Frank Baiamonte, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 26, 2009
0120071800 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 26, 2009)

0120071800

03-26-2009

Frank Baiamonte, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Frank Baiamonte,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120071800

Agency No. 4F-852-0172-05

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal with this Commission from the January 24,

2007 agency decision finding no discrimination.

Complainant is alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. Complainant alleged that the agency

discriminated against him on the bases of race (White), color (white),

sex (male), religion (Catholic), age (May 27, 1963), national origin

(Italian), and reprisal when:

1. Continuing from May 31, 2003, the terms of his contract have been

enforced while the contracts of other contractors have not been enforced.

2. On September 8, 2005, complainant's contract was terminated.

In a prior agency decision, the agency dismissed the complaint for

failure to state a claim because it determined that complainant was an

independent contractor and not an employee. Complainant appealed that

decision to the Commission. In Baiamonte v United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A61526 (August 7, 2006), the Commission determined

that complainant was an employee of the agency and not an independent

contractor. The Commission reversed the agency decision and remanded

the complaint to the agency for further processing. After investigation

of the complaint on remand, complainant requested that the agency issue

a decision.

The record reveals that complainant began working for the agency in

May 2003. His duties included delivering mail for the agency's post

office in Cottonwood, Arizona. Complainant was to have one vehicle with

a 150 cubic foot capacity and another vehicle had to have a minimum of

80 cubic feet of storage space and had to be five years old or newer.

The record also discloses that complainant purchased a Jeep Wrangler in

2004, but he was told that he could not use the Jeep Wrangler because it

did not have a minimum of 80 cubic feet of storage. Complainant alleges

that other workers were allowed to use a Jeep Wrangler on their routes.

The record reveals that complainant wanted to use a 1970s' Jeep Dispatcher

on the 150 cubic foot route three days a week but was told he could only

do so in emergencies. Complainant also wanted to use a Dodge Caravan

on his 150 cubic foot route. Complainant stated that his EEO activity

began in June 2003.

In its decision, the agency found that complainant failed to establish

a prima facie case that the agency discriminated against him based on

race, color, national origin, and age because he had not shown that he

was subjected to an adverse employment action and that others similarly

situated who were not in complainant's protected groups were treated

more favorably. The agency also determined that complainant failed to

establish a prima facie case of reprisal because the agency found there

was no evidence that complainant had engaged in prior protected EEO

activity or that he had established a causal link between the adverse

action and any prior EEO activity.

The agency also concluded that even if complainant had established a prima

facie case of discrimination on each basis, the agency had articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Regarding claim 1, the agency noted that vehicle requirements were

not the same for each of the named comparatives; that cubic space

requirements were assigned based on the capacity deemed appropriate

for the needs of the agency; that the age requirement for vehicles

differed because contracting officials started adding the five years

old or newer requirement in late 2003 or 2005; and that the wording in

subsequent contracts was changed to allow the continued use of older

vehicles if the vehicles were in good mechanical condition and approved

by an administrative official. The agency noted also that complainant

was not paid for extra trips because if complainant could take all the

mail on one trip and did not have to make a second trip, he could not

be paid for an extra trip.

Regarding claim 2, the agency found that complainant was terminated

because he had failed to provide service by refusing to deliver first

class mail and for failure to follow the instructions of a supervisor.

The agency also noted that complainant's performance was poor and he was

previously informed of errors and deficiencies in his performance through

training, oral communications, and informal and formal conferences.

The agency also found that attempts were made to improve complainant's

performance.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, complainant must satisfy

the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must

initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that complainant

was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). The prima facie inquiry

may be dispensed with where the agency has articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United States Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983).

Because this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing,

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to

de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. �1614.405(a).

Upon review, the Commission finds that the agency did not discriminate

against complainant. The Commission need not address whether complainant

has established a prima facie case on each basis because the Commission

finds that the agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions and complainant has failed to show that

the agency's reasons were pretext to mask unlawful discrimination.

Complainant has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that

when the agency engaged in the actions it did that it was motivated

by discriminatory animus. Even assuming that the agency allowed other

workers to use vehicles which were not in compliance with specification

requirements, the preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate

that the agency was motivated by prohibited discrimination. At all

times, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with complainant

to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's

reasons were pretextual or motivated by intentional discrimination.

Complainant failed to carry this burden.

The agency's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court

that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court

also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs,

or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request

is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an

attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 26, 2009

__________________

Date

2

0120071800

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

5

0120071800