Gabriel Krajicek et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 1, 2020

2020004710 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/171,289 07/10/2008 Gabriel Michael Krajicek 3004-P001US 2671
75589 7590 12/01/2020
Matheson Keys & Kordzik PLLC
7004 Bee Cave Rd.
Bldg. 1, Suite 110
Austin, TX 78746
EXAMINER
POE, KEVIN T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3692
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
jkeys@mathesonkeys.com
kkordzik@mathesonkeys.com
smaze@mathesonkeys.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GABRIEL MICHAEL KRAJICEK,
DONALD GORDON SHAFER, TIMOTHY LEROY EISENMAN, and
PAUL RUDOLPH BARTON
Appeal 2020-004710
Application 12/171,289
Technology Center 3600

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 46–68 and 70–88. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Kasasa, Ltd. Appeal
Brief 3, filed February 24, 2020 (Appeal Br.).
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BACKGROUND
This patent application concerns “determining the interest rate and
amount to pay or accredit to an interest bearing account which may qualify
for alternate interest rates based upon transactional and qualifying factors.”
Specification ¶ 3, filed July 10, 2008 (Spec.). Claim 46 illustrates the
claimed subject matter:
46. A computer-implemented method for applying alternate
interest rates to accounts at a financial institution, the method
comprising:
(a) providing an interest rate plan for applying interest
rates to a demand deposit account at the financial institution
comprising
(i) a plurality of tiers for the demand deposit
account, wherein each of the tiers correspond to account
balance ranges,
(ii) non-zero base rates comprising a non-zero base
rate for each tier in the plurality of tiers,
(iii) one or more rate levels, wherein
(A) each of the rate levels has qualification
criteria associated therewith,
(B) the qualification criteria for each of the
rate levels comprises at least one account level
qualification criteria and at least one account
transaction activity qualification criteria,
(C) for each rate level, each tier in the
plurality of tiers has an alternate interest rate, and
(D) for each rate level, a first tier in the
plurality of tiers has a first alternate interest rate that
is a higher-than market interest rate;
(b) designating the demand deposit account to receive
interest based on said interest rate plan;
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(c) providing an application program for implementing the
method in communication with a core processor system for the
financial institution over a communications network;
(d) associating the core processor system with a rate type
from a plurality of rate types that is suitable for communicating
the one or more rate levels to the core processor system;
(e) providing at least one memory accessible by the
application program that includes:
(i) the interest rate plan;
(ii) a qualification cycle date range associated with
the interest rate plan;
(iii) account level qualification criteria for the one
or more rate levels for the financial institution; and
(iv) account transaction activity qualification
criteria for the one or more rate levels for the financial
institution;
(f) accessing, via the application program, the
qualification cycle date range associated with said interest rate
plan;
(g) accessing, via the application program, (i) the
qualification criteria for the one or more rate levels and (ii)
account criteria data for the designated demand deposit account
during the qualification cycle date range;
(h) determining whether the account criteria data for the
designated demand deposit account qualifies the demand deposit
account for the application of the non-zero base rates for an
accounting period;
(i) determining, via the application program, whether the
account criteria data for the designated demand deposit account
meets the qualification criteria for one of the one or more rate
levels for the qualification cycle date range;
(j) upon determining that the account criteria data for the
designated demand deposit account meets the qualification
criteria for the one of the one or more rate levels for the
qualification cycle date range, instructing the core processor
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system to apply the alternate interest rates for the determined rate
level to the designated demand deposit account for the
accounting period wherein the instructing includes converting
the determined rate level into a code for the core processor using
the associated rate type, generating an instruction that includes
the code, and sending the instruction to the core processor system
to adjust the interest paid or accrued by the core processor system
for the demand deposit account;
(k) upon determining (i) that the account criteria data for
the designated demand deposit account does not meet the
qualification criteria for any of the one or more rate levels of the
interest rate plan, and (ii) that the account criteria data for the
designated demand deposit account qualifies for the application
of the non-zero base rates, instructing the core processor system
to apply the non-zero base rates to the designated demand deposit
account for the accounting period.
Appeal Br. 60–62.
REJECTION
Claims 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis
46–68, 70–88 101 Eligibility
DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection and Appellant’s
arguments, and Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner erred. As
consistent with the discussion below, we adopt the Examiner’s reasoning,
findings, and conclusions on pages 2–13 of the Final Office Action mailed
October 30, 2019 (Final Act.), and pages 3–14 of the Examiner’s Answer
mailed April 6, 2020 (Ans.).
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
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Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories,
the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first
to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible
concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of
[the] claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)).
That is, we examine the claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The United States Patent and Trademark Office has revised its
guidance about this framework. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (Revised Guidance).
Under the Revised Guidance, to decide whether a claim is directed to an
abstract idea, we evaluate (1) whether the claim recites subject matter that
falls within one of the abstract idea categories listed in the Revised
Guidance, and if so, (2) whether the claim fails to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51, 54; see also USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
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Eligibility at 1–2, 10–15, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (October SME Update) (providing
additional guidance on determining whether a claim recites a judicial
exception and integrates a judicial exception into a practical application). If
the claim is directed to an abstract idea, as noted above, we then determine
whether the claim has an inventive concept. The Revised Guidance explains
that when making this determination, we should consider whether the
additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field” or “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With this framework in mind, we turn to the § 101 rejection. We
begin our analysis with independent claim 46.
