Galicks, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 20, 2007

08-CA-036079 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 20, 2007)

JD–41–07
New Philadelphia, OH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
GALICKS, INC.
and Case 8-CA-36079
8-CA-36766
SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL UNION NO. 33 OF
NORTHERN OHIO, AFL-CIO
Cheryl Sizemore, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Thomas J. Wiencek, Esq. (Brouse & McDowell),
for the Respondent.
Joseph Guarino, Esq. (Cosme, D’Angelo &
Szollosi) & Matthew F. Oakes,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
IRA SANDRON, Administrative Law Judge. The amended consolidated complaint stems
from unfair labor practice (ULP) charges that Sheet Metal Workers International Association,
Local Union No. 33 of Northern Ohio, AFL–CIO (the Union) filed against Galicks, Inc. (Galicks or
Respondent), alleging violations of Section 8(a)(3), (5), and (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act).
Pursuant to notice, I conducted a trial in Cleveland, Ohio, on January 23 – 25 and March
26 and 27, 2007, at which the parties had full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence.
All parties filed helpful posthearing briefs that I have duly considered. Respondent also
filed a motion for leave to file a reply brief and a memorandum, alleging that the General
Counsel’s and the Union’s post-hearing briefs contain misstatements of fact. In response, the
General Counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to Respondent’s motion, and a motion to
strike Respondent’s memorandum. Inasmuch as Respondent’s memorandum essentially
reiterates the arguments already made in its brief, and any factual misstatements in the other
briefs would be refuted by the record evidence, I conclude that Respondent’s memorandum
serves no purpose and is unnecessary for a determination of the merits of the allegations before
me. See High-Tech Cable Corp., 318 NLRB 280, 284 fn. 4 (1995). Accordingly, I deny
Respondent’s motion for leave to file a reply brief and will not consider its memorandum.
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Issues
1. Since April 7, 2005, when the Union requested voluntary recognition as the
representative of Respondent’s journeymen, has Respondent failed and refused to recall laid-off
journeymen because of their union activities?1
2. After the Union’s certification on June 3, 2005, as the collective-bargaining
representative of Respondent’s journeymen, did Respondent implement a unilateral change in
working conditions by assigning to production workers (or production employees) work that
journeymen had traditionally performed, without affording the Union prior notice and an
opportunity to bargain?
3. Did Respondent unlawfully fail and refuse to provide the Union with necessary and
relevant information in response to the Union’s information requests dated August 12, 2005, and
August 23, 2006?
4. Did Respondent, on about September 7, 2006, unlawfully withdraw recognition of the
Union as the certified bargaining representative of its journeymen, and thereafter fail and refuse
to meet and bargain with the Union over the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement?
Witnesses and Credibility
Witnesses for the General Counsel included union agents Alan Chermak, Jerry Durieux,
and Matthew Oakes, and Gregory Griner, a former employee and journeyman. Tom Caruthers,
the union business agent who serviced Galicks from the 1980’s through July 2003, did not
testify. The General Counsel represented that he was in Florida, and neither the General
Counsel nor the Union subpoenaed him to appear. Accordingly, I draw an adverse inference
against the General Counsel and the Union on any factual matters in the case about which he
likely would have knowledge. See Daikichi Sushi Corp., 335 NLRB 622 (2001); International
Automated Machines, 285 NLRB 1122, 1123 (1987), enfd. mem 861 F. 2d 720 (6th Cir. 1988);
Martin Luther King, Sr., Nursing Center, 231 NLRB 15 fn. 1 (1977).
Respondent’s witnesses were owner Gregory Galigher, production workers Ed and
Jason (Jake) Galigher (his sons) and Randy Gray, and secretary/bookkeeper Nancy Pearch.
Normally, I do not refer to individuals by first names, but for purposes of brevity and avoiding
confusion in identity, I will hereinafter refer to Gregory Galigher as “Galigher” and to his sons as
“Ed” and “Jake.”
Credibility is often pivotal in making findings of fact, especially when, as here, the
testimony of the General Counsel’s witnesses and Respondent’s witnesses on certain matters
was wholly irreconcilable. In the arena of credibility, the Board has held that witnesses may be
found partially credible, as the mere fact that a witness is discredited in one instance does not
necessarily mean that the witness must be discredited in all respects. Daikichi Sushi Corp.,
ibid; Golden Hours Convalescent Hospitals, 182 NLRB 796, 799 (1970). Rather, it is
appropriate to weigh the witness’ testimony for consistency throughout with the evidence as a

1 There is no evidence of employer knowledge of any union activity by journeymen in 2005
prior to April 7. I do not see from the record why the General Counsel alleged February 22,
2005, as the operative date of this violation. See GC Exh. 1(w) par. 8(a). The date appears
nowhere in either the General Counsel’s or the Union’s briefs.
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whole. Golden Hours Convalescent Hospitals, supra at 798–799. See also MEM Electronic
Materials, 342 NLRB 1172, 1200 fn. 13 (2004), citing American Pine Lodge Nursing, 325 NLRB
98, 99 fn. 1 (1997) (a trier of fact is not required to accept a witness’ testimony in its entirety but
may believe only some of what he or she says); Excel Containers, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 fn. 1
(1997) (it is quite common for judges to believe some, but not all, of a witness’ testimony).
In this regard, I have found neither Galigher nor Durieux and Oakes fully credible,
although I have credited them on certain matters. The former’s testimony on some subjects
was contradictory, tentative, and/or vague, and he struck me as clearly evasive when describing
the nature of Respondent’s business since June 2005 and the work employee Curt Paternoster
has performed since his hire that month. On the other hand, portions of the latters’ testimony
struck me as scripted and implausible and, hence, not believable. The General Counsel and
the Union argue that an adverse inference should be drawn against Galigher for failing to
produce, pursuant to subpoena, certain kinds of records that would establish more definitively
the volume of journeyman and other work that his employees have performed. Galigher
testified that he does thousands of jobs a year but only maintains for any length of time detailed
records of work performed when a job is strung out for a long period such as several months.
Further, although he keeps track of employees’ hours on a job, and employees write down their
hours, he does not keep those records after payroll is prepared. Inasmuch as Galigher
operates a one-shop business and has usually employed no more than several employees at
any particular time, I do not find his testimony implausible. Nor do I find suspicious his claim
that he lost a handful of invoices vis-à-vis the hundreds that he produced.
The General Counsel and the Union further contend that the credibility of Ed, Jake, and
Gray is undermined by the fact that although they testified they worked with journeymen on
jobsites on over 100 occasions, they could recall only a few specific examples. However, I do
not find their testimony suspect in light of the number of years they have worked for Respondent
(approximately 16, 11, and 8, respectively), and the understandable difficulty of remembering
names, without the opportunity of refreshment, when so many years and jobs are involved. I
have taken into account the natural tendency Ed and Jake would have to testify in favor of their
father’s position, but their familial relationship to him does not ipso facto render them unreliable
as witnesses.
Ed and Jake seemed candid, albeit understandably nervous, which I attribute to their
unfamiliarity with testifying in legal proceedings rather than to any discomfort at not being
truthful. Significantly, their testimony on certain points was neither entirely the same nor
identical to their father’s. Thus, Jake stated that Ed was present at an important conversation
Caruthers had with Galigher in 1996, but Ed, on the other hand, stated that he had a one-on-
one conservation with Caruthers at which no one else was present. In addition, although Ed
corroborated a significant statement Galigher attributed to Caruthers (that Ed and Jake could
continue performing the same work they were doing), Jake did not. Moreover, although Jake
recalled that Durieux came to two jobsites at which Jake was working with Ed, Ed did not
recollect seeing Durieux at those locations. Nor did Ed and Jake give matching responses as to
what percent of their work has been architectural and sheet metal. For these reasons, I
conclude that Ed’s and Jake’s answers were not coordinated or deliberately slanted in their
father’s behalf. Their testimony was also generally quite consistent with that of employee Gray,
who similarly seemed candid and not to skew his testimony in Respondent’s favor.
On one matter, I do not accept their testimony: that their duties have remained constant
since the start of their employment. Thus, they all also testified that they traditionally went out
on jobsites with journeymen. Since Respondent had but one journeyman still employed after
July 2004, I cannot believe that their job duties had not changed, at least in degree, by then.
JD–41–07
However, I do credit their testimony that their work duties did not change after June 2005, since
Respondent employed no journeymen by that time.
Griner worked for Galicks for only a little over 2 months, between May and July 2004,
and his tenure was therefore limited. No journeymen with longer employment with Respondent
were called as witnesses. I credit his testimony that he called Durieux concerning Gray’s status.
However, when asked why he did so, he replied, “I didn’t know him. I was just curious of what
he was. I seen[sic] him in the shop working . . . on aluminum truck parts,”2 testimony I find
unsatisfactory. There had to be a more substantial reason why he was concerned about Gray’s
status, and I logically have to conclude that it was because he observed or suspected that Gray
was performing what he considered to be journeyman work. I note that on some subjects, his
testimony comported with that of Ed, Jake, and Gray.
Facts
Based on the entire record, including the testimony of witnesses and my observations of
their demeanor; documents; and the parties’ stipulations, I make the following findings of fact.
Respondent at all times material has had an office and place of business in New
Philadelphia, Ohio, where it has engaged in the fabrication and installation of industrial and
architectural sheet metal in the construction industry. Jurisdiction has been admitted, and I so
find. Respondent’s employees have performed work both in the shop and also at jobsites at
various locations, all in the State of Ohio.
Building Trades Agreements (BTA’s)
Galigher has owned the business since 1979, at which time he became signatory to the
master collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Akron/Canton/Mansfield
Roofing and Sheet Metal Contractors’ Association (the association), of which Respondent was a
member. Respondent continued to be signatory to a series of subsequent association-union
master agreements (BTA’s), the most recent of which was effective from June 1, 2000, until
May 31, 2005.3 Articles 1 and III Section1 thereof detail work that shall be done only by
journeymen and apprentice sheet metal workers:
[T]he manufacture, fabrication, assembling, handling, erection, installation, dismantling,
conditioning, adjustment, alteration, repairing and servicing of all ferrous or nonferrous
metal work, and all other materials used in lieu thereof and of all air-veyor systems and
air handling systems, regardless of material used, including the setting of all equipment
and all reinforcement in connection therewith; (b) all lagging over insulation and all duct-
lining; (c) testing, service, and balancing of all HVAC air-handling equipment and duct
work; (d) the preparation of all shop and field sketches, whether manually drawn or
computer assisted, used in fabrication and erection, including those taken from original
architectural drawings or sketches, and (e) all other work included in the jurisdiction
claims of Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association.
I note that although Respondent has had employees classified as “siding/decking
journeymen,” as distinct from (sheet metal) journeymen, I could find no specific mention of
siding/decking in the agreement. Durieux testified without controversion, and I find that

2 Tr. 95.
3 Jt. Exhs. 29 & 30.
JD–41–07
siding/decking employees can be journeymen, apprentices, or production; it is a classification
that pays less in wages and fringe benefits than work classified as sheet metal; and sheet metal
journeymen can, at their option, “work down” as siding/decking journeymen. For purposes of
this decision, I need not distinguish between sheet metal and siding/decking journeymen but will
simply refer to both as “journeymen.” Respondent has not hired any employees in the
“apprentice” classification.
Journeymen and Production Employees
Prior to 1991, Galigher employed only journeymen to perform sheet metal work. This
changed when he hired his son Ed in 1991, his son Jake in 1996, and Gray in 1999, none of
whom were journeymen or union members. I credit the testimony of all three that, since their
employment began, they have done work stipulated by the parties in Joint Exhibit 32 to
constitute journeyman work.
Galigher contradicted himself on when he began using the term “production worker.” At
one point, he testified that when Ed came to work in 1991, his classification was production;
later, however, he testified that he started using this classification only when he signed a
production agreement in 1996, before that designating such employees as “sheet metal
workers.”4
Respondent paid both journeymen and production workers time-and-a-half for overtime,
but only the latter received paid vacations.
1996 and 2000 Supplemental or Production Agreements
Galigher testified without controversion that in 1996, business agent Caruthers came to
his shop and asked him to sign a supplemental or production agreement so that his sons would
be signed up and pay union dues. Caruthers stated nothing about any restrictions being placed
on the work they did. In fact, when Respondent’s counsel asked Galigher why he signed the
production agreement that (by its terms) limited the work his sons could do, he replied:
“Because [Caruthers] said he didn’t care what I did with my guys. He didn’t care what I did, or
what . . . kind of work they did. He just wanted them signed up in something and paying dues.
That’s exactly what he told me.”5
Ed and Jake partially corroborated this testimony. Thus, Jake testified that he was
present in Galigher’s office in 1996, with his father, Caruthers, and Ed, when Galigher agreed to
sign a production agreement and that his sons would join the Union. Ed recalled a one-on-one
conversation with Caruthers in that office, in which Caruthers stated that the purpose of the
production agreement was “in order to get us into the union and so we could continue on about
our work.”6
According, I credit Galigher’s testimony and find that Caruthers initiated the signing of
the production agreement, stated that its purpose was that Galigher’s sons would join the Union
and pay dues, and expressed no concerns over the type of work they would be performing.
Nothing attributed to Caruthers directly reflects knowledge that Ed and Jake were doing work

