. In fact attendance at the picnic by
company employees was substantial and equivalent to at-
tendance in prior years, even though Queen's employees
also attended. The Company urges that Copass made an
effort to break up the picnic and that this further indicates
an uncooperative attitude on his part disqualifying him for
employment. But no action was taken against him at the
time. Moreover, although Fox was not cross-examined, his
demeanor as a witness did not impress me. I credit the
account of Copass.
i. Conclusion regarding other
alleged misconduct
I conclude that these other incidents of so-called mis-
conduct should cut no ice in this case. In the first place
Copass was not fired because of them but because of the
UGF incident . Some would not have been valid grounds for
discharge . Many were exercises of protected activity. And
in any case , the Company took no action at the time they
occurred . If anything , company reliance on these earlier
incidents supports the General Counsel's case in that they
show the Company was fed up with Copass as a trouble-
some union leader and was eager to be rid of him on that
account . N.L.R.B. v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584
(C.A. 7);1 1 see also Klann Moving and Trucking Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 411 F.2d 261 (C.A. 6).
4. Other evidence of motive in
discharging Copass
As noted earlier, Copass was reelected union president
on October 2, 1971. There is no evidence in this record of
employer interference in that election. But there is evidence
of longstanding hope on the part of management that a
change of officers would occur, as well as evidence that the
Company might try to arrange such a change.
During a negotiating session in 1968 company spokes-
man William Newcomer, according to International Repre-
sentative Prentis Lewis, told the union negotiators that it
looked as though the Company would have to run some
officers against the incumbent union officials so that the
Company would have someone they could deal with. New-
comer did not testify. But John Spaulding who was on the
management negotiating committee at the time testified he
did not hear him make such a comment. I credit Lewis
because his recollection seems more specific. Again in April
1969, during a grievance hearing, Company Labor Rela-
tions Manager Charles Munden informed union representa-
tives that the incumbent union officers were going to have
opposition in a future union election because the Company
had to get rid of Copass in order to have someone the
Company could deal with. I view these incidents in 1968
and 1969 as too isolated and remote in point of time to be
given significant weight. ,
In May 1971 Wright suggested to William Black, an
employee member of the union executive board and chair-
man of its fair employment practice committee, that he run
for the presidency. Black declined. Wright denied that he
discussed the matter with Black, but I credit Black because
his testimony was quite specific and his demeanor particu-
larly forthright.
In the summer of 1971 while the employees were on
strike in support of contract demands, the Company's cor-
porate manager for labor relations, Erwin Pierce, in a nego-
tiating session threatened to leave the employees out on
strike until the Union's October election in order to give the
Company time in which to elect a slate of officers that it
could deal with.'
The above-described evidence casts suspicion on com-
pany motive in terminating Copass. It is not, however,
enough to sustain a finding that the asserted grounds for
discharge were pretextual. As noted earlier, motive is not
really at issue here. The evidence is overwhelming that Co-
pass was discharged because of his conduct regarding the
UGF campaign. In my view the case turns on whether that
was valid cause or protected activity.
B. Alleged Refusals To Bargain
1. The alleged refusal to recognize
and negotiate with Copass
The complaint alleges that since October 20, 1971, the
Company has refused to recognize Copass as the Union's
representative, or to negotiate with him as chairman of the
union grievance committee, or to negotiate with him as the
Union's representative in all matters relating to the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. The Company admits that, as
alleged, it refused to negotiate with him as chairman of the
union grievance committee . I so find . But it denies it refused
to recognize him as the Union's chosen representative or
refused to negotiate with him in matters dealing with the
collective-bargaining agreement.