Claim 46
Directed To
The Revised Guidance identifies three categories of abstract ideas:
mathematical concepts, mental processes, and certain methods of organizing
human activity such as fundamental economic principles or practices and
commercial or legal interactions. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The
Examiner determined that claim 46 recites subject matter that falls into at
least the category of certain methods of organizing human activity. See Final
Act. 3. (determining that claim 46 recites “activity . . . considered to be a
fundamental economic practice, a method of organizing human activity[,]
and/or an idea of itself”).
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We agree. Claim 46 recites “[a] computer-implemented method for
applying alternate interest rates to accounts at a financial institution” that
includes steps (a)–(k). Appeal Br. 60–62. After several preparatory steps
(steps (a)–(g)), the claimed method determines whether an account qualifies
for a rate level or non-zero base rates (steps (h) and (i)). See Appeal Br. 60–
61. If the account qualifies for a rate level, the method instructs a core
processor system to apply an alternate interest rate for the determined rate
level to the account (step (j)). See Appeal Br. 62. If not, and the claimed
method determines that the account qualifies for non-zero base rates, the
method instructs the core processor system to apply the non-zero base rates
to the account (step (k)). See Appeal Br. 62. Appellant equates the recited
“core processor system” to the “core processor” disclosed in the written
description. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 5 (mapping the claimed “core processor
system” to the “core processor” disclosed in the written description). The
written description teaches that a “‘core processor’ is a term of art in the
financial services industry” that “refers to a processing system that
specializes in account transactional reconciliation.” Spec. ¶ 6. The written
description also teaches that a core processor encompasses both in-house
and third-party core processing services. See Spec. ¶ 7.
The recited method of applying alternate interest rates is analogous to
the patent-ineligible concept of intermediated settlement in Alice. Like the
concept of intermediated settlement, determining what interest rate to apply
to an account is “a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our
system of commerce.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010)); see also Spec. ¶ 4 (discussing known methods of
applying interest rates). So too is the use of an intermediary processing
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system like the recited core processor system to perform commercial
functions. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 220 (“The use of a third-party intermediary
(or ‘clearing house’) is also a building block of the modern economy.”);
Spec. ¶¶ 6–7 (discussing known core processors). The recited method
therefore encompasses a fundamental economic principle or practice, which
falls into the category of certain methods of organizing human activity under
the Revised Guidance, see Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Moreover, the method recited in claim 46 is analogous to other
business practices that courts have determined are abstract ideas. See, e.g., In
re Greenstein, 774 F. App’x 661, 664 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (allocating
investment returns); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath Beyond, 876 F.3d
1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (local processing of payments for remotely
purchased goods); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA),
792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (tracking financial transactions to
determine whether they exceed a pre-set spending limit); Dealertrack v.
Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (processing information
through a clearinghouse). Such business practices also fall into the category
of certain methods of organizing human activity. See Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52; October SME Update at 4–6.
Claim 46 also recites mental processes. Mental processes include acts
that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper. See, e.g.,
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (determining that “unpatentable mental processes are the subject
matter of” a claim when the claim’s “method steps can be performed in the
human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper”); see also Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 & nn.14–15. At least steps (a), (b), (d), and
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(f)–(i) of claim 46 are recited at such a high level of generality that they
encompass acts that people can perform in their minds or using pen and
paper. Step (a) recites providing an interest rate plan; step (b), designating
the demand deposit account to receive interest based on the interest rate
plan; and step (d), associating the core processor system with a rate type. See
Appeal Br. 60–61. People can perform these steps by writing the interest rate
plan on a piece of paper, mentally selecting a demand deposit account that
will receive interest based on the interest plan, and mentally linking the core
processor system to a rate type. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373
(determining that a method step “is so broadly worded that it encompasses
literally any method for” performing the step, including “even logical
reasoning that can be performed entirely in the human mind”); Synopsys,
Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he limited, straightforward nature of the steps involved in the claimed
method make evident that a skilled artisan could perform the steps
mentally.”).
Steps (f) and (g) require accessing a qualification cycle date range and
qualification and account criteria. See Appeal Br. 61. People can access this
information by, for example, reading it from a database. See, e.g.,
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (determining that that a method step that
“requires ‘obtaining information about other transactions that have utilized
an Internet address that is identified with the [ ] credit card transaction’—can
be performed by a human who simply reads records of Internet credit card
transactions from a preexisting database” (alteration in original)). And even
if steps (f) and (g) did not recite mental processes, these steps alone would
not make claim 46 patent eligible because they simply gather data. See, e.g.,
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CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (explaining that “data-gathering steps cannot
alone confer patentability”). Finally, steps (h) and (i) recite determining
whether account criteria data for the demand deposit account qualify the
account for non-zero base rates or one or more rate levels. See Appeal
Br. 61–62. People can make these determinations by mentally comparing the
account criteria data to the qualification criteria. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1373; Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1148.
Because at least steps (a), (b), (d), and (f)–(i) encompass acts that
people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper, claim 46 recites
mental processes. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372. This true even
though some of these steps expressly call for computer software such as an
“application program” to perform the recited function. The written
description describes the application program in largely functional, result-
oriented terms and provides few technical details about the program. See,
e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 65–68 (discussing the application program). The lack of
technical details about the application program shows that it encompasses
generic computer software. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie
Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile
interface is so lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a
generic component (software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the
performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific
resources.”). This type of generic computer implementation does not place a
claim outside the mental processes category of abstract ideas. See, e.g.,
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (determining that the claims at issue are directed to an abstract
idea when “with the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there
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is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper”); CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson.”); see also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14
(“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance
in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is
still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be
performed in the mind.”).
Because we determine that claim 46 recites abstract ideas, we next
consider whether claim 46 integrates the abstract ideas into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. In doing so, we
evaluate the claim as a whole to determine whether the claim “integrate[s]
the [abstract ideas] into a practical application, using one or more of the
considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also October SME Update at 12
(discussing the practical application analysis). That is, we consider any
additional elements recited in the claim along with the limitations that recite
an abstract idea to determine whether the claim integrates the abstract ideas
into a practical application. See October SME Update at 12.
The Examiner determined that the additional elements recited in claim
46 include software and hardware components such as the recited
“application program,” “core processor system,” and “communications
network.” See Final Act. 6–10; Ans. 3–6. The Examiner determined that the
additional elements, considered with the limitations that recite an abstract
idea, do not integrate the identified abstract ideas into a practical application.
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See Final Act. 4–5, 9–10; Ans. 7. The Examiner explained that claim 46
recites the additional elements “at a high level of generality” and that the
additional elements “amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the
[abstract ideas] using generic computer components.” Final Act. 5.
We agree. In addition to the certain methods of organizing human
activity and mental processes discussed above, claim 46 recites “an
application program . . . in communication with a core processor system for
the financial institution over a communications network” and “at least one
memory accessible by the application program.” Appeal Br. 61–62. As
already discussed, the written description describes the application program
in a way that indicates that the application program encompasses generic
computer software. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 65–68; see also Erie Indem. Co., 850
F.3d at 1331. The written description also indicates that the application
program uses generic network technology to communicate with the core
processor. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 112 (explaining that “means for communicating
with a financial institution or financial data processing data center may
include locally proximate computer network structures such as data busses,
intranets, and local area computer networks as well as remote computer
network architectures such as wide area networks, leased telephone lines,
and the Internet, the means being well understood to one of ordinary skill in
the art of computer network communications”). The written description
indicates that the core processor system and memory also encompass generic
components. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 67 (disclosing that “third-party core processor
30 . . . [has] suitable computer systems and communications devices to
receive, interpret, and process the instructions received from computer
system 1”); see also Spec. ¶ 66 (describing an embodiment of computer
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system 1 that includes memory 2 that “stores tables or other data”), Figs. 1A
(showing an example computer system 1 that includes memory 2).
Considering the additional elements along with the limitations that
recite an abstract idea, both individually and as an ordered combination, we
agree with the Examiner that claim 46 does not integrate the recited abstract
ideas into a practical application. The claimed method simply uses generic
computer components to implement the recited abstract ideas. See Appeal
Br. 60–62. Using generic computer components in this way does not
integrate an abstract idea into a practical application. See, e.g., Alice, 573
U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally
the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that
the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea] itself.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)); Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859
F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our prior cases have made clear that
mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.”); Capital One
Bank, 792 F.3d at 1370 (“Steps that do nothing more than spell out what it
means to ‘apply it on a computer’ cannot confer patent-eligibility.”).
Because claim 46 recites abstract ideas and does not integrate the abstract
ideas into a practical application, we determine that claim 46 is directed to
abstract ideas.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us otherwise. Appellant
asserts that the Examiner relied on “on unsupported and incorrect factual
allegations relating to the pending claims as interpreted in light of the
specification” and the declaration of Gabriel Krajicek, one of the named
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inventors of the claimed subject matter. Appeal Br. 20. Appellant argues that
when determining whether claim 46 recites an abstract idea, the Examiner
“simply set[] out the entirety of” the claim “and then provide[d] conclusory
factually unsupported and/or incorrect statements, without the analysis
required by judicial precedent or USPTO guidance.” Appeal Br. 22.
Appellant also contends that when determining whether claim 46 integrates
the identified abstract idea into a practical application, the Examiner
(1) ignored certain limitations and “additional software-based elements”; (2)
failed again to address the limitations of claim 46 “in combination in light of
the specification and the Krajicek Declaration”; and (3) “fail[ed] to set out
the more detailed analysis required by the” Revised Guidance. Appeal
Br. 23–26 (emphasis omitted and capitalization modified); see also Reply
Brief 2–3, filed June 5, 2020 (Reply Br.) (making similar arguments).
We disagree. When determining whether claim 46 recites an abstract
idea, the Examiner identified the limitations of claim 46 that recite an
abstract idea, see, e.g., Final Act. 6–9 (bolding the limitations that recite an
abstract idea); Ans. 3–6 (bolding certain limitations and explaining that
“[t]hese limitations (with the exception of the unbolded limitations) describe
an abstract idea of paying alternate interest rates”), and explained why they
do so. The Examiner explained that the activity recited in claim 46—“paying
alternate interest rates”—is a “fundamental economic practice,” “method of
organizing human activity,” and “an idea of itself” and thus the claim recites
an abstract idea. Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 6 (explaining that claim 46
recites the “abstract idea of paying alternate interest rates and corresponds to
certain methods of organizing human activity (commercial or legal
interactions)” (capitalization modified)). That is sufficient to show that claim
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46 recites an abstract idea. See, e.g., October SME Update at 16 (explaining
that examiners “should identify the” abstract idea “by referring to what is
recited . . . in the claim and explaining why it is considered to be an” abstract
idea and that “[t]here is no requirement for the examiner to provide further
support, such as publications or an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR
1.104(d)(2), for the conclusion that a claim recites a judicial exception”
(emphases omitted)).
