Gang Ji et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 27, 202013976093 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/976,093 07/15/2014 Gang Ji P42593US 4198 88032 7590 03/27/2020 Jordan IP Law, LLC 12501 Prosperity Drive, Suite 401 Silver Spring, MD 20904 EXAMINER FAIRBANKS, BRENT ALAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2862 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/27/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): admin@jordaniplaw.com info@jordaniplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte GANG JI, ALEXANDER B. UAN-ZO-LI, MAZEN G. GEDEON, JORGE P. RODRIGUEZ, and BASAVARAJ B. ASTEKAR Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 Technology Center 2800 ____________ Before JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, MICHAEL G. McMANUS, and SHELDON M. McGEE, Administrative Patent Judges. McMANUS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant seeks review of the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38–42, 45–47, 49, and 51–54.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM and issue a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Intel Corporation. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The present application generally relates to “systems and methods of enabling a battery system to intelligently provide its current support capability include logic to determine current battery power status information.” Abstract. In such method, “[t]he current battery power status information may be compared with a set of programmed battery power status information to determine a match.” Id. Claim 28 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below: 28. A computer-implemented method comprising: receiving a support requirement related to a battery system, wherein the battery system is a smart battery system that includes a battery controller, a battery memory and a battery interface associated with a battery charger, and wherein the support requirement is selected from a plurality of distinct battery power levels; determining, via logic in the battery memory, current battery power status information of the battery system, wherein the battery power status information is based on one or more battery power parameters including one or more voltage parameters, one or more current parameters, and one or more resistance parameters; comparing, via logic in the battery memory, the current battery power status information with a set of programmed battery power status information to determine a match with a member of the set, wherein the set of programmed battery power status information is stored in the battery memory; indicating, via logic in the battery memory, the current battery power status information based on the match between the current battery power status information and the programmed battery power status information; and Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 3 indicating, via logic in the battery memory, whether the support requirement can be satisfied based on the indicated current battery power status information, wherein the battery interface is set to reflect the battery power status information based on the match including setting an interface register to a value that corresponds to the programmed battery power status information. Appeal Br. 25 (Claims App.). REFERENCES The Examiner relies upon the following prior art: Name Reference Date Khodorkovsky et al. (“Khodorkovsky”) US 7,624,287 B2 Nov. 24, 2009 Svensson et al. (“Svensson”) US 2010/0219836 A1 Sept. 2, 2010 Martin et al. (“Martin”) US 2011/0063119 A1 Mar. 17, 2011 REJECTIONS The Examiner maintains the following rejections: 1. Claims 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38–42, 45–47, 49, and 51–54 are rejected under 35 U.S.C § 101 as directed to ineligible subject matter. Final Action mailed April 26, 2017 (“Final Act.”). Final Act. 2–5. 2. Claims 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38–42, 45–47, 49, and 51–54 are rejected under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) (pre-AIA) as being unpatentable over Martin in view of Khodorkovsky and further Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 4 in view of Svensson. Id. at 6–21. DISCUSSION Rejection 1. The Examiner rejects claims 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38–42, 45–47, 49, and 51–54 as directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Appellant argues these claims collectively. Appeal Br. 13–18. We select claim 28 as representative and the remaining claims at issue will stand or fall with claim 28. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by appellant, the Board may select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the basis of the selected claim alone.”). The Examiner determines that independent claim 28 is directed to abstract subject matter. Final Act. 2–4. More specifically, the Examiner determines that the claim is directed to the abstract idea of determining whether a battery can supply a requested amount of power. Id. at 2. With respect to claim 28, the Examiner enumerates the following limitations as reciting an abstract idea: receiving a support requirement related to a battery system, wherein the support requirement is selected from a plurality of distinct battery power levels; determining current battery power status information of the battery system; comparing the current battery power status information with a set of programmed battery power status information to determine a match with a member of the set; Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 5 indicating the current battery power status information based on the match between the current battery power status information and the programmed battery power status information; and indicating whether the support requirement can be satisfied based on the indicated current battery power status information, wherein the battery interface is set to reflect the battery power status information based on the match. Id. at 2–3. The Examiner determines that the identified limitations of claim 28 correspond to concepts identified as abstract in certain prior judicial cases. Id. at 3. The Examiner additionally finds that the nonabstract elements of the claim, such as the battery system, are “recited at a high level of generality and are well-known, routine and customary in the art.” Appellant argues that the Examiner’s determination of ineligibility is in error. Appeal Br. 13–18. First, Appellant argues that the limitations identified by the Examiner “are not fundamental economic practices, mathematical algorithms, or basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Id. at 15. Appellant further argues that the claim, considered as a whole, “is more akin to a physical process than an abstract idea.” Id. Second, Appellant argues that the claimed methods, apparatus, and systems are patent eligible because they improve an existing technological process. Id. at 15–16. A. Section 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 6 abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 7 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of section 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 8 (“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 2019 Revised Guidance at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: 2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df). 