Fundacion Educativa Ana G. Mendez d/b/a Puerto Rico Junior College

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 12, 1982

265 N.L.R.B. 72 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Fundacion Educativa Ana G. Mendez d/b/a Puerto
Rico Junior College and Asociacion de Maes-
tros Universitarios
Asociacion de Maestros Universitarios and Funda-
cion Educativa Ana G. Mendez d/b/a Puerto
Rico Junior College. Cases 24-CA-4133 and
24-CB-1053
October 12, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
ZIMMERMAN
On February 20, 1981, Administrative Law
Judge Richard L. Denison issued the attached De-
cision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
Employer and Respondent Union both filed excep-
tions and supporting briefs, and Respondent Em-
ployer filed an answer to Respondent Union's ex-
ceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge
that Respondent Employer violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act, first by unilaterally discontinu-
ing evaluations for faculty retention (i.e., past the
2-year probationary period), tenure, and promotion,
without prior notice to or bargaining with Re-
spondent Union, and thereafter by refusing to bar-
gain with Respondent Union about the inclusion of
these subjects in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment then being negotiated.
In doing so, we note that Respondent Employ-
er's defense against the allegations of unlawful re-
fusal to bargain is elusive. Respondent Employer
did not allege in its answer to the instant com-
plaint, as an affirmative defense against the allega-
' In affirming the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent
Employer violated Sec. 8(a(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally termi-
nating evaluations for faculty rank, probation, and tenure, without prior
notice to or bargaining with Respondent Union, and by thereafter refus-
ing to bargain about the inclusion of such evaluation procedures in the
collective-bargaining agreement then being negotiated, we do not rely on
the distinction drawn by the Administrative Law Judge between
N.LR.B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), and the instant case.
The Administrative Law Judge distinguished the two cases on the
grounds that Yeshiva involved the refusal of an employer to negotiate an
initial collective-bargaining agreement with a contested faculty unit,
whereas the instant case involved the refusal of Respondent Employer to
negotiate about the renewal of a part of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement with a certified (pre- Yeshiva) faculty unit. These latter aspects
of the instant case do not foreclose analysis of the managerial issue in this
case under the framework for such analysis set forth in Yeshiva.
265 NLRB No. 3
tions that it unlawfully refused to bargain with Re-
spondent Union about evaluations, that the faculty
was supervisory or managerial, and that Respond-
ent Employer was thus not obligated to bargain
with Respondent Union. Indeed, Respondent Em-
ployer admitted in its answer that Respondent
Union was at all times material in this case the cer-
tified and recognized collective-bargaining repre-
sentative for the instant full-time faculty unit; fur-
ther, the record establishes that Respondent Em-
ployer did engage in continued productive bargain-
ing with Respondent Union in negotiations over a
new collective-bargaining agreement, and reached
agreement with Respondent Union on many sub-
jects.
Instead, Respondent Employer's argument con-
cerning the supervisory or managerial status of the
faculty appears to be confined to the faculty's par-
ticipation in the evaluation process. Thus, Re-
spondent Employer alleged in its answer to the
complaint that "faculty rank and tenure not being
mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Act
. . . Respondent Employer did not violate the Act
by refusing to bargain [about those subjects]."
Later, in its opening statement at the hearing, Re-
spondent Employer espoused a position which it
described as "more limited than in N.LR.B. v. Ye-
shiva."2 It asserted that the full-time faculty acts as
both employer and employees with regard to eval-
uations for retention, tenure, and promotion, there-
by rendering those items nonmandatory subjects of
bargaining, and thus relieving Respondent Employ-
er of any obligation to bargain about them. Finally,
in its post-hearing brief to the Administrative Law
Judge, Respondent Employer argues that in the
areas of faculty evaluation for retention, tenure,
and promotion the faculty acts in a supervisory or
managerial way, and that, therefore, Respondent
Employer is not obligated to bargain with Re-
spondent Union about these subjects.
Thus, according to Respondent Employer in its
brief to the Administrative Law Judge:
In [Yeshiva] it was determined that there are
certain academic activities in institutions of
higher education where members of the facul-
ty substantially participate in the institutional
governance matters, and because of that fact,
said faculty members and said activities are out-
2 Opening statements in the instant proceeding were made on February
11, 1980, 9 days before the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in
N.LR.B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672. Thus, Respondent Employ-
er's reference to "N.LR.B. v. Yeshiva" is apparently to the underlying
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 582 F.2d
686 (1978), which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
72
PUERTO RICO JUNIOR COLLEGE
side the jurisdiction of the NLRB since the
faculty acts as managers under the Act.
It is our contention that in the specific activ-
ity of the granting or denial of evaluation,
rank and tenure at Puerto Rico Junior College
· . . the faculty of said college has substantial
participation [in] that process and was exercis-
ing therein managerial functions, thus putting
the issue outside the jurisdiction of the NLRB
or of collective bargaining. It is Respondent's
contention that [the] NLRB must refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction in those specific activi-
ties in academia that encompass such a thor-
ough participation of faculty and that its inter-
vention would imply putting faculty "on both
sides of the bargaining table...." [Emphasis
supplied.]
* a * * *
Where, as in the case at bar, management has
reserved the right to grant or deny evaluation,
rank and tenure and has delegated it to a
group of faculty members acting in committee,
a participatory model is in existence, the facul-
ty is acting in that specific activity in a manage-
rial capacity and NLRB intervention is not
warranted by law.
We specifically reject Respondent Employer's
assertion that a faculty unit (or, for that matter, any
appropriate bargaining unit) may be found to be su-
pervisory or managerial only for certain aspects of
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, but not for others. There is simply no
warrant for the contention that a unit of employees
can be an appropriate unit for bargaining about
some aspects of terms and conditions of employ-
ment, while simultaneously being an inappropriate
unit for bargaining about other aspects of the em-
ployment relationship.
There certainly is no support to be found for Re-
spondent Employer in either the Supreme Court's
or in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' opin-
ions in N.LR.B. v. Yeshiva University. Thus, con-
trary to the assertion of Respondent Employer, nei-
ther the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court
determined that certain academic activities are out-
side the jurisdiction of the Act because the faculty
acts as managers in regard to those activities. On
the contrary, the court of appeals defined the issue
as whether the full-time faculty were supervisors
' Respondent Employer essentially adheres to this statement of its posi-
tion in its brief in support of its exceptions to the Administrative Law
Judge's conclusion that it unlawfully refused to bargain with Respondent
Union about evaluation matters.
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act or
managerial personnel within the Board's definition
of that term as adopted by the courts.4 Indeed, far
from determining that the faculty at Yeshiva Uni-
versity was supervisory or managerial for only
specified aspects of terms and conditions of em-
ployment, the court of appeals noted that the su-
pervisory and managerial authority of that faculty
was "pervasive and consistently exercised."5
Nor did the Supreme Court, in affirming the
court of appeals in Yeshiva, determine that certain
academic activities are outside the jurisdiction of the
Act. Indeed, the Court found that the Yeshiva fac-
ulty's authority in regard to academic matters was
"absolute," 6 and that the faculty's role in hiring,
tenure, promotion, and termination was "predomi-
nant."' There was no attempt-or apparent inclina-
tion-on the part of the Court to sift out discrete
aspects of the employment relationship in its deter-
mination that the faculty was managerial.
Nor did the Supreme Court, in reviewing the
history of the managerial exclusion in N.L.R.B. v.
Bell Aerospace Co., supra, expressly or impliedly
raise the possibility of such bifurcated bargaining as
proposed by Respondent Employer in this case.
Thus, as stated, there is no warant for a piecemeal
application of the Supreme Court's holding in
N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University. Rather, the manage-
rial and supervisory exclusions are total exclusions
from the coverage of the Act, applicable in all
ways to all individuals within the group so denomi-
nated. These exclusions are decidedly not applica-
ble to particular bargaining subjects, as Respondent
Employer would have them apply to the faculty
evaluation process in the instant case.
Moreover, we agree with the Administrative
Law Judge's rejection of Respondent Employer's
contention that the nature and extent of the facul-
ty's involvement in the evaluation of individual fac-
ulty members establishes that the faculty is supervi-
sory within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
Act, or managerial within the scope of the Su-
preme Court's opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva Uni-
versity, supra. More precisely, we find that Re-
spondent Employer has failed to establish its con-
tention that the full-time faculty acts in a supervi-
sory or managerial manner in the process of faculty
evaluation.
4 582 F. 2d at 694-695. The definition of "managerial employees" re-
ferred to by the court is "those who 'formulate and effectuate manage-
ment policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their
employer."' NLR.B. v. Bell Aerospace Company. Division of Textron. Inc.,
416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974).
s 582 F.2d at 695, fn. 10.
6 444 U.S. at 686.
7 Id. at fn. 23.
73
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The essential facts are as follows: According to
the terms of the November 1, 1975-October 31,
1978, collective-bargaining agreement between the
parties, new faculty members serve an initial 2-year
probationary period. At any time during this
period, the faculty member's employment may be
terminated without the faculty member having any
recourse to the contractual grievance and arbitra-
tion procedure. At the end of the 2-year probation-
ary period, the faculty member is evaluated for
possible retention. If this evaluation is not favora-
ble, then, again, the faculty member's employment
may be terminated without recourse by the faculty
member to the contractual grievance and arbitra-
tion procedure. Faculty members who are retained
beyond the 2-year probationary period are given
annual appointments for their third, fourth, and
fifth years of service. Any actions taken by Re-
spondent Employer which affect the employment
status of a faculty member during the third-
through-fifth-year period of service may be re-
viewed under th contractual grievance procedure.
Upon completion of 5 years of uninterrupted
service, faculty members are evaluated for tenure.
Tenured faculty members are evaluated for promo-
tion through the ranks of assistant professor, asso-
ciate professor, and professor.
Hiram Puig, Respondent Employer's chancellor,
and, in that capacity, its chief administrative and
academic officer, testified about the organizational
structure of the school as it pertains to the evalua-
tion process. According to Chancellor Puig, the
"main legislative board" of the school is the Ad-
ministrative Council, which has final authority
over all administrative and policy matters, subject
only to the veto of the president of the Fundacion.
The Administrative Council has 13 members: the
chancellor, five deans,8 the "Title III" director,
three students (elected by the student body), and
three faculty members (elected by the faculty).
Immediately below the Administrative Council is
the Academic Board, described by Chancellor Puig
as "a forum where all matters concerning the facul-
ty and college are brought and discussed; and from
where those matters go the [Administrative Coun-
cil]." The Academic Board has approximately 26
members: the chancellor, the academic dean, the
associate dean, the Institute directors, °1 and a fac-
s Not further specified in the record.
u Also not further specified in the record.
'o Institutes at the instant school are akin to academic departments. Al-
though the record is not absolutely clear in this regard, there are appar-
ently nine such Institutes: Business Administration, Education, English.
Humanities, Natural Science, Nursing, Secretarial Science, Social Sci-
ence, and Spanish. Each Institute has a director, akin to an academic de-
partment chairman. Institute directors are not included in the bargaining
unit.
ulty member from each Institute (elected by the
faculty of that particular Institute). '
Below the Academic Board, with regard to eval-
uation of faculty members, is the schoolwide Gen-
eral Evaluation Committee, comprised of the aca-
demic dean, the dean of Learning Resources, 12 a
representative of Respondent Union, and a faculty
member. s
Finally, each Institute has an Evaluation Com-
mittee, comprised of the Institute director and two
faculty members. 14
Each faculty member being evaluated for reten-
tion upon completion of probation, for tenure, or
for promotion is evaluated in three separate ways:
by students, by the Institute Evaluation Committee
(based on classroom observation), and by the Gen-
eral Evaluation Committee. The student and Insti-
tute evaluations are provided to the General Evalu-
ation Committee, which itself prepares a separate
evaluation of the faculty member's administrative
performance, and then compiles an overall evalua-
tion for that faculty member.
The overall evaluation compiled by the General
Evaluation Committee is forwarded to the Aca-
demic Board, which in turn forwards it to the Ad-
ministrative Council, with the Academic Board's
recommendation in regard to whatever action is
being considered (i.e., retention, tenure, or promo-
tion). As indicated, the Administrative Council has
final authority in such matters, subject only to the
veto of the Fundacion's president. 16
All of the above-described evaluations are ren-
dered in accordance with procedures proposed by
the Academic Board, and approved by the Admin-
istrative Council, following preliminary considera-
tion by a Special Committee of the Administrative
Council comprised of two administrators, two fac-
ulty members, and two representatives of Respond-
ent Union. '
" The Academic Board also acts as the school's Curriculum Commit-
tee, which convenes at the call of the chancellor. According to Chancel-
lor Puig, the Curriculum Committee has been convened twice during the
2-1/2 years prior to the hearing.
" Not further specified in the record.
Is The record does not indicate whether the faculty member on the
General Evaluation Committee is elected or appointed to that position.
"4 Associate Professor Idsa Alegria, Respondent Union's sub-secretary-
general and a member of the faculty for 13 years, testified that one of the
faculty members on the Institute Evaluation Committee is appointed by
the Institute director, while the other is elected by the Institute faculty.
However, Chancellor Puig testified that both of the faculty members on
the Institute Evaluation Committee are elected to their positions.
'I Chancellor Puilg testified that the president has never exercised his
veto in this regard. Union sub-secretry-general and Associate Professor
Alegria testified that not all probationary faculty members have been re-
tained, and that not all faculty members are awarded tenure. However,
Respondent Union's secretary-general. Carmelo Rodriquez, testified that
he was not aware of any faculty member who did not receive tenure
upon completion of 5 years of service. Also according to Rodriquez, no
one had been evaluated for promotion in approximately 8 years.
1" Once again, the record does not indicate whether the faculty mem-
bers on this Special Committee are appointed or elected.
74
PUERTO RICO JUNIOR COLLEGE
Reviewing this evidence, we find that, while fac-
ulty members are elected to the Administrative
Council and to the Academic Board, and serve,
either through election or by appointment, on the
schoolwide General Evaluation Committee and on
the separate Institute Evaluation Committees, they
are in the majority only on the separate Institute
Evaluation Committees, have no more than an
equal voice on the schoolwide General Evaluation
Committee, and are in the decided minority on the
Academic Board (9 faculty out of approximately 26
members of the Board) and on the Administrative
Council (3 out of 13). Thus, as the evaluation of
any particular faculty member ascends through the
hierarchy of the evaluation process, the potential
for effective faculty influence on the evaluation un-
dergoes a corresponding decline. Moreover, this
obvious progressive diminution of faculty influence
in the evaluation process must also be considered
in light of the fact that the only evaluation ren-
dered by a committee with faculty majority, the
Institute Evaluation Committee, is immediately di-
luted in the next step of the process, wherein the
schoolwide General Evaluation Committee com-
bines the Institute evaluation with the student eval-
uation, and its own evaluation, to compile an over-
all evaluation.
Thus, the potential for effective faculty influence
in the overall evaluation process is markedly limit-
ed.
Beyond that, the record fails to establish the
actual nature and extent of specific faculty partici-
pation in the evaluation process, and the actual
extent of faculty influence in the retention, tenure,
and promotion of faculty members. In the absence
of such factual underpinnings in the record before
us, we cannot say, as the Supreme Court was able
to say in N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University, that the
faculty plays a "predominant role in faculty . . .
tenure ... termination and promotion." 17
In these circumstances, we find that Respondent
Employer has failed to establish that the instant
faculty has the authority, in the interest of Re-
spondent Employer, and exercised through the use
of independent judgment, effectively to recom-
mend the promotion, discharge, or reward of indi-
vidual faculty members,1 8 or that the instant facul-
ty formulates and effectuates management policies
in regard to faculty evaluations by expressing and
17 444 U.S. at 686, fn. 23. Cf. Ithaca College, 261 NLRB 577, 578
(1982), and Thiel College, 261 NLRB 580, 585 (1982) (substantial evidence
in both cases of effective faculty participation in and influence on deci-
sions regarding tenure, termination, and promotion); Duquesne University
of the Holy Ghost, 261 NLRB 587, 588 (1982) (tenure awarded according
to vote of tenured faculty).
"' See Sec. 2(11) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (supervisory status).
making operative the decisions of Respondent Em-
ployer in the matter of faculty evaluations. 1 9
Accordingly, we affirm the Administrative Law
Judge's conclusion that Respondent Employer vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilater-
ally terminating the existing faculty evaluation pro-
cedures governing retention, tenure, and promo-
tion, without prior notice to or bargaining with Re-
spondent Union, and by thereafter refusing to bar-
gain with Respondent Union about those proce-
dures.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent Employer, Fun-
dacion Educativa Ana G. Mendez d/b/a Puerto
Rico Junior College, Rio Piedras and Cupey,
Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, and the Respondent Union, Asociacion de
Maestros Universitarios, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order.
'9 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. at 682; N.LR.B.
v. Bell Aerospace Ca, 416 U.S. at 288 (managerial status).
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD L. DENISON, Administrative Law Judge:
This consolidated proceeding was heard in Hato Rey,
Puerto Rico, on February 11-14, 1980. The consolidated
complaint, issued August 3, 1979, alleges that Fundacion
Educativa Ana G. Mendez d/b/a Puerto Rico Junior
College, hereafter referred to as the Respondent Em-
ployer, or the College, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act, on or about February 16, 1979, and thereafter,
by failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with Aso-
ciacion de Maestros Universitarios, hereafter referred to
as the Respondent Union, or the Union. The complaint
does not contain any allegation of "course of conduct"
bad-faith bargaining or a lack of intention to reach an
agreement. ' Specifically, it is alleged that on or about
February 16 the Respondent Employer unilaterally ter-
minated the existing faculty evaluation procedure gov-
erning probation, rank, and tenure, without prior notice
to or bargaining with the Union, and thereafter refused
and continues to refuse to discuss faculty rank and
tenure. It is also alleged that from February 16 until May
11 the Respondent Employer refused to discuss and ne-
gotiate with the Union concerning faculty probation.
The complaint further alleges that from February 23
i At the hearing, consistent with the complaint, counsel for the Gener-
al Counsel disavowed any intent to proceed on the basis of a general bad-
faith bargaining theory
75
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
until March 9 the Respondent Employer replied to a
union proposal for dues checkoff by means of a counter-
proposal seeking a 20-percent service charge on the total
amount of money collected by the College for checkoff
purposes. In addition, it is alleged that on March 14 the
Respondent Employer bargained directly with unit em-
ployees and offered them a different and more advanta-
geous medical plan than it had offered the Union during
negotiations, which it thereafter withdrew on March 23
following the Union's acceptance. Finally, it is alleged
that on March 21 the Respondent Employer unilaterally
reinstated the procedure for evaluating probation and
tenure and on April 9 the procedure for evaluating facul-
ty rank, which it had unilaterally discontinued on Febru-
ary 16, without prior notice to or bargaining with the
Union.
Concerning the Respondent Union, the complaint al-
leges that it violated Sections 8(b)(3) and 8(d) by failing
to notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Conciliation and
Arbitration Bureau of the existence of a dispute, as re-
quired by Section 8(d)(3), and by engaging in a strike
from April 25 until May 7 in furtherance of its expressed
desire to terminate the collective-bargaining agreement
and in furtherance of its demands.
The Respondents' answers, respectively, deny the alle-
gations of unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint.
Upon the entire record in the case, including my obser-
vation of the witnesses and consideration of the briefs, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
As alleged in the complaint and admitted in the an-
swers, I find that the Respondent Employer is, and has
been at all times material herein, a nonprofit foundation
duly organized under, and existing by virtue of, the laws
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, where it is en-
gaged in the operation of post-secondary educational in-
stitutions at Turabo, Puerto Rico, known as Colegio Uni-
versitario del Turabo; and at Rio Piedras and Cupey,
Puerto Rico, known as Puerto Rico Junior College, the
only educational institution involved in this proceeding.
During the year preceding the issuance of complaint in
this matter, a representative period, the Respondent Em-
ployer, in the course and conduct of its business, pur-
chased and caused to be transported and delivered to its
educational institutions goods and materials valued in
excess of $50,000, which were transported and delivered
in interstate commerce to said educational institutions di-
rectly from States of the United States. During the same
period of time the Respondent Employer derived gross
revenues in excess of $1 million, exclusive of contribu-
tions, from the operations of said educational institutions.
It is admitted, and I find, that the Respondent Employer
is, and has been at all times material herein, an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
As alleged in the complaint and admitted in the an-
swers, I find that the Respondent Union is, and has been
at all times material herein, a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Il1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES IN CASE
24-CA-41 33
A. Background
The Respondent Employer is a nonprofit foundation
which operates educational institutions, one branch of
which is Puerto Rico Junior College. The Respondent
Union, originally certified by the Board on January 30,
1975, as the collective-bargaining representative for the
faculty employees of the College, had a 3-year agree-
ment with Fundacion, which expired October 31, 1978.
That agreement included provisions for evaluations of
faculty members for release or retention following a pro-
bationary period, and governing the granting or denial of
rank and tenure. It also contained a dues-checkoff clause.
Following the Union's July 28, 1978, request for the ter-
mination or modification of the contract, in September
1978, the parties began negotiations for a new contract.
At the outset of the negotiations the parties had agreed
that each time agreement was reached on a particular
clause it would be initialed by the chief spokesman as no
longer in issue, and tentatively agreed to subject to
achieving agreement on a complete contract ratified by
the Union's membership. The record reveals that this
procedure was followed throughout the negotiations,
even with respect to certain individual clauses originally
contained in "package" or "global" proposals submitted
by Fundacion. A hiatus in the collective-bargaining ne-
gotiations occurred, beginning November 17, 1978, when
a decertification petition was filed with the Board, and
ending with the recertification of the Union on February
6, 1979.2 Collective-bargaining sessions were held on
February 14 and 23, March 9 and 23, and April 20 and
27. Strike authorization was voted by the Union's mem-
bership at a meeting on April 18. The Union's board of
directors decided on April 21 to strike. The strike began
on April 25. On April 27 Fundacion declined to negoti-
ate further until the "illegal" strike ended.
Although the parties had exchanged contract propos-
als early in the negotiations and had met a few times in
September, October, and early November 1978, when
the negotiations reconvened on February 14 the Union's
chief negotiator, Federico Rivera Saez, insisted that bar-
gaining begin again because "there had been some elec-
tions held." Fundacion's chief negotiator and labor rela-
tions consultant, Raul Salgado, expressed his surprise at
this position, but nevertheless submitted a previously pre-
2 Hereafter, all dates are in 1979 unless otherwise specified.
The appropriate collective-bargaining unit is:
All full-time teaching personnel employed by the Employer, Funda-
cion Educativa Ana G. Mendez, at its two Puerto Rico Junior Col-
lege campuses located in Rio Piedras and Cupey, Puerto Rico; in-
cluding instructors, associate professors, professors, Academic Coun-
selors II, the Specialists in English, Spanish and Mathematics and
athletic instructor/coaches.
76
PUERTO RICO JUNIOR COLLEGE
pared "counterproposal" for the Union's consideration
prior to the next meeting, which was set for February
23.
B. The Unilateral Discontinuance of Faculty
Evaluations
At the February 23 meeting Saez noted that Funda-
cion's proposal did not contain clauses governing evalua-
tions for faculty rank, probation, and tenure. Salgado
stated that the College was not going to negotiate on
those clauses since they were not mandatory subjects of
bargaining. However, no mention was made of the fact
that Respondent Fundacion had actually discontinued
evaluations on February 16; nor did the Union receive
any official notice of this action until March 21 and
April 9, respectively, when Chancellor Hiram H. Puig
announced, by memoranda, their resumption. However,
the College maintained its refusal to include evaluation
procedure clauses in the new contract, on the ground
that evaluation was not a mandatory subject for bargain-
ing and was a management right, until the bargaining
session on April 20, when it shifted its position.
At the April 20 meeting, in response to the Union's
March 23 package proposal containing an evaluation
clause, Salgado stated that Fundacion was willing to
give the Union a proposal providing for deferral of the
negotiations of the evaluation clause until the issuance
and assessment of the United States Supreme Court's
then pending decision in N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University,
444 U.S. 672 (1980), which Respondent Fundacion had
argued, and continued to assert, would be controlling
concerning its obligation to bargain on this issue. How-
ever, no specific proposal along this line was given the
Union at this meeting. The Union demonstrated its lack
of interest in the suggested deferral arrangement by Saez'
unavailability thereafter, despite his request at the end of
the April 20 meeting that Salgado contact him no later
than April 24.
I find that Respondent Fundacion's reliance on the Ye-
shiva case is misplaced. Yeshiva arose as the result of the
university's postelection refusal to bargain concerning an
initial contract with the certified union of a unit of full-
time faculty members found appropriate by the Board.
By means of this proceeding Yeshiva obtained court
review of the Board's unit determination in the represen-
tation proceeding reviewing its originally rejected con-
tention that all of its faculty members were not employ-
ees within the meaning of the Act because they were
managerial or supervisory personnel. The Board adhered
to its unit finding, and ordered the university to bar-
gain. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
denied the Board's petition for enforcement of its Order,
holding that the faculty had "managerial status" suffi-
cient to remove them from the coverage of the Act.4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and
affirmed the court of appeals on the basis of the unique
facts of the Yeshiva case, stating:
The controlling consideration in this case is that
the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority
a 231 NLRB 597 (1977).
8 582 F.2d 686 (1978).
which in any other context unquestionably would
be managerial. Their authority in academic matters
is absolute. They decide what courses will be of-
fered, when they will be scheduled, and to whom
they will be taught. They debate and determine
teaching methods, grading policies, and matricula-
tion standards. They effectively decide which stu-
dents will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On
occasion their views have determined the size of the
student body, the tuition to be charged, and the lo-
cation of a school. When one considers the function
of a university, it is difficult to imagine decisions
more managerial than these. To the extent the in-
dustrial analogy applies, the faculty determines
within each school the product to be produced, the
terms upon which it will be offered, and the cus-
tomers who will be served.5
The instant case, in my view, is clearly distinguishable
from Yeshiva. First, unlike Yeshiva, which stemmed from
a refusal to negotiate a first contract covering a contest-
ed unit, this case originates from negotiations arising
from a previous collective-bargaining contract covering
an agreed-upon faculty unit. Indeed, as counsel for the
General Counsel urges, Respondent Fundacion's answer,
in the light of Section 9(a) of the Act, admits the appro-
priate unit allegation of paragraph 5 of the complaint.
Second, the issue presented herein is entirely different
from that of Yeshiva; i.e., whether because of the Court's
Yeshiva decision, and despite the inclusion of such clauses
in the previous 3-year labor agreement, faculty evalua-
tion for the purposes of probation, rank, and tenure is a
mandatory subject for bargaining. Fundacion contends it
is not. I disagree since it is self-evident that such evalua-
tions are determinative concerning the question of reten-
tion or termination, in the case of probation, or attaining
job security, in the case of tenure. Therefore, as such,
they have the status of conditions of employment, which
the Board has long held to be mandatory subjects for
bargaining.
Finally, and most significantly, although the undisput-
ed testimony of Chancellor Puig clearly shows that full-
time faculty members have participated in the evaluation
process through their faculty representatives at most all
levels of the decisionmaking process in various adminis-
trative and academic committees, boards, and councils,
there was no evidence, offered by Respondent Funda-
cion in support of its affirmative defense, to show that
Fundacion's faculty meets the Court's Yeshiva test for
managerial employees; i.e., absolute authority in aca-
demic matters. To the contrary, the record does show
that faculty representation in these forums is substantially
in the minority, and, in addition, the chancellor may
reject their recommendations and the Foundation presi-
dent may veto them.
I therefore find and conclude, for the reasons set forth
above, that the Yeshiva decision is not controlling, and
that evaluation of faculty members for purposes of pro-
bation, rank, and tenure is a mandatory subject for bar-
gaining.
s 444 U.S. at 686.
77
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Since it is undisputed that Respondent Fundacion uni-
laterally discontinued these evaluations from February 16
until March 21 (probation and tenure) and April 9 (rank)
and thereafter refused to bargain concerning the inclu-
sion of an evaluation clause in the collective-bargaining
agreement, I find that Respondent Fundacion violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as alleged in para-
graphs 8(a), (b), and (c) of the complaint. 6
C. The Alleged Bad-Faith Bargaining With Respect to
Respondent Fundacion's Proposed 20-Percent Service
Charge for Administering Dues Checkoff
Respondent Fundacion's proposal of February 14,
which was reviewed by the parties during the February
23 session, contained a provision, not included in the pre-
vious contract, establishing a 20-percent service charge
for its role in processing employee dues-checkoff deduc-
tions. Credited testimony by Raul Salgado reveals that
during the ensuing discussions of this proposal Funda-
cion attempted to justify its position on the basis of its
costs for administering the checkoff provision, although
he was unable to locate any detailed discussion of cost in
the minutes of the meeting. The Union countered that
the College did not charge other institutions for making
similar deductions. Apparently this argument was persua-
sive, for at the next meeting on March 9 Fundacion
withdrew its demand for a service charge and the parties
reached an agreement on the basis of the checkoff clause
in the prior contract, which they later initialed on April
20 without further change
I find that the General Counsel has failed to prove
that Fundacion violated the Act by its conduct relating
to the checkoff service charge proposal. The complaint
does not allege that Respondent Fundacion engaged in a
course of conduct designed to frustrate bargaining, or
demonstrated a lack of intent to reach a final and binding
agreement with the Union. Moreover, counsel for the
General Counsel specifically disavowed such a broad
theory of the case, and expressed an intention to prove
only the specific violations of Section 8(a)(5) specified.
In any event, there is no evidence that the proposal was
designed or itself tended to disparage or undermine the
Union in the employees' eyes. When the negotiations re-
convened on February 14, the College acceded to the
Union's request that negotiations begin again. Fundacion
gave the Union its written proposal, which was reviewed
in the interim and discussed for the first time on Febru-
ary 23. That proposal contained the 20-percent service
charge provision. The record does not reflect whether
the subject of checkoff first arose in these talks on Feb-
ruary 23 or at the next meeting on March 9, but it is
clear that such a discussion occurred at one of those ses-
sions and that the Union made a convincing argument, in
voicing its objections, on the basis that Fundacion made
deductions for others without charge. Thereafter, Re-
spondent Fundacion did not insist on its service charge
proposal, but instead promptly withdrew that clause at
I Since I have considered the restoration of the evaluation procedure
on March 21 and April 9 as a factor in deciding that Fundacion bar-
gained in bad faith during negotiations over this issue, I do not find the
restoration of these procedures to be a separate unilateral change in viola-
tion of the Act as alleged in pars. 8(f) and (h) of the complaint
the March 9 meeting, and agreed on the basis of the
clause in the expired contract. Under these circum-
stances, to find a violation of the Act here one must per-
ceive the law to be that an employer commits a technical
per se violation of the Act the minute it makes such a
proposal, even where it is promptly withdrawn without
insistence after hearing convincing arguments from
across the table. In my view this is not the law. Thus,
the Board has for some time expressed a disinclination to
find per se violations. I find and conclude that Respond-
ent Fundacion did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
including the service charge provision in its contract
offer of February 14, as alleged in paragraph 8(d) of the
complaint.
D. The Bargaining Concerning Fundacion's Medical
Plan Proposal
The package counterproposal Respondent Fundacion
orally submitted to the Union at the March 9 meeting
contained a medical plan known as "Blue Cross Plan
1000." Under the provisions of this plan, as explained by
credited testimony by Raul Salgado, the employee be-
comes eligible to enroll in the plan at the first year of
employment. From the beginning of second to the end of
the fifth year Fundacion would pay only for the employ-
ee's coverage. Thereafter, following the faculty mem-
ber's securing of tenure, Fundacion would pay for cover-
age for both the employee and his family.
The General Counsel alleges that following the March
9 meeting the College bargained directly with the unit
employees, and in bad faith with the Union, by offering
the faculty a better medical plan than it offered the
Union in negotiations. It is also contended that Respond-
ent Fundacion further violated the Act by withdrawing
the allegedly better plan after the Union accepted that
portion of the package proposal at the March 23 meet-
ing.
The basis of the General Counsel's theory concerning
the medical plan is the wording of a memorandum, stipu-
lated into evidence, dated March 14, 1979, addressed to
"members, contracting unit Puerto Rico Junior College"
from Jose F. Mendez, president, setting forth the Col-
lege's counterproposal. Item 5 of that summary states:
Plan 1000, offered by Cruz Azul de Puerto Rico,
with major medical, was offered. Concerning eligi-
bility to join the plan, any person who has worked
for a year or more is covered. Family plan will be
obtained when tenure is obtained. The expenses of
this plan are totally paid by the Fundacion.
However, the General Counsel's witnesses were unable,
in the face of Salgado's assertion that the March 9 and
14 medical clauses were one and the same, to recall what
specific respects in the March 9 medical clause were dif-
ferent. Indeed, Union Secretary Rodriquez agreed they
were "similar," while Idsa Alegria admitted that Plan
1000 was offered, but could not remember any details.
She pointed to the last sentence of item 5 in the March
14 memorandum as the source of the Union's argument
that two different proposals were offered, but could not
78
PUERTO RICO JUNIOR COLLEGE
explain in what manner. 7 I therefore find that the Gener-
al Counsel has failed to prove that Fundacion directly
offered unit employees a better plan than was offered at
the bargaining table. Therefore, in addition, Respondent
Fundacion did not renege on any agreement at the
March 23 meeting when the Union "accepted" the medi-
cal clause in the March 14 memorandum. s
I find that Respondent Fundacion did not violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as alleged in paragraphs
(e) and (g) of the complaint.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES IN CASE
24-CB-1053
On April 18 the Union held a meeting of its member-
ship at which its secretary general, Carmelo Rodriquez,
addressed those present. His topic was a review of the
entire negotiations with a heavy emphasis on Funda-
cion's economic offers which he characterized as "mini-
mum." Rodriquez then recommended strike action since
the likelihood of Fundacion hiring replacements would
be minimized by the proximity of examinations and grad-
uation, affecting 7,000 students. He, therefore, expressed
his opinion that the best time of strike was at hand. Then
Idsa Alegria moved that the membership authorize the
Union's board of directors to call a strike. A strike was
authorized. Felix Rivera Resto, the Union's information
and propaganda secretary, was also authorized to issue a
press release at the appropriate time.
On April 20 the parties met for the final time before
the strike. According to Rodriquez at least 18 clauses
were initialed by the parties as agreed to at that meeting.
These clauses included the checkoff and medical clauses,
which had been the subject of considerable dispute, and
other substantive clauses relating to economics, hours,
and working conditions. Total agreement on a contract
was not achieved. Those items not agreed to included
the evaluation clause for faculty probation, rank, and
tenure; and other clauses about salaries, summer pay,
yearly bonus, life insurance, pay for extra classes, Christ-
mas bonuses, leave with pay, accident insurance, and the
accumulation of vacation time per month.
On April 21 the Union's board of directors met and se-
lected April 25 as the date for the commencement of the
strike. A propaganda committee was formed under the
direction of Professors Resto and Alegria which pre-
pared a press release, published in El Mundo on April 24
stating that the strike "is due to the fact that the group is
trying to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement
. . . for the past nine months without success." The arti-
cle also quoted Carmelo Rodriquez as announcing, "the
strike would be of an economic type .... " In his testi-
mony Rodriquez conceded it was "very possible" he told
reporters that the strike would be of an economic nature.
The strike began April 25. Pictures taken that day of
picket signs show only economic captions, mainly ex-
pressing the faculty's desire for a pay raise. I, therefore,
I Whether the Union's negotiators became confused by the sentence
structure of item 5 in the March 14 memorandum, or by the differences
in the meaning of "eligibility," "coverage," and "totally paid." is not
clear in the record, and therefore any finding based on this possibility
would be based on speculation.
8 On April 20 the parties reached agreement on the medical clause.
find, in accordance with the undisputed evidence, that
the strike by the Respondent Union began as an econom-
ic strike having as a purpose compelling the modification
of the contract.9
The above findings concerning the legal status of the
strike at its inception are relevant only in assessing the
Respondent Union's defense. It is admitted that the
Union failed to comply with notice requirements set
forth in Section 8(d) of the Act. However, Respondent
Union contends that it is excused from its failure to
comply by Respondent Fundacion's unfair labor prac-
tices which, it argues, caused the strike. However, I have
found that the strike was not caused by Respondent Fun-
dacion's unfair labor practices, but rather by economic
circumstances. Moreover, Respondent Fundacion's unfair
labor practices, described herein, do not stem from a re-
jection of the Union as majority representative and are
not of such a flagrant nature as to otherwise excuse the
Respondent Union from compliance with Section 8(d) of
the Act. Consequently, the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Mastro-Plastics Corp., and French-
American Reeds Manufacturing Company, Inc., 350 U.S.
270 (1954), as reiterated by the Board in Mrs. Fay's Pies,
Inc., 145 NLRB 495, 497 (1963), cited by the Respondent
Union, is not controlling. Furthermore, as noted by
counsel for the General Counsel in her brief, the Board
has held that strikes to compel a change in contract
terms call for prior compliance with Section 8(d) even if
the employer had not bargained in good faith concerning
them, Telephone Workers Union of New Jersey, Local 827,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers AFL-CIO
(New Jersey Bell Telephone Company), 189 NLRB 726,
731 (1971); Local 156, United Packinghouse Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, et al (Du Quoin Packing Company),
117 NLRB 670 (1957). I find and conclude that Re-
spondent Union violated Sections 8(d) and 8(bX3) of the
Act as alleged in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 14 of the
complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent Employer is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By unilaterally terminating the existing faculty eval-
uation procedure governing probation, rank, and tenure
on or about February 16, without prior notice to or bar-
gaining with the Union, and thereafter refusing to bar-
gain with the Union concerning the inclusion of an eval-
uation procedure clause in any agreement between the
parties, the Respondent Employer violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. The strike of the Respondent Employer's faculty
members, which began on April 25, was not caused by
' It is unnecessary for the purpose of deciding the issues in this case to
decide whether or not the strike was thereafter converted to an unfair
labor practice strike. I note that Cases 24CA-4146 and 24-CA-4154, re-
lating to that question and its effect on strikers who may have offered to
return, are not before me by reason of a final decision by the General
Counsel not to issue a complaint in those cases.
