G. Zaffino And Sons, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 20, 1985

275 N.L.R.B. 456 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

456 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
G. Zaffino and Sons, Inc. and Shopmen 's Local
Union No. 455, International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Work-
ers, AFL-CIO. Case 29-CA-10582
20-May 1985
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS.
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 17 January 1985 Administrative Law Judge
Raymond P. Green issued the attached. decision.
The General Counsel filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief, and the Respondent filed an answer-
ing brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has consid-
ered the decision and the record in light of the ex-
ceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the
judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to
adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative
law judge is adopted and the complaint is dis-
missed.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RAYMOND P. GREEN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was heard by me on March 20, 21, and 23, 1984.
The charge in this proceeding was filed on July 8, 1983,
and a complaint was issued on October 31, 1983. In sub-
stance, the complaint alleges: (1) that Respondent has ne-.
gotiated with the Union in bad faith, with no intention of
reaching a contract; and (2) that "some time within six
months prior to the filing of the instant charge, Respond-
ent unilaterally changed existing wage rates and other
terms and conditions of employment by giving employ-
ees' . . . a unilateral wage increase without having bar-
gained in good faith with the Union concerning such
change, and without having reached an impasse with the
Union."
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. JURISDICTION
It is agreed by all parties that G. Zaffino and Sons,
Inc. is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. It also is
agreed that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. BACKGROUND
This is one of a group of related. cases ' all of which
have _a long history of litigation Insofar as relevant, the
background is described below.
For a period of time prior to 1975, Zaffino had main-
tained a collective-bargaining relationship with the
Union on an independent, as opposed to multiemployer,
basis. (Before 1975, the Union also bargained with an
employer association called the Allied Building Metal In-
dustries, Inc.) As a result, Zaffino and other independent
companies which bargained with the Union came to
have a history of executing a series of successive con-
tracts which basically were referred to as the standard
independent contract. Over a period of time there
evolved a degree of difference between the standard in-
dependent contracts and the Allied contracts.
In early 1975 Zaffino along with other companies
which were not members of the Allied Building Metal
Industries, Inc. (the Allied 'Association), decided to form
their own multiemployer association called the Independ-
ent Association of Steel Fabricators. One of the new As-
sociation's. goals was to achieve parity with the contract
held by the Allied Association.
Bargaining between the Union and the Independent
Association commenced on June 10, 1975. No contract
having been reached by June 30, 1975, the Union com-
menced a strike on July 1, 1975. From July 1 to late
- August there was a hiatus in negotiations, albeit one of
the Independent Association's members signed a separate
contract with the Union. (That action provoked some
litigation which is described in NLRB v. Independent
Assn. of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied 439 U.S. 1130 (1979).)
In late August and through October 1975, negotiations
were held between the Union and the Independent Asso-
ciation. However, as both sides stuck- to their guns on a
number of issues, not much progress was made. In Octo-
ber the spokesman of the Association advised Local 455
that another union -was interested in organizing the em-
ployees involved. Subsequently, between November 1975
and January 1976, some of the employer members of the
Independent Association • entered into contracts with
Local 810 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, an
action later held to be unlawful by the Board - and the
Second Circuit Court -of Appeals at 231 NLRB 264
(1977) and 582 F.2d 135. 1
In early January 1976, the Union and the Allied Asso-
ciation reached a contract settlement. On January 14 the
Union offered the wage and fund package to the Inde-
pendent Association on the same basis as had been
agreed to with the Allied Association. However, the In-
dependent Association, desirous of parity, offeied to
accept the exact same terms as had been agreed to with
the Allied Association. The Union refused. On January
' On various days in February, March, April, June, and September
1984 I heard a number of other cases where the facts were substantially
related to the instant case These were Roman Iron Works Inc, 29-CA-
10583, 29-CA-10582, Achilles Construction Co, 29-CA-10585, The
Peele Co, 29-CA-10584, and Koenig Iron Works Inc, 29-CA-10586. As
the cited cases were not consolidated for hearing with the present case, I
shall, in due course, issue separate decisions in each of these
275 NLRB No. 67
G. ZAFFINO & SONS
16, Local 455 was notified that 19 of the Independent
Association's members had withdrawn from the Associa-
tion On January 20, the Union notified the Association
that it did not consent to such withdrawals It further ad-
vised that any agreement made between it and the Asso-
ciation's remaining members would be binding on those-
employers who had attempted to withdraw without the
Union's consent.
