GANOR, Shlomo COHEN.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 1, 2020

13349648 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/349,648 01/13/2012 Shlomo COHEN GANOR P-75634-US 1080
49443 7590 05/01/2020
Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Baratz LLP
1500 Broadway
12th Floor
New York, NY 10036
EXAMINER
PRESTON, JOHN O
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Arch-USPTO@PearlCohen.com
USPTO@PearlCohen.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte SHLOMO COHEN GANOR
________________

Appeal 2019-001816
Application 13/349,648
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JASON J. CHUNG, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Non-Final
Rejection of claims 1–3, 8–13, 18–22, 24, and 25.2 An Oral Hearing was
held on April 24, 2020. A transcript of the hearing will be made of record in
due course. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, NICE Ltd. is the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 1.
2 Claims 4–7, 14–17, and 23 are canceled. Appeal Br. 17, 19, 22.
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INVENTION
The invention relates to correlating transaction events over a
transaction lifecycle. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and
is reproduced below:
1. A method, implemented using one or more
processors and associated memories, for correlating transaction
events, the method comprising:
receiving at a correlation engine comprising a processor
incoming transaction events, each event identifying actions
executed at a plurality of different types of source systems and
having an event identifier, each source system comprising a
processor and being selected from a computer; an automated
teller machine; and a point of sale system;
assigning to each transaction event, using the correlation
engine processor, a correlation configuration set having an
identifier, based on one or more of: the source system executing
the action identified by the transaction event; and the data type
of the event;
each correlation configuration set including a set of one
or more equivalence relations, each equivalence relation
comprising an equivalence relation identity value function
producing a string comprising one or more of a first set of
parameters of an input event; and a relation identity equality
function which determines if events match based on approximate
and non-exact criteria applied to a second set of event
parameters;
determining, using the correlation engine processor, for
each transaction event one or more corresponding identity keys,
each identity key comprising:
the identifier of the correlation configuration set
selected for the transaction event, an identity value
produced by an equivalence relation identity value
function for the correlation configuration set selected for
the transaction event, and an identifier for the equivalence
relation identity value function used to produce the
identity value;
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using the processor, grouping transaction events in a map
such that different events having exactly matching identity keys
are grouped,
determining which transaction events are correlated as
being associated with the same payment transaction using a
relation identity equality function for each set of grouped
transaction events having the same identity key to determine if
grouped events match approximately and non-exactly differing
within a predetermined range for a subset of event parameters;
using the processor, determining for a payment
transaction whether or not to trigger a flag or alert when
possibly fraudulent data is detected due to the change in the
amount of payment across grouped transaction events; and
outputting a list of the correlated transaction events over
a lifecycle of the same payment transaction.

Appeal Br. 16–17 (Claims Appendix) (emphases added).

REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 1–3, 8–13, 18–22, 24, and 25 under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Non-Final
Act. 4–9.
ANALYSIS
A. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
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abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “Update”)
(available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
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internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the Update, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.

4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
C. The Examiner’s Conclusions and Appellant’s Arguments
The Examiner concludes the present claims recite certain mental
processes that can be performed using pen and paper. Non-Final Act. 4;
Ans. 8.
Appellant argues that the present claims recite an improvement to the
technology of organizing and controlling transactions. Appeal Br. 7–9, 13–
14 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Spec. ¶¶ 3, 15, 16); Reply Br. 2–5; Supp. Appeal Br. 2–4. Appellant
further argues the present claims are necessarily rooted in computer
technology to solve problems specifically arising in that realm. Appeal Br.
10–11 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed.
Cir. 2014)). Appellant argues the present claims do not preempt any abstract
idea. Appeal Br. 7, 9, 13. Appellant argues that the present claims are not in
the prior art and, thus, have not been performable previously by a computer
or a human. Id. at 12. Appellant argues the present claims recite a non-
conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional
elements, which results in an inventive concept. Id. at 7, 9, 11–13 (citing
BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We disagree with Appellant.
D. Discussion
1. Step 2A, Prong 1
Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question that we resolve
pursuant to the 2019 Revised Guidance. We conclude the emphasized
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portions of claim 1,5 reproduced above (see supra at 2–3), recite concepts
that can practically be performed in the human mind because the present
claims require taking transaction events input from disparate sources,
performing a unique and specific ordered series of operations on the input,
and providing a useful output based on that transformed data. We also
conclude the present claims are analogous to the claims in FairWarning IP,
LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (2016). In FairWarning, the
Court held that collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and
notifying a user when misuse is detected is a mental processes, which is an
abstract idea. Id. at 1094–95, 1097. According to the 2019 Revised
Guidance, concepts that can practically be performed in the human mind fall
into the category of mental processes. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52. Moreover, such mental processes are a type of abstract idea. See
id.
Additionally, we conclude the present claims recite commercial
interactions (including sales activities or behaviors) because the present
claims require taking transaction events input from disparate sources,
performing a unique and specific ordered series of operations on the input,
and providing a useful output based on that transformed data. According to
the 2019 Revised Guidance, commercial interactions (including sales
activities or behaviors) fall into the category of certain methods of
organizing human activity. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.