As for the Examiner’s practical application analysis, the Examiner did
not ignore the elements and limitations identified by the Appellant. Rather,
the Examiner explicitly categorized each of these elements and limitations as
either part of the abstract ideas or an additional element. Compare Final
Act. 6–9 (bolding the elements and limitations that recite an abstract idea),
and Ans. 3–6 (same), with Appeal Br. 23, 24 (identifying the elements and
limitations that the Examiner allegedly ignored). And although Appellant
asserts that claim 46 includes additional elements that the Examiner failed to
identify, see Appeal Br. 23; Reply Br. 3, Appellant has not persuasively
explained why these elements fall outside the abstract ideas identified by the
Examiner. Many of these elements (the interest plan, qualification criteria,
and qualification cycle data range, for example) are simply information, and
information is abstract. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Information as such is an intangible.
Accordingly, we have treated collecting information, including when limited
to particular content (which does not change its character as information), as
within the realm of abstract ideas.” (citations omitted)); see also Digitech
Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (“Data in its ethereal, non-physical form is simply information
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that does not fall under any of the categories of eligible subject matter under
section 101.”).
Appellant asserts that the additional elements recited in claim 46 also
include the software allegedly required to perform the functions recited in
steps (d) and (j). See Appeal Br. 23. But unlike steps (f), (g), and (i) that
expressly call for an application program to perform the functions recited in
those steps, steps (d) and (j) do not explicitly recite who or what performs
the associating and converting called for in these steps. See Appeal Br. 61,
62. Even assuming that steps (d) and (j) implicitly require that software
perform these functions, the lack of technical details about the software in
the written description indicates that the software is generic. See, e.g., Erie
Indem. Co., 850 F.3d at 1331. Using generic computer software to execute
abstract ideas does not integrate those abstract ideas into a practical
application. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24; Credit Acceptance, 859
F.3d at 1055; Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d at 1370.
After categorizing the limitations recited in claim 46, the Examiner
then considered whether the claim integrates the recited abstract ideas into a
practical application. See Final Act. 3–5, 9–12; Ans. 7–10. This approach
follows the Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55
(explaining that examiners should “evaluate integration into a practical
application by . . . [i]dentifying whether there are any additional elements
recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and “evaluating those
additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether
they integrate the exception into a practical application, using one or more of
the considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit”).
Finally, the Examiner considered Appellant’s arguments about the
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specification and the Krajicek Declaration but determined that claim 46
nevertheless is directed to abstract ideas. See, e.g., Ans. 7–10. For the
reasons discussed below, we see no error in this determination.
Appellant then argues that the Examiner “fail[ed] to cite any court
decision applicable to the specific combination of steps and limitations and
therefore . . . fail[ed] to consider the claim limitations of the rejected claims
in combination.” Appeal Br. 27. We disagree. The Examiner explicitly relied
on the cases discussed in Office guidance on subject matter eligibility and
the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure to support the Examiner’s
rejection. See, e.g., Final Act. 4–5 (citing USPTO, July 2015 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility at 4–5, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/ieg-july-2015-update.pdf; Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure § 2106). And for the reasons discussed above, the rationales in
several of the cases referenced in these sources—for example, Alice,
Dealertrack, and CyberSource—apply to claim 46. In any event, Appellant’s
conclusion does not follow from its premise. Even if the Examiner had failed
to cite applicable court decisions, that alone would not mean that the
Examiner had considered the claim limitations individually as argued by
Appellant.
Appellant also asserts that claim 46 is patent eligible because it
allegedly addresses the “technical challenge of . . . implementing the
invention on a computer” that communicates “over a network [with] a core
processor system that may be one of many different legacy core processor
systems that has hardware and programmed software interfaces that do not
have the technical capability of applying alternate reward interest rates based
upon the qualification criteria.” Appeal Br. 33. Appellant argues that the
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written description “makes clear that such technical improvements were
necessary in order to implement the new and nonobvious invention(s)
recited in the pending claim.” Appeal Br. 34 (emphasis omitted). Appellant
cites the Krajicek Declaration and parts of the written description in support
of this argument. See Appeal Br. 33–35. Appellant contends that claim 46 is
thus “directed to improvements to the technological processes and networks
used in the financial services data processing field.” Appeal Br. 33.
We disagree. Given the broad, result-oriented language of claim 46
and the lack of implementation details in the written description, claim 46
recites an abstract idea, not improvements to technological processes and
networks. Appellant identifies steps (d) and (j) as examples of steps that
address the technical challenge of communicating with different core
processor systems. See Appeal Br. 33. Step (d) recites associating the core
processor system with a rate type from a plurality of rate types. Appeal
Br. 61. Step (d) does not recite how the method associates the core processor
system with a rate type; step (d) merely recites that the method does so.