On January 23, 1975, Local 455 met -with three em-
ployers who had not withdrawn from the Independent
Association. At this meeting the parties present reached
an agreement, although the three employers stated that
they were not authorized to represent the Association.
Thereafter, in late January, five employers signed the
January 23 stipulation, albeit refusing to do so on behalf
of the Independent Association.
Meanwhile, the strike was continuing against the other
members of the Independent Association who had not
signed contracts with Local 455. The Union thereupon
sent two letters to the employers who had withdrawn
from the Independent Association, one requesting that
they implement the January 23 stipulation,2 and the
other requesting reinstatement of the striking employees.
Two employers did execute agreements identical to the
January 23 stipulation and did reinstate the striking em-
ployees. The 17 others, including Zaffino, did not.
In light of the situation summarized above, Local 455
filed various unfair labor practice charges. Also an unfair
labor practice charge was filed against the Union. All of
those cases were consolidated for trial and ultimately led
to a series of decisions by the Board and the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reported at 231 NLRB 264, 582
F.2d 135, 252 NLRB 922, and 681 F.2d 130 (1983). Inso-
far as relevant to the present case, certain former mem-
bers of the Independent Association, including Respond-
ent, were ordered to bargain on an individual basis (as
opposed to a multiemployer basis) with Local 455. Also,
certain employers who had executed contracts with
Local 810 were ordered to abrogate such contracts and
withdraw recognition with that Union.
Zaffino, unlike some of the other companies, did not
enter-into a contract with Local 810. However, as it did
not renew its contract with Local 455, it did not contin-
ue to follow the terms of the expired contract.3 As a
consequence, since 1975 it operated as if it were, de
facto, a nonunionized company and unilaterally esta-
bished its own terms and conditions of employment
during the 7-year period during which the litigation pro-
ceeded.
By the time the court of appeals issued its last decision
on June 6, 1982, the Company employed five bargaining
unit employees, two of whom had been employed before
the 1975 strike and three having been hired in 1980 and
1981. Also, the two owners of the business, who are men
in their seventies, no longer were interested in the
growth of their business.
2 On the theory that their withdrawals from the Independent Associa-
tion were untimely and therefore they were bound to execute any agree-
ment made between the Union and the remaining members of the Asso-
ciation
3 For example , upon expiration of that contract , Zaffino ceased making
payments to the vanous trust funds as required by the contract
457
Concluded Findings
After the court's June 6 opinion, the Union sent a
letter on June 8, 1982, to Roman and other companies
asking to start negotiations. On July 12 the Union sent
another letter requesting information including the names
and addresses of employees.
On August 18, 1982, a meeting was held between Wil-
liam Colavito, president of Local 455 and Stanley Israel,
a labor attorney representing Zaffino and seven other
companies (These were Roman Iron Works, Inc., Achil-
les Construction Co., The Peele Co., Koenig Iron
Works, Mello Metal Products, Inc., Master Iron Craft
Corp., and Mohawk Steel Fabricators, Inc.)4 At this
time, Colavito presented as the Union's proposal certain
wage increase demands plus the same Standard Inde-
pendent contract which these companies had rejected in
1975. Israel, on behalf of his clients, told Colavito that
they would not agree to the Standard Independent Con-
-tract and would each insist on negotiating contracts suit-
able to themselves.
Following the August 18 meeting, Colavito and Israel
(sometimes accompanied by his client) held a series of
about 14 meetings through November 21, 1983. In this
respect, it appears that although negotiations for each
company represented by Israel were kept more-or less
separate, there were occasions when discussions at a
meeting for Company A related to some or all of the
other companies. This often occurred when there was
discussion of demands: and counterproposals relating to
"non economic" contract language. Thus, although it is
clear that Israel was negotiating separately for each com-
pany, there was a degree of overlap during the negotia-
tions.
