Freeman Decorating Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 24, 2001

335 N.L.R.B. 103 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 103
Freeman Decorating Co. and United Steelworkers of
America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover,
Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition,
Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No.
17U and Dan Brady

Brede, Inc. and Steelworkers, Local 17U and Dan
Brady

UFCW Local 653 (Excel Decorators, Inc.) and UFCW
Local 653 (Freeman Decorating Company)

UFCW Local 653 (Brede, Inc.) and Dan Brady.
Cases 18–CA–14810, 18–CA–14922, 18–CA–
14964, 18–CA–15057, 18–CA–14846, 18–CA–
14963, 18–CB–3847, 18–CB–3855, and 18–CB–
3883
August 24, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND TRUESDALE
On August 9, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Wil-
liam J. Pannier III issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel and Respondents Brede, Inc. (Brede)
and UFCW, Local 653 (Local 653) each filed exceptions
and a supporting brief. The General Counsel and Local
653 filed answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2 as
modified below, and to adopt the recommended Order3
as modified below.4

s.

1 Respondent Local 653 has excepted to some of the judge’s
credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule
an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear
preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are
incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd.
188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing the finding
2 There were no exceptions to the judge’s conclusions that: (1)
Freeman violated: (a) Sec. 8(a)(5) by obtaining extras from sources
other than Local 17U and applying to those extras terms and conditions
of employment inconsistent with those specified in the Freeman/17U
contract; and (b) Sec. 8(a)(1) by threatening to subcontract its Minnea-
polis work to Brede unless unfair labor practice charges were with-
drawn; (2) Brede violated: (a) Sec. 8(a)(2) by granting recognition to
Local 653 on the basis of a card count at a time when Local 17U was
still the authorized and lawful bargaining representative, and (b) Sec.
8(a)(5) by concurrently withdrawing recognition from Local 17U; and
(3) Local 653 violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by refusing to refer
Local 17U Chairperson Dan Brady to work because he supported Local
17U.
1. The judge concluded, and we agree, that: (1) Re-
spondent Freeman violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
obtaining extras from sources other than Local 17U and
applying to those extras terms and conditions of em-
ployment other than those specified in the Freeman/17U
contract, and (2) Respondent Brede violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to bargain with Local 17U
over terms and conditions of employment of extras re-
ferred to Brede by the Stagehands Union.5 In reaching
these conclusions, the judge interpreted the identically-
worded language of the Brede/17U and Freeman/17U
certified bargaining units. In brief, the judge found that
the unit description language was not ambiguous,6 and
interpreted the language to mean that “all” extras are
included in the unit and that “all other employees” (em-
phasis added) are excluded. The judge then went beyond
this essential interpretation, adding dicta to the effect
that: (1) employees ineligible for unit inclusion when the
election agreement was signed may never be included in
the unit, even if they later satisfy the unit criteria; (2)
3 This is a companion case to Brede, Inc., 335 NLRB 71 (2001). In
Brede, the Board adopted the judge’s findings that Brede violated Sec.
8(a)(5) by: (1) changing its procedures for hiring unit employees; (2)
substantially increasing its reliance on sources of unit employees other
than its traditional on-call list, such as Stagehands and Teamsters; (3)
substantially increasing its use of nonunit employees to perform unit
work; (4) using a unit employee, out of seniority, to perform unit work
at below unit wages, and (5) taking the hiring system back in-house.
The Board, however, reversed the judge’s finding that Brede violated
Sec. 8(a)(2) by entering into a Letter of Understanding with 653 stating
that it was taking hiring back in-house.
In Brede, the Board further adopted the judge’s finding that Local
653 violated: Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) by referring employees to Freeman with-
out regard to objective standards or criteria; and Sec. 8(b)(2) by refus-
ing to refer four named discriminatees for employment because they
supported Local 17U and/or complained about Local 653’s operation of
its referral system.
4 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance
with our recent decision in Ferguson Electric Co., 335 NLRB 142
(2001).
5 No exceptions were filed to the judge’s finding of these violations.
Brede excepts only to the judge’s remedial order, arguing that the rem-
edy is broader than the violation found. Brede relies on language in the
judge’s decision implying that its bargaining obligation extends only to
Stagehands not covered by a collective-bargaining agreement when the
Stipulated Election agreement was signed. We disavow that language
as dicta inconsistent with the judge’s conclusion that Brede’s bargain-
ing obligation extended to “all” extra employees performing decorating
work. Because we agree with the judge’s ultimate conclusion that
when Brede uses Stagehands to perform casual, on-call decorating
work, those Stagehands fall within the unit’s broad inclusionary lan-
guage, we find no merit in this exception.
6 Where the terms of a Stipulated Election Agreement are unambi-
guous, the Board must hold the parties to its text. Avecor, Inc. v.
NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1048
(1992).
335 NLRB No. 4
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 104
new employees may not be eligible for unit inclusion;
and (3) employees who fail to satisfy the unit criteria
remain represented by 653.
The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s dicta. The
General Counsel argues that the judge has misconstrued
the eligibility standard by setting substantive limitations
on unit scope.
We find merit in this exception. Bargaining unit cov-
erage survives despite turnover among specific employ-
ees. The judge’s dicta, however, effectively places a
“sunset” clause on Local 17U’s bargaining units, making
them disappear when the last employees on the Excelsior
lists leave employment. Moreover, the judge’s dicta
leaves an inappropriate residual unit which Local 653
can claim an interest in representing—those employees
hired after the election who do not satisfy the criteria of
minimum number of shows/days—worked. Thus, we
disavow the judge’s analysis to the extent that he sug-
gests that the unit is limited in scope to only those em-
ployees eligible for inclusion when the unit description
was signed. We also disavow the judge’s analysis to the
extent that he found that the unit description preserves
for Local 653 representation of extras who failed to meet
the “minimum time” standards. We leave to compliance
the determination of whether individual employees meet
the unit criteria for remedial purposes.
2. The judge found, and we agree, that Respondent
Local 653 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by demanding and
accepting recognition from Brede, with knowledge that
there existed unremedied unfair labor practices which
prevented employees from making an uncoerced choice
of a collective-bargaining representative. The judge spe-
cifically noted that 653 was aware of these unfair labor
practices, having been a party to Brede, supra.
Local 653 excepts, arguing that the judge improperly
created a conclusive presumption that the mere existence
of unremedied unfair labor practices prevented the exis-
tence of an uncoerced majority. Local 653 argues that,
while existing unremedied unfair labor practices may
have “discouraged” extras, there was no evidence of “co-
ercion,” such as threats to Brede unit employees or
unlawful assistance by Brede, within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A). For the reasons stated below, we find no
merit to this exception.
It is well-settled that a union violates Section
8(b)(1)(A) by accepting recognition when it does not
represent an uncoerced majority. Rainey Security
Agency, 274 NLRB 269 fn. 3 (1985); First National
Maintenance Corp., 254 NLRB 289 fn. 1 (1981), enfd.
681 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1981). A “minority union” in-
cludes both a union which has failed to secure sufficient
support in the unit for which it is recognized and a union
which has obtained ostensible majority support that is
tainted by coercion and therefore unreliable. Distributive
Workers District 65 (Hartz Mountain) v. NLRB, 593 F.2d
1155, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1978).7 The Board has drawn an
inference of an absence of an uncoerced majority using a
“totality of the circumstances” approach. Siro Security
Service, 247 NLRB 1266, 1271 (1980). One of the cir-
cumstances examined by the Board is whether the evi-
dence of loss of the incumbent’s majority was obtained
in the context of unremedied unfair labor practices, a
limitation designed to preserve the bargaining relation-
ship where “serious violations of the Act tend to produce
disaffections from a union.” Anvil Products, Inc., 205
NLRB 709 fn. 1 (1973), enfd. in part and remanded 496
F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1974). Not every unfair labor practice
will override what appears, in the total circumstances, to
be the uncoerced choice of bargaining unit employees.
There must be a rational basis for concluding that unlaw-
ful conduct bears a causal link to substantial defections
from a union. Airport Aviation Services, 292 NLRB 823,
832 (1989) [citation omitted].
Here, Local 653 acquired cards while unfair labor
practice violations found in Brede remained unreme-
died.8 Those violations included Brede’s violating Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) by: making unilateral changes to its hiring
criteria and procedures, including taking the hiring sys-
tem back in-house; substantially increasing its reliance
on sources of unit employees other than its traditional
on-call list; substantially increasing its use of nonunit
employees to perform unit work; and using a unit em-
ployee, out of seniority, to perform unit work at below
unit wages. Further, Brede’s unilateral changes to the
hiring criteria and procedures, and the increased reliance,
after Local 17U’s certification, on other employee
sources, clearly signalled to Local 17U bargaining unit
members that allegiance to Local 17U would result in
lost employment opportunities.9 “With employees out of
work and the union seemingly powerless to help them,”
Pirelli Cable Corp., 323 NLRB 1009, 1010 (1997), enfd.
in part and remanded 141 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 1998), there

7 We do not agree that knowledge of the unfair labor practices is an
essential element of taint.
8 To the extent that the judge relies upon the unremedied 8(a)(2) vio-
lation reversed by the Board majority in Brede, we do not rely on his
analysis. See fn. 3.
9 Also unremedied were the 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) unfair labor prac-
tices found against 653: specifically, the failure to refer pursuant to
objective standards and the discriminatory referrals. While the referral
violations occurred in connection with Freeman, they affected the same
pool of employees affected by Brede’s unfair labor practices: thus,
these employees knew that they would be passed over by 653 for em-
ployment with Freeman if they continued to support Local 17U. This
would also naturally tend to cause employee disaffection from Local
17U.
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 105
can be little doubt that Brede’s violations undermined
employee morale and tended to cause employee disaffec-
tion from Local 17U. Thus, these unremedied 8(a)(5)
violations were of a nature and type sufficient to infer a
causal link between the unlawful conduct and employee
defections from 17U.10
3. The judge found, and we agree, that Respondent
Freeman violated Section 8(a)(5) by “resorting to sources
other than” Local 17U for extras. The General Counsel
excepts insofar as the judge failed to specifically find
that Freeman violated Section 8(a)(5) when using Chi-
cago Carpenter foremen to perform unit work. The Gen-
eral Counsel seeks an order requiring Freeman to cease
and desist from unilaterally reassigning Local 17U bar-
gaining unit work to nonunit employees. For the reasons
stated below, we deny this exception.
The applicable unfair labor practice charge alleged that
Freeman “unilaterally assigned bargaining unit work to
nonunit employees.” That charge, however, merely set
in motion the machinery of a Board inquiry. The subse-
quent complaint was the operative document. “When a
Board complaint issues, the question is only the truth of
its accusations. The charge does not even serve the pur-
pose of a pleading.” NLRB v. Indiana & Michigan Elec-
tric Co., 318 U.S. 9, 17 (1943).
Here, the complaint, at paragraph 12, which the Gen-
eral Counsel claims “was intended to target the use of
Carpenters,” alleges:

10 In Lee Lumber, 322 NLRB 175, 177 (1996), enfd. in relevant part
117 F.3d 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the Board wrote:
Not every unfair labor practice will taint evidence of a union’s sub-
sequent loss of majority support; in cases involving unfair labor
practices other than a general refusal to recognize and bargain,
there must be specific proof of a causal relationship between the
unfair labor practice and the ensuing events indicating a loss of
support. In cases involving an 8(a)(5) refusal to recognize and
bargain with an incumbent union, however, the causal relationship
between unlawful act and subsequent loss of majority support may
be presumed.
Chairman Hurtgen does not presume a causal nexus in cases which
do not involve a complete refusal to recognize and bargain. See his
dissent in Priority One Services, 331 NLRB 1527 (2000). Nonetheless,
Chairman Hurtgen agrees that, in this case, there is a causal nexus
between unremedied violations and employee disaffection from Local
17U. Thus, in agreeing with the judge that Local 653 violated Sec.
8(b)(1)(A) when it accepted recognition from Brede, Chairman Hurtgen
takes administrative notice of the consistent testimony in Brede that,
after Brede began hiring in-house and changed its procedures and hir-
ing criteria, Local 17U employees stopped calling Brede for work,
since they either reached only an answering machine with a “no work”
message, or, if they were fortunate enough to get past the answering
machine, were told there was no work for them. In view of this futility
in representation, Chairman Hurtgen infers that a substantial number of
Local 17U employees who would have been hired under the “old sys-
tem” were no longer being hired, and that these lost employment oppor-
tunities reasonably tended to cause employee disaffection from Local
17U.

In April and May 1998, Respondent hired a large num-
ber of Unit employees whose identities are not known
to the General Counsel at this time from sources other
than Local 17U. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the allegation of the charge was that Respondent
assigned unit work to nonunit employees. By contrast,
the allegation of the complaint, although unclear, appears
to be that Respondent hired, into the unit, employees
from non-Local 17U sources.
At no time did the General Counsel move to amend the
complaint to add the separate allegation involving as-
signment of unit work to nonunit personnel. Accord-
ingly, because the allegation in the complaint is the hir-
ing of unit employees from sources other than Local
17U, and because the “unilateral reassignment” allega-
tion was neither properly pled nor fully litigated, we
deny the General Counsel’s exception.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that Respondent Brede, Inc.,
Boston, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, Respondent Freeman Decorating Co., Des
Moines, Iowa, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, and the United Food and Commercial Workers,
Local 653, Plymouth, Minnesota, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall take the actions set forth in the Or-
der as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph B,2(c).
“(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph C,2(d).
“(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.”

Joseph H. Bornong, Esq. for the General Counsel.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 106
Joseph B. Nierenberg, Esq. (Fredrikson & Byron), of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Respondent-
Employers.
Roger A. Jensen, Esq. and Carol A. Baldwin, Esq. (Peterson, Bell, Converse & Jenson), of St.
Paul, Minnesota, for Respondent-Union.
Daniel P. Brady, of Mounds View, Minnesota, appearing pro se for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM J. PANNIER III, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, on February 22 through 24, and on April 5 through 8, 1999. On November 25,
1998, the Acting Regional Director for Region 18 of the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) issued three separate Orders consolidating cases and consolidated complaints: one based
upon unfair labor practice charges in Case 18–CA–14810, filed on April 13, 1998, in Case 18–
CA–14922, filed on July 16, 1998, and in Case 18–CA–14964, filed on August 18, 1998,
alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act); the
second based upon unfair labor practice charges in Case 18–CA–14846, filed on May 5, 1998,
and in Case 18–CA–14963, filed on August 18, 1998, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1),
(2), and (5) of the Act; and, the third based upon unfair labor practice charges in Case 18–CB–
3847, filed on May 26, 1998, in Case 18–CB–3855, filed on June 10 and amended on Novem-
ber 16, 1998, and in Case 18–CB–3883, filed on October 29, 1998, alleging violations of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. By order further consolidating cases, also dated Novem-
ber 25, 1998, the Acting Regional Director consolidated the three consolidated complaints for
hearing and decision.
Then, on January 28, 1999, the Regional Director for Region 18 issued a complaint in Case
18–CA–15057, based on an unfair labor practice charge filed on November 16, 1998, and
amended on January 26, 1999, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and, moreover,
by order further onsolidating cases, consolidated that case with the ones already consolidated
for hearing and decision.
All parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to introduce evidence, to examine
and cross-examine witnesses, and to file briefs. Based on the entire record, on the briefs which
have been filed, and on my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Issues
The allegations of this case arise from two September 1995 representation elections con-
ducted in two identically worded and admittedly appropriate bargaining units, each among
employees of a different exposition decorating employer. One of those employers is Brede,
Inc. (Respondent Brede), a Minnesota corporation, with an office and place of business in
Minneapolis, engaged in providing services, equipment, and materials involved in setting up
and dismantling trade shows and convention exhibits.1 The other employer is Freeman Deco-
rating Co. (Respondent Freeman), an Iowa corporation with an office and place of business in
Des Moines, Iowa, where it engages in the manufacture, rental, and installation of exhibits,
decorations, booths, and equipment for conventions and trade shows.2

1 It is admitted that at all material times Respondent Brede has been
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act, based upon the admitted factual allegations that, in
conducting its above-described business operations during calendar
year 1997, Respondent Brede purchased, and received in Minneapolis
directly from suppliers located outside of the State of Minnesota, goods
valued in excess of $50,000 and, during that same calendar year, sold
goods and/or services valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers
located outside of Minnesota.
2 It is admitted that at all material times Respondent Freeman has
been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec.
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, based upon the admitted factual allegations
that, in the course of conducting its above-described business opera-
tions during calendar year 1997, Respondent Freeman purchased, and
Two unions appeared on the ballots for each of those two elections. One is a charging party
in this proceeding: United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover,
Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No.
Local 17U (Steelworkers Local 17U), an admitted labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act. The other had ostensibly been the incumbent bargaining agent of the
employees involved in the elections. It is United Food & Commercial Workers International
Union, Local 653, AFL–CIO (Respondent UFCW Local 653), also an admitted labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Both elections were won by Steelworkers Local 17U. On September 18, 1995, the Re-
gional Director for Region 18 issued certifications of representative to Steelworkers Local 17U
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees in separate appropriate
bargaining units, one for employees of Respondent Brede and the other for employees of
Respondent Freeman. Each of the certified appropriate bargaining units is worded:

All on-call, casual, extra employees employed by the Employer as journeypersons or helpers
during at least two shows, exhibitions, and/or conventions at facilities located in the Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul, MN metropolitan area for at least five working days during the past twelve months
or who have been employed by the Employer at such events for at least 15 days within the past
two years; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, managerial employees,
all other employees currently covered by other collective bargaining agreements, and guards
and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.