5 Claim 1 is reproduced above with emphases. Appellant does not argue
claims 1–3, 8–13, 18–22, 24, and 25 separately. Appeal Br. 6–15. We,
therefore, group those claims together and refer to those claims as the
“present claims.”
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Moreover, those certain methods of organizing human activity are a type of
abstract idea. See id.
Because the present claims recite mental processes or commercial
interactions, which are abstract ideas, we proceed to prong 2.
2. Step 2A, Prong 2
The additional elements of the present claims do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any
meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea for the following reasons.
Appellant does not identify persuasively how the Specification sets forth an
improvement in technology. The Update addresses how we consider
evidence of improvement that is presented to us. The Update states:
the evaluation of Prong Two requires the use of the
considerations (e.g. improving technology, effecting a particular
change treatment or prophylaxis, implementing with a particular
machine, etc.) identified by the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, to ensure that the claim as a whole “integrates [the]
judicial exception into a practical application [that] will apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.”
Update, 11 (emphases added). The Update further states:
[d]uring examination, the examiner should analyze the
“improvements” consideration by evaluating the specification
and the claims to ensure that a technical explanation of the
asserted improvement is present in the specification, and that the
claim reflects the asserted improvement. Generally, examiners
are not expected to make a qualitative judgment on the merits of
the asserted improvement. If the examiner concludes the
disclosed invention does not improve technology, the burden
shifts to applicant to provide persuasive arguments supported by
any necessary evidence to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill
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in the art would understand that the disclosed invention improves
technology. Any such evidence submitted under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.132 must establish what the specification would convey to
one of ordinary skill in the art and cannot be used to supplement
the specification. For example, in response to a rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101, an applicant could submit a declaration under
§ 1.132 providing testimony on how one of ordinary skill in the
art would interpret the disclosed invention as improving
technology and the underlying factual basis for that conclusion.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the present claims an
improvement to the technology of organizing and controlling transactions.
Appeal Br. 7–9, 13–14 (citing McRO, 837 F.3d at 1299; Enfish, 822 F.3d at
1327; Spec. ¶¶ 3, 15, 16); Reply Br. 2–5; Supp. Appeal Br. 2–4. In this case,
the Examiner concludes that the present claims do not recite an improvement
to technology, but rather are improvements to a business or financial
problem. Non-Final Act. 2; Ans. 7–8, 10. Consequently, we focus on any
evidence Appellant cites as discussed in the Update.
Here, although Appellant identifies paragraphs 3, 15, and 16 of the
Specification, those paragraphs merely describe correlating transactions
whose parameters change over time to detect fraud (i.e., mental processes or
certain methods of organizing human activity), which fall within the
category of an abstract idea as discussed supra, not an improvement to
technology. Appeal Br. 7–9, 13–14 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 3, 15, 16). Paragraphs
3, 15, and 16 of the Specification are unlike the technological improvements
in McRO.
The subject claim considered by the McRO court concerned a method
for automatically animating lip synchronization and facial
expressions. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1303. The McRO court concluded the
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subject claims did not recite an abstract idea because the computer animation
used a structure of limited rules that reflected a specific implementation
which an animator would not likely have utilized. Id. at 1316. Thus, the
claimed invention in McRO used “limited rules in a process specifically
designed to achieve an improved technological result” over “existing,
manual 3-D animation techniques.” Id. Unlike the claims of McRO, the
present claims do not recite an improvement to technology; instead, the
present claims focus on an improvement to the abstract idea itself.
Similar to Appellant’s citation to McRO, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s citation to Enfish. Appeal Br. 7–9, 13–14; Reply Br. 3–5. In
Enfish, the Federal Circuit considered how the invention in Enfish was
superior to the technology in the prior art. That is, the court considered “the
specification’s emphasis that ‘the present invention comprises a flexible,
self-referential table that stores data,’” “[t]he specification also teaches that
the self-referential table functions differently than conventional database
structures,” and “traditional databases, such as ‘those that follow the
relational model and those that follow the object oriented model’ are inferior
to the claimed invention.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337 (interior citations
omitted). Moreover, in Enfish “‘[t]he structural requirements of current
databases require a programmer to predefine a structure and subsequent
[data] entry must conform to that structure,’ [and] the ‘database of the
present invention does not require a programmer to preconfigure a structure
to which a user must adapt data entry.’” Id. Based on the foregoing, the
court determined the claims “achieve[d] other benefits over conventional
databases, such as increased flexibility, faster search times, and smaller
memory requirements.” Id. Unlike the claims of Enfish, the present claims
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do not recite “a specific improvement to the way computers operate,
embodied in the self-referential table.” Id. at 1336.
Instead, the present claims recite an abstract idea as discussed supra,
in § I.D.1. or at best, improving an abstract idea—not a technological
improvement. The Specification indicates the additional elements (i.e.,
“engine,” “processor,” “source systems,” “computer,” “automated teller
machine,” “point of sale system,” and “memory”6) recited in the present
claims are merely generic computer components used to implement the
abstract idea. Spec. ¶¶ 19–22, 24, 28. Further, the generic computer
components, individually or in combination, do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application.
Additionally, “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (emphasis added). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim
directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or
abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive
concept necessary for patent eligibility . . . .” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial
L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
We further disagree with Appellant’s argument that, similar to DDR
Holdings, the present claims are necessarily rooted in computer technology
to solve problems specifically arising in that realm. Appeal Br. 10–11. The
subject claim considered by the DDR court pertained to a visitor of a host’s
website clicking on an advertisement for a third-party product displayed on
the host’s website, the visitor is no longer being transported to the third