4 Contrast Tr. 491 with Tr. 598–590, 602.
5 Tr. 561. His testimony at Tr. 603 was consistent with this (“I could use them however I
liked.”)
6 Tr. 670.
JD–41–07
that the BTA called to be performed by journeymen. Whether or not such knowledge might be
inferred, his statements clearly demonstrated the Union’s lack of interest in the matter.
Pursuant to Caruthers’ request, Galigher in June 1996 signed a supplemental or
production agreement, with a successor agreement negotiated in June 2000, effective through
May 31, 2005.7 They allowed Respondent to hire production workers at lower wages and
benefits to perform certain work that typically would otherwise fall under the scope of the BTA
and require the use of journeymen or apprentices. Both of these production agreements were
concurrent with the existing BTA and stated, in Article 1 (scope of work):
SECTION 1. This Agreement covers the rates of pay and conditions of employment of
all employees of the Employer engaged in the manufacture, fabrication, assembling,
handling, altering and repairing of all ferrous and nonferrous metals, including other
materials, and in lieu thereof, as required for installation within the confines of an
industrial, processing or manufacturing jobsite and defined in Section 2 of this Article.
SECTION 2. Section 1 of this Article relates to the fabrication only, of air pollution
control systems, noise abatement materials and all other industrial work excluding air
conditioning, heating and ventilating systems installed in building enclosures to provide
human comfort and all architectural sheet metal work . . . .
Under this agreement, production workers were permitted to fabricate certain items in
Respondent’s shop. They could not fabricate human comfort, architectural, or other excluded
sheet metal products, which journeymen were to continue to do. Moreover, their work was to be
performed only in the shop itself, not at customers’ jobsites. Thus, all installation work out of the
shop was to stay with journeymen.
Work of Production Employees After the 1996 Agreement
Galigher testified several times as an adverse witness under Section 611(c) that during
the period June 1, 2000, through June 2005, fabrication and installation of architectural sheet
metal (as defined in Joint Exhibit 32(a), paragraph 1) was performed by both journeymen and
production employees. The General Counsel showed him his September 26, 2006 affidavit to
the Region, in which he stated that non-production sheet metal work historically, and between
June 1, 2000, and June 1, 2005, included the following work performed off site: “a. Fabrication
and installation of metal trim; b. Duct/dust collection work; c. Heating and air conditioning duct
work; d. Siding and decking; and e. Installation of form, stack, or fascia systems.” 8 After
reviewing the affidavit, Galigher explained that during this period, he used production workers to
help out the journeymen who installed at jobsites, testimony not necessarily inconsistent with his
affidavit or with the testimony of Ed, Jason, and Gray, described below.
This was also consistent with his testimony that prior to April 2005, production
employees on installation jobs worked with a journeyman if he had one employed at the time,
and he used production employees to do “small jobs” at customers’ sites.9 However, he later
contradicted himself by testifying that after the execution of the 1996 production agreement;
“almost all” of the production employees’ work was performed at Respondent’s facility, as

7 GC Exhs.12 & 2; see also Jt. Exh. 29, relating to the latter.
8 GC Exh. 27 at 1.
9 Tr. 523.
JD–41–07
opposed to off site.10 He did concede that, traditionally, he tried to use mainly the journeymen
on off-site work and that after 1996, and continuing after June 2005, they spent about 80
percent of their time installing at jobsites, and 20 percent fabricating materials in the shop.
I credit Galigher’s testimony on the nature of production employees’ work to the extent
that it was consistent with the testimony of Ed, Jake, and Gray. Their testimony on this was
substantially consistent, and partially corroborated by journeyman Griner, who testified for the
General Counsel. Accordingly, I credit their testimony regarding their work and find the
following facts.
Both before and after execution of the 1996 production agreement, Ed and Jake
performed work in all three categories of work in which Respondent engaged, as stipulated by
the parties in Joint Exhibit 32(a): “architectural,” “sheet metal,” and “stock.” In this regard, Ed
estimated that about 20 – 30 percent of his work was “architectural,” and Jake gave his
percentage as approximately 25–30. After his hire in 1999, Gray performed work for
Respondent in all three categories, with about 30 percent of his work being architectural. The
percentages they gave for “sheet metal” work were as follows: Ed – 60 – 70 percent; Jake – 80
percent (his breakdowns came to over 100 percent); and Gray – 30 percent.
Both before and after the execution of said agreement, Ed and Jake worked with
journeymen employed by Respondent on over 100 customers’ jobsites, performing installation
work that was reserved for journeymen and apprentices under the BTA. Gray testified similarly
concerning his work after his hire in 1999. In this regard, I note Griner’s testimony that, prior to
his layoff in July 2004, he worked on installing gutters and downspouts at a jobsite (House of
Jacob) with journeyman Russell Cottis and also with Ed and Jake, whom he believed were
journeymen. During this same time period, he recalled, Ed also worked with him in installing
gutters at a church in Bathlisk.
Accordingly, I find that both before and after the execution of the production agreement
in 1996, Ed and Jake, and Gray starting in 1999, performed work at jobsites that was
journeyman work under the BTA, and that the traditional practice was that they assisted
journeymen perform installation at such jobsites.
Union Knowledge of Production Employees
Performing Journeymen Work Prior to April 7, 2005
In July 2003, Durieux took over from Caruthers as the business agent servicing Galicks.
At the time, Caruthers said nothing to Durieux about having problems with Respondent.
Thereafter, Durieux visited the shop over a dozen times and talked to Galigher on five or six
occasions when Galigher called to request either journeymen or production employees.
Chermak testified that when he was union president and business manager from 1993
—2003, he had no knowledge that Respondent’s production workers were performing work on a
regular basis that was outside the scope of the production agreement, or he would have filed a
grievance.
Turning to specific incidents alleged in 2004 and 2005, credibility resolution is critical
because Durieux and Oakes testified about certain conversations, which Galigher, Ed, and Gray
testified did not take place at all, and Jason recalled differently.

10 Tr. 504.
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I will start with Durieux’s and Oakes’ versions. In approximately August 2004,
journeyman John Vesper reported to the Union that a nonjourneyman was also working for
Respondent on a jobsite (Dollar Store, New Philadelphia). Durieux and Oakes went there. The
nonjourneyman was Gray, whose monthly union dues receipt showed that he was a production
worker. Dureiux told him he was not permitted to work out of the shop. Durieux called Galigher
the next day and said the same thing. Galigher replied not to worry, that Gray would not be
there again, and journeymen would finish the work. Durieux testified he did not file a grievance
because he believed Galigher. At around the time of this incident, Oakes checked remittance
forms submitted by Respondent and ascertained that Ed and Jake were also production
workers.
Griner, who was employed from May – July 2004, testified that on one occasion he
called Durieux concerning Gray’s status, and Durieux replied that Gray was a production
employee. I credit this testimony but believe that Griner called because he thought Gray was
performing journeyman work.
In approximately February, 2005,11 the Union received a report from one of
Respondent’s journeymen that the HVAC on a job (Wal-Mart, Coshocton) was a nonunion
contractor. Durieux and Oakes went to the site, where they encountered Gray, Ed, and Jake.
Durieux and Oakes told them they were not allowed to work there.
A day or two later, Durieux and Oakes met with Galigher in his office. They repeated
that he was not allowed to use production workers at jobsites. He replied that he was getting
too old for this and was going to turn over the business to his sons, who did not want to be
union. He also complained that the Union could not supply him with qualified people and that
employees he had trained when he started the business had quit and gone to work for another
signatory sheet metal contractor.
In contrast, Gray denied having any conversations with Durieux or that anyone from the
Union ever told him he could not do installation work at jobsites. Ed denied having a
conversation with Durieux at the Wal-Mart, Coshocton jobsite. Jake recalled such a
conversation but testified that Durieux only asked who was running the HVAC and said nothing
about his working there. He also recalled a conversation with Durieux at the Dollar Tree, New
Philadelphia jobsite, in which Durieux again only asked what company was running the HVAC
on the job. Galigher denied having the conversations alleged by Durieux and Oakes following
the above jobsite incidents. In fact, he testified that he did not meet Oakes until April 2005,
when they discussed voluntary recognition.
Several factors lead me to credit Respondent’s witnesses over Durieux and Oakes.
First, I find implausible the latters’ testimony about their rather low-key responses when they
purportedly encountered nonjourneymen performing journeyman work on jobsites. I also find
implausible Durieux’s testimony that in August 2004, he accepted at face value Galigher’s
statements that he would stop using Gray to perform journeyman work and therefore took no
further action. Second, Durieux’ and Oakes’ versions about their alleged conversation with

11 The precise date is unclear from the record. I base this date on Oakes’ testimony that he
made a trust fund audit request in February or March 2005, “within a day or two after [Durieux]
and I had our discussion with Mr. Galigher” concerning the Wal-Mart, Coshocton job. Tr. 409.
In initially testifying about this incident, both Durieux and Oakes stated it occurred in the winter
of 2005. However, Durieux later testified that a subsequent incident occurred “in the fall of
2005” (Tr. 354 - 355), an inherent inconsistency.
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Galigher in February 2005 were too consistent, almost identical, considering the event occurred
over 2 years ago, leading me to believe that their testimony was “canned.” Third, Oakes
testified that at the meeting he and Durieux had with Galigher on April 7, 2005, requesting
voluntary recognition of the Union as the representative of nonproduction employees, Galigher
said he was looking at retirement and turning the business over to his sons, who were not
interested in being union—strikingly similar language to what Oakes testified Galigher
purportedly said during their February conversation. I find it difficult to believe that Galigher
would have repeated such statements in April had he already made them in February. Fourth,
as discussed below, I believe that the Union knew much earlier than August 2004 that
Respondent was using production employees to perform journeyman work.
Finally, and what I find most damaging to Durieux’ and Oakes’ credibility here is the fact
that, by letter dated January 19, 2005, described below in more detail, Galigher notified the
Union that he was withdrawing recognition relating to the production workers. According to both
Durieux and Oakes, their reason for initiating the purported February conversation with Galigher
was to protest his using production workers to perform journeyman work. Neither one testified
that they wanted to talk to Galigher about the January 19 letter, and neither testified that
anything was said in the conversation about his withdrawing recognition—certainly, a subject of
grave concern to the Union. This strains believability.
For the above reasons, crediting Respondent’s witnesses, I find that the Union did not
tell either production employees or Galigher in August 2004 or in February 2005 that production
employees could not perform journeyman work.
On the other hand, I am convinced that the Union knew of this practice much before
August 2004, perhaps as far back as 1996, when Caruthers solicited Galigher to sign the
production agreement. Significantly, remittance forms that Respondent submitted for its
employees on a monthly basis showed the kind of work those employees were performing,
since they reflected different rates of pay for different classifications. Therefore, the Union could
determine if employees such as Ed and Jake were classified as production workers. In fact,
Oakes admittedly did so in approximately August 2004. Moreover, union members’ dues
receipt records and employees’ pension statements reflected their classifications, since the
amounts contained therein were different for journeymen (and journeymen who performed
siding/decking) and production workers. I cannot believe that between the availability of these
types of documents, reports from journeymen who were employed on Respondent’s jobsites,
and other sources of information, the Union did not learn before August 2004 that Respondent
employed production employees to do work that was journeyman under the BTA. I conclude,
therefore, that at some point prior to August 2004, the Union had actual knowledge of this.
It is undisputed that the Union never filed a grievance or ULP charges on the subject of
production employees performing journeyman work, prior to the charges before me. Oakes
testified that after the alleged February 2005 conversation with Galigher, the Union did not file a
grievance because of uncertainty over how much journeyman work the production employees
were performing. To obtain such information, the Union, within a day or two of meeting with
Galigher, requested a trust fund administrator audit of Respondent’s fringe benefit records.
However, Respondent’s attorneys refused to allow the audit, and the Union filed ULP charges
that have led to the instant proceeding and resulted in the audit being put on hold.

JD–41–07
Withdrawal of Recognition in January 2005 and Aftermath12
Ed, Jake, and Gray signed a petition dated January 17, stating that they no longer
wished union representation and were resigning their memberships. By letter of the same date,
Galigher forward the petition to the Union and stated that he was therefore withdrawing
recognition from the Union after the contract expired on June 1.13
By letter dated February 9 to the Union, Galigher confirmed that he was withdrawing
recognition after the contract expired on June 1.14 He further stated that he had advised the
association that he was immediately withdrawing his authorization that it act as his agent for
collective-bargaining purposes.
After receipt of the second letter, the Union talked to Respondent’s journeymen,
including Russell Cottis, Greg Griner, Bill Keenan, and John Vesper. Only Cottis was still
working for Respondent at the time, the other three having been put on layoff status in May and
July 2004. All four stated that they wished to continue to be union and signed cards to that
effect.
On April 7, Oakes and Durieux took the cards to Galigher and requested voluntary
recognition. According to Oakes and Durieux, he responded that he would not recognize the
Union, further stating that he was looking at retirement and turning the business over to his
sons, who were not interested in being union. Galigher did not deny making such statements,
and I find that he did so at this April 7 meeting.
On April 13, the Union filed a petition with the Region, and on April 28, Respondent
signed a stipulated election agreement that set out “the appropriate collective-bargaining unit”
as all full-time and regular-part time building trades (siding/decking journeymen) and sheet
metal journeymen and apprentices, excluding, inter alia, production employees.15 In the
agreement, “temporarily laid off” employees were designated eligible to vote. At the election
conducted on May 23, the four laid-off journeymen named above were the only voters,
Respondent did not challenge their eligibility, and they voted unanimously for the Union.16 A
certification was issued on June 3.17
Union Actions Following Certification
After the election, Durieux called Galigher on one occasion and asked if he wanted to sit
down and negotiate; Galigher responded ambiguously. By letter of June 9 to Respondent,
Oakes stated that the recent certification had resulted in the successful conversion of the
current collective-bargaining agreement into a 9(a) agreement.18 With cover letter dated
June 14, Thomas Wiencek, Respondent’s attorney, sent the Union a proposed agreement

12 All dates in this and the following section occurred in 2005 unless otherwise specified.
13 GC Exh. 3.
14 GC Exh. 4.
15 Jt. Exh. 14.
16 See GC Exh. 5.
17 GC Exh. 6.
18 Jt. Exh. 16.
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encompassing employees in the certified unit.19 The proposal was for a residential contract,
and Oakes told Wiencek that it was “a slap in the face.”20
In the June to July time period, Oakes drove by the facility on several occasions and
observed fabricated architectural metal products, journeyman work under both the BTA and
production agreements. By this time, Respondent had laid off the last of its journeymen, Cottis.
Oakes did not speak to any employees or see anyone working on the products.
In August or September, Oakes heard that Respondent had been awarded the
architectural sheet metal work for the Super Wal-Mart job in St. Clairsville. He and Durieux
visited the jobsite, where they observed large sections of gutters and downspouts that appeared
to be journeyman work. They did not witness anyone installing the materials. The project
manager confirmed that Respondent had been awarded the contract for the gutters and
downspouts and that Galigher’s sons were doing the work.
By letter dated August 12 to Respondent, Oakes referenced Respondent’s earlier
representation that its production workers had resigned from the Union.21 He went on to state
that since Respondent had terminated the production agreement, all work it covered reverted to
coverage under the BTA (and was to be performed by journeymen and apprentices, rather than
production employees). Oakes then said that because of the current bargaining relationship,
and to ensure a smooth transition from the production agreement to the BTA, he was requesting
certain information:
1. A list of all work performed since June 1.
2. A current list of employees.
3. A copy of all time cards and/or job sheets for each of those employees, as well as
copies of payroll checks paid to employees since June 1.
4. A list of all future projects, including any current projects that Respondent may have
had prior to June 1 that would have been performed under the production
agreement.
Galigher responded by letter dated August 12.22 He referred to the Board certification
that excluded production employees and stated that the Union had no jurisdiction over them. In
addition, he and his sons were performing most of the production work, and they were not
considered employees under the Act. Therefore, he would not provide the requested
information.
The Union filed ULP charges on August 22. Oakes testified that the Union did not
pursue negotiations for two reasons: first, it wanted resolution of the charges; second, it
understood that Respondent remained covered under the new BTA agreement that had gone
into effect on June 1. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Union acted in bad faith
in taking this position.

19 Jt. Exh. Exh. 17.
20 Tr. 226.
21 GC Exh. 7.
22 GC Exh. 8.
JD–41–07
The Region, however, rejected the Union’s contention that Respondent was bound to
the new BTA, and issued a partial dismissal letter on May 31, 2006.23 The Region determined
that the Union’s conduct, including its filing of a petition and its stipulating to a single-employer
unit, amounted to its consent to Respondent’s withdrawal from the association and creation of a
single-employer relationship. Accordingly, Respondent ceased being bound to the BTA once it
expired on June 1, 2005.
The Office of Appeals upheld the Region’s determination on July 25.24 By letter to
Respondent dated August 23, Oakes referenced the denial of the Union’s appeal and requested
to meet for bargaining over a new agreement.25 In addition to proposing alternative dates for a
first session, he requested the following information in connection with facilitating negotiations:
1. A list of current employees.
2. A copy of all current company personnel policies, practices, or procedures.
3. A statement and description of all such policies, practices, or procedures other than
those mentioned in item 2.
4. A copy of all company fringe benefit plans not sponsored by the Union.
5. Copies of company wage or salary plans.
6. A list of current projects, including shop and field work.
7. A list of all work completed since June 1, 2005.
8. A list of all future projects.
By letter dated September 7 to Wiencek, Oakes referred to a conversation they had on
August 30, in which Wiencek said he would notify Oakes by September 8 of Respondent’s
intentions with respect to negotiations.26 Oakes asked in the letter that he receive a response
to his August 23 letter by close of business on September 8; otherwise, he would assume that
Respondent was refusing to supply the requested information and to meet and negotiate.
Wiencek replied by letter dated September 7, stating that Respondent no longer
recognized the Union as the representative of the certified unit.27 He went on to say that at
present, and since the certification on June 3, 2005, the only employees that Respondent
continuously employed were production employees excluded from the unit, naming Ed and
Jake, Gray, and Curt Paternoster, in addition to Galigher. Further, any sheet metal work
performed since the certification date was de minimis and would not support a one-man
bargaining unit. Additionally, none of the journeymen who had been laid off had any reasonable
expectancy of recall in the near future. Finally, even if the Union believed the production work
was covered by the Union’s jurisdiction, recognition could still legally be withdrawn because
Galigher and his sons were not employees within the meaning of the Act, and the remaining two
(Gray and Paternoster) had repeatedly objected to union representation. Wiencek concluded by
stating that Respondent would neither bargain with the Union nor provide the information
requested in the August 23 letter.

