Fresh Creek Technologies, Inc.Download PDFTrademark Trial and Appeal BoardJul 25, 2013No. 85358621 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 25, 2013) Copy Citation THIS OPINION IS NOT A PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB Mailed: July 25, 2013 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____ Trademark Trial and Appeal Board _____ In re Fresh Creek Technologies, Inc. _____ Serial No. 85358621 _____ Michael J. Femal of Much Shelist PC for Fresh Creek Technologies, Inc. Odessa Bibbins, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 105 (Thomas G. Howell, Managing Attorney). _____ Before Zervas, Ritchie, and Masiello, Administrative Trademark Judges. Opinion by Masiello, Administrative Trademark Judge: Fresh Creek Technologies, Inc. filed an application to register the mark TRASH GUARD in standard character form on the Principal Register for the following goods and services: Separators for the cleaning and purification of liquids; Sustainable onsite water recycling and wastewater treatment systems; Waste water purification apparatus, installations and tanks; Waste water purification units; Water purification and filtration apparatus; Water purification installations; Water purification units; Water purification, sedimentation and filtration apparatus for clarification, thickening and filtration of water, waste water and industrial water; Water treatment apparatus, namely, clarification and thickening machines for use in Serial No. 85358621 2 treatment of liquids in the nature of water, waste water and industrial water; Water treatment equipment, namely, water filtration units, in International Class 11; Management of discharge system units for waste water treatment made to order and/or specification of others, in International Class 35; Refuse cleanup, namely, removing trash and floatables from waste water and storm water runoff for municipalities, industrial and commercial sources, in International Class 37; and Custom building of waste water purification units; Custom construction of floatables removal systems for waste water; Custom manufacture of waste water trash and floatables control units; Manufacture of general product lines in the field of waste water, storm water and urban runoff purification and trash removal units to the order and specification of others; Manufacture of discharge system units for waste water treatment to order and/or specification of others; Recycling of waste and trash; Treatment of waste water; Waste management; Waste treatment; Waste water treatment services; Waste water treatment services for industrial purposes; Water treatment and purification; Water treatment services, in International Class 40.1 The trademark examining attorney refused registration as to each class of goods and services under § 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that applicant’s mark, as used in connection with applicant’s goods and services, so resembles the registered mark Trash Guard as to be likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. The cited mark is registered on the Principal Register in standard character form for “Non-metal storm water screens.”2 When the refusal was made final, applicant filed a notice of appeal with a request for reconsideration. 1 Application Serial No. 85358621, filed under Trademark Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. §1051(b), on June 28, 2011. 2 Reg. No. 3483870, issued on August 12, 2008. Serial No. 85358621 3 On reconsideration, the examining attorney maintained her refusal and this appeal ensued. Applicant and the examining attorney have submitted briefs and applicant has filed a reply brief. I. Evidentiary Objection. We turn first to an evidentiary objection raised by the examining attorney in her brief. Applicant submitted with its brief, for the first time, information relating to the prices of various goods of registrant (marked Annexure 1); and a list of application and registration numbers relating to various marks, apparently derived from the online TESS database of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Annexure 2). The examining attorney objected to this evidence on the ground that it is untimely.3 Trademark Rules provide, “The record in the application should be complete prior to the filing of an appeal. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board will ordinarily not consider additional evidence filed with the Board by the appellant or by the examiner after the appeal is filed.” 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d). See also TBMP § 1207.01. Applicant contends that Annexure 1 does not constitute “new evidence” because “the pricing between applicant’s and registrant’s goods was made an issue on the record,” citing applicant’s arguments contained in its response of April 20, 2012.4 However, merely raising an issue in argument is no substitute for actually making evidence of record. 3 Examining Attorney’s brief, unnumbered p. 4. 4 Applicant’s reply brief at 3. Serial No. 85358621 4 With respect to Annexure 2, applicant argues that “such marks are public record on the USPTO website and the TTAB is free to judicially recognize or not any such listings….”5 It is the Board’s well-established practice not to take judicial notice of third-party registrations. TBMP § 1208.02. To make a third-party registration of record, a copy of the registration, either a copy of the paper USPTO record or a copy taken from the electronic records of the Office, should be submitted during examination of the application. In re Compania de Licores Internacionales S.A., 102 USPQ2d 1841, 1843 (TTAB 2012). Mere listings of registrations are not sufficient to make the registrations of record. Id.; In re Hoefflin, 97 USPQ2d 1174, 1177 (TTAB 2010). Neither does the Board take judicial notice of pending or expired applications. See In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1535 n.3 (TTAB 2009). The applicant has the responsibility to make sure that the record is complete prior to filing a notice of appeal. In re Van Valkenburgh, 97 USPQ2d 1757, 1768 n. 32, 1769 (TTAB 2011). Accordingly, the Board has not considered Annexures 1 and 2 to applicant’s brief. II. Likelihood of Confusion. We turn next to the merits of the examining attorney’s refusal. Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likelihood of confusion, as set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key 5 Id. Serial No. 85358621 5 considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods and services at issue. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976). In this case, applicant and the examining attorney have also submitted evidence and arguments regarding the channels of trade, classes of customers and their sophistication, the degree of care taken in the selection of the goods and services, similar marks in the marketplace, and absence of actual confusion. (a) The marks. We address first the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. Du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567. Applicant’s mark is identical to the mark in the cited registration. Although applicant initially argued against this point,6 in its reply brief applicant appears to concede that the marks are identical.7 Applicant’s concession is appropriate, because both the mark in the application and the cited registered mark are “standard character” marks. Marks presented in standard characters are not limited to any particular depiction. The rights associated with a mark in standard characters reside in the wording and not in any particular display. Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re RSI Systems, LLC, 88 USPQ2d 1445, 1448 (TTAB 2008); In re Pollio Dairy Products Corp., 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2015 (TTAB 1988). Accordingly, even though registrant may currently display its mark in a particular design format and in a particular color, as 6 Applicant’s brief at 7-9. 7 Applicant’s reply brief at 11 (“applicant agrees that the marks are identical”). Serial No. 85358621 6 applicant contended, registrant may change the format of its display and its attendant registration rights will continue to apply. Applicant nonetheless appears to argue that the marks differ in meaning, stating that “applicant has submitted evidence establishing that applicant’s “Trash Guard” and registrant’s “Trash Guard” are recognized differently when associated with their respective goods because the goods/services of applicant are so dissimilar in the minds of the purchaser.”8 We disagree. Applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are both used in connection with goods and/or services whose purpose is to create a barrier against trash and other forms of waste in order to protect bodies of water from contamination. As both marks are used in such similar contexts, we see no reason to believe that the marks would be perceived to have different meanings or to create different commercial impressions among likely customers. Accordingly, we find that the factor regarding the identity of the marks weighs heavily in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion. (b) The goods and services at issue. We turn next to the respective goods and services of applicant and registrant in order to determine whether they are sufficiently related to give rise to potential confusion. Applicant argues that the goods of applicant and registrant are dissimilar because applicant’s goods are “prefabricated” of “plastic,” “not custom made,” available “in only three sizes”, and “require no pre-engineering or custom 8 Reply brief at 11-12. Serial No. 85358621 7 design.”9 Arguments of this type are unavailing because they seek to limit the nature of registrant’s goods in ways that are not set forth in the cited registration. In considering the scope of the cited registration, we must look to the registration itself, and not to extrinsic evidence about the registrant’s actual goods, customers, or channels of trade. In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981), citing Kalart Co., Inc. v. Camera-Mart, Inc., 119 USPQ 139 (CCPA 1958). Registrant’s goods are identified as “non-metal storm water screens.” Although they are not of metal, they are not limited to plastic. The protections of the registration are not limited to prefabricated screens in only three sizes; if registrant makes, whether now or in the future, custom-designed screens in a variety of sizes, they will be within the scope of the registration’s protection. There is nothing about the inherent nature of “non- metal storm water screens” to exclude them from projects in which “pre- engineering” is required (or at least there is no evidence in the record to so indicate). Bearing in mind this general concept of the goods identified in the registration, we will consider in turn each class of applicant’s goods and services, to determine whether they are sufficiently related to registrant’s goods such that marketing them under a mark identical to the registered mark would likely give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate from or are associated with the same producer. Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. VigiLanz Corp., 94 USPQ2d 1399. 1410 (TTAB 2010); Schering Corporation v. Alza Corporation, 207 USPQ 504, 507 (TTAB 9 Applicant’s brief at 9-10. Serial No. 85358621 8 1980); Oxford Pendaflex Corporation v. Anixter Bros. Inc., 201 USPQ 851, 854 (TTAB 1978). (i) Applicant’s goods in International Class 11. Applicant’s goods include several broadly defined types of water filtration devices, including “Water… filtration apparatus” and “Water treatment equipment, namely, water filtration units.” To a layperson, a “storm water screen,” as identified in the registration, might constitute a type of water filtration apparatus. Even if this is not so, the record suggests that a storm water screen may be a component of a water filtration apparatus or unit: marketing material of applicant describing the Kingston Pump Station installation depicts, as a component of the system, an “overflow screen” (albeit a screen that appears to be of metal, rather than non-metal).10 The record also indicates that the goods of applicant and registrant have the same purpose. Registrant’s goods are designed to “capture[ ] debris, sediments & floatables” so as to result in “trash free stormwater discharge.”11 Similarly, applicant’s system installed at Kingston Pump Station is described as a “solution[ ] to the growing problem of trash and debris being dumped into the lakes….”12 Moreover, while some of applicant’s goods are identified as “waste water” filtration systems, rather than “storm water” filtration systems, the evidence suggests that storm water is a type of waste water or a component of waste water. “Fresh Creek systems use rugged custom-knitted disposable mesh nets to 10 Evidence submitted with applicant’s response of April 14, 2012. 11 See , submitted with the Office action of October 13, 2011. 12 “Kingston Pump Station Installation” brochure, submitted with applicant’s response of April 14, 2012. Serial No. 85358621 9 capture and remove trash, floatables and solids from stormwater, urban runoff and combined sewer overflow (CSO) discharges.”13 Applicant also characterizes its goods as “designed to capture and then remove floatable trash, debris, oil and other hazardous sediments to purify the storm water outflow and discharge….”14 Because the goods of registrant, as identified, may be components of systems of the types identified in the application, and because applicant’s and registrant’s goods have similar purposes, we find the goods of applicant and registrant to be related. We need not make this finding with respect to every item in applicant’s identification of goods. For purposes of likelihood of confusion analysis, it is sufficient to make the finding with respect any item within a class of identified goods. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981); Apple Computer v. TVNET.Net, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1393, 1398 (TTAB 2007). Accordingly, with respect to the goods in International Class 11, the du Pont factor of the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods favors a finding of likelihood of confusion. (ii) Applicant’s services in International Class 35. Applicant’s Class 35 services are “management of discharge system units for waste water treatment made to order and/or specification of others.” Such services are, by their nature, facilities operation services or business administration services. Services of this type are inherently different in nature from any kind of 13 “End-Of-Pipe, In-Line, Channel and Floating Systems” (emphasis supplied), submitted with applicant’s request for reconsideration of October 22, 2012. 14 Applicant’s reply brief at 8 (emphasis supplied). Serial No. 85358621 10 manufacture or other production of a hardware product such as a storm water screen. There is no reason to expect that a business that provides personnel to operate a facility would also be a source of the equipment of which the facility is constructed. The examining attorney has not made of record any evidence to demonstrate a degree of relatedness between the identified services and registrant’s goods. Accordingly, on this record the du Pont factor of the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods and services weighs against a finding of likelihood of confusion with respect to the services in Class 35. (iii) Applicant’s services in International Class 37. Applicant’s Class 37 services are “Refuse cleanup, namely, removing trash and floatables from waste water and storm water runoff for municipalities, industrial and commercial sources.” Such services might involve, in their rendition, use of a device such as a storm water screen. However, customers of such services would not naturally assume that the service provider produces its own equipment and machinery and markets such equipment at retail. There is no evidence of record to the contrary. Accordingly, on this record the du Pont factor of the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods and services weighs against a finding of likelihood of confusion with respect to the services in Class 37. (iv) Applicant’s services in International Class 40. Applicant’s services include “manufacture of general product lines in the field of waste water, storm water and urban runoff purification and trash removal units to the order and specification of