Frank McSween, III, Appellant,v.Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 25, 1999
01983107 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 25, 1999)

01983107

10-25-1999

Frank McSween, III, Appellant, v. Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency


Frank McSween, III v. Department of the Navy

01983107

October 25, 1999

Frank McSween, III, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01983107

v. ) Agency No. DON-98-00231-001

)

Richard J. Danzig, )

Secretary, )

Department of the Navy, )

Agency )

)

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission) from the final decision of the agency concerning

his allegations of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The appeal

is accepted by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of EEOC

Order No. 960.001.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency improperly dismissed appellant's

complaint for failure to state a claim.

BACKGROUND

On December 23, 1997, appellant filed a formal complaint alleging

discrimination based on race (African American), sex (male), color

(Black), physical disability (sleep apnea), and reprisal (prior EEO

complaint) when:

(a) appellant was assigned tasks by his immediate supervisor (Supervisor

I) by electronic mail from July through September 1997, with unrealistic

time frames set and threats of adverse action to his performance appraisal

if tasks were not completed;

(b) appellant was assigned tasks by Supervisor I by memorandum dated

September 8, and 16, 1997, with unrealistic time frames set and threats of

adverse action to his performance appraisal if tasks were not completed;

(c) appellant was threatened by Supervisor I with adverse action to his

performance evaluation by e-mail on September 8, 1997;

(d) appellant met with his second line supervisor (Supervisor II) to

discuss the e-mail threats by Supervisor I and Supervisor II did not

state that he had informed [Supervisor I] to stop the threats;

(e) appellant was denied the command's standard word processing software,

MS Word, on his personal computer;

(f) appellant was unable to complete taskings because they were scanned

onto a disk and edited in MS Word and that software was not available

on his computer;

(g) on October 28, 1997, Supervisor I swung the door and slammed it in

[appellant's] face stating that he wanted to speak to Supervisor II

alone after meeting [appellant] outside the door; and

(h) on November 3, 1997, [appellant] was rated a level 3 close out rating

by Supervisor I for the period June 9, 1997, to November 3, 1997.

Appellant is a computer specialist in the agency's medical clinic.

In the Counselor's Report dated January 15, 1998, appellant alleges

harassment and discrimination in his workplace environment. He alleges

that his first and second line supervisors intentionally harassed him and

restricted his ability to perform his duties. Appellant alleges that the

supervisors set him up for failure and made him believe that his job was

threatened on a constant bases. The record contains copies of several

e-mail messages between appellant and Supervisor I in which Supervisor

I directs appellant to simultaneously complete numerous taskings, and

advises that appellant's performance evaluation will reflect whether he

succeeded in completing the tasks.

In the final agency decision (FAD), dated January 30, 1998, the agency

dismissed appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim per EEOC

regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a). The agency found that appellant was

not aggrieved in that he did not suffer any personal loss or harm with

respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment. The agency

dismissed allegation (h) of the complaint per 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(e)

stating that close-out ratings are interim appraisals which do not serve

as the annual rating of record.

Appellant requested an extension of time from the Commission to procure

the services of an attorney to represent him both in his appeal and in

two other complaints filed against the agency. The Commission granted

appellant until May 8, 1998, to appeal. Appellant appealed on March

6, 1998.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved employee

or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age, or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �1614.103;

�1614.106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long

defined as "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or

loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for

which there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC

Request No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a) provides that an agency

shall dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim under 29

C.F.R. �1614.103.

In Cobb v. Dept. of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March

13, 1997), the Commission has recently reaffirmed what is required in

harassment cases in order to state a claim under the aforementioned

regulation. In conjunction with its discussion of existing precedent

in this area, the Commission advised that (1) the ultimate merit of the

allegations (whether they are true/whether discrimination has occurred)

may not be considered<1>; and (2) the complaint should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the

complainant can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle the complainant to relief. The Commission further instructed that

claims of harassment should be accepted where the complainant has made

factual allegations which, when considered together<2> and treated as

true, are sufficient to state a claim either of (1) disparate treatment

regarding hiring, termination, compensation or any other specific term,

condition, or privilege of employment; or (2) a hostile or abusive

work environment. Cobb, at p. 7. The Commission held that "a claim of

harassment is actionable only if, allegedly, the harassment to which the

complainant has been subjected was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of the complainant's employment .... [t]he trier of

fact should consider whether a reasonable person in the complainant's

circumstances would have found the alleged behavior to be hostile or

abusive." Cobb, at pp. 6-7.

While the Commission has held that "a few isolated incidents of alleged

harassment usually are not sufficient to state a harassment claim,"

(Cobb, at p.5), in this case, appellant lists numerous instances in

which Supervisor I allegedly harassed him with multiple taskings,

references to appellant"s evaluation, and hostile behavior.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(e) provides that an agency shall

dismiss a complaint that alleges "that a proposal to take a personnel

action, or other preliminary step to taking a personnel action, is

discriminatory." The Section by Section Analysis that accompanied

issuance of 29 C.F.R. �1614 states in part:

We intend [1614.107(e)] to require dismissal of complaints that allege

discrimination in any preliminary steps that do not, without further

action, affect the person; for example progress reviews or improvement

periods that are not a part of any official file on the employee.

If the individual alleges, however, that the preliminary step was taken

for the purpose of harassing the individual for a prohibited reason,

the complaint cannot be dismissed under this section because it has

already affected the employee.

57 Fed. Reg. 12643 (April 10, 1992).

In Rodriguez-Soto v. Department of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05960646

(Oct. 8, 1998), appellant alleged the agency placed him on a Performance

Improvement Plan (PIP) and denied him meaningful assistance to improve

during the PIP as part of a pattern of discrimination based on national

origin. The Commission found, since appellant alleged in essence the

agency's actions were taken for the purpose of harassment, he had already

been affected by the agency's actions and stated a claim. See Noone

v. Central Intelligence Agency, EEOC request No. 05940422 (Jan. 23,

1995).

In the instant case, the Commission finds appellant alleges the

close-out rating was issued for the purpose of harassing him for a

prohibited reason, and, therefore, states a claim. Appellant alleges

Supervisor I harassed him with unreasonable deadlines, and threats that

failure to meet those deadlines would negatively affect his evaluation.

The low close-out rating, while an interim appraisal, supports appellant's

allegation that his written appraisal was threatened by Supervisor I as

part of a pattern of harassment

CONCLUSIONS

Accordingly, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission to REVERSE the agency's final decision and REMAND to the

agency for further processing.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded complaint in accordance

with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108. The agency shall acknowledge to the appellant

that it has received the remanded complaint within thirty (30) calendar

days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall issue to

appellant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify appellant

of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days

of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise

resolved prior to that time. If the appellant requests a final decision

without a hearing, the agency shall issue a final decision within sixty

(60) days of receipt of appellant's request. A copy of the agency's

letter of acknowledgment to appellant and a copy of the notice that

transmits the investigative file and notice of rights must be sent to

the Compliance Officer as referenced herein.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION

Oct. 25, 1999

________________________ _______________________

DATE Carlton Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 In Osborne v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05960111

(July 19, 1996), the Commission stated, in dicta, that as long as the

appellant in that case had alleged that she was harassed because of

her sex, she stated a claim. The Cobb decision clarified that, by

this statement in Osborne, the Commission did not intend to overrule,

without discussion, its longstanding policy and practice of determining

whether a complainant's harassment allegations were legally sufficient to

state a claim. The Commission explained that in Osborne, the agency's

conclusion as to whether appellant's complaint met the definition

of sex-based harassment went to the ultimate truth or merits of her

allegation, rather than to whether her allegations stated a claim and

noted that the Commission has repeatedly reversed such agency dismissals

where they were based on the agency's view of the merits of the case

rather than on the legal sufficiency of the claim.

2 The Commission stated that, when considering whether a harassment

complaint states a hostile or abusive work environment claim, the decision

maker must consider all of the alleged harassing incidents and remarks.