23 Jt. Exh. 21. All further dates in this section occurred in 2006.
24 Jt. Exh. 22.
25 GC Exh. 9.
26 GC Exh. 10.
27 Jt. Exh. 23.
JD–41–07
Respondent’s Work after June 2005
Galigher’s testimony in this area was often hesitant and ambiguous, did not seem to be
borne out by documents that Respondent provided, and at times was contradictory or evasive.
He seemed to strain to try to distinguish the work he has done since June 2005 from prior work,
in an effort to minimize the amount that would be classified as journeyman under the BTA.
Accordingly, I accord such testimony only limited weight and give more credence to what
Respondent’s records show or imply.
Cottis, who had been hired in March 2004, was laid off on April 7, 2005. Galigher
testified it was due to lack of work. The Region did not issue complaint on the allegation that
the layoff itself was unlawful.28 Respondent has employed no journeymen since. Galigher
testified that Cottis was not later recalled because there were only short, non-consecutive 2 – 3
day installation jobs, and he normally did not call the Union for a journeyman for a job under 3
weeks or so. He also testified more than once that since Cottis was laid off, only production
workers have performed journeyman work.
Almost exactly 2 months later, on June 6, 2005, Respondent hired Curt Paternoster.
Although Wiencek’s September 7, 2006 letter, above, referred to him as a production employee,
Galigher testified that he has been a laborer or construction worker, performing clean-up work
and odd jobs. In this regard, Galigher was vague, equivocal, and evasive about the exact
nature of Paternoster’s duties. Galigher did admit that on certain occasions Paternoster has
performed journeyman work, saying this occurred when he helped one of the production
workers29—again inconsistent with the representation made in Wiencek’s letter that he is a
production employee. In any event, Respondent’s records confirm that he has performed
journeyman work. For example, in late 2005 and early 2006, he worked a total of 60-1/4 hours
on the fabrication and installation of architectural sheet metal project at the Wal-Mart job in St.
Clairsville.30 Paternoster, who started as a temporary full-time employee but was later made
permanent, worked 1,206-1/2 hours at $7 an hour in 2005, and 2,120-1/4 hours at $9 an hour in
2006, not taking into account time-and-a-half overtime pay.31 Respondent still employs him.
Joint Exhibits 35 – 37 are stipulated summaries of Respondent’s customer invoices that
were submitted at my request following the conclusion of the trial, indicating for the years 2004
–2006 the type of work involved. Joint Exhibit 32(g) contains invoices broken down by type of
work for Hicks Roofing for 2005 and 2006, and Joint Exhibit 34 contains the same information
for Commercial Roofing, both major customers of Respondent. These documents establish that
throughout 2004 – 2006, Respondent performed work classified as “architectural” or “sheet
metal”—journeyman work under the BTA that was traditionally performed by Galick’s
journeymen. Moreover, Durieux and Oakes testified that various other documents Respondent
submitted reflect that Respondent’s employees performed journeyman work under the BTA after
June 2005, and many would have required at least two employees.32 Galigher conceded that
additional documents he submitted indicate the performance of BTA journeyman work
(architectural) after that time.33

28 See GC Exh. 1(e), second amended charge, filed on November 23, 2005. This allegation
was not included in the third amended charge, filed on December 28, 2005 (GC Exh. 1(f)).
29 Tr. 626.
30 See Jt. Exh. 6.
31 Jt. Exh. 15u & g.
32 See, e.g., Jt. Exhs. 11(b) & (c), 24, 25 (a) & (c), 31(c), (d), (g), (h), & (p).
33 Jt. Exhs. 6(g), 8, 9, 10, & 32(a).
JD–41–07
Thus, since June 2005, Respondent has continued to perform all types of sheet metal
fabricating and installation and to sell sheet metal product “out of the door,” including product
that comes under the definition of “architectural.” As an example, it currently fabricates
architectural sheet metal for Hicks Roofing, one of Galick’s biggest customers in June 2005.
Joint Exhibits 35 – 37 further show that the total dollar amount of Respondent’s business
increased from $858,060 in 2004 to $965,905 in 2005 and to at least $1,104,880 in 2006.34
Respondent’s Exhibit 1, compiled from Joint Exhibit 15, shows that direct labor costs for all
employees, excluding Galigher and secretary-bookkeeper Pearch, were $203,334 in 2004,
$179,281 in 2005, and $193,864 in 2006. Payroll records contained in Joint Exhibit 15 reflect
the following combined overtime pay for Ed, Jake, Gray, and Paternoster: $2,99835 in 2003,
$12,644 in 2004, $15,757 in 2005, and $13,006 in 2006.
Based on the above, I find that Respondent since June 2005 has continued to perform a
substantial quantum of work that was classified as journeyman under the BTA and which its
journeymen performed in the past.
Analysis and Conclusions
Failure to Recall Journeymen Because of Their Union Activities
The framework for analysis of allegations of discrimination under Section 8(a) (3) is
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S.
989 (1982). Under Wright Line, the General Counsel must make a prima facie showing
sufficient to support an inference that the employee’s protected conduct motivated an
employer’s adverse action. The General Counsel must demonstrate, either by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that the employee engaged in protected conduct, the employer knew or
suspected the employee engaged in such conduct, the employer harbored animus, and the
employer took action because of this animus.
The big problem with this allegation is that prior to April 7, 2005, when the journeymen’s
support of the Union was made known to Respondent, three of the four of them had already
been laid off, and no ULP charges or grievances were ever filed concerning their layoffs.
Furthermore, as to Cottis, who was laid off on April 7, 2005, the General Counsel has not
alleged his layoff to be unlawful.
Galigher’s statements that he would be turning over the business to his sons and that
they did not wish to be union were not alleged to violate Section 8(a) (1), and I conclude that
they failed to rise to the level of establishing animus. I note that after Galigher made those
statements, he entered into a stipulated election agreement. No other express animus has
been averred, nor are circumstances present that would raise an inference of discriminatory
motive. Even assuming animus, it cannot be established that Respondent’s actions were based
thereon since, as discussed below, Respondent had a longstanding practice of using lower-paid
production employees to perform journeyman work.

34 Respondent could not locate several invoices for 2006.
35 Gray’s overtime amount in 2003 was based on adding the fourth quarter to the first three,
because the year-end total given for him was inaccurate. See Joint Exhibit 15j.
JD–41–07
I conclude, therefore, that the General Counsel has not made out a prima facie case of
discriminatory failure to recall journeymen. Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of this
allegation.
Unilateral Change in Working Conditions
The General Counsel alleges that since on about June 3, 2005, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by assigning bargaining unit (journeyman) work to nonbargaining unit
(production) employees, without affording the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain. I
conclude that this allegation is barred by Section 10(b) of the Act, which precludes the finding of
a violation based on alleged misconduct that occurred over 6 months prior to the filing of a
charge.
The 6-month statute of limitations begins to run when a party has clear and unequivocal
notice of a violation of the Act, which notice may be actual or constructive. St. George
Warehouse, Inc., 341 NLRB 904, 905 (2004); CAB Associates, 340 NLRB No. 171, slip op. at 2
(2003). In determining whether a party was on constructive notice, the inquiry is whether the
party should have become aware of a violation in the exercise of reasonable diligence. St.
George Warehouse, Inc., id.; CAB Associates, id. Failure to exercise such diligence results in a
10(b) bar. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1433 (Phoenix Transit System), 335 NLRB 1263
fn. 2 (2001); Mathews-Carlsen Body Works, Inc., 325 NLRB 661 fn. 2 (1998); Moeller Brothers.
Body Shop, Inc., 306 NLRB 191, 192 (1992).
I conclude that the Union was on constructive notice of Respondent’s practice of using
production workers to perform journeyman work. Galigher filed with the Union monthly reports
on employees’ compensation, which showed pay based on employee classification. Moreover,
there were union members’ dues receipt records and pension statements that also reflected
classification. Indeed, in approximately August 2004, Oakes admittedly ascertained that Ed and
Jake were production employees by checking Respondent’s monthly report records in the
Union’s possession. In May and July 2004, three of Respondent’s remaining journeymen were
laid off, leaving Respondent with three production employees and only one journeyman. The
monthly reports that Respondent provided to the Union reflected such layoffs and certainly
should have been a red flag triggering further investigation of Respondent’s operations. The
situation is analogous to that in Courier-Journal, 342 NLRB 1093 (2004) (Courier-Journal I).
Therein, the Board found constructive notice to the union when, although the employer did not
give the union official notice of increased health insurance premiums, the change was reflected
in the greater amounts withheld for health insurance on the pay stubs of union employees.
This is not a situation where Respondent attempted to conceal or deceive the Union
concerning its use of production employees to perform journeyman work starting in 1991.
Rather, “mere observation” of Respondent’s operations by the Union would have revealed years
before 2005 that Respondent was engaging in this practice. See Moeller Brothers Body Shop,
supra at 192; contrast, Michael Konig T/A Nursing Center at Vineland, 318 NLRB 337, 339
(1995).
In sum, by exercising reasonable diligence, the Union would have known far before
August 2004 that Respondent was using production employees to perform journeyman work.
However, I need not rely on constructive notice alone to find a 10(b) bar. Thus, the Union
admittedly had actual notice of this by around August 2004, approximately a year before the
original charge in Case 8–CA–36070 was filed on August 22, 2005.
JD–41–07
Significantly, the Union’s stated objection all along has been to Respondent’s production
employees performing any journeyman work, even if they worked on jobsites with journeymen.
Thus, it is immaterial that the production employees in earlier years did journeyman work
together with journeymen and later performed such work more and more on their own. By
August 2004, a year before the original charge was filed, only one journeyman was still
employed, with production employees performing independently the remainder of journeyman
work. In essence, the unilateral change of using production workers to perform journeyman
work had already ripened outside the 10(b) period into an existing term and condition of
employment for journeymen. See Courier-Journal, 342 NLRB 1148 (2004) (Courier-Journal II).
For the above reasons, I conclude that the allegation of unilateral change should be
dismissed under Section 10 (b), as untimely filed.
August 2005 Information Request
An employer is obliged to supply information requested by a collective-bargaining
representative that is necessary and relevant to the latter’s performance of its responsibilities to
the employees it represents. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
Although an employer need not automatically comply with a union’s information request,
with its duty to provide such turning on the circumstances of the particular case, Detroit Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314 (1979), requested information that relates directly to the terms
and conditions of represented employees is presumptively relevant. Beverly Health &
Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 328 NLRB 885, 888 (1999); Samaritan Medical Center, 319 NLRB
392, 397 (1995). The Board applies a liberal, discovery-type standard in determining what
requests for information must be honored. Raley’s Supermarket, 349 NLRB No. 7 at p. 3
(2007); U.S. Postal Service., 337 NLRB 820, 822 (2002); Brazos Electric Power Co-op, Inc.,
241 NLRB 1016, 1018 (1979). Thus, the requested information need only be potentially
relevant to the issues for which it is sought. Pennsylvania Power Co., 301 NLRB 1104, 1104–
1105 (1991); Conrock Co., 263 NLRB 1293, 1294 (1982).
A union is not required to make a specific showing of relevance unless Respondent had
rebutted the presumption of such. See Southern California Gas Co., 346 NLRB No. 45 at p. 1
(2006); Mathews Readymix, Inc., 324 NLRB 1005, 1009 (1997), enfd. in relevant part, 165 F.3d
74 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB 987, 991 (1975), enfd. 531 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir.
1976).

Oakes’ August 12, 2005 information request was premised on the mistaken but good
faith belief that since Respondent had terminated the production agreement, all work covered
thereunder reverted to coverage under the BTA (and was to be performed by journeymen,
rather than by production employees). In order to effectuate “a smooth transition from the
production agreement to the BTA,” he requested information relating to work performed since
June 1, current employees, and future projects.
Regardless of Oakes’ error, the Union, pursuant to a stipulated election agreement, had
been certified as the collective-bargaining representative of what were at the time laid-off
journeymen. The information he sought about current employees and current and future work
certainly was presumptively relevant, since it related to whether Respondent would have work
for journeymen and clearly impacted their prospects for recall.
JD–41–07
Mid-States Construction, 270 NLRB 847, 849 (1984), cited by Respondent, is
distinguishable. The Board held therein that an employer was not required to comply with a
union’s information request when the request was premised on the erroneous assumption that
the employer had adopted a multi-employer association agreement with the union. However,
nothing in the decision indicates that the union had been certified as the collective-bargaining
representative of the employer’s employees, in contrast to the situation here.
Therefore, aside from any connection to the BTA, the information request was relevant
to the Union’s representation of bargaining-unit employees who might be recalled in the future.
Accordingly, by failing and refusing to provide the Union with the requested information,
Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
Withdrawal of Recognition and August 2006 Information Request
I will first address Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition. Respondent contends that it
was free to withdraw recognition because the unit consisted of one or no employee, the laid-off
journeymen having no reasonable expectancy of recall because of lack of journeyman work.
Respondent has also asserted that the Union somehow waived its right to further bargaining in
2006 by not taking any steps to negotiate after August 2005.
The argument that there is no viable unit for the Union to represent fails. By signing the
election agreement, Respondent stipulated that a unit including building trades journeymen
was appropriate, and it implicitly agreed that at the time its four laid-off journeymen had a
reasonable expectancy of recall—the Boards’ longstanding test for determining whether
employees on layoff status are eligible to vote. See, e.g., Laneco Construction Systems, Inc.,
339 NLRB 1048, 1049 (2003); Apex Paper Box Co., 302 NLRB 67, 68 (1991). Respondent
confirmed this when it did not challenge their ballots.
The Board has adopted the principle that when parties stipulate the unit in which an
election is held, they are held to their agreements, as any other party is held to an agreement.
See Premier Living Center, 331 NLRB 123 (2000) (in earlier proceeding, “The Board specifically
relied on the hearing officer’s finding that the Employer is bound by the Stipulated Election
Agreement”); Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 246 NLRB 547, 548 (1979); Graham Ford,
Inc., 224 NLRB 927, 927–928 (1976). In agreeing with this precept, the Fifth Court of Appeals
aptly stated in Shore Line Enterprises of America v. NLRB, 262 F.2d 933, 943 (1959):
[A] company and a union must be held to their agreements, as any other party is held to
an agreement. In cases involving a pre-election resolution of eligibility, issues between
a company and a union it is especially important to hold the parties to their contract. To
permit either to repudiate a pre-election agreement and redefine the eligible members of
a bargaining unit, after an election has been held, would enfeeble the consent election
procedure . . . . The company cannot play fast and loose with a pre-election agreement
and a stipulated eligibility list.
Respondent cannot rely on alleged lack of work for journeyman to justify retracting its
earlier agreement that the layoffs were only temporary in nature and that journeymen had a
reasonable possibility of recall. Its own records do not demonstrate that there has been any
decline in the volume of its business or significant change in the nature of its work since.
JD–41–07
On the contrary, invoice summaries contained in Joint Exhibits 32(g), 34, and 35 – 37,
as well as other records that Respondent submitted, reflect increasing business from 2005 to
2006. In this regard, Respondent’s direct labor costs for employees other than Galigher and his
secretary-bookkeeper rose from 2005 to 2006. Respondent’s three production workers hired
before 2005 (Ed, Jake, and Gray) have continued to perform work that was journeyman work
under the BTA. Moreover, Respondent hired at least one additional employee, Paternoster
who, Respondent admitted, has also performed such. It is noteworthy that Paternoster was
hired as a temporary employee but was later made permanent and that he worked over 900
hours more in 2006 (at $9/hour) than he did in 2005 (at $7/hour), not even considering his
overtime pay.
I therefore conclude that Respondent is estopped from relying on its assertion that the
layoffs have become permanent and, for that reason, it has one or no employees in the
bargaining unit.
I further note that in evaluating whether a respondent has unlawfully withdrawn
recognition, the Board requires that the respondent show that the union had lost its majority
status at the time that it withdrew recognition. Highlands Regional Medical Center, 347 NLRB
No. 120 (2006), citing Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717 (2001). Respondent
has proffered no such evidence at any time.
Respondent’s waiver argument also lacks merit. There is no showing that the Union
acted in bad faith in taking the position that Respondent was bound to the successor BTA, in
filing a charge contending such, or in exercising its legal right to have the issue adjudicated first
by the Region and then by the Office of Appeals. Significantly, less than a month after the
Union received the denial of its appeal, affirming the Region’s decision that Respondent had
withdrawn from the multi-employer association, it requested that Galicks engage in negotiating a
single-employer agreement.
For the above reasons, I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by withdrawing recognition of the Union as the bargaining representative of a unit of
journeymen on September 7, 2006, and thereafter failing and refusing to meet and bargain with
the Union over the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement.
Turning to the Union’s August 23, 2006 request for information, I set out above the law
on the subject. In this request, Oakes asked for the following for the purpose of negotiating a
single-employer agreement, as per the General Counsel’s determination: a list of current
employees; current company personal policies, practices, or procedures; a statement of
company fringe benefit plans not sponsored by the Union; copies of company wage or salary
plans; current projects, including shop and field work; a list of all work completed since June 1,
2005; and a list of all future projects.
For the reasons previously stated with regard to the August 2005 information request, I
conclude that the information requested in August 2006 was necessary and relevant to the
Union’s representation of the unit of journeymen and that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) by failing and refusing to provide it.
JD–41–07
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By the following conduct, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and violated Section 8(a) (5)
and (1) of the Act:
(a) Failed and refused to provide the Union with information the Union requested that
was necessary and relevant to the Union’s representation of unit employees.
(b) Withdrew recognition from the Union as the representative of unit employees and
thereafter failed and refused to meet and bargain with it over the terms of a collective-bargaining
agreement.
Remedy
Because Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it must be ordered to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Respondent stipulated that a unit including building trades journeymen was
appropriate, and it did not challenge the eligibility of the four laid-off journeymen to vote. By
such conduct, Respondent conceded that it engaged in, or had a reasonable expectation that it
would engage in, work considered journeyman under the BTA. Indeed, Respondent has
continuously done such work since June 2005—having four nonjourneymen, rather than
journeymen, perform it. The stipulation essentially defined journeyman work independently of
any prospective collective-bargaining agreement that Respondent and the Union might later
negotiate. In this particular set of circumstances, I deem it appropriate to order the following:
Respondent shall set up a preferential hiring list of the laid-off journeymen who voted in the
election and recall them in order of seniority should Respondent have enough building trades
journeyman work to warrant hiring new employees to perform it, unless and until Respondent
reaches a contrary agreement with the Union.

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended36
ORDER
Respondent, Galicks, Inc., New Philadelphia, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from

36 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in
Section 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–41–07
(a) Failing and refusing to provide the Union with information the Union requests that is
necessary and relevant to its role as the certified collective-bargaining representative of unit
employees.
(b) Withdrawing recognition from the Union as the certified collective-bargaining
representative of unit employees, and failing and refusing to meet and bargain with it over the
terms of a collective-bargaining agreement covering those employees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights Section 7 of the Act guarantees to them.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of unit
employees and, on request, meet and negotiate with the Union over the terms of a collective-
bargaining agreement covering those employees.
(b) Furnish the Union with the information it requested about current jobs and
employees, future jobs, company wages and fringe benefits, and company personnel policies.
(b) Establish a preferential hiring list of laid-off journeymen and recall them in order of
seniority should Respondent have enough building trades journeyman work to warrant hiring
new employees to perform it, unless and until Respondent reaches a contrary agreement with
the Union.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in New Philadelphia,
Ohio, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”37 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being signed by Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all
current employees and former employees employed by Respondent at any time since August
12, 2005.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 20, 2007.
____________________
Ira Sandron
Administrative Law Judge

37 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words
in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read
“Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.”
JD–41–07
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES EMPLOYEES THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 33 of Northern Ohio,
AFL-CIO (the Union) is the certified bargaining representative of a unit of building trades
(siding/decking journeymen) and sheet metal journeymen and apprentices employees (the unit).
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of unit employees, unless a majority of those employees tell us they no longer
wish representation.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to meet and bargain with the Union, on its request, over
the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement covering unit employees.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to provide the Union with information it requests that
relates to its ability to negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement concerning unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as set forth at
the top of this notice.
WE WILL recognize the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
unit employees, and WE WILL, on its request, meet and bargain with it over the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement covering unit employees.
WE WILL furnish the Union with the information it requested about our current work and
employees, future work, company wages and fringe benefits, and company personnel policies,
since such information relates to the Union’s ability to negotiate an agreement concerning unit
employees.
WE WILL establish a preferential hiring list of our laid-off journeymen and recall them in
order of seniority should we have enough building trades journeyman work to warrant hiring new
employees to perform it, unless and until we reach a contrary agreement with the Union.

GALICKS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
JD–41–07
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
1240 East 9th Street, Federal Building, Room 1695
Cleveland, Ohio 44199-2086
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
216-522-3716.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 216-522-3723.