Similarly, step (j) recites instructing the core processor system to apply the
alternate interest rate by converting the determined rate level into a code
using the associated rate type, generating an instruction that includes the
code, and sending the instruction to the core processor system. See Appeal
Br. 62. Although step (j) adds more detail than step (d), as with step (d), step
(j) recites that the claimed method converts, generates, and sends
information but provides almost no implementation details for these steps.
The same is largely true of the remaining steps. See Appeal Br. 60–62.
These kind of broadly worded, result-oriented steps do not provide a
technological improvement. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
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One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (determining that the
claims at issue do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea
because the claims “merely describe the functions of the abstract idea itself,
without particularity”); Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (determining that a claim component “encompasses a
patent-ineligible abstract concept rather than an arguably technical
improvement” because the component “simply demands the production of a
desired result . . . without any limitation on how to produce that result”); In
re Gopalan, 809 F. App’x 942, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (determining that the
claims at issue “do not embody a concrete solution to a problem because
they lack the specificity required to transform a claim from one claiming
only a result to one claiming a way of achieving it” (quotation marks
omitted)); In re Rosenberg, 813 F. App’x 594, 597 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(determining that a claim recites “at best an improvement on an abstract
process itself and not a technical improvement, given the broad, non-specific
nature of the claim”); cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d
1084, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Trading Techs. I) (“The fact that the claims add
a degree of particularity as to how an order is placed in this case does not
impact our analysis at step one.”). Regardless, claim 46 recites the type of
electronic recordkeeping and automated instructions that courts have
determined are insufficient to transform an abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26 (determining that
neither “electronic recordkeeping—one of the most basic functions of a
computer” nor “the use of a computer to . . . issue automated instructions”
was enough to “transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”);
Credit Acceptance, 859 F.3d at 1056 (“We have found particularly that data
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processing to facilitate financing is a patent-ineligible abstract concept.”); cf.
Credit Acceptance, 859 F.3d at 1055 (determining that an “invention’s
communication between previously unconnected systems—the dealer’s
inventory database, a user credit information input terminal, and creditor
underwriting servers does not amount to an improvement in computer
technology” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
For its part, to the extent that the written description describes the
steps recited in the claimed method, the written description generally does so
in functional terms and provides few technical details about the recited steps.
For instance, for the associating recited in step (d), the written description
simply notes
that directing the core processor to apply a ‘rate’ in this context
refers to communicating a rate type. The rate (a.k.a. rate type) is
indicated by some aspect of the instruction, such as a code
included therein. That is, the core processor looks up a rate level
corresponding to the rate type communicated to the core
processor in the instruction. Further, the rate type may indicate a
rate plan.
Spec. ¶ 17; see also Appeal Br. 5 (mapping step (d) to paragraph 17 of the
written description). And for the converting, generating, and sending recited
in step (j), the written description discloses that “[t]he rate . . . is indicated by
some aspect of the instruction, such as a code included therein” and
“[d]irecting the core processor to apply one or more of the alternate interest
rates may be done by the remotely executing program sending an instruction
to the core processor.” Spec. ¶¶ 17, 18. The written description also
discloses that “the computer program application sends to the core processor
a flag or other instruction (e.g., code) that the account qualifies or does not
qualify for an alternate interest rate” and shows various embodiments of the
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disclosed system. Spec. ¶ 58, Figs. 1B, 1C; see also Appeal Br. 6 (mapping
step (j) to paragraphs 17, 18, and 58 of the written description, as well as
Figures 1B and 1C). The written description largely describes the remaining
steps in a similar functional manner. These functional descriptions are not
enough to show that claim 46 provides a technological improvement. See,
e.g., In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 615 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (explaining that “vague, functional descriptions” of claim components
in the written description are “are insufficient to transform the abstract idea
into a patent-eligible invention”).
The written description also undercuts Appellant’s argument that
claim 46 is directed to improved network technology. Instead of improving
network technology, the written description makes clear that the invention
uses known networks and network protocols. For example, the written
description teaches that in certain embodiments, “the means for account
qualification, determining the amount of interest to pay, and then paying the
amount due are all in the same internal system, often networked together
with well-established protocols. . . . [and] [travel] through well-understood
network systems such as an intranet or local area network exists.” Spec.
¶ 64 (emphases added). The written description further explains that in other
embodiments “the means for qualifying an account, determining an amount
to be paid, and paying the amount occurs between different computer
systems, some of which may be operated by different entities.” Spec. ¶ 64
“In such embodiments[, the] means for communications may be used that
are well understood in the art, including leased telephone lines, microwave
transmission, virtual private networks over the Internet and other commonly
understood methods.” Spec. ¶ 64 (emphasis added); see also Spec. ¶ 112
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(disclosing that “[t]he means for communicating with a financial institution
or financial data processing data center may include locally proximate
computer network structures such as data busses, intranets, and local area
computer networks as well as remote computer network architectures such
as wide area networks, leased telephone lines, and the Internet, the means
being well understood to one of ordinary skill in the art of computer network
communications”).