3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 9 (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. C. Analysis Revised Guidance Step 1 The first step under the Revised Guidance entails considering whether the claimed subject matter falls within one of the four statutory categories permitted by statute. Claims may directed to “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claims 28, 29, 31, 32, 47, 49, and 51–54 are directed to methods. A method falls within the scope of the term “process” for purposes of our analysis. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b). Claims 33, 36, 38, and 39 are directed to apparatuses. Appeal Br. 26– 27 (Claims App.). These claims require several “logic” elements. Id. The Specification does not clearly define the term “logic” as used therein. The Specification teaches that “battery status determination logic 215 may be implemented in software, hardware or a combination of both.” Spec. 3. The Specification further teaches as follows: One or more aspects of at least one embodiment may be implemented by representative instructions stored on a machine-readable medium which represents various logic Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 10 within the processor, which when read by a machine causes the machine to fabricate logic to perform the techniques described herein. Such representations, known as “IP cores” may be stored on a tangible, machine readable medium and supplied to various customers or manufacturing facilities to load into the fabrication machines that actually make the logic or processor. Id. at 6. Thus, the claimed “logic” appears to be capable of implementation as hardware or software. In either case, it falls within the scope of the term “manufacture” as used in 35 U.S.C. § 101. See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Claims 40–42, 45, and 46 are to a “system” that includes a processor and a smart battery system. Appeal Br. 27–28 (Claims App.). The Supreme Court has defined the term “machine” as “a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices.” Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1863). The claimed systems fall within this definition of “machine.” Accordingly, the claims at issue are not ineligible under Step 1 of the analysis required by the Revised Guidance. Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1 Under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance, we must determine whether claim 1, being directed to a statutory class of invention, nevertheless recites a judicial exception. In finding claim 1 to be ineligible, the Examiner determines that the steps of “receiving a support requirement,” “comparing . . . the current battery power status information,” “indicating . . . the current battery power status information,” and “indicating . . . whether the support requirement can be satisfied” recite a judicial exception. Final Act. 2–3. Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 11 Appellant argues that the claims do not recite abstract elements. Appeal Br. 13–15. Appellant cites to the Board’s decision in US. Bancorp v. Solutran, Inc.4 where a process that included receiving and scanning paper checks was found to be “more akin to a physical process than an abstract idea.” Appellant argues that, like Bancorp, the limitations at issue here “are not fundamental economic practices, mathematical algorithms, or basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Appeal Br. 15. The Federal Circuit has held as follows regarding the collection, analysis, and presentation of information: Information as such is an intangible. Accordingly, we have treated collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas. In a similar vein, we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category. And we have recognized that merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis. Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Here, “receiving a support requirement” is merely the receipt of information indicating the power requirement of a certain mode of operation. See Spec. 5. This is similar to the “collecting information” determined to be abstract in Electric Power Group. Such an information collection step is 4 U.S. Bancorp v. Solutran, Inc., Case No. CBM2014-00076, 2014 WL 3943913, *6 (PTAB Aug. 7, 2014). Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 12 equivalent to a mental process. In addition, the “comparing . . . the current battery power status information” limitation is similar to the analysis of “information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms” determined to be abstract in Electric Power Group. Further, the two “indicating” claim elements are similar to the mere presentation of results held to be abstract in Electric Power Group. Similar to the above, such steps are equivalent to mental processes. The Examiner’s determination is consistent with the Guidance. See Revised Guidance 52 (regarding mental processes). Accordingly, we determine that Appellant has not shown error in Step 2A, Prong 1 of the analysis. Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2 Next, we address the second prong of Step 2A to determine whether additional elements in the claim integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The Guidance indicates that where additional (nonabstract) elements reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer or other technology, such improvement is indicative of the additional elements being integrated into a practical application. Here, the Examiner determines that claim 28 includes the “additional elements/steps of a battery controller; a battery memory; a battery interface; logic in the battery memory; and a processor.” Final Act. 4. Appellant argues that the abstract elements and the additional elements of claim 28, considered as a whole, “improve a technological process (e.g., power management).” Appeal Br. 16. Appellant further asserts that “Appellant’s features are specific or limiting recitations of Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 13 improved computer technology (e.g., smart batteries and intelligent power management and effect an improvement of a technical field (e.g., electrical device power supply)[)].” Id. This appears to be consistent with the Specification. See, e.g., Spec. 1:4–7 (regarding use of power management techniques to extend battery power); Fig. 6. In the Answer, the Examiner does not squarely respond to Appellant’s arguments regarding improvement of a technological process. Rather, the Examiner determines that “all utility patent applications are directed to solving a technological problem or improving a technological process.” Answer 4. In view of the foregoing, considered as a whole, we determine that Appellant has shown that the additional elements in the claim integrate the judicial exception into a practical application in the field of power management. Accordingly, claim 28 is not “directed to” a judicial exception and is not patent-ineligible on such basis. Rejection 2. The Examiner rejects claims 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38–42, 45–47, 49, and 51–54 as obvious over Martin in view of Khodorkovsky and further in view of Svennson. Final Act. 6–21. Appellant asserts that each of the independent claims (claims 28, 33, 40, and 47) includes certain common claim elements and argues the independent claims as a group. Appeal Br. 18–19. Appellant further argues that the rejection of the dependent claims should be reversed for the same reasons as presented with regard to the independent claims. Id. at 23. Accordingly, we select claim 28 as representative and the remaining claims will stand or fall with claim 28. Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 14 Summary of the Rejection The primary reference, Martin, is titled “User Interface for Rechargeable Batteries.” Martin, code (54). In support of the rejection of claim 28, the Examiner finds that Martin teaches all claim elements other than the following: wherein the battery power status information is based on one or more battery power parameters including one or more voltage parameters, one or more current parameters, and one or more resistance parameters; comparing, via logic in the battery memory, the current battery power status information with a set of programmed battery power status information to determine a match with a member of the set, wherein the set of programmed battery power status information is stored in the battery memory; and wherein the battery interface is set to reflect the battery power status information based on the match including setting an interface register to a value that corresponds to the programmed battery power status information. Final Act. 8; see also Appeal Br. 25 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds that Khodorkovsky teaches a power management scheme having various predefined power consumption states and employing a process of “validation” where parameters are examined and the appropriate power consumption state is selected. Final Act. 8–9 (citing Khodorkovsky 3:58–61, 6:47–52). The Examiner finds that the foregoing discloses the claimed step of comparing the battery power status information with a set of programmed battery power levels. The Examiner further finds that Khodorkovsky teaches a “state manager 72 and hardware manager 74 [which] communicate the modified Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 15 set of parameters of the hybrid state to the appropriate software and hardware components of GSS 10 for application.” Final Act. 9 (quoting Khodorkovsky, 7:35–39). An operating parameter value is communicated to a component “which may store the value, e.g., in one or more hardware registers.” Id. (quoting Khodorkovsky 4:6–9). The Examiner finds that the foregoing discloses the claim element requiring that the battery interface reflect the battery power status information based on the match between the battery status and the set of predefined power levels. Id. at 9. The Examiner additionally finds that Svensson teaches a method where battery power status information is based on one or parameters including one or more voltage parameters, one or more current parameters, and one or more resistance parameters. Id. at 10. Argument and Analysis Appellant argues that the rejection is in error on several bases. Appeal Br. 19–23. First, Appellant argues that Martin fails to teach “receiving a support requirement related to a battery system” and “wherein the battery system is a smart battery system.” Id. at 19–21. Appellant contends that the Final Action fails even to make any specific allegation related to these claim elements. Id. at 19–20. In the Answer, the Examiner indicates that “[t]he Examiner's position is that the Final Office action did not rely on Martin to teach these limitations (see Final Office Action, page 7). Rather, the combination of Martin, Khodorkovsky, and Svensson disclose the recited features as discussed below.” Answer 7. Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 16 As a threshold matter, we consider the meaning of the terms “support requirement” and “power levels.” Claim 28 requires “receiving a support requirement related to a battery system . . . wherein the support requirement is selected from a plurality of distinct battery power levels.” Appeal Br. 25 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). The Specification does not clearly define the term “support requirement.” Indeed, the Specification does not even use such term. The Specification does, however, use the terms “support” and “requirement.” The Specification teaches an embodiment as follows: For example, the CPU 105 may determine that, in order to perform operations in certain operation mode (e.g., turbo mode), the CPU 105 may need the battery system 150 to be able to support that operation mode (e.g., satisfy power requirement for the turbo mode). The CPU 105 may send the requirement to the embedded controller 500 via the bus 510. The embedded controller 500 may in turn send the requirement to the battery system 150. The battery system 150 may then cause the battery status determination logic 215 to determine the current battery power status information. The battery system 150 may then compare the current battery power status information with the requirement to determine if the requirement may be satisfied. The battery system 150 may then set the interface register 305 accordingly. This passive mode may be referred to as a negotiation mode where the embedded controller 500 negotiates with the battery system 150 until the battery system 150 indicates that it can support the requirement. Spec. 4:33–5:12. With regard to “power levels,” the Specification teaches that Figure 4 “may illustrate the power modes that the