Importantly, those twin units were not determined by a pre-election decision. Instead, they
were ones agreed upon by the parties in separate Stipulated Election Agreements, one agreed to
by Steelworkers Local 17U and Respondents Brede and UFCW Local 653 in Case 18–RC–
15804; the other by Steelworkers Local 17U and Respondents Freeman and UFCW Local 653
in Case 18–RC–15803.
One aspect of those stipulated bargaining units soon arose to cause difficulty in application.
That is the exclusion of “all other employees currently covered by other collective bargaining
agreements.” Prior to the Stipulated Election Agreements, Respondent Brede had been party to
collective-bargaining contracts with Respondent UFCW Local 653. Respondent Brede also
contends that it had been party to collective-bargaining contracts with International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees, Local 13, Minneapolis, Minnesota (Stagehands), and, as well,
with Teamsters Local No. 544 (Teamsters).
Litigated in a proceeding conducted before Administrative Law Judge John H. West on
March 17 through 20, 1998, were issues of whether Respondent Brede had actually been party
to contracts with those two unions; whether Respondent Brede had violated the Act by, in
effect, funneling off the work of Steelworkers Local 17U-represented employees to employees
represented by Respondent UFCW Local 653, to Stagehands and to Teamsters; and, whether
Respondent Brede had violated the Act by granting recognition to Respondent UFCW Local
653 and by entering into, maintaining, and enforcing a partial collective-bargaining contract
with Respondent UFCW Local 653 as the representative of “on-call, casual, extra employees”
encompassed by the certification of representative issued to Steelworkers Local 17U. In
addition, it was alleged and litigated in that proceeding that Respondent UFCW Local 653 had
violated the Act by certain aspects of its referral (dispatching) procedure and by failing to
properly refer certain employees, among whom were Charging Party Daniel P. Brady, from
about June 2, 1996, through about July 27, 1997.
In a decision issued on August 14, 1998 (JD–123–98), Judge West concluded that Respon-
dents Brede and UFCW Local 653 had violated the Act as alleged. Two points must be made
about that decision, insofar as its findings and conclusions pertain to the instant proceeding.
First, that decision is presently before the Board for review on exceptions. Accordingly, its
findings and conclusions are not those of the Board and cannot be relied upon as the basis for
any conclusion in this proceeding.3 Still, the General Counsel acknowledges that all of the

received at Des Moines directly from suppliers located outside of the
State of Iowa, goods valued in excess of $50,000 and, during that same
calendar year, sold goods and/or services valued in excess of $50,000
directly to customers located outside of Iowa.
3 Indeed, only recently the Board has pointed out that portions of
administrative law judges’ decisions to which no exceptions have been
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 107
allegations in this proceeding against Respondent Brede, and some of the allegations against
Respondent UFCW Local 653, are based on an assumption that certain conclusions reached by
Judge West will be affirmed. Therefore, based on the general principle that it is presumed that
a government official has properly performed his/her duties, I shall assume, for purposes of
those allegations in this proceeding, that Judge West’s related underlying conclusions will be
affirmed. Of course, should that not be the fact, allegations arising from them in this proceed-
ing should be dismissed.
Second, in the course of developing background evidence in this proceeding, Respondents
Brede and UFCW Local 653 presented certain evidence which, in retrospect, concern aspects
of Judge West’s factual and conclusionary findings. I consider that evidence in this proceeding
only to the extent that it bears on issues presented by the now-consolidated above-captioned
cases. I will not rely on that evidence for, in effect, reconsideration of the findings of fact and
conclusions reached by Judge West. Respondents Brede and UFCW Local 653 had their
opportunity to present evidence regarding the issues resolved by Judge West. So far as the
record in this proceeding discloses, neither of those respondents has moved to reopen the record
in the earlier proceeding, pursuant to Board’s Rules and Regulations, Section 102.48(d)(1). See
Grinnell Fire Protection Systems, 307 NLRB 1452 fn. 2 (1992). Obviously, it would be
improper for me to reconsider conclusions reached in an earlier proceeding, while that proceed-
ing is before the Board for review and given that I was not involved in that proceeding.
The allegations made in this proceeding against Respondents Brede and UFCW Local 653
arise from events occurring after the hearing conducted before Judge West. It is alleged, and
admitted by Respondent Brede, that since April 11, 1998, Steelworkers Local 17U has re-
quested bargaining about employment terms and conditions of “on-call, casual, extra employ-
ees” referred to Respondent Brede by Stagehands and, further, that since April 23, 1998,
Respondent Brede has refused to negotiate about the employment terms and conditions of those
employees. In short, Respondent Brede denies that it has violated the Act by that refusal
because those Stagehands-referred “on-call, casual, extra employees” were, and are, “covered
by [another] collective bargaining agreement[ ]” and, thus, are excluded from Steelworkers
Local 17U’s certified bargaining unit.
Both Respondent Brede and Respondent UFCW Local 653 are alleged to have violated the
Act when, during May 1998, the latter requested recognition as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of “on-call, casual, extra employees” employed by the former. It is
further alleged that Respondent Brede unlawfully granted that request and that Respondent
UFCW Local 653 unlawfully accepted recognition, with the parties then unlawfully conduct-
ing negotiations concerning employment terms and conditions of those employees. In the
process, it also is alleged, Respondent Brede unlawfully withdrew recognition of Steelworkers
Local 17U as the collective-bargaining representative of “on-call, casual, extra employees”
employed by Respondent Brede.
The foregoing allegations, as pointed out above, are based upon affirmance of Judge West’s
conclusions in the prior proceeding. Independent of his decision, it is alleged that Respondent
UFCW Local 653 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when its admitted statutory agents,
Business Agent Warren Hartman and Steward Kevin Sabas, told employees that they had to
join Respondent UFCW Local 653 or they would not be able to work for Respondent Free-
man.4 In addition, independent of any finding or conclusion made by Judge West, it is alleged
that Respondent UFCW Local 653 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act since May
1998, by failing and refusing to refer Brady, a member and leading supporter of Steelworkers
Local 17U, to employment in Minneapolis with Excel Decorators, Inc. (Excel), an Indiana
corporation with an office and place of business in Indianapolis, Indiana, where it engages in
the production of trade show and convention decorating services.5 It is further alleged that

filed, and for which no Board-review has been conducted, are “of no
precedental value.” Watsonville Register-Pajaronian, 327 NLRB 957,
959 (1999).
4 No allegation against Respondent Freeman is made in connection
with those alleged threats.
5 It is admitted that at all material times Excel has been an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act, based upon the admitted factual allegations that, in the course
of the above-described business operations during its fiscal year ending
Respondent UFCW Local 653 failed and refused to refer Brady to employment with Excel
because of Brady’s membership and support for Steelworkers Local 17U.
Respondent UFCW Local 653 denies that it committed any of the foregoing alleged unfair
labor practices. In addition, it contends that the allegations against it are barred by the 6-month
limitation proviso of Section 10(b) of the Act. But, there is no basis for reaching such a conclu-
sion with regard to any of the allegations made against Respondent UFCW Local 653 and, in
fact, it has not pointed to any specific allegation barred by that proviso, in light of the dates of
the charges against it and the evidence presented.
Respondent Freeman was not named as a respondent and did not appear by counsel in the
proceeding before Judge West. For the most part, it is alleged in this proceeding that since
October 13, 1997, Respondent Freeman disregarded its statutory obligation to honor collective-
bargaining contracts with Steelworkers Local Local 17U, and its statutory obligation to deal
only with that labor organization as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
Respondent Freeman’s “on call, casual, extra employees,” by hiring those employees from
sources other than Steelworkers Local 17U, specifically Respondent UFCW Local 653, and,
then, by recognizing Respondent UFCW Local 653 as the bargaining representative of those
employees and by applying to them employment terms and conditions inconsistent with those
specified in Respondent Freeman’s collective-bargaining contracts with Steelworkers Local
17U.
Actually, Respondent Freeman admits those factual allegations. It argues that it acted law-
fully, however, inasmuch as those actions were taken pursuant to the certification’s “all other
employees currently covered by other collective bargaining agreements” exclusion. Thus, it
contends, Steelworkers Local Local 17U had no statutory right to prevent it from continuing to
obtain “on-call, casual, extra employees” from Respondent UFCW Local 653, as it had been
doing prior to September 1995, and from applying to those employees whatever employment
terms and conditions were specified in its collective-bargaining contracts with Respondent
UFCW Local 653.
Independently of its bargaining relationships with Steelworkers Local 17U and with Re-
spondent UFCW Local 653, Respondent Freeman is alleged to have violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act on November 3, 1998, because its Des Moines Operations General Manager James
Lowell Zaugg, an admitted statutory supervisor and agent of Respondent Freeman, assertedly
threatened to reduce Minneapolis-area work activity of Respondent Freeman, thereby depriving
“on-call, casual, extra employees” there of work opportunities, unless unfair labor practice
charges against it, including some of those involved in the instant proceeding, were withdrawn
by Steelworkers Local 17U and by Brady.
B. Background
A review of certain background subjects is necessary to better evaluate facts underlying the
issues presented for resolution. As must be obvious from the descriptions of employers’
operations set forth in subsection A above, this case arises in the exposition decorating indus-
try: the business of setting up and, later, dismantling exhibits for trade shows, exhibitions and
conventions. To set one up, a blueprint of the layout is prepared. Based on that blueprint, a
load list is prepared, enumerating the equipment, prefabricated displays, and other material
which must be trucked to the show, exhibition or convention site. At that site, the floor or
ground is marked to show where exhibits will be placed. Then installed are electrical wiring
and plumbing which is needed. Padding and, on that, carpeting is laid and taped down. Plas-
tics are placed over the carpeting and display bases are installed. Then displays are erected.
Displays range in size from booths to more elaborate ones, such as turntable-displays for
automotive shows. Once displays have been erected, electrical and plumbing connections are
made. What is known as “masking” is performed: pipe and frames are set up, and from the
cross-pipes are hung 12- to 20-foot drapes. Soft goods may be hung from batons which, in
turn, are hung from the convention hall ceiling or from trusses rigged on that ceiling. Furniture
and fixtures are placed on the displays, perhaps with signs and/or banners affixed to displays.

May 31, 1998, Excel purchased, and received at Indianapolis directly
from suppliers located outside of the State of Indiana, goods valued in
excess of $50,000 and, during that same fiscal year, sold and shipped
from Indiana, directly to customers located outside of that state, goods
and/or services valued in excess of $50,000.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 108
With the exception of very large or unusual ones–such as the Smithsonian Show which ran
from late September to late November 1996–shows last only a few days. Once shows are
completed, exhibits are disassembled, and the furnishings, equipment and whatever materials
can be reused are packed and trucked to warehouses for future use.
As might be expected, work on any given show is relatively short in duration. A number of
employees are needed to assemble shows and a similar number is needed to disassemble them.
During shows, a more limited number of employees is needed, to perform whatever work may
be required while shows, conventions, and fairs are in progress. The numbers of those employ-
ees are determined about the same time as the load lists are prepared. Based on those determi-
nations, prepared are work tickets which specify what work those employees will be perform-
ing.
In many areas of the country, all exposition decorating employees are supplied to that in-
dustry’s employers by a single union which represents all exposition decorating employees in
that particular area. In the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, however, several unions
represent employees who perform exposition decorating work. Three of those unions are
Respondent UFCW Local 653, Stagehands and Teamsters. Thus, for any given Minneapolis-
St. Paul metropolitan area show, exhibition or convention, the exposition decorating employer
would contact one or more of those unions for referral of needed numbers of employees for
assembly and disassembly.
In many, perhaps most, instances a given Minneapolis-St. Paul employee is on the referral
list of more than one union. While working on any particular show, exhibition, or convention,
that employee is regarded as represented by the union which referred him/her there. Concomi-
tantly, that employee’s employment terms and conditions are governed by the collective-
bargaining contract between the employer and the particular union which referred that em-
ployee. For example, an employee could be regarded as represented by Respondent UFCW
Local 653 for one show, exposition or convention and, then, by Teamsters for the next one.
As with the unions, a number of employers are engaged in the decorating exposition indus-
try in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Two of them are Respondents Brede and
Freeman. Respondent Brede’s headquarters are not there, but it does maintain one of its six
regional offices in Minneapolis, mentioned in subsection A above. During what may be
regarded as the convention season Respondent Brede conducts relatively ongoing convention
decorating activities—producing or being service contractor for a series of shows, expositions,
and conventions in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Its president/general manager
for the last 6 years has been William C. Casey III, an admitted statutory supervisor and agent of
Respondent Brede.
Reporting to him in the Minneapolis regional office is an administrative manager, a sales
manager, and Operations Manager Mike Johnson. The latter is also an admitted statutory
supervisor and agent of Respondent Brede. According to Casey, Johnson “sets up the day to
day work schedule for our [Minneapolis] office and oversees basically all aspects of operation
including who works and making the labor calls and stuff like that.”
Respondent Freeman has branch offices in several locations throughout the country, includ-
ing one in Chicago, Illinois, and another in Des Moines. Personnel in each of those branch
offices is responsible for producing and acting as service contractor for shows, expositions and
conventions in a particular geographic area. As Respondent Freeman has no office in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, its Des Moines office acts as producer/service contrac-
tor for shows, expositions and conventions there.
In contrast to Respondent Brede, Respondent Freeman does not have relatively ongoing ex-
position decorating business in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. During the calen-
dar year 1995, for example, it produced/was service contractor for 14 shows there, employing
personnel on them for a total of only 87 days. During the calendar year 1996, Respondent
Freeman had a total of nine shows in that area, one of which was the Smithsonian Show,
employing employees for a total of 96 days during that year. It was producer/service contractor
for 12 Minneapolis-St. Paul shows during 1997, employing employees on them a total of 51
days.
During 1998 Respondent Freeman was producer/service contractor for 11 Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area shows and conventions, employing employees there for 72 total days.
More specifically, inasmuch as some of those shows were the sites of some alleged unfair labor
practices, during 1998 Respondent Freeman was producer/service contractor for, and employed
employees on, the AARP Show from May 26 through June 6, the Human Resources Manage-
ment Show from June 10 through 18, the RESNA Show from June 25 through 30, the Micro-
soft Developer Days Show on August 1 and 2, the Lumbermen’s Show from September 15
through 20, and the Shakopee Crafts Show from October 27 through 29, and on November 2.
There seems no dispute about the fact the Respondent Freeman had been producer/service
contractor for all of the shows listed in the immediately preceding paragraph. But, it is uncon-
tested that Respondent Freeman only acts as the direct producer/service contractor for about
half of the shows for which it contracts in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. For the
other half Respondent Freeman subcontracts the work to Respondent Brede which, in turn,
supplies the exposition decorating employees for those shows, expositions and conventions.
Although the record does not contain a precise list of those shows, that does not affect the
unfair labor practice allegations, since precise determinations can be made during the compli-
ance phase of this proceeding, if necessary. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883
(1984); and McKenzie Engineering Co. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 1999).
Focusing on Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area shows for which Respondent Freeman
is producer/service contractor, the highest ranking Des Moines Branch official is General
Manager Zaugg. He testified generally that he is “responsible for anything that happens in the
Des Moines operation,” answering to Respondent Freeman’s regional vice president. That had
been James Nork Sr. until January 31, 1999, and has been Dale Morris, since then. Reporting
directly to Zaugg in the Des Moines branch office, he testified, are the director of sales, Larry
Stoddard, by the time of the hearing, and possibly also, though this is not altogether clear, the
operations manager, Ray Pinegar, by the time of the hearing. Reporting to the director of sales
are the four Des Moines branch account executives, one of whom is Stoddard. He had been
elevated to the position of director of sales from the position of account executive. Nonethe-
less, he continues to perform the duties of account executive.
It is the account executives who have direct responsibility for production and servicing
shows, expositions, and conventions for Respondent Freeman. “They all deal with accounts
that are assigned to them,” testified Zaugg, meaning that they “[w]ork with the association or
group [Respondent Freeman is] going to be producing the show for.” According to him, it is
the account executives who “produce the [above-mentioned] work tickets” for shows, exposi-
tions, and conventions, to ensure “that the workers will know exactly what they are to do,” and,
moreover, it is the account executives who secure employees from a union or from unions,
based upon the account executives’ determination as to how many employees will be needed.
Zaugg further testified that, while on site, the account executive is the highest-ranking official
there for Respondent Freeman—save, of course, for whenever Zaugg or his superior happen to
be there.
Reporting to the account executive on site is a general foreman or senior foreman. Zaugg
utilized one or the other title, seemingly interchangeably, when referring to Ray Pinegar who
occupied that position before becoming operations manager, as well as when referring to other
individuals who have been general or senior foremen. It is that official, according to Zaugg,
who receives the above-mentioned work tickets and “run[s] the job at the site,” to set up and
later disassemble exhibits. Among other decisions, it is the general or senior foreman who is
responsible for completing the payroll, for determining when work stops for the day, and for
deciding when employees can leave work early. “His decision,” testified Zaugg.
The foregoing description of duties is not simply some idle recitation of facts. As will be
seen in subsection F below, Stoddard and Pinegar were assigned relatively central roles by
Business Agent Hartman in connection with events at the AARP Show from May 26 through
June 6, 1998—events which supposedly led Respondent Freeman to disregard any effort to
secure referrals of “on-call, casual, extra employees” from Steelworkers Local 17U for the
ensuing Human Resources Management Show of June 10 through 18, 1998, and, instead, to
secure those employees from Respondent UFCW Local 653. Yet, neither Stoddard nor Pine-
gar was called as a witness in this proceeding. There is no evidence that either official had not
been available to appear as a witness. Nor was there any representation to that effect. Their
nonappearance is left unexplained.
As pointed out above, work in the exposition decorating industry is irregular. That is, deco-
rating occurs only when shows, expositions and conventions are conducted. Accordingly, in a
sense, all employees involved in that work might be regarded generally as “on-call, casual,
extra employees”—as ones employed in the industry only whenever there is a show, exposition
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 109
or convention to be produced. “There is no guarantee—you know there is on [sic] guarantee
there of 40 hours of work a week,” explained Eugene Schultz, a Respondent UFCW Local 653
steward at Respondent Brede. At any given time, only one exposition decorating employer
may be producing/service contracting a Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area show, exposi-
tion, or convention, while no other convention decorating employers are doing so. Concomi-
tantly, only some exposition decorating employees may be working during a given period,
while the others are left to look elsewhere for work.
Without delving too far into issues decided by Judge West, inasmuch as Respondent Brede
maintains a facility in Minneapolis, and relatively regularly produces/service contracts shows,
expositions, and conventions in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, there is a group of
exposition decorating employees which it employs as regular and full-time employees—ones
referred to as the “core group.” Thus, so long as there is convention decorating work to be
performed by Respondent Brede, it employs as many of those employees as are needed.
Whenever Respondent Brede has no work for some or all of its core group of regular and full-
time decorating employees, those employees are free to seek, and do seek, temporary work with
other employers in the convention decorating industry.
For most, if not all shows, Respondent Brede needs to augment its core group of decorating
employees with additional employees, many times a number much greater than exists in the
core group. Those additional employees are what have come to be referred to as the “on-call,
casual, extra employees.” During years immediately preceding September 1995 Respondent
Brede, and Respondent Freeman, as well, obtained those employees mostly from Respondent
UFCW Local 653, though they also were obtained from other sources including Stagehands
and Teamsters. What is known as a “hall call” list was maintained under the auspices of
Respondent UFCW Local 653. Employees asked to have their names placed on that list and
they were referred to employment in the order of placement on that list. Thus, while there is
sometime reference to the hall call list as a “seniority” list, that is not actually the fact.
By September 1995, the practice had developed of allowing employees who worked at least
2 days during a calendar month to remain on the hall call list, for referral during the succeeding
month, only if they paid a $15-per-month fee. Failure to make that payment for each month in
which he/she worked 2 or more days would result in deletion of that employee’s name from the
hall call list. To be reinstated on the list, an employee could resume paying the $15 monthly
fee. But after a hiatus in that payment, the employee would not be restored to his/her original
position on the list. Rather, he/she would be added at the bottom of the list’s names. There
seems little, if any, dispute about the general fact that, at show sites, “on-call, casual, extra
employees” perform the same types of work as Respondent Brede’s regular and full-time
employees. There was some generalized testimony, never really explained in depth, to the
effect that there is a difference in skill level between the two groups. For example, Steward
Schultz testified, “I would say, yeah, the work was similar but the extras obviously couldn’t do
what the full-time people did.” Similarly, Respondent Freeman’s general manager, Zaugg,
testified that the core group employees “are more qualified than” the, in effect, “on-call, casual,
extra employees.” But, the core group works for Respondent Brede and its President/General
Manager Casey was not willing to indulge even that distinction between the two groups. Asked
if the extras did work similar to that of, in effect, regular and full-time employees which
Respondent Brede employed, Casey answered, “Not similar. Exactly the same.”
Unlike Respondent Brede, Respondent Freeman does not employ any regular and full-time
decorating employees in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Of course, that is because
its work in that area is only intermittent. And, as pointed out above, a significant amount of its
convention decorating work there is subcontracted by Respondent Freeman to Respondent
Brede. As a result, it may occasionally employ one or more of Respondent Brede’s core group
on shows, expositions and conventions which Respondent Freeman produces/service contracts
itself. So far as the evidence discloses, however, that occurs only whenever Respondent Brede
is not producing/service contracting a show and has no need to employ all of its core group of
regular and full-time employees—in other words, whenever Respondent Brede does not have
work for all of them and those core group employees are willing to take a temporary job until
Respondent Brede next has work for them.
Finally, as must be implicit from some of what has been stated above, by September 1995,
Respondent UFCW Local 653 had contractual relations with both Respondent Brede and
Respondent Freeman. Contracts with both included mention of what would come to be called
“on-call, casual, extra employees” and spelled out some employment terms and conditions for
those employees. However, at least one of the officials of Respondent UFCW Local 653 made
known that it was not truly the bargaining representative of “on-call, casual, extra employees.”
Brady testified that he spoke with then-Business Agent August (Augie) William Zahn dur-
ing 1995, after having been told by Steward Schultz that “possibly never” would “on-call,
casual, extra” decorators be allowed to become members of Respondent UFCW Local 653,
because “it would disrupt [Respondent UFCW Local 653’s] negotiating power,” given the
much better contractual benefits being received by regular and full-time decorators. According
to Brady, when he voiced his membership desire to Zahn, the latter “said flat out that that’s not
ever going to happen,” adding that Respondent UFCW Local 653 “didn’t represent the casual
labor for Freeman or Brede in any way, shape or form” and that “as casual labor we are not part
of [Respondent UFCW Local 653’s] contract.” Those remarks may seem rather unreal in view
of the above-mentioned contractual provisions for “on-call, casual, extra employees.” When
later called as a witness for Respondent UFCW Local 653, however, Zahn never denied having
participated in a conversation such as Brady had described. Nor, more importantly, did Zahn
deny having made any of the above-quoted remarks attributed to him by Brady.
Those remarks, among others, led to the organizing campaign on behalf of Steelworkers
Local 17U, to the Stipulated Election Agreements’ agreed-upon appropriate bargaining units,
and to certification of Steelworkers Local 17U as the representative, in separate units, of “on-
call, casual, extra employees” of Respondents Brede and Freeman.
C. Unlawful Conduct Attributed to Respondent Brede
One of the alleged unfair labor practices attributed to Respondent Brede is that it had re-
fused to bargain with Steelworkers Local 17U, since April 23, 1998, about employment of “on-
call, casual, extra employees” referred by Stagehands and about the terms and conditions under
which those employees worked for Respondent Brede. That allegation is rooted in Judge
West’s conclusion that since January 1, 1996, Respondent Brede had “substantially increased”
its reliance on Stagehands as a source for “on-call, casual, extra employees,” thereby funneling
to Stagehands-represented employees work that otherwise would, and should, have been
assigned to Steelworkers Local 17U-represented employees, by virtue of the certification. (JD
at 46, 48, 59.) As pointed out in subsection A above, that is a conclusion which is being
reviewed by the Board.
By letter to Respondent Brede’s counsel, dated April 11, 1998, Steelworkers Local 17U’s
chairperson, Brady, asserted, in pertinent part, that Steelworkers Local 17U “has acquiesced for
use of stagehands at historical rates,” but “is hoping to negotiate limits on stagehands use”
because, “Stagehands are being used as extra employees and Local 17U represents all extras.”
The letter concludes with a request to “set up a meeting to negotiate rates for extra employees
you get from all other sources.” Of course, by the time of Brady’s letter, Steelworkers Local
17U had been long certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of “[a]ll on-
call, casual, extra employees” employed by Respondent Brede.
Respondent Brede was not willing to accede to Brady’s request. By letter to Brady dated
April 23, 1998, Respondent Brede’s counsel refused to engage in the negotiations requested by
Steelworkers Local 17U. In the process, counsel set forth reasons which, in essence, are
advanced by Respondent Freeman as a defense for most of the unlawful conduct attributed to it.
So, it is worth quoting the April 23 letter at some length. In pertinent part, it states:

The 1995 certification of Local Local 17U, USWA specifically excludes workers covered by
other collective bargaining agreements. Individuals whom Brede hires with the assis-
tance of [Stagehands] fall within that exclusion. Moreover, even if they did not, we do not be-
lieve that there is a community of interest shared by the Stagehands and the individuals whom
Local Local 17U represents.

Concerning Extra Helpers whom Brede employs “from all other sources,” as described in the
last paragraph of your April 11, 1998 letter, those Extras fall into two categories. Either they are
covered by other collective bargaining agreements, in which case they are similar to Stagehands
and do not fall within the group of employees whom Local Local 17U represents, or they are
not covered by any other collective bargaining agreements and they otherwise come within the
scope of the certification, should be represented by Local Local 17U (assuming that your union
continues to enjoy the support of a majority of those employees).

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 110
Brede will not agree to negotiate limits on the use of indi-
viduals who perform decorating work but who are not
within the scope of Local Local 17U’s representation. The
conditions and procedures for the use of non-Local 17U ex-
tras is a matter of long-standing past practice and manage-
ment discretion. It is not a subject of mandatory bargaining
between Brede and local Local 17U. If [sic] fact, it would
be an unfair labor practice for Brede to negotiate with Local
17U over the terms and conditions of employment for em-
ployees represented by other unions.

It may be necessary to clarify the fact that Local Local 17U represents only one portion of the
total number of employees who perform decorating work of any type for Brede. Although your
group became represented by Local Local 17U in 1995, that Union cannot bargain over the rela-
tionship between other employees and Brede.

We agree that it is sometimes difficult to have several unions representing different employees
who are engaged in similar or overlapping work. But at this particular time, that appears to be
the situation with which we all must live.

Yet, the matter is not so straightforward as portrayed in this letter.
Respondent Brede denies the allegation that limits on its use of Stagehands-referred em-
ployees and their pay rates, while working for it, are mandatory subjects of bargaining. That
might be a defensible position so long as, in fact, employees represented and referred by
Stagehands were covered by a collective-bargaining contract on August 3, 1995, and so long as
those referrals continued thereafter to be consistent with practice prior to that date. But, as
pointed out above, Judge West concluded that, after January 1, 1996, Respondent Brede had
“substantially increas[ed] its reliance” on Stagehands-referred “on-call, casual, extra employ-
ees” to perform convention decorating work.
Inherently, that increase undermined the representation of employees in the bargaining unit
for which Steelworkers Local 17U had been certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative—deprived it of representation rights of the increased number of “on-call, casual,
extra employees” being referred by Stagehands to Respondent Brede after January 1, 1996.
Consequently, Steelworkers Local 17U had every statutory right to protect the full extent of its
certified status, both by trying to negotiate limitation on diminution of it and, beyond that, to
negotiate about employment terms and conditions, including wages, of “on-call, casual, extra
employees” who had not been working pursuant to a contractual practice developed prior to
August 3, 1995, the date of the Stipulated Election Agreement. Therefore, Brady’s April 11,
1998 bargaining request was encompassed by Section 8(d) of the Act.
D. Unlawful Conduct Attributed to Respondents Brede
and UFCW Local 653
As described in subsection A above, it is alleged that Respondent Brede violated Section
8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act by granting recognition to Respondent UFCW Local 653 as the
collective-bargaining representative of “on-call, casual, extra employees” being represented by
Steelworkers Local 17U and, furthermore, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
withdrawing recognition from Steelworkers Local 17U as the certified exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of those employees. It is alleged that Respondent UFCW Local 653
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by demanding and accepting that recognition. Again,
those allegations are rooted in conclusions reached by Judge West.
In his August 14, 1998 decision, Judge West concluded that Respondent Brede had made
unlawful unilateral changes which adversely affected Steelworkers Local 17U’s status as a
certified collective-bargaining representative. Moreover, he concluded that Respondent Brede
had unlawfully granted recognition to Respondent UFCW Local 653 and had unlawfully
entered into and maintained a partial collective-bargaining contract with Respondent UFCW
Local 653, covering employees in Steelworkers Local 17U’s certified bargaining unit, at a time
when Respondent UFCW Local 653 had not represented an uncoerced majority of Respondent
Brede’s “on-call, casual, extra employees.” (JD at 59–60.) If those conclusions are upheld by
the Board, two consequences follow from them. First, as of May 1998, there existed unreme-
died unfair labor practices affecting “on-call, casual, extra employees” of Respondent Brede.
Second, the nature of those unfair labor practices was such that they naturally tended to cause
employee disaffection from the incumbent collective-bargaining representative, Steel-workers
Local 17U. Thus, whatever facial majority status was achieved by Respondent UFCW Local
653 as of May 1998, it cannot be regarded as having been uncoerced in view of the unremedied
unfair labor practices.
There is no dispute about the facts leading to the above-enumerated unfair labor practices
allegations. Respondent UFCW Local 653’s business agent, Hartman, testified that, during the
spring of 1997, “one of the people came to me and asked me if they could have some cards.
They were interested in joining Local 653.” During October 1997 that employee, Richard
Gustafson, returned the cards, each having been signed by an “on-call, casual, extra” employee.
Between then and May 1998, testified Hartman, additional cards were obtained from employees
of Respondent Brede in that classification.
Those cards were submitted on May 11, 1998, to the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Ser-
vices, along with a card-check agreement between Respondents Brede and UFCW Local 653.
So far as the evidence shows, Steelworkers Local 17U was never notified of those facts, nor
offered an opportunity to participate in the State proceeding. Indeed, given the fact that the
1995 election among Respondent Brede’s “on-call, casual, extra employees” had been con-
ducted under the Act, neither Respondent Brede nor Respondent UFCW Local 653 explained
why in 1998 those parties had chosen to take the cards to a State agency, rather than returning
for another representation election conducted under the Act’s procedures.
The General Counsel and Respondents Brede and UFCW Local 653 stipulated that the Bu-
reau of Mediation Services conducted a count of the cards and, on May 12, 1998, issued a Unit
Determination and Certification of Exclusive Representative to Respondent UFCW Local 653
as the “exclusive representative” of all employees in an appropriate unit of, “All extra helpers
engaged in decorating work by [Respondent Brede], Minneapolis, Minnesota, and not covered
by other collective bargaining agreements, including agreements with [Teamsters, Stagehands];
Local 880, I.B.P.A.T.; and [Respondent UFCW Local 653] for regular decorators; excluding all
other employees.”
Those same three parties further stipulated that, following issuance of the State certifica-
tion, Respondent Brede recognized Respondent UFCW Local 653 “as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its extra helpers,” and the two parties then conducted bargaining sessions on
June 2 and 16, 1998, though no agreement was reached on terms for a contract. Obviously,
Steelworkers Local 17U was no longer being recognized by Respondent Brede as the bargain-
ing agent of the latter’s “on-call, casual, extra employees,” though, so far as the evidence
discloses, Respondent Brede never bothered to formally notify Steelworkers Local 17U of that
fact. In that regard, apparently Respondents Brede and UFCW Local 653 were continuing to
follow the course of not notifying Steelworkers Local 17U of what was happening in connec-
tion with the bargaining unit for which Steelworkers Local 17U had been certified by the Board
as the bargaining representative—the same course as was being followed by those two respon-
dents before the State certification proceedings.
After Judge West’s decision issued, however, Respondents Brede and UFCW Local 653
ceased negotiating, seemingly acknowledging the effect of Judge West’s conclusions on the
lawfulness of their ability to continue doing so. Employees who had signed Respondent
UFCW Local 653’s cards were notified of that cessation in negotiations.
E. Unlawful Conduct Attributed to Respondent
UFCW Local 653
Independent of the events covered in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is alleged that
Respondent UFCW Local 653 violated the Act in two respects. First, it is alleged that since
about May 1, 1998, it has been failing and refusing to refer Brady to employment with Excel
because of Brady’s support for and activities on behalf of Steelworkers Local 17U, in violation
of Section 8 (b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. In connection with that ultimate allegation, Respon-
dent UFCW Local 653 admits that, since before January 1, 1996, it had maintained an agree-
ment or understanding with Excel requiring that Respondent UFCW Local 653 be the exclusive
source of referrals of employees for decorating employment with Excel in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area.
The evidence shows that Excel was producer/service contractor for two 1998 Minneapolis
shows: the Strictly Business Computer Expo from Sunday, May 10 through Thursday May, 14; and
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 111
the Tech Expo Show from Tuesday, September 22 through Thursday, September 24. Excel needed
eight decorators and a steward on May 10 and 11. According to Hartman, “the Tuesday [May 12]
call went up to like about 40 is what it went up to.” For the Tech Expo Show Excel sought 10
decorators for September 22, one for September 23 and 12 employees for the last day of that show
on Thursday, September 24.
There is no dispute about the facts that Brady had been on Respondent UFCW Local 653’s
list of employees eligible for dispatch to both Excel shows and, moreover, that he was never
dispatched to either of those shows. To properly understand what occurred in connection with
those 1998 shows, four additional background matters need review or explanation.
First, as mentioned in subsection B above, for some years prior to September 1995, Re-
spondent UFCW Local 653 had been conducting dispatch of what have come to be referred to
as “on-call, casual, extra employees” through its hall call lists. As also pointed out in that same
subsection, if an employee worked at least 2 days during a given calendar month, that employee
could remain in the same position on the following month’s hall call list only by paying a $15
fee. Failure to make that payment resulted in the nonpaying employee’s name being dropped
from the hall call list.
Second, the hall call list for September 1995 listed Brady as “on-call, casual, extra” em-
ployee number 15. In light of Steelworkers Local 17U’s campaign and the approaching repre-
sentation elections, Brady elected not to pay his September 1995 hall call fee. So, he was
dropped from the October 1995 hall call list. Moreover, he never paid that fee for any succeed-
ing month. Nonetheless, it is uncontested that by 1998 Brady had notified Steward Sabas that
he (Brady) wanted to be listed for referral through the hall call procedure. Further, it is not
disputed that by 1998 Sabas had been listing Brady for dispatch to employers, such as Excel,
for whose employees Steelworkers Local 17U was not the certified representative.
Third, Sabas took over the hall call list upon becoming Respondent UFCW Local 653’s
steward. In his decision, Judge West concluded that Respondent UFCW Local 653 had
violated the Act because Sabas began operating the hall call “without reference to objective
standards or criteria,” and, furthermore, because it refused to dispatch Brady from January 2,
1996, until July 22, 1997, because of Brady’s alignment with Steelworkers Local 17U (JD at
60). Of course, that decision did not issue until after referral for the May 1998 Strictly Busi-
ness Show. Still, the hearing in that case had occurred during March 1998, before referrals
were made to Excel for its May 1998 Strictly Business Show. Sabas had appeared as a witness
during Judge West’s hearing. Presumably, therefore, he appreciated before May 1998 that his
prior nonreferral of Brady was being challenged.
Fourth, on the September 1995 hall call list Brady’s telephone number was listed as 783–
7490. However, for reasons never explained, during that month he got a new telephone num-
ber, 780–3424, with “a US West voice messaging service,” Brady testified, “installed at the
same time” and answering at the same new telephone number.
Returning to Excel’s work on the Strictly Business Show, from May 10 through 14, 1998,
Sabas denied that he had intentionally not called Brady for work on that show. Examination of
his testimony about supposed calls to Brady for that show, however, reveals that Sabas’s
testimony is not credible.
Both Hartman and Sabas testified that the former had telephonically notified the latter about
Excel’s call for the Strictly Business Show. Hartman testified that, during that telephone
conversation, he had specifically instructed Sabas “to go down through the list by seniority and
to make sure that Brady and [Steelworkers Local 17U supporter Daniel] Mulligan were both
called in their order on the list.”6 Sabas testified, “I was a little puzzled . . . because I didn’t
really understand why I was supposed to call the officer on another union to make a labor call
for our union.” Yet, seemingly that would have been obvious to Sabas, in light of his testimony
2 months earlier during a proceeding in which there had been litigation of then-allegedly
unlawful refusals to refer by Respondent UFCW Local 653 of, inter alia, Brady.
Hartman conceded that Sabas “didn’t like it at all” that Respondent UFCW Local 653 had
to dispatch Brady and Mulligan to the Strictly Business Show: “both of them were officers of
Local 17U, and [Sabas] didn’t feel that he should have to call” either of them. “I told him no,”
Hartman testified, “We’re going to get charges out of this if you don’t call them. And he

6 There is no allegation that Mulligan had been unlawfully denied
dispatch to Excel, nor to any other employer.
assured me that he would.” Sabas agreed that he had been told by Hartman to “make sure” to
call Brady “and any of the other affiliates with Local 17U.” Even so, those accounts by Hart-
man and Sabas are evidence of the latter’s reluctance to call Brady for referral and, moreover,
that the lone reason for his reluctance had been Brady’s status as an officer of Steelworkers
Local 17U.
Sabas asserted that he had followed Hartman’s instruction. He claimed that he “had been
using the December [1995] list”—on which, as pointed out above, Brady’s name did not
appear—to make referrals prior to Excel’s May 1998 call. Sabas had been adding names to that
list after he had taken over the hall calling for Respondent UFCW Local 653. Among the
names added to that list was that of Brady. Sabas further testified that, in addition to the
December 1995 list, he also had been given the September 1995 hall call list, on which Brady’s
name appears as number 15, before the Excel call of May 1998. Written beside Brady’s name
on the September 1995 hall call list had been Brady’s old telephone number, 783–7490, while
beside Brady’s name added to the December 1995 hall call list was Brady’s newer, and still
current by May 1998, telephone number, 780–3424.
Sabas testified that, during the evening of Thursday, May 7, he began making calls for the
Strictly Business Show and, in the process, that he had tried to call Brady, using “the Septem-
ber list because that tells me exactly where [Mulligan and Brady] should be” for referral.
However, Sabas did not explain to which telephone number he had placed that asserted call.
He merely testified that the phone just rang, without answer by human being or by answering
machine.
Next day, according to Sabas, he again attempted to call Brady, from a pay phone while on
break. Because he had failed to bring any list with him, Sabas testified that he had first called
his home and had asked his son, who answered that call, to read off the telephone number from
the list which purportedly had been left by Sabas’ home phone. As it turned out, Sabas
claimed, that had been the September 1995 list, on which appeared Brady’s by-then-
discontinued 783–7490 telephone number. Sabas further testified that, at that time, he had not
realized that he had been given the discontinued number by his son.
He testified that he twice had tried to call that number from the pay phone, but had gotten
no answer to either call. So, testified Sabas, he called Hartman from the pay phone and re-
ported that there was no answer when he had attempted to telephone Brady. Both Sabas and
Hartman testified that the latter had said that he would try to telephone Brady and had asked
Sabas for Brady’s telephone number. Sabas testified that he read off to Hartman the number
purportedly received from his son: the by-then long-discontinued 783–7490 telephone number.
Hartman testified that he had tried to call that number, but had gotten no answer. Thus, Re-
spondent UFCW Local 653’s defense is simply that, through inadvertent confusion arising from
Brady’s telephone number change, no one had been able to reach Brady by telephone, though
efforts had been made to do so, for referral to Excel’s work on the Strictly Business Show. But,
problems emerge when the testimony in support of that defense is examined more closely.
As pointed out above, Sabas testified eventually that he had placed his first call to Brady
during the evening of Thursday, May 7, when he had “started making the labor call” for the
Strictly Business Show. That would mean that his pay phone calls would have been made,
under the account which he advanced when testifying, on Friday, May 8. In fact, Hartman
claimed that he had received his call from Sabas, about not being able to reach Brady by
telephone, “[t]he Friday before the show opened.”
Their dating of those calls, however, was brought into question when the prehearing affida-
vit given by Sabas was produced. In pertinent part, it states:

Mulligan is 14 on the September list, and Brady is 15.
I don’t think I got to them the first day I did calling for
Excel. I had three journeymen, and I believe I got the
other six needed to open before I got as far as Mulligan.
Probably about Sunday May 10, though, I would have had
to call some more to meet Excel’s growing call. I called
Mulligan. . . . Then I called Brady. Again, I got no answer
and no answering machine. I called Mulligan again on
May 13, and Brady right after again, no answer and no
machine.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 112
Comparison of that account with the above-described testimonial one of Sabas gives rise to a
conclusion that there had been “evolving versions” over time in the defense being advanced by
Sabas, similar to the “evolving versions” pointed to in Arnold v. Groose, 109 F.3d 1292, 1296
(8th Cir. 1997). See also Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th
Cir. 1998).
In his affidavit, Sabas asserted that he had not reached Brady’s name on the first day that he
had made calls for the Strictly Business Show, and had not done so until the following Sunday,
May 10. When he appeared as a witness, however, Sabas shifted from a defense of not having
reached Brady’s name on the list until that Sunday to a defense of having tried to call Brady on
May 7 and 8, but not receiving an answer to those purported earlier calls. Simple mistake in
dates? Not really.
Examination of the records of “on-call, casual, extra employees” who worked on the 1998
Strictly Business Show (part of GC Exh. 4), when compared against the September 1995 hall
call list, reveals that Marcia Sundin, employee 29 on the September 1995 hiring list had worked
the Strictly Business Show on Sunday, May 10. She continued working on that show during
succeeding days. Clearly, had Sabas been following the September 1995 list as he began
contacting employees for referral to that show, he had to have reached Brady’s number 15
name on the list before Sunday, May 10. That exhibit, showing the names of “on-call, casual,
extra employees” who had worked on the Strictly Business Show, had been offered and re-
ceived into evidence prior to the day on which Sabas testified as a witness for Respondent
UFCW Local 653. In the face of that exhibit, any effort by Sabas to pursue the defense which
he had advanced in his affidavit—that he had not reached Brady’s name on the September 1995
hall call list until Sunday, May 10—would have been refuted already by what that exhibit
disclosed.
That was not the only disparity between the testimony and affidavit accounts of Sabas.
“Yeah,” he answered, when asked if he had been told to be sure that everything was included in
the affidavit about his asserted calls to Brady for Excel’s May 1998 show. Yet, the affidavit
makes no mention whatsoever of a supposed call to Hartman after Sabas’ purported inability to
reach Brady by telephone. To be sure, Hartman gave testimony which tends to corroborate the
testimonial account advanced by Sabas. Yet, as will be seen below and in the following
subsection, Hartman had his own credibility problems.
Appended to Sabas’s affidavit, in addition to a copy of the September 1995 hall call list (on
which Brady’s newer telephone number has been handwritten), is a three-page typed list of
“on-call, casual, extra employees” and, beside the name of each, their telephone numbers,
followed by a fourth page of partially typed and handwritten names and telephone numbers, as
well as a fifth page of handwritten names and telephone numbers. On the very first page
Brady’s name appears as the fifteenth typed name.7 After Brady’s name appears the typed
telephone number “780–3424,” the newer number which Brady acquired during latter 1995.
Sabas testified that the typed list “is the list that I attempted to type up” after the Strictly
Business Show. In fact, Respondent UFCW Local 653 attempted to raise enough doubt about
the timing of that list’s preparation to negate any inference, it hoped, that the typed list had
been prepared before Excel’s Strictly Business Show. Two problems exist for that attempt.
First, in his affidavit, Sabas states, in pertinent part, “I am attaching a photocopy of the
original September list. It has some notations on it like No#, not avbl; I’m not sure when I
made those notations. I copied this before I did the Excel call, and retyped that, copy attached.”
(Emphasis added.) Consequently, even if Sabas had not actually “retyped” the list before the
Strictly Business Show, he admittedly had “copied” the September 1995 hall call list before
that show, according to his affidavit. Nothing in the record detracts from a conclusion that, in
“copying” the September 1995 list, he had written down by Brady’s name the newer of Brady’s
telephone numbers, as the typed list plainly discloses.
Second, there is one factor which strongly indicates, contrary to any attempt by Respondent
UFCW Local 653 to make a contrary showing, that the typed list, in fact, had existed prior to
the Strictly Business Show call. Sabas acknowledged that handwritten in that typed list’s left
margin, beside Mulligan’s and Brady’s names, is “5/10 5/13 No Answer. No machine.” Of

7 Handwritten at the top of that page is the name and telephone num-
ber of “Lee Johnson.” There is no evidence as to when that name had
been inserted at the top of that typed list of employees.
course, those handwritten notations are consistent with the defense that Sabas had been advanc-
ing when he gave his affidavit. The important point for purposes of this part of analysis of
Respondent UFCW Local 653’s defense, however, is that Sabas advanced no explanation for
why he might have later written those dates and words, had the typed list not truly been typed
until after the Strictly Business Show. To that extent, those handwritten entries tend to support
a conclusion that Sabas already had typed the list before having initiated calls for the Strictly
Business Show. Therefore, the list from which he had been making those calls listed the then-
current telephone number for Brady: 780–3424. That, then, leads to consideration of another
factor which tends to further undermine the reliability of Sabas’s testimony that he had actually
tried to telephone Brady for referral to the Strictly Business Show.
If the typed list, or a handwritten list from which the typed list later had been prepared (as
Sabas stated in his affidavit), had existed “before [Sabas] did the Excel call,” then inexplicable
is his assertion that he had left the September 1995 hall call list by his home telephone from
which he had seemingly been making calls on Thursday evening, May 7. Having gone to the
trouble of preparing, if not typing, an updated list, there would have been no point to leaving
the old list by the phone, for his son to discover on Friday, May 8.
The reality is that Sabas’s testimony, about a list to which his son might have referred for
Brady’s telephone number, is sheer speculation. Nothing in the record discloses any firsthand
knowledge upon which Sabas could have based a reliable account of the list to which his son
might have referred. And his son never appeared as a witness to supply an account based upon
firsthand knowledge, though there is neither evidence nor representation that Sabas’s son was
not available to appear as a witness in this proceeding. Beyond that, Sabas made no mention
whatsoever in his affidavit of having made any telephone call to his son, in a supposed effort to
ascertain Brady’s telephone number. That testimony by Sabas appears to be nothing more than
an additional illustration of the “evolving versions” which he supplied, after the Excel employ-
ment list had been introduced, showing that on May 10 one employee below Brady on the
September 1995 list had worked on the Strictly Business Show.
I do not credit the testimony given by Sabas in connection with Respondent UFCW Local
653’s failure to refer Brady to Strictly Business Show. For his part, Brady denied that he ever
had turned on and off his voice messaging service. As an objective matter, it seems unlikely
that, as an officer and leading proponent of Steelworkers Local 17U, he would have done so.
After all, turning off that machine, whether at home or not, would present a potential of not
being able to receive calls from Steelworkers Local 17U’s officials and from other “on-call,
casual, extra employees” represented by that labor organization.
Hartman admitted that Sabas “didn’t like” the idea of having to call “officers of Local 17U”
for referral by Respondent UFCW Local 653. No question from the tenor of their testimony,
while appearing as witnesses, that both Sabas and Hartman were hostile toward Steelworkers
Local 17U’s representation of employees whom Respondent UFCW Local 653 had been
referring to decorating employers before September 1995. As seen in the preceding and
following subsections, as well as below, Respondent UFCW Local 653 was making every
effort, most unlawful, to recover control over referrals of those employees. Those factors
amply support a conclusion that it harbored animus toward Brady, because of his involvement
with and support for Steelworkers Local 17U, as well as because of his constant charge-filing
whenever it appeared that statutory rights were being infringed, and were disposed to act upon
that animus to disadvantage Brady. The evidence shows that, had normal referral procedure
been followed, Brady should have been called for referral to the first day of the Strictly Busi-
ness Show, a fact which Sabas effectively conceded when testifying. He was not called.
Respondent UFCW Local 673 has failed to credibly show that Brady would not have been
called, absent his support for Steelworkers Local 17U and the hostility of, at least, Sabas toward
calling him based solely on Brady’s support and activities for Steelworkers Local 17U.
A like conclusion is warranted with respect to Brady’s failure to be called for and referred
to Excel’s Tech Expo Show during September 1998. Brady was number 16, in view of the
insertion of Johnson’s name at the top of Sabas’ typed list, on Respondent UFCW Local 653’s
referral list for that show. Brady denied that he had been called to work the Tech Expo Show.
Actually, Sabas never disputed that denial with any particularity. That is, Sabas never testified
that he actually had even tried to call Brady for that show. Instead, the best that Sabas could
muster was an assertion that he would have called Brady for the Tech Expo Show, had he
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 113
reached Brady’s name on the by-then admittedly existing typed list, with handwritten names
and telephone numbers added.
Apparently seeking some plausible way out, Sabas pointed out that the Tech Expo call was
“[p]retty small” and that it “stayed in the top dozen maybe. I don’t think it got more than that.”
Of course, the Tech Expo call was not a large one, as set forth above. Yet, any defense based
upon an implied, at best, assertion that Brady’s name had not been reached, on the typed list, is
obliterated by comparison of that list with the names of “on-call, casual, extra employees” who
worked the Tech Expo Show. Cathy McEwan, James Robinson, Gregory Braun, and Pete
Allen all worked on that show. And all of their names appear below that of Brady on Sabas’
typed list.
There is no showing that Sabas harbored any less animus toward Brady, as a Steelworkers
Local 17U supporter and activist during September 1998, than had been the admitted fact
during the preceding May. By failing to contract Brady for referral during May, Sabas demon-
strated his willingness to act upon that animus and to deprive Brady of calls for referral. Sabas
never did advance any specific explanation for Brady’s not having received a call for referral to
the Tech Expo Show. Obviously, Brady should have received such a call in the ordinary
course, since employees below him on the typed list were employed on that show, equally
obviously as a result of referral by Sabas. A preponderance of the credible evidence supports
the conclusion that Brady was not referred to both Excel 1998 shows for no reason other than
his involvement with Steelworkers Local 17U and Respondent UFCW Local 653’s animus
toward him because of that involvement.
The second respect in which it is alleged that Respondent UFCW Local 653 independently
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act arises from assertedly unlawful remarks to “on-call,
casual, extra employees” by both Hartman and Sabas. More specifically, it is alleged that both
officials told employees that they had to join Respondent UFCW Local 653 or they would not
be able to work in the future for Respondent Freeman.8 The two shows directly involved in
these allegations are Respondent Freeman’s work at the AARP Show, from Tuesday May 26
through Saturday, June 6, 1998, and at the Human Resources Management Show from
Wednesday, June 10 through Thursday, June 18, 1998. Five “on-call, casual, extra” decorating
employees testified about remarks made by Hartman and Sabas.
Louis Ballweber testified that during the last 2 days of the
AARP Show, “on the down,” he had been “on break,” going “to
the back of the building to go out and have a cigarette,” when he
had been approached by Hartman who “asked me to sign a 653
card.” According to Ballweber, when he declined to do so,
Hartman said “something like” signing the card “might be a good
idea” inasmuch as “653 was going to be running the next Free-
man show and if I didn’t sign it I wouldn’t work” that show, to
which Ballweber replied, “Oh, I guess I won’t work,” and walked
away. Similarly, Ballweber’s sister, Theresa, testified that while
working the AARP Show she had been approached by Hartman
who “said he was going to be running the next Freeman show
and he wanted to know if I wanted to work it,” to which she re-
sponded affirmatively. Upon hearing her affirmative response,
she testified, Hartman said that she would “need to sign a 653
card,” and when she said that she would not do so, he had told
her, “well, you should or you won’t be working.”
Brady corroborated Theresa Ballweber’s testimony regarding what Hartman had said to her.
Thus, he testified that “on Friday,” as the employees “were tearing the AARP show out,” he
had heard Harman “ask Teresa [sic] if she wanted to work the next Freeman show,” and telling
her and Annette Richter, with whom Theresa Ballweber was standing, that “if they wanted to”
work the next show of Respondent Freeman “they’d have to sign these 653 cards.” Further-
more, Brady testified that, earlier that same day, he had overheard Hartman asking forklift
operator Fred Grieffenhagen “if he wanted to work the next Freeman show which was just a
week away for 653,” after which he had observed Hartman “inside talking just from one person

8 There is no allegation that Respondent Freeman violated the Act in
that connection with those statements to employees.
to another, going around and asking them questions.” Those observations, testified Brady, led
him to walk over and ask Hartman what he was doing. According to Brady, Hartman an-
swered, “I’m getting people recruited for the next Freeman show which is next week,” and
added during their ensuing conversation, “Well, if you don’t become a member [of Respondent
UFCW Local 653] you can’t work.”
That Friday, presumably June 5, was not the only occasion on which Brady heard about Re-
spondent Freeman resorting to Respondent UFCW Local 653 as the source of employees for
the Human Resources Management Show—as, in fact, would be what happened, as described
in the immediately following subsection. When he got home, seemingly on June 9, there was a
message on his answering machine from Sabas, testified Brady. According to him, that mes-
sage was, “Dan, I’m calling to see if you want to join Local 653 and we’re starting the human
resources show tomorrow if you want to work it.”
Brady’s was not the only testimony about telephone calls from Sabas. Jeff Belden testified
that “Sabas called me,” said that Respondent UFCW Local 653 would be running Respondent
Freeman’s Human Resources Management Show “and that if you go there as a Local 17U
employee you would be turned away. Kicked out of the building.” Belden asked Sabas why
Respondent UFCW Local 653 was handling that show and, according to Belden, Sabas “just
said that something happened at the AARP show and Freeman decided to give it to 653 at the
last minute.”
Belden further testified that he did report for work to the Human Resources Management
Show. When he approached the sign-in table, he testified that seated there, among others, were
Mike Fitzpatrick—identified only, by Hartman, “as one of [Respondent Freeman’s] supervi-
sors” from Chicago and, purportedly, a member of Steelworkers Local 17U—and Hartman.
The latter, testified Belden, “was sitting over with the 653 cards.” According to Belden, when
he picked up a timecard, “Fitzpatrick took it away from me and said I couldn’t fill it out until I
filed papers or signed a card for 653.” Belden testified that when “I asked, you know, what if I
don’t want to do it,” Fitzpatrick retorted, “then you got to go home.”
Belatedly produced during redirect of Belden was a “Membership Application” for Re-
spondent UFCW Local 653 which bore the signature of “Jeffrey W. Belden” and the date “6
DAY 10 YR.” Belden testified that he had received the card from Hartman on June 10, after
being told by Fitzpatrick that a card had to be “filed” and after “similar” remarks were made by
Hartman, and that he then had filled out and signed the application on June 10, 1998. As stated
above, that had been the first day on which Respondent Freeman’s “on-call, casual, extra
employees” had worked on the Human Resources Management Show.
Belden was not the only employee told at that show that he had to fill out a “Membership
Application” for Respondent UFCW Local 653 if he wanted to work the Human Resources
Management Show for Respondent Freeman. Dan Gellerman testified that he had been called
by Sabas who had “asked me if I could make it down there to work because they were short
something 30 people,” but that when he arrived one or more of the approximately six people at
the sign-in table was/were “telling us that we had to fill out this card before we could work this
job. Otherwise we would have to go home and not work at all so I filled out the card.” In fact,
a Respondent UFWC Local 653 membership application signed by Gellerman, and dated “6
MO. 16 DAY YR 98,” was produced and Gellerman identified it as the one that he had com-
pleted and signed.
During cross-examination, various difficulties were highlighted in the individual accounts
of each of the above-named employee-witnesses. For example, Gellerman placed Respondent
Freeman’s Des Moines operations general manager, Zaugg, as one of the people who had been
at the sign-in table on June 16, but did not claim that Hartman had been there. Still, Zaugg
appeared as a witness, but never denied having been present at the Human Resources Manage-
ment Show’s sign-in table on that date. Moreover, Hartman admitted that, during that show, “I
was sitting at the table along with the show supervisor, who I think was Mike Fitzpatrick,” and,
further, allowed that he had “asked [“on-call, casual, extra employees”] if they’d like to sign up
with Local 653.” In fact, as set forth above, Belden placed Hartman “with the 653 cards” at the
sign-in tables on June 10, 1998. Of course, Gellerman did not sign-in at the Human Resources
Management Show until June 16, 1998, 6 days after Respondent Freeman had started working
that show—apparently as a result of Respondent UFCW Local 653’s above-mentioned diffi-
culty locating 30 more employees for the show. Even so, Hartman never claimed that he had
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 114
sat at the sign-in tables only on that show’s first day. Indeed, it seems as reasonable that
Hartman would “like to sign up” employees on later show dates, as on the earlier ones.
Louis Ballweber gave internally contradictory accounts about whether Hartman had said
that “653 was going to be running the next Freeman show,” sometimes testifying that Hartman
had said “Freeman,” other times testifying that Hartman “didn’t mention a name of a com-
pany.” His sister described Hartman as having offered her “like a white index card” to sign, as
opposed to the larger “Membership Applications” signed by Belden and Gellerman. In fact, her
brother, Louis, also mentioned a “small card.” Yet, they testified that they had been shown
those cards on the floor of the AARP Show, as opposed to at the Human Resources Manage-
ment Show sign-in tables. Respondent UFCW Local 653 presented no evidence that it has only
one type of document that employees can sign: a membership application, as opposed to
authorization cards. Thus, the fact that one had been used on some occasions is not inherently
inconsistent with use of the other on different occasions.
The fact is that the foregoing employee accounts are sufficiently similar to be mutually cor-
roborative as to what had been said by Sabas and Hartman. Hartman denied only generally
having told employees anything about card or membership application signing being a require-
ment to work on Respondent Freeman’s show. That is, he never denied with particularity any
of the above-described specific remarks attributed to him. Nor did Hartman deny with particu-
larity having been present when others, such as Fitzpatrick, told employees, such as Belden,
that Respondent UFCW Local 653 documents—cards or membership applications—had to be
signed in order to work for Respondent Freeman at the Human Resources Management Show.
Nor did Hartman deny with particularity having overheard remarks such as those attributed to
Fitzpatrick.
For his part, Sabas admitted having called Brady, interestingly at the newer 780–3424 tele-
phone number, for the Human Resources Management Show. Sabas admitted that he had not
reached Brady, when placing that call, but had left a voice “message to contact me if he wanted
to work.” Sabas did not deny also having said, as part of that message, “I’m calling to see if
you want to join Local 653.” Moreover, Sabas conceded that he had called other employees for
that show. He never disputed that Belden had been one of those other employees whom he had
called about working the Human Resources Management Show. And Sabas never denied
having told Belden “that if you go there as a Local 17U employee you would be turned away.
Kicked out of the building.” Consequently, undenied are those statements attributed to Sabas
by Brady and Belden.
Also undenied effectively are the statements attributed to Hartman by the Ballwebers and
by Brady. He acknowledged having asked employees “if they would want to sign up, or I
wanted them to sign up” for Respondent UFCW Local 653. That tends to corroborate the
above-quoted remarks attributed to him about having to sign up to work the show. His above-
described general and unparticularized denial will not suffice to put in issue specific accounts
of statements attributed to him. For, such a general or “blanket” denial is insufficient to refute
specific and detailed testimony, such as that provided by the Bellwebers and by Brady. Wil-
liamson Memorial Hospital, 284 NLRB 37, 39 (1987); Beaird-Poulan Division v. NLRB, 649
F.2d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 1981); York Products v. NLRB, 881 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1989).9
The employees who testified about what Hartman and Sabas had said appeared to be
testifying candidly. Their descriptions of what had been said by those two officials tend to be
mutually corroborative. Sabas never denied having made the remarks attributed to him by
Belden and Brady. Hartman never effectively denied the statements attributed to him by the
Ballwebers and Brady. In fact, by the time of Respondent Freeman’s work at the Human

nagement Show.

9 Hartman’s situation is not improved by his assertion that he “knew
that I was in big trouble if I told [employees] they had to sign up to
work,” in light of the holding of Communications Workers v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735 (1988). Such testimony, shorn of all other considerations,
really is an appeal to character and “is not admissible for the purpose of
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,”
Fed.R.Evid. 404(a). Beyond that, prisons and jails are filled with peo-
ple who knew that doing what they did, that ended them up there,
would get them in “big trouble”—but they followed a course of, as the
song goes, “catch us if you can,” without regard to the trouble they
knew would follow if they were caught.
Resources Management Show, Respondent UFCW already had received State certification as
the representative of Respondent Brede’s “on-call, casual, extra employees,” as discussed in
subsection D above, and Hartman acknowledged that, by June 2, “if things worked like we
hoped they were going to work that we may be doing it for Freeman too.” Of course,
authorization cards and membership applications were the means for implementing that
desire—the means for setting in motion state proceedings identical to those used to secure
representation for Respondent Brede’s “on-call, casual, extra employees.” Therefore, I
conclude that a preponderance of the credible evidence supports the factual allegation that
Hartman and Sabas had told employees that they had to join Respondent UFCW Local 653, or
at least designate it as their bargaining agent, to be able to work on Respondent Freeman’s June
Human Resources Ma
F. Unlawful Bargaining-Related Conduct Attributed to
Respondent Freeman
Following issuance of the Certifications of Representative on September 18, 1995, Respon-
dent Freeman negotiated with Steelworkers Local 17U and eventually agreement was reached
on terms for a collective-bargaining contract. That contract was signed in October 1997; it was
a 1-year contract effective from July 8, 1997 through July 7, 1998.10 The bargaining unit
described in that contract corresponds to the one for which Steelworkers Local 17U had been
certified, as quoted in subsection A above. Some additional terms of that contract are signifi-
cant in view of the events at issue and arguments advanced.
Article I, section 3 obliged Respondent Freeman “when additional Employees are required
[to] call upon the Union to furnish such competent Employees, satisfactory to the Employer
who have worked for other employers on similar work,” but should Steelworkers Local 17U
not be able to “meet all Employer requirements . . . the Employer shall be entitled to obtain
labor to complete the call from other sources of the Employer’s choosing.” However, nothing
in the contract constitutes a waiver of the certification and contract’s application to employees
obtained “from other sources” than Steelworkers Local 17U. In other words, regardless of by
whom referred, “[a]ll on-call, casual, extra employees” working for Respondent Freeman in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area would be represented by Steelworkers Local 17U, save
to the extent excluded by the certification, and, moreover, their employment terms and condi-
tions would be governed by collective-bargaining contracts between those parties.
Relatedly, article XV, section 1, subsection h allows Respondent Freeman, “To subcontract
all or part of trade show contracts within the Metropolitan area of Minneapolis/St. Paul to any
union trade show contractor.” As pointed out in subsection B above, Respondent Freeman
historically had subcontracted to Respondent Brede exposition decorating work in that metro-
politan area. The quoted subsection allowed Respondent Freeman to continue doing so.11
Articles XII and XIII set forth a disputes resolution procedure, culminating in arbitration.
As set for in subsection A above, it is alleged that, on multiple occasions since October 13,
1997, Respondent Freeman has, in essence, disregarded its contractual obligations, as well as
Steelworkers Local 17U’s status as certified bargaining representative, by obtaining “on-call,
casual, extra employees” from sources other than Steelworkers Local 17U, without first seeking
those employees Steelworkers Local 17U, and has applied to those employees terms and
conditions of employment inconsistent with those specified in the contract between Respondent
Freeman and Steelworkers Local 17U. In support of that generalized allegation, several factual
allegations are made.
10 Thus, it was the contract in effect when Respondent Freeman was
producer/service contractor for the AARP Show from May 26 through
June 6, 1998, and for the Human Resources Management Show from
June 10 through 18, 1998.
11 When that occurred, of course, “on-call, casual, extra employees”
working on those shows would be employees of Respondent Brede and,
thus, would be covered by the Certification of Representative issued for
Respondent Brede and, concomitantly, would be subject to the bargain-
ing relationship between it and Steelworkers Local 17U, as opposed to
the bargaining relationship between Respondent Freeman and Steel-
workers Local 17U.
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 115
As a result of amendment during the hearing, it now is alleged that, “Since on or about Oc-
tober 13, 1997, Respondent [Freeman] has hired at least eight unit employees, John Barrett,
Dan Phillips, Lenny Prouty, Steve Carlson, Rip Fisher, Tom White, Brad Anderson, Michael
Lindholm, and perhaps other unknown at this time from sources other than” Steelworkers Local
17U and, to those employees, applied employment terms and conditions inconsistent with those
in Respondent Freeman’s 1997–1998 contract with Steelworkers Local 17U. It further is
alleged, as also amended at hearing, that, [I]n April and May 1998, and at other times continu-
ing to date, Respondent [Freeman] hired a large number of [“on-call, casual, extra”] employees
whose identities are not known . . . from sources other than” Steelworkers Local 17U. Finally,
it is alleged that, “In June 1998, and at other times continuing to date, Respondent [Freeman]
hired a large number of [“on-call, casual extra”] employees whose identities are not known . .
.from sources other than” Steelworkers Local 17U and, moreover, to those employees applied
employment terms and conditions inconsistent with Respondent Freeman’s collective-
bargaining contract with Steelworkers Local 17U.
Respondent Freeman admits all of the factual allegations, as quoted in the immediately pre-
ceding paragraph. However, it denies the ultimate allegation that, by admittedly having en-
gaged in that conduct, it violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. It denies, as well, the
penultimate allegation that the subjects of employment terms and conditions for employees
hired from sources other than Steelworkers Local 17U are mandatory subjects for the purposes
of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 8(d) of the Act. In addition, Respon-
dent Freeman denies that it violated the Act by having hired and employed those “on-call,
casual, extra employees,” obtained from sources other than Steelworkers Local 17U, without
prior notice to that labor organization and without affording it an opportunity to bargain about
their hiring and employment terms and conditions. However, Respondent Freeman does not
dispute the facts that it had not notified Steelworkers Local 17U that it (Respondent Freeman)
was hiring “on-call, casual, extra employees” from sources other than that labor organization,
nor that it applied to those employees, hired from sources other than Steelworkers Local 17U,
employment terms and conditions other than those specified in its contract with Steelworkers
Local 17U. In support of those denials, Respondent Freeman advanced during the hearing
pretty much the same argument as is set forth in counsel’s April 23, 1998 letter on behalf of
Respondent Brede, as quoted in subsection C above—that is, there was no bargaining obliga-
tion because of the unit exclusion of “all other employees currently covered by other collective
bargaining agreements.”
Before addressing the facts underlying that defense, however, some attention should be di-
rected to facts supporting the above-quoted admitted factual allegations so that, as with stipu-
lated factual allegations, there is a better “picture of the events relied upon.” Old Chief v. U.S.,
519 U.S. 172, 187, (1997). On brief, the General Counsel points to records of several Respon-
dent Freeman Minneapolis shows during 1998 when Respondent Freeman had obtained “on-
call, casual, extra employees” from sources other than Steelworkers Local 17U: the RESNA
Show from June 25 through 30, the Microsoft Developers Days Show of August 1 and 2, the
Lumbermen’s Show of September 15 through 20, and the Shakopee Crafts Show of October 27
through 29 and on November 2. Without going to the extreme of flogging the dead horse of
that which has already been admitted, however, events concerning only one show serve to give
a better picture of those admitted factual allegations.
That show is the Human Resources Management one of Wednesday, June 10 through
Thursday, June 18, 1998. In connection with referral and nonapplication of the contract with
Steelworkers Local 17U to that show, it also is necessary to review some related events which
occurred during the earlier AARP show of Tuesday May 26 though Saturday, June 6, 1998.
Indeed, some related events have already been covered in subsection E above: the statements by
Hartman and by Sabas about employees being able to work on the Human Resources Manage-
ment Show only by becoming members of Respondent UFCW Local 653 or, at least, by
signing authorization cards designating it as the bargaining representative for “on-call, casual,
extra employees” who would be working the Human Resources Management Show for Re-
spondent Freeman.
For both the AARP and Human Resources Management shows Respondent Freeman had,
itself, been producer/service contractor—that is, had not subcontracted production/service
contracting for either of them. Its Des Moines Operations General Manager Zaugg admitted
that, rather than contacting Steelworkers Local 17U for “on-call, casual, extra employees,”
Respondent Freeman had contacted Respondent UFCW Local 653 to obtain those employees
for the Human Resources Management Show. Moreover, rather than recognizing Steelworkers
Local 17U as the collective-bargaining representative for those employees working on that
show, and rather than applying the employment terms specified in its contract with Steelwork-
ers Local 17U, Respondent Freeman recognized Respondent UFCW Local 653 as the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of “on-call, casual, extra employees” working on the Human
Resources Management Show and, further, applied to those employees terms and conditions of
employment in force with Respondent UFCW Local 653.
Neither Zaugg nor any other official of Respondent Freeman made any effort to explain
why that course of action was chosen and pursued for the Human Resources Management
Show. The only witness who attempted to do so was Business Agent Hartman who hardly can
be characterized as someone possessing firsthand knowledge of reasons for managerial deci-
sions made by Respondent Freeman’s officials. Moreover, all that his explanation revealed, in
the final analysis, is that his testimony cannot be accorded any reliance.
He claimed that, on a Friday, he had gone to the AARP Show site, arriving, “I suppose
around 3:00, 2:30, 3:00,” to distribute a meeting notice to “on-call, casual, extra employees”
being represented by Respondent UFCW Local 653, in connection with Respondent “Brede’s
contract proposals,” presumably for the negotiations resulting from the state certification
described in subsection D above. Of course, the AARP Show was not being produced/service
contracted by Respondent Brede. However, Hartman claimed that Respondent UFCW Local
653-represented employees were working there, though he never identified any. Still, as
pointed out in subsection B above, most Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area “on-call,
casual, extra employees” have signed for referral with more than one union.
Once at that site, testified Hartman, two events supposedly occurred. First, he testified that
he had observed Brady handing out paychecks to employees who were then leaving work for
the day, even though “the call was until 10:30 at night,” according to Hartman. He did not
explain how he had known the length of “the call” that day. Hartman further testified that he
had asked Account Executive Larry Stoddard—as described in subsection B above, the official
who would be the highest-ranking one at the site for Respondent Freeman—“what was happen-
ing,” but that Stoddard had replied, “I don’t know.” According to Hartman, Stoddard walked
over to Brady and watched him continue distributing paychecks to employees, “a few of
[whom] said they were leaving.” Eventually, testified Hartman, Stoddard had “a few words”
with Brady, after which the latter began yelling not to leave because only a 15-minute break
was being taken.
Hartman testified that many employees had already left by the time that Brady began telling
them not to go and, “Larry Stoddard asked me to do a call to get some employees in.” “I got
hold of Kevin” Sabas, testified Hartman, and told him to get as many people as possible to
come to the AARP Show site. Although Hartman acknowledged that he left the site at “4:30 or
5:00,” he testified that Sabas had sent between 6 and 10 “on-call, casual, extra employees” to
the site. The next day, “Saturday,” Hartman testified, he was told by Stoddard that when those
employees had arrived, Brady had threatened “for every 653 person that showed up, three of his
guys wouldn’t want to work,” with the result that Stoddard “sent our people home.” Thus, as
portrayed by Hartman, Steelworkers Local 17U had left the AARP Show short of needed “on-
call, casual, extra” decorating employees on that Friday evening.
The second Friday incident, which Hartman claimed had occurred, purportedly involved
“[t]he head guy for AARP.” According to Hartman, that man “came up to me and was com-
plaining about the labor and told me flat out that if Local 17U was going to do the call next
year, they wouldn’t be back” to hold a convention in Minnesota. Hartman also testified that the
AARP “head guy” had complained about Brady moving employees around so that assigned
crews ended up being short of members, about employees showing up as much as 4 hours late
for work, and about “mass exodus” of employees at 5 p.m., leaving work unfinished.
Hartman testified that Stoddard and the “dock foreman” came to him, presumably during
his Saturday visit to the AARP site, and “indicated” they would like Respondent UFCW Local
653 to supply “on-call, casual, extra employees” for the upcoming Human Resources Manage-
ment Show of June 10 through 18, 1998. After conferring with “my Local president” and with
counsel, testified Hartman, it was “decided that we had first call rights” to supply those em-
ployees for that June 10 through 18 show and, accordingly, Respondent UFCW Local 653 did
so. In short, if Hartman is to be believed, Respondent Freeman called in “on-call, casual, extra
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 116
employees” from Respondent UFCW Local 653 for the Human Resources Management Show
solely because of shabby performance by employees in that classification supplied by Steel-
workers Local 17U for the AARP Show.
Not one witness corroborated the foregoing testimony of Hartman. See discussion of the
general principles of adverse inference in NLRB v. MDI Commercial Services, 175 F.3d 621
(8th Cir. 1999). No official of AARP appeared, nor was even identified, to corroborate Hart-
man’s testimony about complaints to Hartman by that organization’s “head guy”—that he had
“appeared like Hairbrearth Harry in a Drury Lane melodrama, gave his ominous [complaints
about work performance] and disappeared.” Schroeder Distributing Co., 171 NLRB 1515,
1526 (1968). In fact, a summary of Respondent Freeman’s Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan
area shows for 1995 through 1998 shows that in none of the 3 years prior to 1998 had Respon-
dent Freeman produced/service contracted a show there for AARP. Neither that summary nor
any other evidence shows that, in the ordinary course of affairs, AARP would likely be plan-
ning to conduct a 1999 show in Minneapolis, as opposed to some other city.
Nor was Stoddard called as a witness, though there was neither evidence nor representation
that he was not available to testify in support of Hartman’s above-described account of events
that Friday, were Stoddard willing to do so. Most significantly, Sabas did appear as a witness
for Respondent UFCW Local 653. But, he gave no corroborative testimony about a supposed
late Friday call from Hartman to find people to work the AARP Show that evening. Beyond
that, no one from Respondent Freeman ever testified that the reason for having selected Re-
spondent UFCW Local 653, to supply “on-call, casual, extra employees” for the Human
Resources Management Show, had been the result of some sort of deficiency or impropriety by
Steelworkers Local 17U officials and employees referred by it on the AARP Show.
Two aspects of the evidence might appear to lend some support to Hartman’s above-
described scenarios. First, Brady did concede that, during the AARP Show, there had been a
Friday when some employees had left work after getting their paychecks and before work had
been completed that day. However, he testified that those employees had first asked General or
Senior Foreman Ray Pinegar if they could leave and, moreover, that Pinegar had been authoriz-
ing their departures until Stoddard discovered what was happening and countermanded Pine-
gar’s departure-authorizations, albeit too late to recover those employees who had left already.
To be sure, Brady testified that, following his conversation with Pinegar, Stoddard had ac-
cused Brady of having caused a “walk out.” Yet, Zaugg never denied having later told Brady
that there simply had been “a misunderstanding” and Pinegar never appeared as a witness to
contradict Brady’s testimony that it had been Pinegar who had authorized the work departures
that Friday, without any input or involvement by Brady in those departure-authorizations. It is
not necessary to go to the length of drawing an adverse inference from the failure to call
AARP’s “head guy,” Stoddard and Pinegar, as discussed in MDI Commercial Services. For,
failure to call them not only leaves uncorroborated much of Hartman’s accounts, but it also
leaves an absence of firsthand evidence about some of the events and supposed management
decisions which Hartman claimed had occurred during the AARP Show. And given Brady’s
uncontested explanation of the early Friday departures, and his undisputed description of
Zaugg’s “misunderstanding” remark, there is no basis for concluding that Brady’s testimony
about them somehow supports in any respect Hartman’s testimony about those early departures.
To the contrary, the evidence does show that there had been early departures on that Friday
evening, but that they had been authorized by Pinegar and that, while Stoddard may have
initially believed that Brady was somehow responsible for them, that Zaugg had investigated
and cleared Brady of any responsibility for employees having left early.
The other aspect involves the timecards of Steven Carlson and Eugene Schultz. As set forth
above, Hartman claimed that Sabas had referred 6 to 10 employees to the AARP site on that
Friday evening—a claim not supported by the testimony of Sabas. Furthermore, Hartman
claimed that, inasmuch as those employees purportedly had been sent home without having
worked that evening, they were paid “a four hour minnie” for having reported, in part as a
consequence of a grievance filed by Respondent UFCW Local 653.
Brady agreed that there had been an occasion when some Respondent UFCW Local 653-
referred employees had reported to the AARP Show site. However, he testified that their
appearances had occurred on a Saturday at the end of May. According to Brady, it was pointed
out to him that Saturday that some Respondent UFCW Local 653-referred people were at the
service desk. He went there, testified Brady, and discovered those people there with Pinegar.
When he questioned the latter, according to Brady, Pinegar said he was uncertain why those
people there—that, “They just sort of showed up and said they were going to go to work on this
show and said that Larry called them in.”
Brady testified that he then went to Stoddard and protested that “we filled the call” and that,
“If you allow them to work, you are going to lose several people for every one that you bring
on the show because they are going to want to leave.” “It was not a threat in any way whatso-
ever,” claimed Brady, but rather, “I was just telling him that he was developing an explosive
situation.” When Respondent Freeman decided to send those people home, rather than allow
them to work, Carlson and Schultz demanded timecards to record that they had reported for
work with Respondent Freeman. That was done and the cards were filled out by Carlson and
Schultz.
Those timecards were produced. Rather than bearing a Friday date—as should have ap-
peared on them, had Harman’s testimony been accurate about a Friday evening referral by
Sabas—both timecards record a date of “5-30.” May 30 had been a Saturday during 1998.
Those dates tend to refute the testimony of Hartman and, conversely, tend to confirm the
account of Brady. Moreover, with the evidence partially contradicting Hartman’s account—
and, further, with no evidence whatsoever corroborating that account about the supposed
Steelworkers Local 17U-responsibility for early Friday departures and the purported Saturday
request by Stoddard that Respondent UFCW Local 653 supply “on-call, casual extra employ-
ees” for the Human Resources Management Show, because of those early Friday departures
and because of supposedly shoddy performance by those employees referred to the AARP site
by Steelworkers Local 17U—the record is left with no credible evidence even tending to justify
Respondent Freeman’s use of “on-call, casual, extra employees” referred by Respondent
UFCW Local 653 to the Human Resources Management Show, rather than the contractually-
required referrals of Steelworkers Local 17U.
In sum, referrals for the 1998 Human Resources Management Show are a concrete example
of Respondent Freeman’s admitted use of “on-call, casual, extra employees” referred by
sources other than Steelworkers Local 17U and, of course, Respondent Freeman admits that it
applied to those employees terms and conditions of employment which were inconsistent with
those specified in its contract with Steelworkers Local 17U, as well as admitting that it had
recognized Respondent UFCW Local 653 as their collective-bargaining representative. That
conduct is not somehow justified by Hartman’s testimony that Respondent UFCW Local 653’s
officials had conferred with counsel who agreed “that we had first call rights” to the “on-call,
casual, extra” work on the Human Resources Management Show. No particularized evidence
has been adduced showing the accuracy of such advice. Even good-faith reliance on advice of
counsel is no defense to an unfair labor practice charge. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hendel Mfg. Co.,
483 F.2d 350, 353 (2d Cir. 1973); Jerstedt Lumber Co., 209 NLRB 662 (1974). Moreover, no
one—such as Respondent UFCW Local 653’s president—corroborated Hartman’s account of
having conferred with counsel, before reaching the decision to refer “on-call, casual, extra
employees” to the Human Resources Management Show, and Hartman never described with
particularity what counsel may have said nor, for that matter, what facts may have been given
to counsel by Respondent UFCW Local 653’s officials. “It is a rare attorney who will be
fortunate enough to learn the entire truth from his own client.” Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153,
163 (1994).
Respondents Brede and Freeman both contend that it had been understood that the bargain-
ing units in their Stipulated Election Agreements entitled them to continue obtaining referrals
of “on-call, casual, extra employees” from sources other than Steelworkers Local 17U, and
regarding those referrals as represented by union sources which referred them, so long as there
were collective-bargaining contracts covering those employees as of August 3 and July 31,
1995, respectively. Respondent Brede has had the opportunity to litigate that contention, in the
proceeding conducted before Judge West. So, its situation will not be addressed further in this
proceeding.12

12 Respondents Freeman and Brede moved to sever the cases involv-
ing the former from those involving Respondents Brede and UFCW
Local 653, in light of that earlier proceeding involving only the latter
two respondents. It does seem reasonable to grant that motion inas-
much as disposition of the allegations against Respondent Freeman are
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 117
Turning to the situation pertaining to Respondent Freeman, as pointed out in subsection B
above, it only occasionally had been producer/service contractor for shows, expositions and
conventions in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. And many of them there are
subcontracted to Respondent Brede. Consistent with that relatively sporadic performance there
of convention decorating work, unlike Respondent Brede, Respondent Freeman employs no
regular and full-time employees in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, at least not so
far as the evidence shows. All of the decorating employees which it employs there are, as a
realistic matter, “on call, casual, extra employees,” though some may be regular and full-time
employees of Respondent Brede who obtain work with Respondent Freeman whenever Re-
spondent Brede has no work for them.
It does seem accurate that prior to July 31, 1995, whenever Respondent UFCW Local 653
was unable to supply all “on-call, casual, extra employees” needed by Respondent Freeman for
particular shows, the latter would resort to other sources to obtain the needed complement of
those workers: to Teamsters, to Stagehands, perhaps to barroom sweeps. But, there is no
evidence that prior to that date Respondent Freeman had been party to a collective-bargaining
contract with any union other than Respondent UFCW Local 653, though it would follow other
unions’ area contracts whenever it employed “on-call, casual, extra employees” who happened
to be referred to it by one or more of those unions other than Respondent UFCW Local 653. In
short, the situation was marked by relative informality.
To be sure, Des Moines Operations General Manager Zaugg testified that Respondent
Freeman had a contract with Teamsters. However, no contract was produced between Respon-
dent Freeman and Teamsters for any period before July 31, 1995. Indeed, no such contract for
any period was produced. Moreover, Zaugg testified that the Teamsters contract to which he
referred had been “signed 30 days” before his second appearance as a witness, on April 7, 1999.
“To the best of my knowledge, no,” testified Zaugg, when asked if there had been a contract
between Respondent Freeman and Teamsters before that recently-signed one. Of course,
employers are not free to usurp an incumbent union’s representative status by merely signing a
contract with a different union covering already-represented employees—to deprive an incum-
bent union of its certified status by later substituting representation for those employees by a
different union.
The only evidence of a collective-bargaining contract between Respondent Freeman and
any union prior to July 31, 1995, is that which pertains to the contract with Respondent UFCW
Local 653. While that contract, and its predecessors, provided terms pertaining to what have
come to be called “on-call, casual, extra employees,” as pointed out in subsection B above, it is
undisputed that, during 1995, then-Business Agent Zahn had told Brady that Respondent
UFCW Local 653 was not actually the collective-bargaining representative of “on-call, casual,
extra employees” and did not intend to admit any of them to its membership.
Evidence was adduced concerning communications in connection with the Stipulated Elec-
tion Agreements and the units specified in each. Most of that evidence, however, was directed
to negotiation of the election agreement for the “on-call, casual, extra employees” of Respon-

not contingent upon the Board’s resolution of Judge West’s conclusions
involving Respondents Brede and UFCW Local 653. Even so, I am
reluctant to take that step and, instead, leave it for the Board to take,
should it feel that severance is warranted. First, much of the evidence
in this proceeding involves all three of the respondents, intermeshed
collectively. So, it may be counterproductive at my level to make a
severance decision. More important, secondly, the Board may want to
evaluate the conclusions of the prior proceeding by considering some of
the evidence adduced in this proceeding. That is, the Board may want
to, in effect, either reopen the record in the earlier proceeding to con-
sider evidence adduced in this proceeding or, alternatively, consolidate
some or all of the charges presented in this proceeding with those of the
earlier proceeding. Inasmuch as I have no access to the record made in
the earlier proceeding, and certainly am not allowed to re-evaluate the
earlier proceeding’s conclusions, as can be done by the Board, those
possible decisions are beyond my authority and I feel that it is best to
leave the situation as presented, so that the Board has maximum flexi-
bility to pursue one or more of the several courses which might be
traveled in connection with this and the prior proceeding.
dent Brede—shoring and filling-in the evidence seemingly adduced in the proceeding before
Judge West. As stated above, repeatedly, his resolutions are not ones that can be revisited in
this proceeding.
Very little particularized evidence was adduced concerning
communications about the “on-call, casual, extra employees” of
Respondent Freeman. Zaugg wanted to treat the regular and
full-time decorators of Respondent Brede—the so-called “core
group”—as continuing to have referral preference over “on-
call, casual, extra employees.” But, there is no evidence of
what actually had been said in that connection during the pre-
stipulated unit period. Even if there was evidence that employ-
ees in the core group would continue to have referral preference
for work at Respondent Freeman, seemingly they would be
regarded as “on-call, casual, extra employees” when employed
by it, given that they are regular and full-time employees of
Respondent Brede, filling gaps in their employment with it by
accepting temporary employment with other decorating em-
ployers, and given that Respondent Freeman employs no regu-
lar and full-time employees in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metro-
politan area.
Zaugg did testify that he had always regarded employees referred from Respondent UFCW
Local 653 as represented by that labor organization, by virtue of the very fact that it had re-
ferred them. The problem with that distinction is a statutory one: at root, it is a distinction
based upon nothing more than the extent to which employees have been organized by one
union or another. For the Board to countenance such a distinction in a representation proceed-
ing, or allow parties to enter into election stipulations doing so, would contravene the prohibi-
tion of Section 9(c)(5) of the Act. That is, the Act does not allow certifications to issue to units
of employees which one union has organized and represents, excluding like-situated employees
whom another union happens to have organized and represents.
In a somewhat revealing display of inconsistency, by letter dated August 11, 1995, Respondent
UFCW Local 653’s counsel insisted that core group employees be added to the eligibility list for
the election among Respondent Freeman’s employees: “Those members of Local 653 have their
membership by virtue of their employment with Brede. They should not be disqualified from
voting in the election regarding their employment with Freeman, because of their union member-
ship with another employer.” Of course, given the units’ description, that is a correct statement.
Problem for Respondent UFCW Local 653 is that the unit included only “on-call, casual, extra
employees” who satisfied stated prior work requirements. So, if members of the core group—the
regular and full-time employees of Respondent Brede—were to be eligible to participate in the
election among Respondent Freeman’s employees, then they had to be regarded as “on-call, casual,
extra employees” of Respondent Freeman—not as its regular and full-time employees of whom
Respondent Freeman employed none, as stated above. In effect, by its letter, Respondent UFCW
Local 653 conceded that regular and full-time employees of Respondent Brede were “on-call,
casual, extra employees” when working for other convention decorating employers, such as Re-
spondent Freeman.
As much was also conceded by the evidence concerning negotiations between Steelworkers
Local 17U and Respondent Freeman, following the certifications’ issuance on September 18, 1995.
Questioned by Respondent UFCW Local 653’s counsel, Respondent Freeman’s counsel testified
that repetition of the certification’s “all other employees currently covered by other collective
bargaining agreements” exclusion, in the 1997–1998 collective-bargaining contract between
Respondent Freeman and Steelworkers Local 17U, “Theoretically . . . was to exclude the same
type of arrangements that Brede had. Although we were not aware that there necessarily were any.
We wanted to be safe and cover the waterfront.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, counsel acknowledged
the distinction between Respondent Freeman’s and Respondent Brede’s employment situations
regarding decorating employees. It could not be reasonably contended that the foregoing testimony
had somehow been a slip of the lip. For, counsel later testified:

I think that there was an assumption and there could have been—there probably was some dis-
cussion that these—the 653 referrals to Freeman were folks that were or had worked for Brede
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 118
were somehow on the 653 Brede seniority list or got to be in the pool to be referred somewhere
through Brede. There was not any real discussion in the Steelworkers—in any session that I
was involved in over specific definitions or descriptions or qualifications or any
kind of specific attributes about the 653 referrals. It was a class of persons—class of em-
ployees that was there. We felt it would continue to be there. We just didn’t spend a lot of time
talking about it.

In sum, while there may have been discussion during Respondent Freeman’s negotiations about
its ability to accept referral of Respondent Brede’s regular and full-time employees, there is no
evidence of any discussion that those, or any other, decorating employees would be regarded as
regular and full-time employees of Respondent Freeman.
Beyond that, there is no particularized evidence whatsoever, during either pre-Stipulated
Election Agreement communications nor during negotiations, that there had been any discus-
sion, much less agreement, that any of the “on-call, casual, extra employees” who worked for
Respondent Freeman would be excluded from those included in the stipulated bargaining unit.
In other words, there is no particularized evidence that Respondents Freeman and UFCW Local
653 and Steelworkers Local 17U, before entering into the Stipulated Election Agreement, had
agreed, or even discussed, that any “on-call, casual, extra employees”, or group of them, would
be encompassed by the “all other employees currently covered by other collective bargaining
agreements” exclusion.
G. Unlawful Threat Attributed to Respondent Freeman
As set forth in subsection A above, it is alleged that Respondent Freeman violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act as a result of an alleged threat by Zaugg to reduce work in the Minneapolis-
St. Paul metropolitan area unless unfair labor practice charges filed by Brady and Steelworkers
Local 17U were withdrawn. As will be seen below, the testimony about those threats was
never effectively denied.
Zaugg testified that “since the organization began” by Steel-
workers Local 17U, a total of 24 charges had been filed “either
directly against Freeman Decorating or against” Respondent
UFCW Local 653, with Respondent Freeman being named as the
employer involved. Zaugg acknowledged that “the expense of
this [sic] trial and the expense of the charges was weighing heav-
ily on my shoulders” by September of 1998. So much so, in fact,
that Zaugg acknowledged having sent a letter to Tommy Tho-
mas, the head official of Steelworkers Local 17U, based in Chi-
cago, dated July 17, 1998. In that letter, Zaugg complained about
the lack of cooperation with Respondent Freeman that, in his
view, Steelworkers Local 17U had been displaying. The letter
concludes, “Prior to filing NLRB charges and grievances, talk to
us about the problem. It may be that we can work out the prob-
lems without a formal charge. Formal charges indicate to us that
there is no desire on [Steelworkers Local 17U]’s part to work
things out.” Passage of time did not reduce Zaugg’s concern
about the charges being filed against Respondent Freeman.
It is uncontroverted that during the Lumbermen’s Show of September 15 through 20, 1998,
Thomas telephoned Zaugg to inquire how things were going on that show. Zaugg testified that,
after acknowledging that things were satisfactory, “I then asked him, Tommy what’s going to
happen to all these NLRB charges? To which he informed me they were going to be all be [sic]
dropped,” and asked Zaugg to “have Dan Brady give him [Thomas] a call.” According to
Zaugg, “I passed the message on the [sic] Dan Brady.” Significantly, Zaugg testified that “in
the conversation with Tommy Thomas the charges that were on my mind were the ones that are
being reviewed here at the hearing,” two of which, as of that time, had been filed against
Respondent Freeman by Brady.
Obviously, those charges were not “dropped,” as Thomas had assured Zaugg would hap-
pen. Beyond that, not only is Zaugg’s testimony about his telephone conversation with Thomas
not contested, but neither did Zaugg dispute Brady’s description of an ensuing telephone
conversation between Brady and Thomas, during which Zaugg had been present when Brady
was speaking on the phone.
As to that conversation, Brady testified that Zaugg “walked over to me and asked me to
give Tommy a call and we walked back to the service desk together where I—where he
[Zaugg] actually called Tommy Thomas and then handed me the phone.” According to
Brady’s uncontroverted testimony, after a brief discussion about how things were going on the
Lumbermen’s Show, Thomas said that Zaugg “had asked me if I would drop the NLRB
charges,” to which Brady, after “look[ing] at Jim who was standing there,” replied, “I just
found out there were two more shows that we didn’t [get] called for this morning.” Still,
testified Brady, he told Thomas, “Well, I will talk to Jim [Zaugg] about it. He’s standing right
here,” and, “If he wants to discuss it, I will.” However, Brady testified, when he then asked if
Zaugg “want[ed] to talk about dropping these NLRB charges,” Zaugg answered, “Well, not
right now,” after which Brady said on the phone to Thomas, “I’m not going to drop any charges
right now. We have got a lot of things to discuss about it.”
So far as the record discloses, Zaugg never did initiate a subsequent discussion with Brady
about the charges until Freeman was producing/service contracting the Shakopee Crafts,
sometimes referred to as the Canterbury Crafts, Show from October 27 through November 2,
1998. By letter dated October 22, 1998, Brady had requested that Zaugg furnish a list of shows
which Respondent Freeman intended to produce/service contract during 1999. Upon arriving
home on Friday, October 30 from working on that show, Brady testified that he discovered a
message from Zaugg on his answering machine: “Dan, we’ve got to do something about these
NLRB charges. We’d like to drop them if you can. Would you give me a call at your earliest
convenience.”
Zaugg equivocated somewhat as to having called Brady, in response to the latter’s October
22 letter: “My memory serves that Dan called me. Possibly I called him first.” Then, he
conceded, “I possibly could have called him and left him a message prior to that to call me. I
don’t recall.” Significantly, Zaugg never disputed Brady’s testimony about the substance of the
message which Zaugg had left on the answering machine.
Both men agreed that there ultimately did take place a telephone conversation between
them. Zaugg placed that conversation as having occurred on November 3. He testified that,
during it, he “assured” Brady that a calendar of those shows would be sent to Steelworkers
Local 17U, but that he (Zaugg) was hesitant to do so at that time. According to Zaugg, “I was
reluctant to provide that because we had many shows that were pending, that were not firmed
up as far as us receiving contracts from associations,” and, in addition, Respondent Freeman
“also had not made a final determination on which jobs were going to be subcontracted to
Brede.”
Brady testified that Zaugg had also said “that unless we dropped the NLRB charges there
weren’t going to be any more upcoming shows,” and that “[h]e was going to sub them all out to
Brede up here.” Of course, such a statement—about subbing shows out to Respondent Brede—
is not inconsistent with Zaugg’s above-stated statement that, as of the date of this telephone
conversation with Brady, Respondent Freeman “had not made a final determination on which
jobs were going to be subcontracted to Brede.” Moreover, by not having sent a list of 1999
shows to Steelworkers Local 17U, Respondent Freeman was effectively keeping open its option
to subcontract all 1999 Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area shows to Respondent Brede.
That is, it avoided making a commitment to which Steelworkers Local 17U could later point as
evidence that Respondent Freeman had switched direction and subcontracted shows to Respon-
dent Brede, after having informed Steelworkers Local 17U about those shows.
Respondent Freeman elicited testimony that, in the final analysis, skirted direct denial of
the above-quoted threat which Brady attributed to Zaugg. “I did not,” Zaugg testified, ever tell
Brady that no calendar of 1999 shows would be shown to Brady unless he dropped unfair labor
practice charges, nor say that he (Zaugg) did not want to send the calendar to Brady unless the
latter dropped the charges. Of course, as quoted above, Brady never claimed that Zaugg had
tied not sending a 1999 show-calendar to dropping the charges; Brady testified that Zaugg had
threatened that Respondent Freeman would subcontract all 1999 Minneapolis-St. Paul shows to
Respondent Brede unless the charges were dropped.
Zaugg did deny that Respondent Freeman ever had made a subcontracting decision in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area based either on pendency of unfair labor practice
charges or on the basis of any issue pertaining to labor. But, again, those denials are not
responsive to the threat attributed to him by Brady. Respondent Freeman is not alleged to have
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 119
actually subcontracted work because of the charges; it is alleged that its general manager
threatened to subcontract work unless the charges were dropped.
The closest Zaugg came to a denial of that threat, attributed to him by Brady, occurred
when he was asked if he had ever told Brady that anything about the existence of charges
would influence how many shows Respondent Freeman was going to produce in the Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul area. Rather than simply answer that question in the negative or affirmative, as he
had in response to questions which bred the answers described in the immediately preceding
two paragraphs, Zaugg answered somewhat unresponsively: “When I vented my frustration
over the number of NLRB charges, I’m sure that at some point I said, you know, why should
Freeman go through these enormous expenses of trials and one charge after another which we
continue to win when we have other options. That would be as close as I could have come.”
To the extent that such an answer might be characterized as a denial, two other events should be
considered.
First, no 1999 show calendar was forthcoming after Brady’s above-described conversation
with Zaugg. So, testified Brady, “I filed an NLRB charge as a result of this” telephone conver-
sation with Zaugg. In fact, the charge in Case 18–CA–15057 was filed on November 16, 1998.
And, in part, it alleges that Zaugg had “refused to provide relevant information to [Steelworkers
Local 17U], specifically a calendar or other information concerning its upcoming work sched-
ule.” By letter dated the following day, November 17, 1998, Zaugg sent to Brady a list of five
“firm jobs that Freeman is to produce in Minneapolis in 1999.” Attached to that list was a copy
of Zaugg’s above-described letter to Thomas of July 17, 1998—the one in which Zaugg stated,
inter alia, “Formal charges indicate to us that there is no desire on the union’s part to work
things out.” Zaugg never explained why he had so-belatedly chosen to send a copy of that July
letter to Brady.
Second, Daniel Mulligan, an “on-call, casual, extra” employees and a known supporter of
Steelworkers Local 17U, mentioned in subsection E above, testified that he had asked Brady
about available work from Respondent Freeman during 1999. Brady replied, apparently based
upon Zaugg’s above-mentioned list supplied with the November 17 letter, “we were only going
to be doing about five of them and the other ones were going to be subbed out to Brede,”
testified Mulligan. Mulligan placed this conversation as having occurred during the Shakopee
or Canterbury Crafts Show, which would have been between October 27 and 29, or on Novem-
ber 2, 1998. Especially in view of the five 1999 shows listed in Zaugg’s postcharge letter to
Brady, however, it seems more likely that it had not been until after November 17 that Mulligan
had questioned Brady about 1999 shows for Respondent Freeman. Renewed discussion of that
subject finally led Brady to suggest that Mulligan call Zaugg with his (Mulligan’s) questions.
Mulligan testified that he did call Zaugg. Zaugg never contested Mulligan’s testimony
about the substance of their ensuing conversation, especially that Zaugg had said to Mulligan
that Respondent Freeman was “willing to work with any union” it had to in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area, but that “a large part of how much work we do up there depends on
what the NLRB decides,” and, further, “because of the fact that every time they turned around
Dan Brady filed another charge up here he didn’t find it very profitable to be doing business in
Minneapolis.” Of course, that does not constitute an actual threat to subcontract work should
charges not be withdrawn. But, Zaugg’s undisputed remarks to Mulligan do show that Zaugg
drew an equation between charges and Respondent Freeman not regarding it to be profitable to
do business in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area in the face of those charges.
In sum, as set forth above, Brady testified that Zaugg had threatened to subcontract all of
Respondent Freeman’s Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area work to Respondent Brede
unless unfair labor practices charges against Respondent Freeman were dropped. Zaugg never
effectively denied having made that threat to Brady. To the contrary, much of Zaugg’s testi-
mony—that he had earlier broached the subject of charges with Thomas during September
1998, that “weighing heavily” on him was the expense of charges, that he had “vented my
frustration over the number of NLRB charges” to Brady—tends to show that Zaugg likely had
made that subcontracting threat. Brady’s testimony about the threat tended to further be
corroborated by Zaugg’s comments in his letter to Thomas of July 17, 1998, by his unexplained
inclusion of a copy of that letter with the calendar sent to Brady 4 months later, and by Zaugg’s
undisputed remarks to Mulligan, again equating charges with Respondent Freeman’s willing-
ness to continue decorating work in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.
When he testified to Zaugg’s threat, Brady appeared to be doing so with candor. I credit his
account of Zaugg’s subcontracting threat should the charges not be “dropped.”
Now, it might be argued that decorating work would be available during 1999 in the Min-
neapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area for “on-call, casual, extra employees,” even if performed by
Respondent Brede, rather than by Respondent Freeman—that a threat of subcontracting had
been a meaningless one, because those employees would be performing that work for one
respondent rather than the other. Yet, such a conclusion is overly simplistic in the circum-
stances.
As of the fall of 1998, Respondent Freeman had executed a second collective-bargaining
contract with Steelworkers Local 17U, one for a term of July 8, 1998 through July 1, 1999.
Respondent Brede did not have a similar contract with Steelworkers Local 17U. To the con-
trary, notwithstanding issuance of Judge West’s Decision on August 14, 1998, there is no
evidence that Respondent Brede had reversed its position, based upon the State Bureau of
Mediation Service’s certification, that Respondent UFCW Local 653, not Steelworkers Local
17U, was by then the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of “on-call, casual, extra
employees” whom Respondent Brede employed. Thus, were Respondent Freeman’s ordinarily
performed work to be performed by Respondent Brede during 1999, Brady and other “on-call,
casual, extra employees” confronted the possibility of being employed by an employer which
unlawfully did not recognize the collective-bargaining representative chosen by those employ-
ees.
Beyond that, as concluded in subsection E above, Respondent UFCW Local 653 had been
skipping over Brady in referrals made to Excel. There would be no reason for him to conclude
that Respondent UFCW Local 653 would be less disposed to skip over him should it make “on-
call, casual, extra” referrals to Respondent Brede during 1999. In fact, given the efforts by
Respondent UFCW Local 653 to have those employees sign its authorization cards and mem-
bership applications before allowing them to work on its shows, as also described in subsection
E above, Brady could reasonably fear that he would be obliged to execute like documents
before being allowed to work on 1999 shows, exhibitions and conventions which Respondent
Freeman subcontracted to Respondent Brede. In the totality of these circumstances, it hardly
can be maintained with persuasion that “on-call, casual, extra employees,” such as Brady,
would not reasonably apprehend detriment if, rather than being producer/service contractor
itself, Respondent Freeman subcontracted to Respondent Brede all or almost all convention
decorating work in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.
II. DISCUSSION
Given the discussions in section I’s subsections, there is no need for prolonged repetition of
the facts underlying any of the alleged violations, save for one. Thus, it is alleged that Respon-
dent Brede violated the Act by rejecting a request to bargain with Steelworkers Local 17U, and
by failing and refusing to bargain, about employment terms and conditions of “on-call, casual,
extra employees” referred and represented by Stagehands. As discussed in section I,C, supra,
Judge West concluded that, following Steelworkers Local 17U’s certification, Respondent
Brede had unlawfully “substantially increas[ed] its reliance on” Stagehands as a source of “on-
call-casual, extra employees.” A natural consequence of that increased reliance is the erosion,
potentially the elimination, of “on-call, casual, extra employees” whom Steelworkers Local
17U, the certified bargaining representative of those employees, would be able to represent. In
consequence, Respondent Brede was using the Stagehands-referred and -represented employees
to limit, perhaps eventually eliminate altogether, employees in the certified bargaining unit for
which Steelworkers Local 17U was supposed to be the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative.
An employer cannot avoid its statutory bargaining obligations under the Act by simply em-
ploying in an incumbent bargaining agent’s certified unit an expanded number of employees
represented by another union and by recognizing that other union as the representative of that
expanded number of employees. To allow such conduct would be to allow private parties to
obliterate the certification process which Congress has mandated should be observed. Conse-
quently, Respondent Brede cannot escape its statutory bargaining obligation by employing
employees in the bargaining unit who are obtained from another union. By refusing to bargain
with Steelworkers Local 17U about employment terms and conditions for employees in the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 120
certified bargaining unit, whom it had obtained from Stagehands’ referral, Respondent Brede
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Turning then to the alleged unlawful conferral and acceptance, respectively, by Respondent
Brede and by Respondent UFCW Local 653, of recognition pursuant to State certification,
based upon Judge West’s conclusions, Respondent UFCW Local 653 had obtained authoriza-
tion cards from Respondent Brede’s “on-call, casual, extra employees” at a time when the
lingering effects of earlier unfair labor practices remained unremedied. Those unfair labor
practices naturally tended, measured by objective standards, to undermine employee support for
an incumbent bargaining agent. In such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the authori-
zation cards, and any membership applications, for Respondent UFCW Local 653 truly re-
flected the uncoerced choice of employees who had signed them. Therefore, by granting
recognition to Respondent UFCW Local 653 on May 12, 1998, on the basis of a count of those
cards, Respondent Brede violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. In the process, concomi-
tantly, Respondent Brede effectively withdrew recognition from Steelworkers Local 17U, as
the incumbent certified collective-bargaining representative of those employees, and thereby
further violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
For its part, Respondent UFCW Local 653 had secured those authorization cards during a
period when some of Respondent Brede’s unfair labor practices were being committed and all
of the cards were secured while the lingering effects of those unfair labor practices remained
unremedied. Respondent UFCW Local 653 can hardly claim ignorance of those unfair labor
practices. It had been a respondent in the same March 1998 hearing in which Respondent
Brede’s unfair labor practices were being litigated before Judge West. Indeed, one of those
alleged unfair labor practices heard by Judge West was that Respondent Brede had conferred
unlawful recognition upon—and had unlawfully entered into, maintained, and enforced a
partial collective-bargaining agreement with—Respondent UFCW Local 653 on or about
January 4, 1996. Therefore, Respondent UFCW Local 653 had knowledge of Respondent
Brede’s unremedied unfair labor practices during the period when it secured authorization cards
from the latter’s “on-call, casual, extra employees” and, certainly, during the period when it
demanded and accepted recognition from Respondent Brede, as a result of the state-conducted
card check. By having done so, Respondent UFCW Local 653 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act.
As discussed in section I,E, supra, a preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that
Sabas and, especially, Harman told employees that they would have to join Respondent UFCW
Local 653—or, at least, designate it as their collective-bargaining agent, by signing authoriza-
tion cards—to work on the Human Resources Management Show. In the first place, as de-
scribed in section I,F, supra, and as discussed below, Respondent Freeman violated the Act by
failing to honor its contractual referral obligation to Steelworkers Local 17U when it secured
“on-call, casual, extra employees” for that show from Respondent UFCW Local 653. Beyond
that, labor organizations are not allowed under the Act to extract membership commitments—
nor, even, designations of support, such as authorization cards—as the price for referring to
work or for allowing employees to work, save of course to the limited extent allowable under
the first proviso of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The statements of Sabas and Hartman exceeded
that statutory allowance.
The Human Resources Management Show should have been staffed by “on-call, casual,
extra employees” referred and represented by Steelworkers Local 17U, pursuant to the 1995
certification and to the then-effective collective-bargaining contract between that labor organi-
zation and Respondent Freeman. Instead, the latter disregarded that contractual obligation and
sought referrals of those employees from Respondent UFCW Local 653. In turn, the latter’s
officials utilized its unlawful selection as the source of “on-call, casual, extra employees” for
that show as the basis for telling those employees that they had to sign-up with Respondent
UFCW Local 653 to be allowed to work on that show. By those statements of its admitted
agents, Respondent UFCW Local 653 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
Beyond that, as also described in section I,E, supra, Respondent UFCW Local 653 failed to
refer Brady to Excel’s two 1998 Minneapolis shows. Brady was on the list for referral to those
shows. Respondent UFCW Local 653 concedes that it would have referred him to those shows
in the ordinary process of referral. But, Brady was not referred to either show. It is admitted
that Sabas, Respondent UFCW Local 653’s official making those 1998 referrals to Excel, had
harbored animus toward Brady because of the latter’s status as official of another labor organi-
zation, Steelworkers Local 17U. In an effort to justify his failure to refer Brady to either 1998
Excel show, Sabas’ advanced testimony which was not credible. As a result, Respondent
UFCW Local 653 has failed to advance credible evidence of any lawful reason for nonreferral
of Brady to Excel’s 1998 Minneapolis shows. Therefore a preponderance of the credible and
objective evidence supports the allegation that Respondent UFCW Local 653 unlawfully failed
and refused to refer Brady to those shows because of his support for and activities on behalf of
another labor organization, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
Turning to the allegations against Respondent Freeman, as concluded in section I,G, supra,
a preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that its Des Moines Operations general
manager did tell Brady that unless unfair labor practices charges against it were withdrawn—
“dropped”—Respondent Freeman would subcontract all 1999 work on Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan area shows to Respondent Brede. That was a threat of potentially meaningful
detriment to Brady and other “on-call, casual, extra employees” represented by Steelworkers
Local 17U, most importantly a threat of possible loss of employment during 1999, as well as of
loss of representation by their chosen bargaining agent. Therefore, I conclude that the threat
did constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Which leaves for consideration the ultimate allegations that Respondent Freeman violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by choosing a source of referral—Respondent UFCW Local
653—other than Steelworkers Local 17U for “on-call, casual, extra employees” since Octo-
ber 13, 1997, thereby not honoring a contractual obligation imposed by Respondent Freeman’s
collective-bargaining agreement with Steelworkers Local 17U; by recognizing Respondent
UFCW Local 653 as the representative of those employees which it had referred to Respondent
Freeman; and, by applying to those Respondent UFCW Local 653-referred employees terms
and conditions of employment inconsistent with Respondent Freeman’s collective-bargaining
contract with Steelworkers Local 17U. As pointed out in section I,F, supra, Respondent
Freeman admits those factual allegations, but contends that it lawfully engaged in that conduct
pursuant to the “all other employees currently covered by other collective bargaining agree-
ments” unit exclusion of Steelworkers Local 17U’s Certification of Representative and of the
Stipulated Election Agreement underlying it. To determine whether Respondent Freeman’s
conduct constituted unfair labor practices, accordingly, it is necessary to analyze the stipulated
bargaining unit’s inclusions and exclusion.
When a stipulation exists for an appropriate unit, that stipulation constitutes “a binding con-
tract between the parties” (citation omitted) Henry Ford Health System v. NLRB, 105 F.3d
1139, 1147 (6th Cir. 1997), and where “the terms of the stipulation are unambiguous, the Board
must hold the parties to its text.” Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied 502 U.S. 1048 (1992). Here, while a long and complicatedly-worded one, the
stipulated unit description is not so ambiguous, in the circumstances, as might be thought at
first blush.
The unit inclusions break down into two components. To be included, an employee must,
first, be an “on-call, casual, extra” employee employed as a journeyperson or helper. Scant
evidence is devoted to that last part: “journeypersons or helpers.” Still, no party has argued that
the “on-call, casual, extra employees” of Respondent Freeman at issue here had been other than
“employed [by it] as journeypersons or helpers.” Given the extent of litigation about the units,
and the evidence adduced and arguments made during hearing about the twin units, surely
Respondent Freeman or Respondent UFCW Local 653 would have opened the issue of “jour-
neypersons or helpers,” had there been some basis for contending that some or all of the “on-
call, casual, extra employees” employed by Respondent Freeman on shows on and after Octo-
ber 13, 1997, such as the Human Resources Management Show, had not qualified as either
“journeypersons or helpers.” That this did not happen tends to indicate that there is no dispute
about the fact that all “on-call, casual, extra employees” working for Respondent Freeman on
and after that date had been “journeypersons [or] helpers,” within the meaning of the unit
inclusion, regardless which labor organization had referred them there. To the extent that one
or a few may not have been, that is a subject which can be addressed in the compliance phase of
this proceeding. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
The second component of the unit inclusions is that, to be eligible for unit inclusion, an em-
ployee must have worked “at least two shows, exhibitions and/or conventions at facilities locate
in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN metropolitan area for at least five working days during the
past twelve months or . . . been employed by the Employer at such events for at least 15 days
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 121
within the past two years.” Not much attention was paid to this second component during the
hearing and, accordingly, its meaning is not in issue. Nevertheless, some attention should be
paid to it, because “on-call, casual extra employees” who failed to satisfy that minimum show,
exhibition and/or convention-requirement, or who failed to work the minimum floor of days
during the periods specified, are not included in the certified bargaining units. Indeed, even if
an employee later satisfied that two-part number of shows, etc. and minimum number of days
test—by work performed after September 18, 1995—that employee may never be included in
Steelworkers Local 17U’s certified unit, given the fact that that employee was not eligible for
inclusion when the Stipulated Election Agreement for Respondent Freeman’s employees had
been approved.
In fact, proceeding one step further, employees newly hired after that approval may not be
eligible for inclusion in the unit and representation by Steelworkers Local 17U, given that they
had not been employed prior to that agreement and, thus, had not as of that time satisfied the
shows- and work time-tests. Indeed, if there is ambiguity in the unit description, it arises in this
second, not the first, component of the unit description’s inclusions. Even so, any such
ambiguity need not be resolved since, as pointed out above, it is not brought into issue here. If
it comes to be an issue in the compliance phase of this proceeding, in connection with computa-
tion of backpay, for example, it can be addressed at that stage.
Shorn of the above-described nonissues, left for consideration is interpretation of a unit
which includes, “All on-call, casual, extra employees,” but which excludes “all other employ-
ees currently covered by other collective bargaining agreements.” Unlike the situation pre-
sented Judge West of possible Respondent Brede collective-bargaining contracts with unions
other than Respondent UFCW Local 653, here the evidence fails to reveal that Respondent
Freeman had been party to a collective-bargaining contract with any union other than Respon-
dent UFCW Local 653 as of August 3, 1995, when the Stipulated Election Agreement between
those two parties and Steelworkers Local 17U had been approved.
Of course, the most-recent contract between Respondents Freeman and UFCW Local 653
had contained provisions for what have come to be referred to as “on-call, casual, extra em-
ployees.” Yet, as parties to that contract and, also, to the Stipulated Election Agreement, those
two respondents were free to agree upon severance of a part of their contractual unit. Nothing
in the record shows that it would have been contrary to any purpose of the Act for them to have,
in reality, agreed to sever, in effect, part-time employees from a historic bargaining unit. Their
part-time employment status is an objective standard.
Of course, as pointed out in section I,B, supra, Respondent Freeman employs, and has
never employed, regular and full-time decorating employees in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan area, as has Respondent Brede. Thus, all of Respondent Freeman’s decorating
employees in that metropolitan area have been “on-call, casual, extra employees.” To be sure,
some of Respondent Brede’s regular and full-time employees have worked occasionally for
Respondent Freeman. When doing so, however, they are not working for Respondent Freeman
as its regular and full-time employees. Rather, they are employed by Respondent Freeman only
so long as it needs “on-call, casual, extra employees” for a particular show, exhibition or
convention and so long as they are free from their regular work with Respondent Brede.
That reality is not altered by the fact that Respondent UFCW Local 653—and Respondent
Freeman, as well—had been according employment preference to regular and full-time em-
ployees of Respondent Brede when they were referred to Respondent Freeman. So far as the
evidence shows, those regular and full-time employees performed the same duties for Respon-
dent Freeman as did “on-call, casual, extra employees” whom it was employing. Nor is that
fact changed by the fact that Respondents Freeman and UFCW Local 653 had agreed to com-
pensate at regular and full-time rates and benefits the regular and full-time employees of
Respondent Brede, whenever one or more of them happened to work for Respondent Freeman.
Referral preferences and higher compensation and benefits cannot, under the Act, change the
status of irregular employment some sort of full-time employment. Such preferences merely
work to the benefit, nor the employment status, of employees. Indeed, as pointed out in section
I,F, supra, in his letter of August 11, 1995, Respondent UFCW Local 653’s counsel seemed to
concede as much, since he argued that those regular and full-time employees of Respondent
Brede should be regarded as eligible to cast ballots in the “on-call, casual, extra employees”
unit for Respondent Freeman’s employees.
Beyond questions of severance, and of “on-call, casual, extra” status versus that of regular
and full-time status, it should not be overlooked that during 1995, before Steelworkers Local
17U had filed its representation petitions, it is uncontested that Respondent UFCW Local 653’s
then-business agent had told Brady that, actually, Respondent UFCW Local 653 did not regard
itself as the collective-bargaining representative of what have come to be called “on-call,
casual, extra employees.” That, in effect, disclaimer, in the face of some employment terms
negotiated in the past for those employees, warrants a conclusion that although Respondent
UFCW Local 653 had negotiated some employment terms for “on-call, casual, extra employ-
ees,” it had done so not because it was their collective-bargaining representative, but rather as
an afterthought—to exclude them from contractual benefits which were being contractually
conferred upon the regular and full-time employees of Respondent Brede.
In light of the foregoing considerations, it cannot be said that some inherent inequity is be-
ing worked by excluding from representation by Respondent UFCW Local 653 all “on-call,
casual, extra employees” of Respondent Freeman. Those two respondents executed the Stipu-
lated Election Agreement. There is no evidence that, during negotiations preceding that
execution, Respondent UFCW Local 653 had sought specifically to retain representation of any
“on-call, casual, extra employees” whom it had been referring to Respondent Freeman in the
past, except, of course, if it won the representation election and except, of course, those em-
ployees who failed to satisfy the minimum number of shows and workdays provided by that
agreement.
An examination of the inclusionary and exclusionary language of the agreement supports a
conclusion that the “currently covered by other collective bargaining agreements” exclusion, of
itself, does not preserve for Respondent UFCW Local 653’s representation any “on-call, casual
extra employees” other than those who had failed to work a sufficient minimum time on two or
more shows, exhibitions and/or conventions for Respondent Freeman during the periods
specified in the stipulation. First, the agreement’s inclusion of “on-call, casual, extra employ-
ees” is preceded by the word, “All.” Read naturally, that term is an expansive one.
Secondly, the phrase, “All on-call, casual, extra employees” is a specific one, while the
phrase “employees currently covered by other collective bargaining agreements” is a more
general one. It is a well-established interpretative “canon that specific provisions qualify
general ones.” (Citation omitted.) Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429, 430
(1992).13
Thirdly, the exclusionary language to which Respondents Freeman and UFCW Local 653
point begins “all other employees currently covered by other collective bargaining agree-
ments.” (Emphasis added.) Obviously, use of the word “other” in that context must be given
full meaning. And its only naturally-read meaning is employees “other” than those specified in
the unit inclusion. Thus, included in the unit are “All on-call, casual, extra employees em-
ployed by the Employer as journeypersons or helpers,” who meet the minimum show and work
requirements, but excluding “all other employees” who happen to be then “covered by other
collective bargaining agreements.”
Acceptance of Respondents Freeman and UFCW Local 653’s interpretation of the unit
would mean that a class of employees was included in the stipulated bargaining unit, but then
removed from it a few phrases later. As an objective matter, that would be a ridiculous conclu-
sion—would allow “a degree of verbal know-nothingism that would render [meaningful
interpretation of stipulated bargaining units] quite impossible. Deal v. U.S., 508 U.S. 129, 135
(1993).
Beyond that, such an interpretation would allow Respondent Freeman to pick and choose—
for each show, exhibition and convention—the bargaining representative of the “on-call, casual,
extra employees” which it employed. In a very real sense, it would be permitted to select those
employees based upon no standard other than “the extent to which [those] employees have been

13 I recognize that the cited case involved statutory, not contractual,
interpretation. Yet, standing alone, there is no reason why a canon of
statutory interpretation cannot also be utilized when interpreting other
documents, such as Stipulated Election Agreements. If anything, a
canon of value in interpreting a statute would seem to be of equal value
when interpreting other documents, so long as there is no inherent
reason for limiting its application to statutory interpretation. No such
reason exists in the context presented here.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 122
organized” by Respondent UFCW Local 653 or by Steelworkers Local 17U. Such a result is
hardly one countenanced under Section 9(c)(5) of the Act.
In sum, I reject the argument that the “all other employees currently covered by other col-
lective bargaining agreements” exclusion is so broad that it gobbles up the unit inclusion of
“All” of the “on-call, casual, extra employees” whom Respondent Freeman employs. Further-
more, inasmuch as Respondent Freeman admits that, contrary to its collective-bargaining
contract with Steelworkers Local 17U, it had been resorting to sources other than that labor
organization since October 13, 1997, for “on-call, casual, extra employees” and had been
recognizing whichever union happened to represent those employees as their representative
while working for it and, in addition, had been applying to those employees terms and condi-
tions of employment other than those negotiated with Steelworkers Local 17U, I conclude that,
by that conduct, Respondent Freeman violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Brede, Inc. has committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce by rejecting a request
by, and failing and refusing to bargain with, United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC,
Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decora-
tors Union, Local No. Local 17U—as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit of: All on-call, casual, extra employees employed
by Brede, Inc. as journeypersons or helpers during at least two shows, exhibitions, and/or
conventions at facilities located in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan area for at
least 5 working days during the past 12 months or who have been employed by Brede, Inc. at
such events for at least 15 days within the past 2 years; excluding office clerical employees,
professional employees, managerial employees, all other employees currently covered by other
collective bargaining agreements, and guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended—about employment terms and conditions of employees employed
in that unit because those employees had been referred to employment by another union, and by
withdrawing recognition from the above-named labor organization as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of employees in that bargaining unit at a time when unremedied
unfair labor practices by Brede, Inc. had naturally eroded employee-support for that labor
organization, thereby inherently precluding employees from making an uncoerced choice of a
different collective-bargaining representative, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act;
and, by rendering unlawful assistance and support to United Food & Commercial Workers
International Union, Local 653, by granting it recognition as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of employees in the above-stated bargaining unit, at a time when there were
unremedied unfair labor practices having a natural effect of undermining employee-support for
an incumbent bargaining representative and, therefore, at a time when United Food & Com-
mercial Workers International Union, Local 653 did not represent an uncoerced majority of
employees in that bargaining unit, in violation of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 653 has committed unfair
labor practices affecting commerce by failing and refusing since May 1998 to refer employee
Daniel Brady to employment with Excel Decorators, Inc., for no reason other than Brady’s
support for, and activities on behalf of, another labor organization, in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act; and, by demanding and accepting recognition from Brede, Inc.,
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees in the above-stated bargain-
ing unit, with knowledge that there existed unremedied unfair labor practices which inherently
prevented those employees from making an uncoerced choice of a collective-bargaining repre-
sentative other than their incumbent certified representative, and by telling employees that they
had to sign membership applications and authorization cards, designating it as those employ-
ees’ bargaining agent, to be allowed to work on shows, expositions and conventions to which
United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 653 was unlawfully referring
employees, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
Freeman Decorating Co. has committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce by fail-
ing to honor the referral provisions of its collective-bargaining contracts with United Steel-
workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window shade, Venetian Blinds,
Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U—as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit of: All on-
call, casual, extra employees employed by Freeman Decorating Co. as journeypersons or
helpers during at least two shows, exhibitions, and/or conventions at facilities located in
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan area for at least 5 working days during the past
12 months or who have been employed by Freeman Decorating Co. at such events for at least
15 days within the past 2 years; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees,
managerial employees, all other employees currently covered by other collective-bargaining
agreements, and guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended—and seeking referrals from United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local
653, by recognizing United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 653 as the
collective-bargaining representative of employees in that bargaining unit whom it sent as
referrals to perform work covered by that bargaining unit, and by applying to employees
referred by United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 653 employment
terms and conditions other than those specified in collective-bargaining contracts with United
Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian
Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act; and, by threatening to subcontract all 1999 work in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area unless unfair labor practice charges against it were not
withdrawn, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having concluded that Brede, Inc., United Food & Commercial Workers International Un-
ion, Local 653, and Freeman Decorating Co. have engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall
recommend that each of them be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and, further, that each be
ordered to take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. With respect to
the latter, Brede, Inc. shall be ordered to resume recognizing and to bargain collectively with
United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade,
Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U—as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of: All on-call, casual, extra employees em-
ployed by Brede, Inc. as journeypersons or helpers during at least two shows, exhibitions,
and/or conventions at facilities located in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan
area for at least 5 working days during the past 12 months or who have been employed by
Brede, Inc. at such events for at least 15 days within the past 2 years; excluding office clerical
employees, professional employees, managerial employees, all other employees currently
covered by other collective bargaining agreements, and guards and supervisors as defined in the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended—and embody any agreement reached in a written
contract.
United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 653 shall be ordered to,
within 14 days of the date of this Order, notify Daniel P. Brady in writing that it will refer him
to employment to Excel Decorators, Inc., and to all other employers to whom he is eligible for
referral, without regard to his support for and activities on behalf of United Steelworkers of
America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition,
Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, or any other labor organization. In
addition, it shall be ordered to make Brady whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits he
suffered because he was discriminatorily not referred to employment with Excel Decorators,
Inc. after May 1, 1998, with backpay to be computed on a quarterly basis, making deductions
for interim earnings, F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and with interest to be paid
on the amounts owing, as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 238 NLRB 1173
(1987).
Freeman Decorating Co. shall be ordered to recognize and bargain with United Steelwork-
ers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds,
Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U for all employees which
it employs in an appropriate bargaining unit of: All on-call, casual, extra employees employed
by Freeman Decorating Co. as journeypersons or helpers during at least two shows, exhibitions,
and/or conventions at facilities located in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan
area for at least 5 working days during the past 12 months or who have been employed by
Freeman Decorating Co. at such events for at least 15 days within the past 2 years; excluding
office clerical employees, professional employees, managerial employees, all other employees
currently covered by other collective-bargaining agreements, and guards and supervisors as
defined in the National Labor Relations Act. Moreover, it shall be ordered to honor all em-
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 123
ployment referral and other terms of its collective-bargaining contracts with that labor organiza-
tion for employees employed in the aforestated bargaining unit. Furthermore, it shall be
ordered to make whole both all employees who have worked in that bargaining unit since
October 13, 1997 and, as well, all employees who should have been referred to employment
with it since October 13, 1997, but were not referred because of its unlawful refusal to honor
the referral provisions of its collective-bargaining contracts with the above-named labor organi-
zation, for lost wages, calculated in accordance with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682,
683 (1970), and, also, for any losses resulting from its failure to make contractual welfare and
pension payments, in the manner prescribed in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891 fn. 2
(1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981). The method of determining any amounts
owing to benefit funds shall be that specified in Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213
(1979). Interest shall be paid on any money due and owing employees as computed in the
manner prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). See generally
Our Lady of Lourdes Health Center, 306 NLRB 337 fn. 1 (1992).
Inasmuch as it has no office or other facility in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area
to which employees ordinarily would go, Freeman Decorating Co. shall be ordered to duplicate
and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the attached notice marked “Appendix C” to each
employee employed by it in the bargaining unit set forth above and, as well, to every additional
employee listed for referral by United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip
Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local
No. Local 17U since October 13, 1997. To further ensure that no employee who should have
been represented by that labor organization when working for Freeman Decorating Co., or who
should have worked for that employer since October 13, 1997 is overlooked, additional copies
of that notice marked “Appendix C” shall be signed by an authorized representative of Freeman
Decorating Co. and forthwith returned to the Regional Director for posting by United Steel-
workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds,
Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, it being willing, at
facilities in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan area where it customarily posts
notices to members and employees.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I issue the following recommended14
ORDER
A. The Respondent Brede, Inc., Boston, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Rendering unlawful assistance and support to United Food & Commercial Workers In-
ternational Union, Local 653, by granting it recognition as the collective-bargaining representa-
tive of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth in subparagraph (b) below, unless
and until it becomes certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of employees in that bargaining unit.
(b) Withdrawing recognition from United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC,
Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decora-
tors Union, Local No. Local 17U, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth below, at a time when there are unreme-
died unfair labor practices which naturally tend to undermine employee-support for that labor
organization, and which thereby preclude employees from making a free and uncoerced choice
of representation by a different collective-bargaining representative. The appropriate bargain-
ing unit is:

All on-call, casual, extra employees employed by the Employer as journeypersons or helpers
during at least two shows, exhibitions, and/or conventions at facilities located in the Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul, MN metropolitan area for at least five working days during the past twelve months

14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
or who have been employed by the Employer at such events for at least 15 days within the past
two years; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, managerial employees,
all other employees currently covered by other collective bargaining agreements, and guards
and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.

(c) Rejecting requests to bargain made by, and failing and refusing to bargain with, United
Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian
Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U concerning
employment terms and conditions of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth
in subparagraph (b) above, even though those employees have been referred to employment
with Brede, Inc. by a different labor organization.
(d) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Resume recognizing and, upon request, bargain with United Steelworkers of America,
AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and
Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U about employment terms and conditions of all
employees employed in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth in paragraph 1(b) above,
regardless of whether those employees have been referred to employment in that bargaining
unit by a different labor organization, and embody any agreement reached as a result of that
bargaining in a written contract.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Minneapolis, Minnesota, office
and place of business copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A.”15 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by its duly
authorized representative, shall be posted by Brede, Inc. and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places, including all places where notice to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to ensure that notices are not altered, defaced or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings,
Brede, Inc. has gone out of business or closed its Minneapolis office and place of business
involved in these proceedings, it shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and former employees employed by it in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul metropolitan area at any time since November 5, 1997.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn cer-
tification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that it
has taken to comply.

B. The Respondent, United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 653,
Plymouth, Minnesota, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees that they must sign its membership application or authorization card
before they will be allowed to work for Freeman Decorating Co., or for any other employer.
(b) Demanding or accepting recognition from Brede, Inc., as the exclusive collective bar-
gaining representative of employees in a bargaining unit of, all on-call, casual, extra employees
employed by Brede, Inc. as journeypersons or helpers during at least two shows, exhibitions
and/or conventions at facilities located in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan
area for at least 5 working days during the past 12 months or who have been employed by
Brede, Inc. at such events for at least 15 days within the past two years; excluding office
clerical employees, professional employees, managerial employees, all other employees cur-
rently covered by other collective bargaining agreements, and guards and supervisors as
defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, unless and until such time as it is
certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining represen-
tative of all employees in that appropriate bargaining unit.
15 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judge-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 124
(c) Refusing to refer to employment with Excel Decorators, Inc., or any other employer, or
otherwise causing or attempting to cause that employer or any other employer to discriminate
against Daniel P. Brady, or any other employee, because of support for or activities on behalf of
United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade,
Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, or any
other labor organization.
(d) In any like or related manner, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, notify Daniel P. Brady in writing that it will
refer him to Excel Decorators, Inc., and to any other employer to whom he is eligible to be
referred, without regard to his support for, or activities on behalf of, United Steelworkers of
America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition,
Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, or any other labor organization.
(b) Make whole Daniel P. Brady for any loss of earnings and other benefits he suffered be-
cause he was unlawfully not referred to employment with Excel Decorators, Inc. after May 1,
1998, with backpay to be computed as set forth in the remedy section of this decision and with
interest to be paid on amounts owing.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available to the Board or its agents for
examination and copying, all hiring records, referral and dispatch lists, referral slips and all
other records, including an electronic copy of the records if stored in electronic form, necessary
to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Plymouth, Minnesota facility
and, as well, at any other hiring halls and facilities it maintains in the Minneapolis-St. Paul,
Minnesota metropolitan area, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B.”16 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by its
duly authorized representative, shall be posted by United Food & Commercial Workers Interna-
tional Union, Local 653 and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by it to ensure that notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, United Food & Commercial Workers
International Union, Local 653 has been dissolved or merged with any other labor organization,
or has closed its above-mentioned offices, it shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy
of the notice to all current members and employees, and to all former members and employees,
whom it has referred to employment in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan area
since November 26, 1997.
(e) Additional copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B” shall be signed by a
duly authorized representative of United Food & Commercial Workers International Union,
Local 653, and forthwith returned to the Regional Director for posting by Excel Decorators,
Inc. and by Brede, Inc., they being willing, at Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan
area places of business where notices to employees are customarily posted by those employers.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn cer-
tification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
have been taken to comply.

C. The Respondent, Freeman Decorating Co., Des Moines, Iowa, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening to subcontract work to other employers unless unfair labor practice charges
filed against it are withdrawn.
(b) Failing and refusing to honor the provisions of its collective-bargaining contracts with
United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade,
Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U—the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit of:

16 Ibid. fn. 15
All on-call, casual, extra employees employed by Freeman Decorating Co as journeypersons or
helpers during at least two shows, exhibitions, and/or conventions at facilities located in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan area for at least 5 working days during the past
12 months or who have been employed by Freeman Decorating Co. at such events for at least
15 days within the past 2 years; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees,
managerial employees, all other employees currently covered by other collective bargaining
agreements, and guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended—by disregarding their referral provisions and resorting to United Food & Commer-
cial Workers International Union, Local 653 as the source for referrals of employees in the afor-
estated appropriate bargaining unit; recognizing United Food & Commercial Workers Interna-
tional Union, Local 653 as the collective-bargaining representative of bargaining unit employees
whom it has referred; and, applying to any employees in that appropriate bargaining unit terms
and conditions of employment other than those specified in collective-bargaining contracts with
United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Ve-
netian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U.
(c) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Honor the terms of collective-bargaining contracts with United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag
and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth in paragraph 1(b)
above.
(b) Bargain collectively with the labor organization named in subparagraph (a) above, as
the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit set forth in paragraph 1(b) above, and embody any agreement reached in a written contract.
(c) Make whole all employees employed in the bargaining unit set forth in paragraph 1(b)
above since October 13, 1997, and, in addition, all employees who should have been referred
by United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade,
Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U for
work in that unit since October 13, 1997, but who were not referred as a result of the unlawful
refusal to honor the referral provisions of collective-bargaining contracts with that labor organi-
zation, and, as well, benefit funds, with interest, in the manner prescribed in the remedy section
of this decision.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available to the Board or its agents for
examination and copying all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of the records
if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms of
this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, duplicate and mail, at its own expense, cop-
ies of the attached notice marked “Appendix C”17 to all employees employed in the bargaining
unit set forth in section 1(b) above since October 13, 1997, and to any additional employees
who since that date were on the referral lists of United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO,
CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting
Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U for referral to work encompassed by that unit. Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 18, shall be signed by a
duly authorized representative of Freeman Decorating Co.
(f) Additional copies of that notice marked “Appendix C” shall be signed by a duly author-
ized representative of Freeman Decorating Co., and forthwith returned to the Regional Director
for posting by United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window
Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U,
it being willing, at any Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan area facility where it
customarily posts notices to members and employees.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn cer-
tification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Regional Director attesting to the
steps that it has taken to comply.
17 Ibid. fn. 15.
FREEMAN DECORATING CO. 125
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT render unlawful assistance and support to United Food & Commercial
Workers International Union, Local 653 by granting it recognition, as the collective-bargaining
representative of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth below, unless and until
it has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of employees in that bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO,
CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting
Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth below, so long as there exist unreme-
died unfair labor practices committed by us which naturally tend to undermine your support for
continued representation by that union and, thus, which preclude you from making a free and
uncoerced choice of representation by a different union. The appropriate bargaining unit is:

All on-call, casual, extra employees employed by the Employer as journeypersons or helpers
during at least two shows, exhibitions, and/or conventions at facilities located in the Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul, MN metropolitan area for at least five working days during the past twelve months
or who have been employed by the Employer at such events for at least 15 days within the past
two years; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, managerial employees,
all other employees currently covered by other collective bargaining agreements, and guards
and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.

WE WILL NOT reject requests to bargain made by, and WE WILL fail and refuse to bar-
gain with, United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window
Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U
concerning employment terms and conditions of all employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit set forth above, even though those employees have been referred to employment with us by
a different union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of your rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and, upon request, bargain with United Steelworkers of America,
AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and
Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U about employment terms and conditions of
all employees employed in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth above, without regard to
whether those employees have been referred to us for employment by another union, and
embody any agreement reached as a result of that bargaining in a written contract.

BREDE, INC.

APPENDIX B

NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT tell you that you must sign our membership applications or authorization
cards before we will allow you to work for Freeman Decorating Co., or any other employer.
WE WILL NOT demand nor accept recognition as the collective-bargaining representative
of all on-call, casual, extra employees employed by Brede, Inc. as journeypersons or helpers
during at least two shows, exhibitions, and/or conventions at facilities located in the Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan area for at least 5 working days during the past 12 months
or who have been employed by Brede, Inc. at such events for at least 15 days within the past 2
years; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, managerial employees, all
other employees currently covered by other collective-bargaining agreements, and guards and
supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, unless and until such
time as we have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of all those employees.
WE WILL NOT refuse to refer to employment with Excel Decorators, Inc., or any other
employer, and we will not cause or attempt to cause that employer or any other employer to
otherwise discriminate against, Daniel P. Brady or any other employee because of support for,
or activities on behalf of, United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip
Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local
No. Local 17U, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed you by the Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Order, notify Daniel P. Brady in writing that
we will refer him to Excel Decorators, Inc., and to any other employer to whom he is eligible to
be referred, without regard to his support for, or activities on behalf of, United Steelworkers of
America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition,
Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, or any other union.
WE WILL make whole Daniel P. Brady for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered
because we unlawfully refused to refer him to employment with Excel Decorators, Inc. after
May 1, 1998, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.

UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTER-NATIONAL UNION,
LOCAL 653

APPENDIX C
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 126
To organize
To form, join or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT threaten to subcontract our work to other employers unless unfair labor
practice charges filed against us are withdrawn.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to honor our collective-bargaining contracts with United
Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian
Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth
below, by disregarding their referral provisions and, instead, seeking referrals for employees in
that bargaining unit from United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local 653.
The appropriate bargaining unit is:

All on-call, casual, extra employees employed by Freeman Decorating Co. as journeypersons or
helpers during at least two shows, exhibitions, and/or conventions at facilities located in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan area for at least 5 working days during the past
12 months or who have been employed by Freeman Decorating Co. at such events for at least
15 days within the past 2 years; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees,
managerial employees, all other employees currently covered by other collective-bargaining
agreements, and guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.

WE WILL NOT recognize United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, Local
No. 653 as the collective-bargaining representative of employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit set forth above, whom it refers to us during the term of collective-bargaining contracts
between us and United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover,
Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No.
Local 17U.
WE WILL NOT apply to any employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth above
terms and conditions of employment other than ones specified in our collective-bargaining
contracts with United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window
Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U.
WE WILL NOT in any like of related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL honor our collective-bargaining contracts with United Steelworkers of America,
AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and
Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, as the exclusive collective–bargaining
representative of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth above.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America, AFL–
CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bun-
ting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, as the exclusive collective–bargaining representa-
tive of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit set forth above, and embody any
agreement reached in a written contract.
WE WILL make whole all employees employed in the bargaining unit set forth above who
have worked on our shows, exhibitions, and conventions in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minne-
sota metropolitan area since October 12, 1997, and also benefit funds, for any loss of pay and
benefits suffered by our failure to honor our collective-bargaining contracts with United Steel-
workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade, Venetian Blinds,
Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, plus interest.
WE WILL make whole all employees who should have been referred to employment with
us in the bargaining unit set forth above since October 13, 1997, but who were not referred
because of our failure to honor referral provisions of our collective-bargaining contracts with
United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, Drapery, Slip Cover, Window Shade,
Venetian Blinds, Exhibition, Flag and Bunting Decorators Union, Local No. Local 17U, as well
as benefit funds, for any loss of pay and benefits specified in those contracts, plus interest.

FREEMAN DECORATING CO.