As noted above, the complaint in this case alleges that
Respondent made unilateral wage increases during the
course of the negotiations without there having been an
impasse. More specifically, the complaint alleges that
such wage increases occurred "some time within six
months prior to the filling of the instant charge" The
problem with this allegation is that the evidence simply
does not show any wage increases given by the Compa-
ny during the period alleged. It certainly is true that
there was evidence of wage increases given in July and
August 1982 (some time after the bargaining had com-
menced). But such increases were not alleged as violative
and cannot be found unlawful because they occurred
outside the 10(b) statute of limitations period.5 It also is
true that the General Counsel elicited evidence that at a
negotiation on October 31, 1983, Angelo Zaffino said
that two employees had received wage increases in
August 1983. However, the complaint does not allege
these latter wage increases as being violative of-the Act
and the General Counsel never moved to amend the
complaint to encompass these August 1983 alleged uni-
lateral wage increases. Respondent for its part objected
to the relevancy of this evidence, did not attempt to
° Of these companies , Master, Mohawk , and Melto signed contracts
with Local 455 (Master's contract with the Union was received in evi-
dence )
5 January 8, 1983, is the cutoff date for,purposes of Sec 10(b) of the
Act
458 . DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meet it, and • did not proffer any evidence to explain or
justify these raises.
As there was no evidence to-support the allegation of
unilateral changes as alleged by the complaint, and as the
only wage increases . granted during . negotiations oc-
curred either outside the 10(b) period or at point outside
the scope of the complaint, I shall recommend that this
allegation be dismissed. Gehnrich & Gehnrich, Inc., 258
NLRB 528 (1981); Camay Drilling Co., 254 NLRB 239
fn. 9 (1981). ,
The other issue in this case-is the General Counsel's
allegations that Zaffino entered into negotiations in bad
faith and "with no intention to enter into any final or
binding collective bargaining agreement." - ' - `
Section 8(d) of the Act, which defines the duty to bar-
gain , does not' compel either party to a collective-bar-
gaining relationship, to agree to a proposal; or to make 'a
concession. Therefore, insofar as mandatory subjects of
bargaining (generally relating to wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment), the Act does not require
either party to yield or compromise its position. In this
respect, the'Supreme Court 'in NLRB v. American Insur-
ance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952), stated:
[T]he Board • may not, either directly- or indirectly,
compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment
upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining
agreements. - -
The Court further stated in H. - K Porter Co. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99, 107-108 (1970): -
It is implicit in the entire structure of the Act that
the Board acts to oversee and-referee' the process of
collective bargaining, leaving the results of the con-
test to the bargaining strengths of the parties . . . .
While'the parties' freedom of contract is not abso-
lute under the Act, allowing the Boardto compel
agreement ` when the parties themselves' are unable
to agree would violate 'the fundamental premise on
which the--Act is based-private bargaining under
governmental supervision' of the procedure alone;
without any official compulsion over the- actual
terms of the contract.
It also is clear that it was the intention of -Congress to
permit (within limits) employers and unions to - utilize
their relative economic strengths vis-a-vis each other, as
part of the bargaining process.6 As pointed out by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361' U.S.
477, 489 (1960): - '
The presence of economic weapons.in reserve, and
their actual ; exercise, on occasion by the parties, is
part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized . . . the truth of
the ' matter is that at the present statutory stage of
our national labor relations policy, the two fac-
tors-necessity for good-faith bargaining between
6 There are of course statutorily defined limits upon each side's use of
economic power Thus, for example, Sec 8(b)(4)(B) prohibits a union
from, engaging in secondary boycotts, and Sec 8(a)(3) would preclude an
employer from discharging-employees who join or support a union
parties, and the availability of economic pressure
devices to each to make the other party incline to
agree on one's terms-exist side by side.