others.” Registrant’s “storm water screen” is within Serial No. 85358621 11 the scope of products produced by a manufacturer of “general product lines in the field of… storm water… purification.” Customers for such goods, as well as customers for the specialized manufacturing services identified in the application, would readily expect that a business that provides custom manufacture of storm water purification products could also be the source of retail products such as storm water screens. For this reason, we find registrant’s identified goods to be closely related to the custom manufacturing service identified in the application. As noted above, we need not make the same finding with respect to every service identified in Class 40. Tuxedo Monopoly, 209 USPQ at 988. Accordingly, with respect to the services in International Class 40, the du Pont factor of the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods and services favors a finding of likelihood of confusion. (c) The channels of trade. Applicant argues that, because of the technical complexity of installing its water treatment systems, its goods and services are marketed in a manner different from the manner in which registrant’s goods are marketed: It requires Civil Engineering, General Contractors and EPA approval before installation… Applicant’s goods/services take years of planning with municipalities and approvals of governmental agencies prior to the custom installation by a general contractor pursuant to engineered specification related to the site to make up its goods/services. … Applicant’s goods/services require professional engineers to design and specifiy [sic] the custom built goods/services associated with its application….15 15 Applicant’s brief at 10. Serial No. 85358621 12 Applicant contends that, by contrast, “Registrant’s goods are bought off the shelf… without any engineering or classes conducted to aid in the specification of the goods to meet a particular site.”16 Even though registrant’s goods, by their nature, would constitute only one component of a storm water filtration system, we see no reason to believe that they would be excluded from the trade channel described by applicant. Assuming that applicant’s goods and services are marketed directly to municipal leaders, engineers and contractors, there is no reason to believe that equipment and components, such as registrant’s goods, would not also be marketed directly to such decision-makers. If these potential customers decide to engage applicant to provide its goods and services, it is not a foregone conclusion that they will also decide to obtain all equipment and components from applicant. Storm water screens are likely to be marketed through the same trade channels as storm water control services and goods. Accordingly, we find that the du Pont factor of trade channels favors a finding of likelihood of confusion. (d) Customers. As to the customers for applicant’s goods and services, applicant argues that : [applicant’s goods and services] target a particular area of an organization, more specifically the Civil Engineering Departments of Municipalities and Governments as well as Civil and Environmental Engineers from the U.S. EPA. In contrast, the Registrant’s goods on the other hand, are targeted towards consumers in general streets and sanitation departments of municipalities without Civil engineers, General Contractor to custom install or the 16 Id. at 12-13. Serial No. 85358621 13 EPA approval to insert within a catch basin under a curb sewer grate.17 The examining attorney responds by referring to registrant’s web site which contains indications that registrant also considers municipalities and engineers to be its customers: Provides your city with an inexpensive solution to storm water pollution. … Trash Guard, Inc. has developed a patented catch-basin trash screen for municipalities to have trash free stormwater discharge. … Trash Guard offers a product screen sizing calculations computerized program that can assist engineers in selecting the correct screen size.18 Applicant’s contention that registrant’s goods are offered to consumers or to city departments different from the departments to which applicant sells its goods and services is speculative and unsupported by evidence. There is nothing in this record to support a finding that registrant’s goods and applicant’s goods and services are directed to distinct classes of customers. The similarity of the classes of customers to whom the goods and services are offered favors a finding of likelihood of confusion. (e) Careful selection by sophisticated customers. Applicant next contends that its customers exercise a high degree of care in selecting its goods and services because their goal is “to meet EPA standards” and “it is critical for a corporation or municipality to avoid severe financial penalties by 17 Applicant’s brief at 11. 