79
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the unfair labor practices of the Respondent Employer,
and was, therefore, at its inception, an economic strike.
5. By engaging in a strike having as a purpose compel-
ling a modification of the existing contract, without
having first complied with the provisions of Section 8(d)
of the Act, the Respondent Union violated Sections
8(b)(3) and 8(d) of the Act.
6. The Respondents did not violate the Act in any re-
spects other than those specifically found.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order
that the Respondents cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act. Since the Respondents' unlawful conduct
has, in each instance, been limited to a single narrow and
specific breach of their obligation to bargain in good
faith, as opposed to a lack of intention to reach an agree-
ment or engaging in a course of conduct designed to
frustrate bargaining, I find that a narrow and specific
order is appropriate. Furthermore, since the Respondent
Employer resumed utilizing the faculty evaluation proce-
dure governing probation and tenure on March 21 and
rank on April 19, an affirmative provision in the Order
with respect to that issue is unnecessary.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER '
A. The Respondent Employer, Fundacion Educativa
Ana G. Mendez d/b/a Puerto Rico Junior College, Rio
Piedras and Cupey, Puerto Rico, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Asociacion
de Maestros Universitarios by unilaterally terminating or
discontinuing existing faculty evaluation procedures gov-
erning probation, rank, and tenure without prior notice
to or bargaining with the Union.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by
refusing to negotiate concerning the inclusion of faculty
evaluation procedures governing probation, rank, and
tenure in a collective-bargaining agreement between the
parties.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union
concerning the inclusion of faculty evaluation procedures
governing probation, rank, and tenure, and, if agreement
10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
is reached, embody that understanding in a signed collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.
(b) Post at its premises in Rio Piedras and Cupey,
Puerto Rico, in both the English and Spanish languages,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A.""I
Copies of "Appendix A," on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 24, after being duly signed by
an authorized representative of the Respondent Employ-
er, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent Employer to ensure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 24, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent Employer has taken to comply
herewith.
B. The Respondent Union, Asociacion de Maestros
Univeritarios, its officers, representatives, and agents,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from engaging in a strike or work
stoppage having as a purpose compelling a modification
of the existing contract, without first complying with the
conditions prescribed by Section 8(d) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post, in English and Spanish languages, in its of-
fices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix B."'2 Copies of "Appendix B" to be
furnished by the Regional Director for Region 24, shall,
after being duly signed by an official representative of
the Respondent Union, be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent Union
and its agents to ensure that such notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Forward to the Regional Director for Region 24
signed copies of "Appendix B," in the English and Span-
ish languages, for posting by the Respondent Employer,
if willing, at its Rio Piedras and Cupey, Puerto Rico,
facilities where notices to employees are customarily
posted.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 24, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent Union has taken to comply here-
with.
" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
I' See fn. II.
80
PUERTO RICO JUNIOR COLLEGE
APPENDIX A
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith
with Asociacion de Maestros Universitarios con-
cerning the inclusion of faculty evaluation proce-
dures governing probation, rank, and tenure for
those employed in the collective-bargaining unit;
and we will, upon request, bargain with the above-
named Union concerning the inclusion of an evalua-
tion clause, and, if agreement is reached, embody
that understanding in a signed collective-bargaining
agreement. The collective-bargaining unit is:
All full-time teaching personnel employed by the
Employer, Fundacion Educativa Ana G.
Mendez, at its two Puerto Rico Junior College
campuses located in Rio Piedras and Cupey,
Puerto Rico; including instructors, associate pro-
fessors, professors, Academic Counselors II, the
Specialists in English, Spanish and Mathematics
and athletic instructor/coaches.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally terminate, discontinue,
or otherwise change the existing faculty evaluation
procedures governing probation, rank, and tenure,
without prior notice to or bargaining with the
Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner in-
terfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the Act.
FUNDACION EDUCATIVA ANA G. MENDEZ
D/B/A PUERTO RIco JUNIOR COLLEGE
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT engage in a strike or stoppage
having as a purpose to compel modification of an
existing contract without first complying with the
provisions of Section 8(d) of the Act. That section
of the Act prescribes, in relevant part, that:
No party to [a] contract shall terminate or
modify such contract, unless the party desiring
such termination or modification-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other
party to the contract of the proposed termination
or modification 60 days prior to the expiration
date thereof, or in the event such contract con-
tains no expiration date, 60 days prior to the time
it is proposed to make such termination or modi-
fication;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Concila-
tion Service within 30 days after such notice of
the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously
therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency
established to mediate and conciliate disputes
within the State or Territory where the disputes
occurred, provided no agreement has been
reached by that time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without
resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and
conditions of the existing contract for a period of
60 days after such notice is given or until the ex-
piration date of such contract, whichever occurs
later:
ASOCIACION DE MAESTROS UNIVERSITARIOS
81