It therefore is not necessarily unlawful for the stronger
side to make demands or take positions consistent with
its strength. Quite obviously, the respective strength of a
union versus a company in bargaining is largely depend-
ent on the support of the employees it represents, their
willingness to strike, and the vulnerability of the compa-
ny to a strike. See, for example, World Publishing Co.,
220 NLRB 1065, 1071 (1975), enfd. 545 F.2d 1138 (8th
Cir. 1976). Furthermore, collective bargaining is basical-
ly a two-way street. Thus, while a union may lawfully
make demands designed to improve existing employee
wages and benefits, there is nothing in the Act which
denies an employer the right, for its part, to demand give
backs.', Where the parties are negotiating to replace a
prior contract, neither side is precluded from seeking
modifications to its own advantage. The act simply does
not preclude an employer from demanding that various
provisions of the old contract be modified, altered, or
even eliminated: Thus, in the present case, when the
General Counsel argues that the Respondent sought to
modify or eliminate contractual provisions contained in
the contract or eliminate contractual provisions con-
tained in the contract which expired in 1975, Iam. unim-
pressed as to the materiality of such a fact.
Although it is not illegal for a company to engage in
hard bargaining, Section -8(a)(5) of the Act nevertheless
requires the company to bargain in good faith, which is
essentially defined as a willingness to enter into a con-
tract. NLRB v. Insurance Agents, supra at 485. Thus, al-
though a company may use its relative strength to press
for contract terms favorable to itself, it may not use its
strength to engage in futile or sham negotiations with the
intention of never reaching an agreement . NLRB v.
Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 1960).
As stated in Abingdon Nursing Center, 197 NLRB-781,
787 (1972).
Good faith, or the want of it, is concerned essential-
ly with a state of mind . . . . That determination
must be based upon reasonable inference drawn
from the totality of conduct evidencing the state of
mind with which the employer entered into and
participated in the bargaining process . . . -. All as-
pects of the Respondent's bargaining and related
conduct must be considered in unity, not as separate.
fragments each to be assessed in isolation.
In the instant case negotiation commenced on August
12; 1982, and ended on November 21, 1983. During that
the time there were about 14 meetings specifically direct-
ed to Zaffino but there also were other meetings where
matters relevant to Zaffino were discussed. There is, in
my opinion, no evidence that the Company refused to
meet the Union at reasonable times and places.
The evidence shows that -at the start of negotiations,
Colavito presented to each company represented by
Israel the Standard Independent Contract. This form of
contact was rejected-by Israel who stated that each com-
G. ZAFFINO & SONS 459
pany desired to negotiate its own terms Although Israel
told Colavito that certain of his clients were not going to
supply the addresses of their employees, he did indicate
that Zaffino would turn over this information to Local
455. This was done on Spetember 7, 1982.
At the next meeting on September 20, Israel tendered
a marked up copy of the Standard Independent Contract
with the name Melto written in. Israel said that the doc-
ument also 'represented the offers of various of his other
clients, including Zaffino, except that (1) whereas Mello
would not agree to union-security and checkoff provi-
sions, the others would, and (2) whereas Mello wanted
the contract to run for 6 years from October 1, 1982, to
September 30, 1988, the other companies (including Zaf-
fino) wanted 5-year contracts 'to run to September 30,
1987. As to wage rates and other economic items, Israel
said that each company would make its own economic
offers at a subsequent time.
There is a dispute as to whether Isarel on behalf of
Zaffino made an economic counterproposal on Septem-
ber 20, 1982. According to Colavito he did not. Accord-
ing to Israel he made an identical wage offer for Zaffino
and Achilles which was cost-of-living increases each
year less 1 percent. In my opinion it is unnecessary to
resolve the above dispute as it appears that by.mutual
consent, the first 6 'or 7 months of bargaining primarily
revolved around contract language differences inasmuch
as Zaffino's proposed contract was significantly different
from' the Union's proffered Standard Independent Con-
tract. In this respect, Zaffino and the other companies in-
volved were demanding many and sizeable give backs on
mandatory subjects of bargaining such as seniority, vaca-
tions, holidays, subcontracting, etc. Israel also made it
plain from early on in the negotiations' that the compa-
nies would not agree to contribute 'to the various multi-
employer trust funds called for in the Union's proposed
Standard Independent Contract. In this respect, Zaffino
had made contributions to these funds before the 1975
contract expired but had ceased making such payments
when it expired.7 At the time of these negotiations, Zaf-
fino had neither a pension plan nor a health insurance
plan for its employees. Its only fringe benefits were holi-
days and vacations. During the negotiations (in July
1983), the Company offered to obtain Blue Cross and
Blue Shield coverage for its employees. It also offered,
on August 9, 1983, to make payments of 15 cents per
hour per employee to a single. employer pension plan
which had immediate vesting or to improve welfare ben-
efits
At meetings during November and December 1982,
the parties discussed' at considerable length their respec-
tive "language" proposals. Although there were many
differences there also were some agreements. (See, for
example, Israel's letters to the Union on December 21,
1982, and April 11, 1983.)