18 , submitted with Office action of October 13, 2011. Serial No. 85358621 14 not meeting EPA standards for discharging into waterways….”19 We note that there is nothing in the identification of applicant’s goods and services to indicate that their purpose is compliance with EPA regulations. In any event, the record does indicate that applicant’s goods and services are costly and generally complex in nature. They are the types of goods and services that are likely to be selected by means of a bidding process or a request for proposals, involving careful consideration by the decision makers. On the other hand, registrant’s goods, which are a single component rather than an entire system, would likely be selected with substantially less care and possibly at a different stage of project planning. (For example, a single component might be selected as a replacement part after completion of the project, rather than at the time the system is originally built.) Moreover, we note that even sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion, especially where the marks are identical. See In re Research Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 230 USPQ 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986), citing Carlisle Chemical Works, Inc. v. Hardman & Holden Ltd., 434 F.2d 1403, 168 USPQ 110, 112 (CCPA 1970); In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 1988). Overall, however, we find that the factor of careful selection of the goods and services weighs against a finding of likelihood of confusion. 19 Applicant’s brief at 14-15. Serial No. 85358621 15 (f) Lack of actual confusion. Applicant argues that it has been using its mark since June of 2000 and it is not aware of any confusion involving the marks of applicant and registrant.20 In an ex parte context, where we have no input from the registrant, applicant’s uncorroborated statement of no known instances of actual confusion is of little evidentiary value. In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Bisset-Berman Corp., 476 F.2d 640, 177 USPQ 528, 529 (CCPA 1973). In any event, the record lacks evidence of the length of time during which applicant has used its mark and of the extent of such use; accordingly, applicant has not demonstrated that there have been meaningful opportunities for instances of actual confusion to have occurred in the marketplace. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1847 (Fed. Cir. 2000); and Gillette Canada Inc. v. Ranir Corp., 23 USPQ2d 1768, 1774 (TTAB 1992). Accordingly, the du Pont factor of the length of time during and conditions under which there has been contemporaneous use without evidence of actual confusion is neutral. (g) Similar marks in the marketplace. Applicant contends that there are at least three marks similar to the mark at issue in use in the marketplace, that such third-party use renders the mark TRASH GUARD weak as a source indicator, and accordingly the likelihood of confusion is reduced. However, applicant has not effectively made of record any evidence of 20 Applicant’s brief at 16. Serial No. 85358621 16 actual use of any similar third-party mark; nor has it made of record evidence of any third-party trademark registrations or applications. (See discussion at Part I above.) Accordingly, there is no basis for a finding that the mark TRASH GUARD is weakened by dilution. Applicant also contends that the mark at issue is inherently weak.21 This point is well taken. The examining attorney has made of record a dictionary definition of the word TRASH indicating that it means “waste.”22 The record also contains many indications that the control of trash is the purpose of the registrant’s goods and applicant’s goods and services. The word GUARD, as a verb, has the following meaning: 2 b : to stand on the border or at the entrance of as if on guard… or as a barrier.23 As a noun, GUARD means: 6 : a fixture or attachment designed to protect or secure against injury, soiling, defacement, theft, or loss.24 It is clear, therefore, that the mark TRASH GUARD is highly suggestive of the nature and function of goods and services whose purpose is to create a barrier against trash and other forms of waste in order to protect bodies of water from contamination. Accordingly, we agree with applicant that the registered mark is inherently weak and thus may not be entitled to the wide scope of protection that we would normally accord 21 Applicant’s reply brief at 12. 22 Cambridge Dictionaries Online, submitted with Office action of October 13, 2011. 23 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993), p. 1007. 24 Id. The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Serial No. 85358621 17 a non-suggestive, stronger mark. We note, however, that even weak marks are entitled to protection against confusion. Hunt Control Systems Inc. v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., 98 USPQ2d 1558, 1567 (TTAB 2011); King Candy Company v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (CCPA 1974) (“likelihood of confusion is to be avoided, as much between ‘weak’ marks as between ‘strong’ marks, or as between a ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ mark.”). Overall, this factor weighs against a finding of likelihood of confusion. (h) Balancing the factors. Having considered all of the evidence and arguments of record and all relevant du Pont factors, including those not specifically discussed herein, we find, with respect to applicant’s goods in Class 11 and applicant’s services in Class 37, that applicant’s mark, as applied to those goods and services, so closely resembles the cited registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the source of applicant’s services. However, with respect to applicant’s services in Classes 35 and 40, no such likelihood has been demonstrated. Decision: With respect to applicant’s goods in Class 11 and applicant’s services in Class 37, the refusal to register the mark is affirmed; with respect to applicant’s services in Classes 35 and 40, the refusal to register the mark is reversed. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation