Freddie M. Farris, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 20, 2009
0120092287 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 20, 2009)

0120092287

10-20-2009

Freddie M. Farris, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Freddie M. Farris,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120092287

Agency No. 4F-945-0176-08

Hearing No. 550-2009-00074X

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's March 25, 2009 final action concerning

an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming employment

discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

During the period at issue, complainant was employed as a City Carrier

at the agency's Willow Glen Station in San Jose, California.

On August 5, 2008, complainant filed the instant formal complaint.

Therein, complainant alleged that the agency discriminated against her

on the basis of disability (bi-lateral elbow tendonitis) when:

on May 16, 2008, she was removed from her limited duty job in the Passport

Office and placed in non-productive work assignments.

The record reflects that during the relevant time, complainant was

unable to perform the essential functions of her City Carrier position

with or without accommodation because of her physical limitations.

The record further reflects that complainant was limited to one hour

of simple grasping, fine manipulation, reaching above her shoulders,

and driving a vehicle.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). On December 29, 2008, the AJ issued a Notice

of Intent to Issue a Decision Without a Hearing (Notice) allowing the

parties to file written response to the Notice. The record reflects

that only complainant responded.

On March 9, 2009, the AJ issued a decision without a hearing, finding

no discrimination. Therein, the AJ determined that complaint is a

qualified individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.

The AJ further found that there was no dispute that complainant was not

qualified to perform the duties of a City Carrier with accommodation.

Specifically, the AJ found that in order for the agency to provide work

for complainant, she was assigned to the Passport Office.

Further, the AJ found that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for removing from her limited duty job in

Passport Office. Specifically, complainant was in the Carrier Craft;

however, the Passport office job is in the Clerk Craft, and such crossing

of crafts is prohibited under the collective bargaining agreement and

local Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

The Postmaster (PM) stated that complainant was removed from the Passport

Office because she was a Carrier crossing to the Clerk Craft, a practice

prohibited under the collective bargaining agreement for the Clerk Craft.

Specifically, PM stated an "agreement was made with clerk union to

return all carriers back to their carrier craft once bids were posted

for vacant clerk positions in passports which did occur and carriers

were returned to their craft." PM further stated that the Acting

Manager removed complainant "from the Passport job, explaining that

all carriers in passports were being sent back to the carrier craft."

Moreover, PM stated that complainant's disability "was not a factor in

the decision to return complainant to her craft."

On appeal, complainant argues that the according to the local MOU,

crossing craft is not prohibited. Complainant further argues that the

agency "cannot show a legitimate reason for removing me and three other

injured co-workers from our Rehabilitation positions." Complainant

requests that she be reinstated to her former limited duty job in the

Passport Office.

In response, the agency argues that Article 13, Section 4 of the

collective bargaining agreement states "every effort shall be made to

reassign the concerned employee within the employee's present craft or

occupational group." The agency further argues that by implementing this

requirement, management removed complainant from her limited duty job in

the Passport Office "to duties within her original craft. The agency thus

submits that it has adhered to its contractual commitment under Section

4A of Article 13 of the Contract." Finally, the agency argues that while

complainant is seeking a particular job, the Rehabilitation Act "does

not create such an entitlement, neither do the collective agreements."

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

Complainant has offered no persuasive arguments on appeal regarding the

AJ's decision to issue a decision without a hearing, or regarding the

AJ's findings on the merits. Therefore, after a review of the record

in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted

on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final action, because the Administrative

Judge's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate and a

preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that unlawful

discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 20, 2009

__________________

Date

2

0120092287

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

5

0120092287

6

0120092287