On March 7, 1983, Israel wrote a letter to Colavito
setting forth each company's contract offer. As to Zaf-
fino's economic offer, this was as follows:
' The Standard Independent Contract calls for employer contributions
to a pension fund, a welfare fund, an annuity fund, a vacation fund, an
apprenticeship and training?und, and a severance pay fund
1. Five year agreement, retroactive to October 1,
1982. -
2. Retention of existing benefit levels and terms.
3. Across the board wage increases to employees
on the payroll on the date of the increases (6/1/83,
6/1/84, 6/1/85, 6/1/86, and 6/1/87) equal to cost
of living increases on that June over the prior June,
- less 1%
With receipt of Israel's March 7, 1983 letter, - it seems
clear that at least by this time Zaffino was -tendering a
complete contract offer which was capable of acceptance
by the Union. Although this offer (and subsequently in--
creased offers) may not have been to the Union' s-liking,
it did represent a complete contract covering wages,
hours, and other terms and' conditions of employment.
Thus, among other things, the Company's offer included-
(1) wage increases.over 5 years, (2) union-security and
checkoff provisions, and-(3) grievances-arbitration proce-
dures., 8 Moreover, between March 7 and November 21,
1983, the evidence shows that the- Company made fur-
ther concessions. Thus, as noted above, the Company of-
feted in July and August, respectively, (1) to purchase a
Blue Cross-Blue Shield Plan at 50 cents per hour, per
employee and (2) to make a contribution to a single em-
ployer pension fund or, at the Union's option, to buy
greater welfare benefits. Also on July '28, 1983, Zaffino
changed its wage offer to offer wage- increases of 60
cents per hour per employee on June 1 of each year of
its proposed contract. _
Notwithstanding the- 'above, the General Counsel
points to a number of evidentiary factors from which she
argues that I should infer surface bargaining. The salient
points are:
(1) The General Counsel argues that the Company
reneged on offers it previously had made. In one respect
she asserts that Zaffino reneged on its initial offer to
agree to sections 4 and 5 of'the Standard Independent
Contract. Sections 4 and 5 are titled respectively "Union
Security" and "Checkoff of Union Dues." Section ' 4
(union security) also contains a union hiring hall provi-
sion. The General Counsel's argument is that when Israel
on behalf of Zaffino said that Zaffino would agree to
section 4, it therefore agreed also to the hiring hall pro-
8 Zaffino's contract offer is unlike those in cases such as Continental
Insurance Co Y NLRB, 495 F 2d 44 (2d Cir 1974), NLRB Y A-I King
Size Sandwiches, 732 F 2d 872 (11th Cir 1984), cert denied 105 S Ct. 508
(1984), American Parts Systems, 232 NLRB 41, 47-48 (1977), and San
Isabel Electric Services, 225 NLRB 1073, 1079 fn 7 (1976) In the cited
cases the companies were found to have engaged in surface bargaining
where their contract offers insisted on broad no-strike clauses while at
the same time refusing to offer any effective means of resolving contract
disputes In that class of cases, it may be said that the companies made
illusory contract offers because the contracts offered were, in effect, un-
enforceable and/or required the unions to waive their representation
functions
Zaffino's offer also is distinguishable from cases where companies in-
sisted on contracts of unreasonably short or long duration See, e g ,
Holmes Tuttle Broadway Ford, 186 NLRB 73 (1970), enfd 465 F 2d 717
(9th Cir 1972) See also Mooney Aircraft, 132 NLRB 1194 (1961 ), where
the administrative law judge, in an opinion adopted by the Board, con-
cluded that the respondent's insistence on a 5-year contract without a
wage reopening clause was evidence of surface bargaining in the context
of other evidence showing an unwillingness to reach agreement
460 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
visions. 'Israel-on'the other hand credibly testified that he
said that Zaffino would agree to union-security - and
checkoff provisions (contained in secs. 4 and 5), but
never agreed to a union hiring hall. As I do not find that
Zaffino at any time agreed to a union hiring hall I do not
find that it reneged on a previously agreed to provision.