computer system 100 may operate based on the power level that the battery system 150 can support. For example, when the bit values of the interface register 305 are ‘111’, the Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 17 computer system 100 may operate at maximum power or turbo mode.” Spec. 4:9–12. Figure 4 of the Specification is reproduced below. Figure 4 is a table that shows various interface register values associated with certain battery power levels and system power levels. Considering the foregoing teachings of the Specification, as well as the manner in which the term “support requirement” is used in the claims, we determine for purposes of this appeal that the term “support requirement” means a battery power level indicative of an amount of electrical power required for a computer system to operate in a desired power mode. Id. at 4:1–10. The Examiner does not clearly direct us to any teaching of a “support requirement” in any reference in the Final Action or in the Answer. See Final Act. 6–7; see also Answer 7. Accordingly, Appellant has shown error in this regard. Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 18 We further find that Khodorkovsky teaches as follows regarding receiving a support requirement: Next, a predefined operating parameter set representing a desired power consumption state is selected from table 32 (S404). This is achieved by setting the read pointer (RPTR) 34 to point to the state descriptor in table 32 (FIG. 2) which has the desired associated power consumption level. The desired level is, for example, determined by the event manager 70 on the basis of current operating conditions at the GSS 10 and/or host device and/or on the basis of one or more detected events. In one embodiment such a detected event may be, for example, a selection made by a user, an application or the operating system. Current operating conditions that are considered may include, e.g., whether or not high resolution video is being displayed by the device and whether or not multiple displays are being driven by the device. Examples of relevant events may be a detected disconnection from an alternating current power source and switchover to battery power or a period of user inactivity. A person of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that many other conditions and events could conceivably be considered for the purpose of selecting a desired power consumption level and corresponding state. Once selected, the desired state is communicated by the event manager 70 to the state manager 72 (FIG.1). Khodorkovsky 6:9–32. Figure 2 of Khodorkovsky is reproduced below. Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 19 In regard to Figure 2, Khodorkovsky teaches that “[s]tate table 32, which is illustrated in greater detail in FIG. 2, is a table in host device (CPU) memory which stores descriptors for each of a set of N predefined power consumption states, where N is a positive integer greater than one.” Khodorkovsky, col. 3:58–61. Khodorkovsky further teaches that “each of the state descriptors in table 32 [Figure 2] describes a single power consumption state.” Id. at col. 3:62–63. Thus, the “support requirement” of the present Specification (and claims) and the “state descriptor” of Khodorkovsky describe a battery power level that corresponds to an amount of electrical power required for a system to operate in a desired power mode. Accordingly, we find that the “state descriptor” of Khodorkovsky is equivalent to the “support requirement” of the claims. Appellant additionally contends that Martin fails to teach “wherein the battery system is a smart battery system that includes a battery controller, a battery memory and a battery interface associated with a battery charger.” Appeal Br. 19–21. Appellant argues that the Examiner “fails to make any specific allegations related to these features.” Id. at 19–20. This is not accurate. The Examiner makes findings relating to this claim element in the Final Action. Final Act. 6–7. Martin teaches an embodiment as follows: A rechargeable battery includes a housing having an external surface; a battery cell within the housing, the battery cell having a state of charge, and a state of health; a processor disposed within the housing, the processor configured to store and display the state of charge and the state of health of the battery cell; and a user interface region provided on the external surface of the housing, the user interface region including a plurality of visual components configured to provide a plurality Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 20 of visual cues relating to the charging status, the state of charge, and the state of health of the battery cell. Martin ¶ 9 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Martin teaches a smart battery, a battery controller (microprocessor 604 (id. ¶ 32–33)), a battery memory (the processor that stores the state of charge), and a battery interface (user interface). Appellant does not allege error in the Examiner’s stated reason to combine. Appeal Br. 18–23; Final Act. 9–10. In view of the foregoing, we determine that the cited references teach the subject matter of the claims at issue. We specifically find that Khodorkovsky teaches the “support requirement” limitation. We, therefore, affirm the rejection of claims 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38–42, 45–47, 49, and 51–54 as obvious over the cited prior art. Because our findings differ from those of the Examiner, however, we designate our affirmance of the Examiner’s obviousness rejection as a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION. Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 21 CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are reversed. The Board issues a new ground of rejection. In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground of Rejection 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38– 42, 45– 47, 49, 51–54 101 Ineligible subject matter 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38–42, 45–47, 49, 51–54 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38– 42, 45– 47, 49, 51–54 103 Martin, Khodorkovsky, Svensson 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38–42, 45–47, 49, 51–54 28, 29, 31– 33, 36, 38– 42, 45–47, 49, 51–54 Overall Outcome 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38–42, 45–47, 49, 51–54 28, 29, 31– 33, 36, 38– 42, 45–47, 49, 51–54 This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), which provides that “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides that the appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of Appeal 2018-006640 Application 13/976,093 22 the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation