Frank Klimek, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Region), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 27, 2000
01971909 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 27, 2000)

01971909

07-27-2000

Frank Klimek, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Region), Agency.


Frank Klimek v. United States Postal Service

01971909

July 27, 2000

Frank Klimek, )

Complainant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01971909

) Agency No. 4-G-770-1182-96

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(S.E./S.W. Region), )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) from a final agency decision (FAD) concerning his equal

employment opportunity (EEO) complaint, alleging discrimination on the

bases of race (Caucasian), age (51), physical disability (hypertension),

and retaliation (prior EEO complaints), in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq;<1>

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

621 et seq.; and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

amended,<2> 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The Commission hereby accepts the

appeal pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). The issue presented is whether complainant has

proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was discriminated

against on the above-referenced bases when he was denied light-duty work

hours on December 5, 6, 18, 19, 20, and 26, 1995.<3>

During the relevant time, complainant, a Letter Carrier, PS-5, had been

placed in light duty status owing to hypertension and related conditions

which restricted him from operating a motor vehicle and doing outside

work. Accordingly, he had been given light duty work of casing mail

when it was available, but was denied such work on the above dates when

he alleged similarly situated comparative employees not in his protected

groups were given such work.

Feeling that he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed three formal complaints on March

26, 1996. The three complaints were consolidated for processing, and

at the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was notified of his

right to a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or a FAD without

a hearing. After complainant failed to respond, the agency issued its

FAD finding no discrimination.

The agency determined that complainant was unable to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination based on race, age, physical disability,

or reprisal. While the agency found that complainant was able to

establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, it further found

that management articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions, namely, that the female employee who worked more light duty

hours than complainant on December 5-6, 1995, was the first carrier on

light duty and was therefore given the first chance at light duty work.

On appeal, complainant's representative makes many contentions, chief

among them that the agency made an incomplete investigation, as evidenced

by excluding the dates of December 18-20, and 26, 1995, from consideration

in its FAD, omitting the case numbers of two of the consolidated cases,

and later inking in dates covered on the agency investigative affidavits

as a way to obscure the dates actually covered by the investigation.

In addition, complainant contends that his hypertension was job-related

and therefore he should have been eligible for limited duty, and that

he did request such duty, as evidenced by his request for a CA-1 form.

He further contends that the agency refused to recognize his limited

duty status so that it could exclude from comparison any employees on

limited duty who were given more favorable treatment, that it gave work

to a transitional employee to the detriment of regular carriers despite

such being prohibited by union contract, and that it wrongly found that

he did not have an impairment, i.e., hypertension, which substantially

limited one or more major life activities, e.g., vision, walking, etc.

Finally, complainant requests summary judgment in his favor on the

basis of the agency's failure to conduct a full and complete impartial

investigation in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37656 (to be

codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(b)), or

in the alternative, that the Commission reverse the FAD and remand the

case for a hearing so complainant could bring out facts favorable to him

which were not covered in the investigation. The agency did not reply

to complainant's contentions on appeal.

In applying the analytical framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental

Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F. 2d 222

(1st Cir. 1976) (applying the framework to cases of reprisal); Prewitt

v. United States Postal Service, 662 F. 2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying

the framework to cases of disability discrimination); and Loeb v. Textron,

Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1973) (applying the framework to cases

of age discrimination), we agree with the agency that complainant

was unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based

on race, reprisal, or age, either due to a lack of similarly situated

comparative employees not in complainant's protected groups who were

given more favorable treatment on the dates in question, or in the case

of reprisal, that he was unable to show a causal connection between his

prior EEO activities and his being denied light duty on those same dates.

While we also agree with the agency that complainant established a prima

facie case of discrimination based on sex, we note that complainant was

not able to show that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by

the agency for the female carrier's working more light duty hours than

complainant on the same days was a pretext for discrimination. Nor has

complainant shown that the agency had more light duty work available

that complied with complainant's restrictions on the dates in question,

other than that given to the female carrier.

In order to claim the protection of the Rehabilitation Act, complainant

must first establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment disability

discrimination by showing that: (1) he is an individual with a disability,

as defined by 29 C.F.R. � 16302(g); (2) he is a qualified individual with

a disability pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1630.2(m); and (3) he was subjected

to an adverse personnel action under circumstances giving rise to an

inference of disability discrimination.<4> See Prewitt, supra.

An individual with a disability is one who: (1) has a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;

(2) has a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having

such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g). The Commission has defined

"substantially limits" as "[u]nable to perform a major life activity

that the average person in the general population can perform" or

"[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration

under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as

compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average

person in the general population can perform that same major life

activity." 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(j)(i) and (ii). Major life activities

include such functions as caring for one's self, performing manual

tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and

`working. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).

Complainant submitted inadequate medical documentation to support his

claim that his hypertension rose to the level of a "disability" under the

definition.<5> He stated in his affidavit that his hypertension caused

dizziness, headaches, impaired vision, faintness and an accelerated

heart rate. He did not, however, specify the frequency or severity

of any of these symptoms. The only documentation in the record of his

medical condition consists of the forms submitted by complainant which

detail the restrictions that his physician felt he should work under.

Those limitations included an inability to drive a motor vehicle, overtime

work was "not recommended" and it was recommended that he case mail until

further notice. There were no restrictions placed on his ability to

lift, carry, push, pull, stand, walk, stoop, bend or reach over shoulder

height. Additionally, complainant did not present any evidence regarding

the permanency or long term impact of his hypertension. According to

the record, we note that the restrictions were temporary in nature

and therefore not covered under the Rehabilitation Act. See Loniello

v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01951539 (Sept. 18, 1996).

In this regard, complainant's medical report states that while complainant

was totally disabled from October 17 to November 17, 1995, and partially

disabled from November 18, 1995 to January 31, 1996, he was released to

resume full duties as a letter carrier on February 1, 1996.

Complainant also contends on appeal that his hypertension was job-related,

and that he therefore should have been granted at least eight hours of

limited duty every day he was disabled. We note, however, that it

is the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) that determines

whether injuries are job-related and not the EEOC. Complainant is

accordingly advised to contact that agency to resolve this question

and whether he then would have been eligible for limited duty during

his period of disability. We further note that individuals are not

necessarily regarded as individuals with disabilities, as defined by

the Rehabilitation Act, even though they may have been provided with

a limited duty assignment because of an on-the-job injury or because

they have received an award from the OWCP. The individual must still

establish that his medical condition meets the regulations set forth

at 29 C.F.R.� 1630.2(g). See Waller v. Department of Defense, EEOC

Request No. 05940919 (April 6, 1995); Bailey v. U.S.Postal Service, EEOC

Appeal No. 01952545 (March 7, 1996). Without substantial limitation

of a major life activity, we find that complainant is not an "individual

with a disability" and therefore agree with the agency that complainant

has failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

In reaching the above determination, we have examined complainant's

disability claim in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in

Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999);

Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 119 S.Ct. 2133

(1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.555, 119 S.Ct. 2162

(1999); Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S., 119

S.Ct. 1597 (1999); and Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S.Ct. 2196

(1998).

Complainant further contends that the investigation was incomplete

since the FAD explicitly addressed only the dates of December 5 and 6,

1995, and all the dates accepted for investigation were inked in on the

agency investigative affidavits. We note, however, that such evidence

is not conclusive proof that all the dates were not covered in the

investigation, since all the dates were listed as the subject of both

agency investigative affidavits. While the agency stated that it would

not specifically address dates other than December 5 and 6, 1995, in

its FAD, it did make a general finding of no discrimination based on the

agency investigative affidavits which covered all the dates in question

and gave legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for denying complainant

light duty on all those dates. Hence, we determine that the FAD satisfied

the requirements of the EEOC Regulations found in Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,657 (1999) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. �1614.110(b)), which provide

that �[t]he final decision shall consist of findings by the agency on the

merits of each issue in the complaint.� Therefore, even though the agency

did not explicitly find that no discrimination occurred on the dates of

December 18, 19, 20, and 26, 1995, we will make this explicit finding now

to complete the decision-making process. Moreover, having determined that

the investigation uncovered all the facts necessary to make a decision,

we thus need not grant complainant's request either for summary judgment

or that we remand the case for a supplemental investigation or hearing.

Accordingly, after a careful review of the entire record, including

arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision,

it is the decision of the EEOC to AFFIRM the agency's final decision in

this matter.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

July 27, 2000

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,

the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints

of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's

website: www.eeoc.gov.

3In its FAD, the agency listed the dates as December 5 and 6, 1995,

only, inasmuch as complainant, in his investigative affidavit, cited

these dates alone. The agency therefore concluded that complainant was

no longer interested in pursuing the other dates, although they had been

accepted for investigation, and stated it would not specifically address

them in the FAD.

4 The October 1992 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act provide that the

standards used to determine whether Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act has been violated in a complaint alleging non-affirmative action

employment discrimination shall be the standards applied under Title

I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 29 U.S.C. � 791(g).

The regulations at 29 C.F.R. � 1630 implement the equal employment

provisions of the ADA.

5In an earlier decision involving the same complainant (EEOC Appeal

No. 01973926 (March 16, 2000)), we also made the point that complainant

submitted inadequate medical documentation to support his claim that

his hypertension rose to the level of a disability under 29 C.F.R.�

1630.2(g).