At most, there was simply a misunderstanding.
(2) The General Counsel contends that the Company's
insistence on a provision which would permit it to sub-
contract is evidence of its intention to avoid reaching an
agreement. Her argument appears to be that if the-Com-
pany was able to obtain such a clause, it theoretically
could subcontract out all of its business and eliminate the
bargaining unit. -
As to the subcontracting contention, the last contract
which Zaffino had' maintained with Local 455 (expired in
1975), and the `Standard Independent Contract proferred
by the Union at,the outset of these negotiations, contains
a no subcontracting provision at section 20. Initially, Re-
spondent proposed that section 20 simply be deleted.
-Subsequently, however, Respondent asked for a clause
that would explicitly allow it to subcontract. (The Union
had agreed to such a clause in its contract with Master
Iron Craft Corp.) - -
The subject of subcontracting has traditionally been
considered a mandatory, subject of bargaining which
means that either side may insist on its position regarding
the subject. Thus, a union would clearly be within its
right if during negotiations it insisted on a ' clause which
precluded all subcontracting by a company.9 By the
same token I can see, nothing illegal in a company refus-
ing to agree to subcontracting restrictions dr alternative-
ly'-insisting on a right. to subcontract during the life of
the labor agreement. To hold otherwise would, in effect;
impose a lack of mutuality in collective bargaining which
I do not believe was envisioned by Congress. In the
present case there is no evidence that Zaffino was taking
its positions vis-a-vis subcontracting because it, in fact,
intended to' take the draconian step of eliminating the
bargaining unit . All that can be said is that Israel intend-
ed to give the Company the option of subcontracting if
economic circumstances made that desirable. I therefore
do not believe that the Company's position regarding
subcontracting is evidence of surface bargaining in the
context of this case. "
(3) The General Counsel correctly notes that the'Com-
pany wanted significant give-backs from the last contract
it had with Local 455. However, there had been a 7-year
hiatus between the expiration of that contract and the re=
sumption of negotiations and a great many changes had-
evolved in the employer's terms of employment during
the interim. Moreover, I do not perceive the Act to pro-
hibit a company from demanding give-backs. Collective
bargaining is a two way street and each side is entitled to
try to get the best deal possible for itself. Given the stat-
utory scheme, if a unioii does not 'have the economic
muscle to back up its demands, it cannot ask the Board
to compel an employer to make a contract offer more to
its liking: As the evidence in this case demonstrates that -
Respondent made various complete contract offers, the
General Counsel cannot, in my opinion, assert that the
Company had no intention of reaching an agreement
simply because those offers were viewed unfavorably by
the Union. Accordingly, it is recommended that this alle-
gation of the' complaint be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent G. Zaffino and Sons, Inc. is and has
been at all times material herein an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act. -
2. Shopmen's Local Union No. 455, International As-
sociation of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers, AFL-CIO is and has been at all times material
herein a labor organization within, the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Employer has not violated the Act in any re-
spect as alleged by the complaint.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
edio
ORDER
It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in
its entirety.
I should note, however, that there are certain types of subcontracting 10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
clauses which are illegal pursuant to Sec 8(e) of the Act For a discus- Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
sion of so-called union signatory clauses in the context of Sec 8(e) see, Order shall, as provided in Sec' 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
for example, Retail Clerks Local 1288, 163 NLRB 817 (1967), enfd 390 Board and all- objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
F 2d 856 (D C Cir 1968) poses