The parts of the written description identified by Appellant do not
lead to a different conclusion. To establish that claim 46 recites
technological improvements, Appellant points to statements in paragraphs 8,
11, 17, and 64 of the written description and the examples illustrated by the
discussion in paragraphs 91 and 92. See Appeal Br. 33–35. Paragraph 8
states that a need existed “to implement methods and systems to effectively
pay the desired amount of interest to the account holder based upon financial
institution-defined qualification criteria for a variety of software and
hardware environments.” Spec. ¶ 8. And paragraph 64 explains that
“[a]lthough the thought of an alternate interest-bearing account might seem
simple on its surface, implementation is not, especially when examining the
different data processing functions occurring at and among a financial
institution, a financial institution remote data processing center, and/or a
third-party core processor.” Spec. ¶ 64. Even if these statements are true,
they do not change that the written description provides almost no details
about how the claimed method performs the recited steps. Paragraphs 11 and
17 respectively explain that certain “[s]tatements herein . . . are intended to
imply determination or application of any of an unlimited number of interest
rates based on account holder satisfaction of an unlimited number of
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qualification criteria” and provide guidance on the terms “rate level” and
“rate type.” Spec. ¶¶ 11, 17. But as with paragraphs 8 and 64, paragraphs 11
and 17 do not meaningfully explain how the claimed method performs the
recited steps.
Paragraphs 91 and 92 provide another instance of the written
description describing the disclosed invention in functional terms. Paragraph
91 discloses that an exemplary embodiment of the invention creates
transactions that instruct the core processor to adjust the amount of interest
paid or accrued. See Spec. ¶ 91. Crucially, paragraph 91 does not explain
how the disclosed invention creates these transactions or indicate that
creating these transactions involves anything other than generic computer
implementation. Paragraph 92 discloses that at the end of the disclosed
process a “credit upload, a debit upload, or no upload transaction exists” and
that the process can be repeated “so as to aggregate a series of debit and
credit upload transactions to be transmitted by conventional means to a core
processor for batch account interest adjustment.” Spec. ¶ 92. As with
paragraph 91, paragraph 92 does not explain how the claimed method
performs the recited method. And paragraph 92 underscores that the claimed
invention uses conventional communication means. As for the remaining
examples, Appellant has not specifically identified anything in these
examples that indicates a technological improvement.
As to the Krajicek Declaration, Appellant does not cite a particular
potion of the declaration in support of Appellant’s argument. See, e.g.,
Appeal Br. 33. Regardless, the declaration does not establish that the
claimed invention provides a technological improvement. The declaration
explains that the inventors created a “reward checking” financial product
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that satisfied a Federal Reserve regulation about paying interest on customer
accounts, unlike an earlier reward product. See Krajicek Declaration ¶¶ 3–8.
This is, at best, an improvement to an abstract business or commercial
practice, not technology. See, e.g., Move, Inc. v. Real Estate All. Ltd., 721 F.
App’x 950, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“While the ideas of storing available real
estate properties in a database and selecting and displaying a particular
geographic area may well be improvements in the identification of available
real estate properties, there is no evidence that these ideas are technological
improvements.”); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Although many of the claims [in certain earlier
cases] recited various computer hardware elements, these claims in
substance were directed to nothing more than the performance of an abstract
business practice on the Internet or using a conventional computer. Such
claims are not patent-eligible.”); cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC,
921 F.3d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Trading Techs. II) (explaining that
“the claims here fail because arranging information along an axis does not
improve the functioning of the computer, make it operate more efficiently,
or solve any technological problem”); Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish
Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he claimed
invention is at most an improvement to the abstract concept of targeted
advertising wherein a computer is merely used as a tool. This is not an
improvement in the functioning of the computer itself.”).
The declaration also states that, to Mr. Krajicek’s knowledge, “at the
time of the filing of the . . . patent application there were no financial
institutions offering a financial product such as claimed in the pending
application.” Krajicek Declaration ¶ 8. The remainder of the declaration
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largely focuses on the alleged commercial success of, and industry praise
for, the claimed invention. See Krajicek Declaration ¶¶ 9–11. These parts of
the declaration fail to show that claim 46 is patent eligible. Even if the
subject matter recited in claim 46 is novel as asserted by Mr. Krajicek, that
does not make the claim patent eligible. “[A] claim for a new abstract idea is
still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Nor does the alleged commercial success and
industry praise establish that claim 46 is patent eligible. See, e.g., Versata
Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“Versata improperly conflates improvements to technologies with
commercial success. Commercial success is not necessarily a proxy for an
improvement in a technology nor does it necessarily indicate that claims
were drawn to patent eligible subject matter.”); WhitServe LLC v. Donuts
Inc., 809 F. App’x 929, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (rejecting licensing activity as
evidence of an inventive concept because “[a]fter all, ineligible ideas can be
valuable.”).
Appellant next contends that the Enfish, 2 Virtual Memory,3
CardioNet,4 McRO,5 Finjan,6 and Smith7 decisions show that claim 46 is
patent eligible. See Appeal Br. 36–40; Reply Br. 3–4. We disagree. In
Enfish, the claims were “directed to a specific improvement to the way

2 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
3 Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
4 CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc, 955 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
5 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
6 Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
7 Ex parte Smith et al., Appeal No. 2018-000064 (PTAB April 1, 2019)
(informative).