6 This feature is recited in claims 11 and 21, but not recited in claims 1 and
22.
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party’s website. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. In DDR, instead of
losing visitors to the third-party’s website, the host website can send its
visitors to a web page on an outsource provider’s server that (1) incorporates
“look and feel” elements from the host website and (2) provides visitors with
the opportunity to purchase products from the third-party merchant without
actually entering that merchant’s website. Id. at 1257–58. In contrast to the
claims of DDR, the present claims do not recite incorporating “look and feel
elements” from a host website and providing visitors with the opportunity to
purchase products from a third-party merchant without actually entering the
merchant’s website.
Appellant’s argument that the present claims do not preempt any
abstract idea does not persuade us that the claims are eligible. Appeal Br. 7,
9, 13. Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does
not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1098. For
claims covering a patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully
addressed and made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework.
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
With regard to Appellant’s argument that the present claims recite
features that were not known previously because there is no prior art
rejection (Appeal Br. 12), Appellant improperly conflates the requirements
for eligible subject matter (§ 101) with the independent requirements of
novelty (§ 102) and non-obviousness (§ 103). “The ‘novelty’ of any element
or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–
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89; see also Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (stating that, “under the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed
to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea)
cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept
necessary for patent eligibility”).
3. Step 2B
We find that the abstract idea is implemented with additional elements
that are well-understood, routine, and conventional. The Specification also
supports the Examiner’s determination in this regard because it explains that
“engine,” “processor,” “source systems,” “computer,” “automated teller
machine,” “point of sale system,” and “memory” are generic components.
Spec. ¶¶ 19–22, 24, 28. Appellant’s Specification indicates these additional
elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional components
because it describes them at a high level of generality and in a manner that
indicates that they are sufficiently well-known. Id. Moreover, the additional
elements recited in the present claims, analyzed individually or in
combination, do not result in the claim, as a whole, amounting to
significantly more than the judicial exception.
An inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of
nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.” Genetic Techs. Ltd.
v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (explaining that, after determining a claim
is directed to a judicial exception, “we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the
claims before us?”’ (emphasis added, brackets in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 78)). Instead, an “inventive concept” is furnished by an element
or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to the
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judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim as a whole amounts to
significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218-
19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73); see BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc.,
899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Supreme Court in
Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s
use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood,
routine and conventional,” (emphasis added)).
We also disagree with Appellant’s argument that the present claims
recite a non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
conventional elements, which results in an inventive concept. Appeal Br. 7,
9, 11–13 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Appellant’s arguments fail to
identify any additional element or particular combination of elements that
allegedly are unconventional, non-routine, or not well-understood. See
Appeal Br. 7, 9, 11–13. We cite paragraphs in support of our finding that the
generic computer components were well-understood, routine, and
conventional components performing conventional computer operations.
Spec. ¶¶ 19–22, 24, 28.
Moreover, in BASCOM, the claims were directed to “a filter
implementation versatile enough that it could be adapted to many different
users’ preferences while also installed remotely in a single location.”
BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1348–51. The inventive concept was “the installation
of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with
customizable filtering features specific to each end user” that “gives the
filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits
of a filter on the ISP server.” Id. at 1350. Thus, when considered as an
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ordered combination, the court concluded the claims provided “an inventive
concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement
of known, conventional pieces.” Id. Here, the present claims recite an
abstract idea using additional elements that are generic computer
components as discussed supra, in §§ I.D.1. and I.D.2. or at best, improving
an abstract idea—not an inventive concept for the reasons discussed in
§ I.D.2.
Appellant does not argue claims 2, 3, 8–13, 18–22, 24, and 25
separately, but asserts the § 101 rejection of those claims should be
withdrawn for at least the same reasons as argued for independent claim 1.
Appeal Br. 6–15. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of:
(1) independent claims 1, 11, 21, and 22; and (2) dependent claims 2–3, 8–
10, 12, 13, 18–20, 24, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to
make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 8–13,
18–22, 24,
25
101 Eligibility 1–3, 8–13,
18–22, 24,
25

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AFFIRMED