The evidence shows beyond question that from Octo-
ber 20 on, the Company not only refused to negotiate with
him in the handling of grievances, but generally would not
deal with him or allow him on company premises for the
purpose of conducting union business. Wright stated just
that on October 20, and made similar statements on No-
vember 1 and 2. On November 16, in stating its position to
the Board's Regional Office, the Company wrote, "We
stand ready and willing to meet with any other representa-
tive of the union on any matter which is a proper subject for
collective bargaining." While sound administrative policy
1 This finding is based on the collective testimony of Union Vice President
William Thompson, negotiating committee member Bobby Ezell , and Co-
pass. Pierce testified he did not tell the Union that the Company would
attempt to affect the outcome of the election. In view of the contradicting
testimony of the other witnesses who corroborate each other , I do not credit
Pierce.
746 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
may argue against evidentiary use of such statements of
position, this one forms part of the record here and it does
serve to clarify the Company's posture. On December 2
Copass wrote to Wright seeking to process two grievances
(his own), suggesting in furtherance thereof a meeting at
some neutral location . In reply Wright wrote to him on
December 16 in part as follows, "While we agree that under
the applicable federal law, the employees may elect whom-
soever they chose as officers, if in accordance with their
by-laws and constitution, it does not necessarily follow that
we are obligated to deal with any given individual by virtue
of that election. We have been advised that the law recog-
nizes that special circumstances may exist which operate to
relieve that burden. We believe those circumstances exist in
our case. In any event, that issue as well as the issue of your
allegedly discriminatory discharge will, as we understand it,
be litigated before the National Labor Relations Board on
or about January 31, 1972. Until these questions are litigat-
ed and resolved, we must maintain our position as stated
herein. In conclusion, we stand ready to bargain with Local
670 through any employee representative or international
official except yourself ...:'
Thus, the Company was unwilling to deal with Copass
for any purpose, and I find that, as alleged, it refused to deal
with him not only regarding grievances but refused to recog-
nize him as the Union's representative generally, including
for matters relating to the collective -bargaining agreement.
This broad posture remained unchanged until early
February 1972 when the Company relented somewhat. At
that time Copass sought a meeting for the purpose of signing
a new collective-bargaining agreement, indicating that he
would participate. On February 4, Wright responded, in
part, in these words, "The Company would agree that you
should be present at any meeting held for the purpose of
discussing and signing the contract since you were the chief
negotiator for the Union." At the hearing herein the Com-
pany stated its willingness then and for the future to recog-
nize and negotiate with Copass as the union representative
in contract negotiations. But this willingness apparently re-
mains limited to matters directly relating to contract nego-
tiations and does not extend to other dealings.
With respect to its admitted refusal to deal with Copass
as chairman of the union grievance committee, the Compa-
ny relies on its interpretation of the agreed upon grievance
procedures which it contends require that members of the
grievance committee be employees of the Company. It rea-
sons that it need not deal with Copass since he no longer is
an employee.
As I read the agreed-upon procedures, however, they
do not support the company interpretation. They certainly
are not a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to use
a nonemployee as a representative. See Perkins Machine
Co., 141 NLRB 98, 102. The pertinent provisions are as
follows:
SECTION 2. The Plant Grievance Committee
shall consist of representatives chosen by the Company
and representatives chosen by the Union. The Union
representatives shall consist of the President, Vice Pres-
ident, Chief Steward or Shift Steward and the agg-
rieved party.
SECTION 3. The President and Vice President of
Local No. 670 URCLPWA, or their authorized repre-
sentatives , employees of the Company, shall be fur-
nished a pass permitting them to enter all departments
of the Plant for the purpose of handling or investigating
grievances . Upon entering the department , they will
contact the foreman and arrange to investigate the
grievance in such a manner that will not cause any
undue interruption of production.
SECTION 5. International Executive Officers of
the Union or their district and field representatives
duly authorized to represent the International Union
will be permitted to attend meetings between the Griev-
ance Committee and Management ...
The above-quoted section 2 is plainly mandatory in its
definition of the makeup of the union grievance committee,
and the president of the Union is one of those named. The
Company argues that section 3 quoted above limits, the
committee makeup to company employees. But that is a
misreading. The only fair reading of section 2 with section
3 is that they permit the president and vice president of the
Union to send authorized representatives in their stead if
these stand-ms are employees of the Company.
The Company makes an additional point that it was
justified in excluding Copass from grievance hearings be-
cause the agreed-upon grievance procedures forbid any un-
due interruption of production. The Company claims that
Copass' history shows he is a threat in this regard. This
defense also lacks merit. Whatever else may be said of Co-
pass' conduct, the evidence does not establish that his pres-
ence at a grievance hearing would unduly interrupt
production. And in any case, whatever difficulties the Com-
pany may have had with him in past grievance matters, it
took no action when the events occurred similar to what
they now claim is warranted. I do not think an employer
with good faith may horde minor disagreements of the past,
as a squirrel hordes nuts, for convenient use later. In the
circumstances, I find that fear of undue interruption of
production was not the reason Copass was excluded from
grievance hearings.
Considering the above, I conclude that the Company
had no valid basis for not dealing with Copass as a member
of the union grievance committee or for not recognizing him
as the president of the Union or not dealing with him in all
matters relating to a collective-bargaining agreement. In
acting as it did in all these regards it has refused to bargain
collectively with the representatives of its employees con-
trary to the requirements of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act and has thereby committed and is committing unfair
labor practices. Signal Manufacturing Co., 150 NLRB 1162.
In urging a contrary conclusion the Company cites
Corrugated Container Co., 180 NLRB 663. In that case the
employer fired an employee, the union president, for insub-
ordination and thereafter, when he sought to process his
own grievance, refused to meet with him on the ground that
the collective-bargaining agreement limited handling of
grievances to stewards. Although that case is much like the
present one, it is factually distinguishable in that there, un-
GATES RUBBER, INC.
like the present case , the union president had been flagrant-
ly insubordinate, thereby giving the employer clear cause
for discharge . There is a further difference in degree in that
it is more apparent in the present matter that the activity for
which the employee was discharged was protected activity.
I also find that General Electric v. N.L.R.B., 388 F.2d
213 (C.A. 6) relied on by Respondent is distinguishable
from the present case . There the union president was dis-
charged for threatening physical violence . His discharge
was not questioned , but when the union thereafter sought
to use him as a consultant in discussions at the plant dealing
with new rate structures, the employer refused to allow him
in production areas of the plant on the ground he might lead
other employees to cease work and might interfere with
production. These special circumstances do not exist in the
present case.
The Company here further urges that the refusal to
bargain aspects of the present matter should not be enter-
tained because Board adjudication of the discharge of Co-
pass is sought in the 8 (a)(3) case . The Company cites
Corrugated Container, supra, which stands for this proposi-
tion . It seems to me, however, that that precedent is not
applicable here because the refusal to bargain established
by this record is broader than would be disposed of by a
determination that Copass either was or was not discrimina-
torily discharged . In Corrugated Container disposition of the
8(a)(3) case for practical purposes disposed of the 8(a)(5)
case . Because that would not necessarily be so here, the
Company's argument in this regard should not prevail.
2. The alleged refusal to
furnish information
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that
since October 15, 1971, the Company has refused to furnish
to the Union the contents of Copass' personnel file which
are necessary to process a grievance.
It is clear from the record that Copass filed grievances
on October 18 and 25 based on his suspension and dis-
charge . On October 20 Lewis orally requested , and on Octo-
ber 28 Copass requested in writing, the contents of Copass'
personnel file, and on November 3 Lewis, also in writing,
requested all records pertaining to his alleged anti-Compa-
ny attitude, a reason given by the Company for his termina-
tion . The information was requested to assist in handling his
grievances.
The Company did not hand over the contents of his
personnel file. Its position is that the file contains no infor-
mation relevant to the processing of grievances based on his
suspension and termination . But prior to the hearing herein
it never informed Copass or the Union that his file con-
tained no relevant material. According to the Company, if
the file had contained any relevant information it would
have been glad to turn such over to Copass and the Union.
On past occasions the Company had satisfied union re-
quests for information to assist in processing grievances by
selecting and handing over relevant material. The record
evidence in this regard is sparse , hardly warranting a finding
that the past practice of the parties was to leave the selection
of relevant data exclusively to the Company. The position
of the General Counsel and Union is that the Union was
747
entitled to see whatever was in the personnel file and to
determine on its own what , if anything, was relevant or
material to the processing of the grievance.
The question is almost academic . All the evidence indi-
cates there was nothing in the file which would have helped
in the grievance . The file was not subpoened for use at the
unfair labor practice hearing . It was available at the hearing
for examination but was not used . But until the hearing the
Company never advised Copass or the Union that the file
was barren . If Respondent had told the Union it could not
have relevant information from the personnel file, it would
have violated the Act. See Perkins Machine Co ., 141 NLRB
98. I find it was equally obligated to at least respond if it had
no information . Failure to do so violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act. In the circumstances I deem it unnecessary
to decide whether such duty required a turn-over of the
entire personnel file.
3. The alleged rejection of
Copass' grievance
The complaint alleges , and the answer denies , that on
November 4, 1971, the Company rejected a grievance filed
on behalf of Copass concerning the Company's refusal to
negotiate with him concerning grievances and refusing to
recognize him as president of the Union.
As found earlier herein the Company did refuse to
negotiate with him concerning grievances and in general
refused to deal with him although he was president of the
Union.
On November 3, Copass filed two grievances including
one-alleging that the Company had on November 1 violated
the collective-bargaining agreement when it would not al-
low him as president of the Union and chairman of the plant
grievance committee to attend scheduled meetings for pro-
cessing grievances of other employees . The next day, No-
vember 4, Wright rejected these grievances on the ground
that under the agreed-upon procedures Copass had no right
to file grievances because he was no longer an employee. I
find that the facts in this regard are as alleged in the com-
plaint.
The company defense is that management was perfect-
ly willing to process the grievances and only requested that
they not be duplicitous. This is founded on the circumstance
that on November 3 Union Steward James Tyler had filed
two other grievances on the same basis as Copass, namely,
Company refusal on October 29 and November 1 to allow
Copass to attend grievance meetings . On November 4
Wright also rejected both of these on the ground that they
needlessly duplicated each other. He indicated he would
entertain one of the Tyler grievances if it were resubmitted.
Either of these would have dealt with the same subject as
Copass' grievances, but not the right of a discharged em-
ployee to file one. Duplication was not the reason the Co-
pass grievances were rejected . Wright was unwilling to
process them on any basis because he lacked employee
status. The question is whether that was a valid basis to
reject a grievance . Respondent does not address itself to
that question.
Wright based his rejection of the Copass grievance on
the terms of the agreed-upon grievance procedures which he
748 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
construed as requiring that the grievant be an employee.
Copass filed this grievance as an individual employee. It did
not deal with his own termination. On November 1, apart
from any residual rights he may have had to obtain a rever-
sal of his own discharge , he clearly was no longer an em-
ployee. The agreed-upon grievance procedures, by their
terms, were available to "any employee or group of employ-
ees having a problem." As an individual he did not then
qualify, and he did not purport to file the grievance for
others who did. As I construe the agreed-upon procedures,
Wright correctly rejected the grievances. Accordingly, the
allegation of the complaint based upon that rejection should
be dismissed, and I grant Respondent's motion to dismiss
in that regard.
C. Availability of Arbitration
The grievance procedures agreed upon between the
parties provide for arbitration of certain grievances not set-
tled in the preliminary steps . Some issues in this case involv-
ing interpretation of those agreed-upon grievance
procedures might have been disposed of by arbitration.
These include (a) whether the makeup of the union griev-
ance committee is limited to employees of the Company,
and (b) whether a discharged employee such as Copass has
standing to file a grievance on matters other than his own
discharge. The Union did not seek arbitration but instead
filed unfair labor practice charges. The Company did not
plead a deferral-to-arbitration defense in its answer. See
Montgomery Ward & Co., 195 NLRB No. 136. At the hear-
ing herein the General Counsel and the Union took the
position that none of the issues were arbitral. The Company
took the position that although it might earlier have been
interested in arbitration, it no longer was.
Although some questions presented here might have
been arbitrated, others involve construction of the Act rath-
er than merely interpretation of an agreement. To separate
out the issues susceptible of arbitration would, it seems to
me, fragment disposition of what is a single overall problem.
Given these circumstances and the positions of the parties,
noted above, I conclude that deferral to arbitration in the
manner indicated in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No.
150, is not appropriate.
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States. Those found to be unfair labor practices tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce, and are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3), (5), and (1),
and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3), (5), and (1) of the Act, I recommend that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
I recommend that Respondent offer to Donald Copass
immediate, full, and unconditional reinstatement to his for-
mer employment, without prejudice to his seniority or other
rights, privileges, or working conditions, and make him
whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the
discrimination against him by paying him a sum of money
equal to the amount he would have earned from the date of
his suspension on October 13, 1971, to the date Respondent
offers him reinstatement, less his net earnings during that
period in accordance with the, Board's formula stated in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest
thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum as set forth in
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, and that it
make records available to the Board agents in connection
with compliance therewith.
Having found that Respondent has refused to bargain
collectively with the Union I recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom. However, because of the long established
bargaining relationship between the parties, and because
Respondent has not questioned its duty to recognize and
bargain with the Union, an Order requiring Respondent to
generally recognize and bargain with the Union is not war-
ranted. See The Standard Oil Company (Ohio), 174 NLRB
177, fn. 1. Respondent should be required to recognize and
negotiate with the Union's chosen representatives, includ-
ing Donald Copass as president of the Union or as chair-
man of its grievance committee, or any other representative
chosen by the Union. In addition Respondent should be
required upon request from the Union for information nec-
essary for use in processing grievances, to respond to such
requests, and to furnish such information.
I further recommend that Respondent post appropriate
notices.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER2
Respondent , Gates Rubber , Inc., its officers , agents,
successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Local Union No. 670,
United Rubber , Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or in any other labor organiza-
tion of its employees , by suspending , discharging, or in any
other manner discriminating against any employee in re-
gard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi-
tion of employment.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union
named above by refusing to recognize and negotiate with its
chosen representatives, including Donald Copass as presi-
dent of the Union or as chairman of its grievance commit-
2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
GATES RUBBER, INC.
tee, or any other representative chosen by the Union.
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively with the above-
mentioned Union by not responding to requests of the
above-named Union for information necessary in pro-
cessing grievances or by not furnishing such information
when requested.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Offer Donald Copass immediate and full rein-
statement to his former job or , if that job no longer exists,
to a substantially equivalent one, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights , privileges , or working conditions,
and make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him in the
manner set forth in the section hereto entitled "The Reme-
dy-"
(b) Notify immediately Donald Copass , if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of the
right to full reinstatement , upon application after discharge
from the Armed Forces , in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service
Act.
(c) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying all payroll
records , social security payment records , timecards , person-
nel records and reports , and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
recommended Order.
(d) Upon request bargain collectively with the above-
749
named Union by recognizing and negotiating with its cho-
sen representatives including Donald Copass as president
and as chairman of its grievance committee.
(e) Bargain collectively with the above -named Union
by responding to its requests for information necessary in
the processing grievances and by furnishing such informa-
tion when requested.
(f) Post at its premises in Nashville, Tennessee copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3 Copies of the
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 26 , after being duly signed by Respondent 's represent-
ative , shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered , defaced or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writ-
ing, within 20 days of the date of the receipt of this Decision,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.4
It is further ordered that the complaint be dismissed
msofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found herein.
3 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a judgement of the
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
4 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after
exceptions have been filed , this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify
the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."