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computers operate, embodied in the self-referential table,” 822 F.3d at 1336,
and the accompanying written description taught that the self-referential
table functioned “differently than conventional database structures,” 822
F.3d at 1337. And the claims in Virtual Memory were patent eligible because
they were “directed to an improved computer memory system” that could
“outperform a prior art memory system that is armed with ‘a cache many
times larger than the cumulative size of the subject caches.’” 867 F.3d at
1259. Appellant has not shown that claim 46 similarly improves computer
technology. Appellant has not shown that the method recited in claim 46
changes the way computers function, let alone specifically improves how
they operate. Nor has Appellant shown that claim 46 requires an improved
database or memory. Indeed, the written description indicates that the
claimed invention uses generic tables and memory. See Spec. ¶ 66
(disclosing that “computer system 1 includes a memory 2 for storing an
application that is executed by a processing unit 4” and “[m]emory 2 also
stores tables or other data needed by the computer instructions of a novel
application program 3”).
Similarly, in CardioNet, the written description made clear that “the
asserted claims [were] directed to a specific technological improvement—an
improved medical device that achieves speedier, more accurate, and
clinically significant detection of two specific medical conditions out of a
host of possible heart conditions.” 955 F.3d at 1370. And in Smith, the
claims included features that “provide a specific technological improvement
over prior derivatives trading systems.” Smith, 2018-000064 at 9. Here,
claim 46 uses generic computer technology to implement an abstract idea.
This is not a technological improvement. See, e.g., Move, Inc., 721 F. App’x
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at 956; DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256; cf. Trading Techs. II, 921 F.3d at 1385;
Customedia Techs., 951 F.3d at 1365.
Appellant’s reliance on McRO and Finjan is equally unpersuasive. In
McRO, the claims at issue were “limited to rules with specific
characteristics” that “achieve[d] an improved technological result in
conventional industry practice.” 837 F.3d at 1313, 1316. Although Appellant
contends that claim 46 uses similar limited rules, see Appeal Br. 38, claim
46 is functional and result oriented in nature. As already discussed, claim 46
broadly recites what the claimed method does but does not meaningfully
specify how the claimed method does it. And in Finjan, the claimed method
“employ[ed] a new kind of file that enable[d] a computer security system to
do things it could not do before.” 879 F.3d at 1305. Appellant has not shown
that method recited in claim 46 makes computers perform differently, much
less that the method uses new types of files to do so.
Inventive Concept
Finally, we consider whether claim 46 has an inventive concept, that
is, whether the claim has additional elements that “‘transform the nature of
the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). This requires us to evaluate whether the
additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field” or “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
As noted above, the additional elements recited in claim 46 include
“an application program . . . in communication with a core processor system
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for the financial institution over a communication network” and “at least one
memory accessible by the application program.” Appeal Br. 61–62. The
Examiner determined that the additional elements “do not amount to
significantly more than” the identified abstract ideas because the elements
add “well-understood, routine, and conventional computing activities.” Final
Act. 11–12.
We again agree with the Examiner. The written description describes
the application program, communication network, core processor system,
and memory in a manner that indicates that these elements encompass
conventional computer components. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 65–68, 112, 118,
Fig. 1A; see also; In re Myers, 410 F.2d 420, 424 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“A
specification is directed to those skilled in the art and need not teach or point
out in detail that which is well-known in the art.”); Erie Indem. Co., 850
F.3d at 1331; USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure
Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility
Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF (explaining that a specification that describes additional
elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are
sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the
particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can
show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional).
Whether we consider the elements individually or in an ordered
combination, they do not provide an inventive concept. The Federal Circuit
has “repeatedly held that . . . invocations of computers and networks that are
not even arguably inventive are ‘insufficient to pass the test of an inventive
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concept in the application’ of an abstract idea.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d
at 1355 (quoting buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2014)).
Appellant contends that the Examiner failed to “consider the
additional elements in combination, as well as individually, when
determining whether [the] claim as a whole amounts to significantly more”
than the recited abstract ideas. Appeal Br. 46 (emphasis omitted). Appellant
also argues that the Examiner did not find “written support that the
combination of claim steps/elements describe only ‘well understood, routine
and conventional’ activities.” Appeal Br. 46–47.
We disagree. The Examiner explicitly evaluated the additional
elements “individually and in combination” and determined that they are not
“sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception”
because the elements are simply “instructions to apply” the abstract ideas
“using generic computer components.” Final Act. 4–5. And the Examiner
pointed to decisions cited in Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
§ 2106.05 and Office guidance to support the Examiner’s finding that the
additional elements are well understood, routine, and conventional. See Final
Act. 5. Even if the Examiner had not relied on these decisions, as discussed
above, the written description makes clear that these elements are well
understood, routine, and conventional.
Appellant also contends that claim 46 is patent eligible because the
claim recites a “non-conventional and non-generic arrangements of steps and
computer components that in combination confine the claim to a particular
useful technical application.” Appeal Br. 52. In Appellant’s view, claim 46
thus involves an inventive concept similar to the inventive concepts in the
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BASCOM, 8 Amdocs,9 Faith,10 Singhal,11 Wooldridge,12 and Apple13
decisions. Appeal Br. 52–54. Appellant argues that “[t]he Examiner has in
fact acknowledged this conclusion given the prosecution history findings
that the Appellant has overcome all Section 102 and 103 rejections.” Appeal
Br. 52.
We disagree. Even assuming that claim 46 is novel and nonobvious,
that does not mean that claim is patent eligible. See, e.g., Synopsys, 839 F.3d
at 1151; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“We may assume that the techniques claimed are ‘[g]roundbreaking,
innovative, or even brilliant,’ but that is not enough for eligibility. Nor is it
enough for subject-matter eligibility that claimed techniques be novel and
nonobvious in light of prior art, passing muster under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and
103.” (citations omitted) (alteration in original)). And the cases cited by
Appellant do not establish that claim 46 is patent eligible. In BASCOM, the
claimed invention “improve[d] the performance of the computer system
itself” and was “more dynamic and efficient” than other systems. 827 F.3d at

8 BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
9 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
10 Ex parte Faith & Hammad, Appeal No. 2017-004510 (PTAB
September 20, 2017).
11 Ex parte Singhal, Appeal No. 2016-004555 (PTAB November 30, 2017).
Appellant incorrectly identifies the appeal number for this decision as 2017-
004555. Appeal Br. 26.
12 Ex parte Wooldridge et al., Appeal No. 2016-001501 (PTAB October 17,
2017). Appellant incorrectly identifies the appeal number for this decision as
2017-001501. Appeal Br. 42.
13 Apple, Inc. et al. v. Mirror World Techs., CBM2016-00019 (PTAB
May 26, 2016).
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1351. Appellant has not shown that the method recited in claim 46 similarly
improves the performance of a computer system. Moreover, the claims in
BASCOM “recite[d] a specific, discrete implementation of the abstract idea.”
827 F.3d at 1350 (emphasis added). In contrast, claim 46 uses broad, result-
oriented language to describe the claimed invention and provides few
technical details about the invention.
Amdocs involved a distributed computer architecture that was
“unique” and “unconventional.” 841 F.3d at 1303. Unlike the unique,
unconventional computer architecture in Amdocs, claim 46 uses generic
computer technology to implement the recited abstract ideas. Using this
generic computer technology to implement abstract ideas does not make
claim 46 patent eligible. See, e.g., SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1170 (rejecting the
argument that “the inclusion of a ‘parallel processing’ computing
architecture in” a claim makes the claim patent eligible when “neither the
claims nor the specification call for any parallel processing architectures
different from those available in existing systems”); see also Alice, 573 U.S.
at 223–24; Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d at 1370. As for Faith, Singhal,
Wooldridge, and Apple, these non-precedential Board decisions involved
markedly different claims, written descriptions, and facts. Like the Federal
Circuit, “[w]e are not bound by” our “non-precedential decisions at all,
much less ones to . . . different specifications[] or different claims. Each
panel must evaluate the claims presented to it.” Trading Techs. I, 921 F.3d at
1095.
Finally, if Appellant argues that claim 46 is patent eligible because
aspects of the identified abstract ideas are not well understood, routine, and
conventional, Appellant misunderstands the relevant inquiry. When
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determining whether an inventive concept exists, “we assess ‘whether the
claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it was directed were well-understood, routine, and conventional.’”
Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 778 F. App’x 882, 892 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (quoting BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290 (“[T]he
relevant inquiry is not whether the claimed invention as a whole is
unconventional or non-routine. . . . It has been clear since Alice that a
claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed
cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly
more’ than that ineligible concept.” (first emphasis added)).
We have reviewed Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them
unpersuasive. For at least the reasons discussed above, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 46 under § 101.
Claims 47–68 and 70–88
Appellant asserts that the dependent claims (claims 47–68 and 71–86)
“recite more significant steps, elements, and limitations” and contends that
the Examiner “fail[ed] to address any of the specific limitations set out in” in
the dependent claims. Appeal Br. 24–25. But the Examiner determined that
the dependent claims merely “further define the abstract idea[s] . . . present
in their respective independent claims” and are patent ineligible for the same
reasons. Ans. 10. We thus disagree that the Examiner failed to address the
limitations recited in the dependent claims.
For dependent claim 57 and 58, Appellant asserts that the instructing
steps recited in these claims further define “[t]he relationship of a ‘rate level’
with a ‘rate type’” recited in independent claim 46. Appeal Br. 35. Appellant
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contends that “[n]one of these claimed[] ‘rate type’ instructions were ever
needed, let alone contemplated, by the prior art” and thus claims 57 and 58
are patent eligible. Appeal Br. 35.
We disagree. As determined by the Examiner, dependent claims 57
and 58 merely narrow the abstract ideas recited in independent claim 46. See
Ans. 10; Appeal Br. 65–68. Narrow abstract ideas are still abstract ideas.
See, e.g., SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1169 (explaining that limiting “the claims to
a particular field of information . . . does not move the claims out of the
realm of abstract ideas” and “simply provid[ing] further narrowing of” of the
abstract ideas recited in the independent claims “add[s] nothing outside the
abstract realm”); see also BSG Tech., 899 F.3d at 1291 (“As a matter of law,
narrowing or reformulating an abstract idea does not add ‘significantly
more’ to it.”). And as with claim 46, we see no meaningful difference
between the steps recited in claims 57 and 58 and the electronic
recordkeeping and automated instruction steps that courts have determined
are insufficient to provide an inventive concept. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at
225–26; cf. Credit Acceptance, 859 F.3d at 1055.
Appellant does not present separate, persuasive arguments for the
remaining claims. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these
claims under § 101.
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
46–68, 70–
88 101 Eligibility
46–68, 70–
88

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No period for taking any action in connection with this appeal may be
extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED