Fortinet, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 20, 2021

2021000221 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 20, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/269,466 09/19/2016 Zhi Hon Yang FORT-022600(16062) 1075
176502 7590 07/20/2021
Douglas M. Hamilton
HDC Fortinet
224 S. Main Street, 114
Springville, UT 84663
EXAMINER
BROWN, ADAM WAYNE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3745
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/20/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
dhamilton@hdciplaw.com
miquelchamilton@hamiltonshome.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ZHI HON YANG, SHENGHUA JIANG, and KEQIN CHEN

____________

Appeal 2021-000221
Application 15/269,466
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, EDWARD A. BROWN, and
MICHAEL L. WOODS, Administrative Patent Judges.

STAICOVICI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision in the Final Office Action (dated Oct. 4, 2019, hereinafter “Final
Act.”) rejecting claims 1–23. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Fortinet, Inc. is identified as the real party in interest in
Appellant’s Appeal Brief (filed Mar. 3, 2020, hereinafter “Appeal Br.”).
Appeal Br. 3.
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SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM IN PART.

INVENTION
Appellant’s invention is directed “to fan vibration damping devices
and methods for damping vibrations utilizing one or more fan vibration
damping devices.” Spec. para. 2.
Claims 1, 11, and 21 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the
claimed invention and reads as follows:
1. A vibration damping device for a fan, the fan including
an inlet side of a frame and an exhaust side of the frame, the
frame retaining a fan mechanism; the vibration damping device
comprising:
a mass mT comprising one or more solid weight elements;
and
at least one solid resilient attachment member having a
first spring characteristic, wherein said at least one solid
resilient attachment member is configured to be connected to
the frame and said mass mT and retain said mass mT between the
inlet side of the frame and the exhaust side of the frame;
wherein said vibration damping device is tunable to
damp the vibration of the fan by at least one or a combination
of (a) varying the mass mT by replacement or addition or
subtraction of one or more solid weight elements, and (b)
replacing said at least one solid resilient attachment member
having the first spring characteristic with a second solid
resilient attachment member having a second spring
characteristic.

Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.).

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REJECTIONS

I. The Examiner rejects claims 1–7, 9–17, and 19–23 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Higham2 and Sehgal.3,4
II. The Examiner rejects claims 8 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Higham, Sehgal, and Rodewalt.5

ANALYSIS
Rejection I
Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 9 and 10
Appellant does not present separate arguments for the patentability of
claims 2, 4, 6, 9, and 10 apart from claim 1. See Appeal Br. 11–18.
Therefore, in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we select claim 1
as the representative claim to decide the appeal of the rejection of these
claims, with claims 2, 4, 6, 9, and 10 standing or falling with claim 1.
The Examiner finds Higham discloses a tunable vibration damping
device including, inter alia, fan 193, mass mT having one or more elements
140, and at least one resilient block 141, 142 having a first spring
characteristic, “wherein said vibration damping device is tunable to damp

2 Higham, US 4,819,439, issued Apr. 11, 1989.
3 Sehgal et al., US 5,647,726, issued July 15, 1997.
4 As claims 8 and 18 are separately rejected, we view the Examiner’s
inclusion of claims 8 and 18 in the heading of this rejection as a mere
typographical error. See Final Act. 2, 5. See also id. at 5 (“Higham in view
of Sehgal . . . fails to teach that said one or more plates are of substantially
triangular shape.”).
5 Rodewalt, US 3,504,533, issued April 7, 1970.
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the vibration of the fan by being tunable to match the resonance frequency of
said fan.” Final Act. 3 (citing Higham, Abstract, col. 4, ll. 11–20, Fig. 1).
The Examiner further finds that Higham fails to disclose tuning the vibration
damping device by either varying mass mT by adding or subtracting
elements 140 or by replacing the at least one resilient block 141, 142 having
a first spring characteristic with at least one resilient block 141, 142 having a
second spring characteristic. Id. at 4. Nonetheless, the Examiner finds
Sehgal discloses damping vibrations “by adjusting (i.e. adding or changing)
either the mass or changing the spring” of a spring-mass damping system.
Id (citing Sehgal, col. 3, l. 55–col. 4, l. 10). Thus, the Examiner concludes
that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art “to
modify the vibration damper and corresponding method of using the damper
of Higham by tuning the damper . . . [as a result of] adjusting the mass or the
spring as taught by Sehgal as a combination of prior art elements to achieve
the predictable result of tuning the vibration damper.” Id. at 4–5 (citing
Higham, col. 4, ll. 11–20, Sehgal, col. 3, l. 55–col. 4, l. 10).
In response, Appellant argues that both Higham and Sehgal constitute
non-analogous art to the claimed invention. Appeal Br. 11. Appellant
contends that both Higham and Sehgal are “outside of the field of the
inventor’s endeavor relating to damping vibrations originating from a fan”
because Higham relates to damping “vibrations caused by reciprocating
motion” of linear motors and Sehgal relates to reducing vibrations caused by
helicopter rotor blades. Id. at 12, 14 (citing Higham, Abstract, col. 1, ll. 15–
18, col. 4, ll. 11–13; Sehgal, col. 1, ll. 9–63, col. 2, ll. 61–62, col. 3, ll. 55–
64). Appellant asserts that because Higham’s compressor driven by a linear
motor and Sehgal’s helicopter rotor hub represent “very different
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environment[s] than that of a conventional cooling fan,” neither Higham nor
Sehgal are “‘reasonably pertinent’ to the particular problem [of the inventor]
relating to the negative impacts of vibrations originating from a cooling
fan.” Id. at 13, 15 (emphasis omitted).
“Criteria for determining whether prior art is analogous may be
summarized as ‘(1) whether the art is form the same field of endeavor,
regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the
field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably
pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is
involved.’” Scientific Plastic Prods., Inc. v. Biotage AB, 766 F.3d 1355,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658–59 (Fed. Cir.
1992)). In this case, we agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s invention,
Higham, and Sehgal, all address the common problem of “how to damp
mechanical vibrations.” Examiner’s Answer (dated June 12, 2020,
hereinafter “Ans.”) 3. Whether Higham addresses damping vibrations from
compressors driven by linear motors (see Appeal Br. 13) or Sehgal addresses
damping vibrations from helicopter rotor hubs (see id. at 14), the function of
the damping systems of Higham and Sehgal is evidently to dampen
vibrations.
A reference is reasonably pertinent if . . . it is one which,
because of the matter with which it deals, logically would
have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in
considering his problem. If a reference disclosure has the
same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to
the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference
in an obviousness rejection.

Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (quoting Clay, 966 F.2d at 659).
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In contrast, Appellant’s statement of the problem would focus the
analysis not on the problem at issue but on the specific application and
setting identified in the Specification—“[v]ibration damping devices and
methods . . . for damping vibrations in a fan.” Spec. para. 6 (emphasis
added); see also Appeal Br. 13 (“particular problem relating to the negative
impacts of vibrations originating from a cooling fan.”) (emphasis omitted).
The analogous prior art should not be so limited. See Graham v. John Deere
Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 35 (1966) (rejecting the argument that the
cited references were not “pertinent prior art” and stating that “[t]he
problems confronting [the patentee] and the insecticide industry were not
insecticide problems; they were mechanical closure problems”). Rather, the
scope of analogous art is to be construed broadly. Wyers v. Master Lock
Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court’s decision
in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), directs us to
construe the scope of analogous art broadly, stating that ‘familiar items may
have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary
skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like
pieces of a puzzle.’” Id. at 402 (emphasis added).”). Thus, the Examiner
correctly found that both Higham and Sehgal are analogous art, and properly
considered their teachings in determining that the subject matter of
independent claim 1 would have been obvious to a skilled artisan.
Appellant further argues that because Higham’s system dampens
linear vibrations resulting from a reciprocating armature and Sehgal’s
system dampens vibrations of a helicopter rotor mast, the combined
teachings of Higham and Sehgal fail to disclose a “vibration damping device
[that] is tunable to damp the vibration of the fan.” See Appeal Br. 16
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(emphasis omitted). According to Appellant, it is not reasonable to equate
damping vibrations from Higham’s reciprocating armature 110 with the
claimed damping of “the vibration of the fan” or to equate Sehgal’s
helicopter rotor mast “with a fan.” Id. at 17, 18.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because we agree
with the Examiner that the configuration of Higham’s spring-mass damping
system of “two resilient attachment members (141, 142) with a mass (140)
attached [there]between” is the same as Appellant’s configuration “with
mass 112 located between resilient attachment members 108 and 110.” Ans.
4. The Examiner is also correct that the tuning of Sehgal’s spring-mass
damping system “by adjusting . . . either the mass or changing the spring” is
the same as Appellant’s tuning. Final Act. 4 (citing Sehgal, col. 3, l. 55–col.
4, l. 10). As such, the Examiner has made explicit findings that the structure
and function of Higham’s damping system, as modified by Sehgal, and
Appellant’s claimed “vibration damping device,” are so similar as to shift
the burden to Appellant to show that the damping system of Higham, as
modified by Sehgal would not perform like Appellant’s, that is, would not
“damp the vibration of the fan.”
In other words, the Examiner is on solid ground in finding sufficient
structural similarity between Higham’s damping system, as modified by
Sehgal, and Appellant’s claimed “vibration damping device,” that the recited
functional limitation “to damp the vibration of the fan” would also be
present in the damping system of Higham and Sehgal. See In re Schreiber,
128 F.3d 1473, 1477–78 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (once the Examiner finds that the
prior art structure would be capable of performing all of the functions
claimed, the burden shifts to the applicant to show this this is not the case)).
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In this case, Appellant does not provide sufficient evidence or persuasive
reasoning to indicate that Higham’s damping system, as modified by Sehgal,
despite its structural similarity to the claimed “vibration damping device,”
would not be capable of performing the function “to damp the vibration of
the fan.”
Appellant further contends that Higham’s vibration damper is not
“tunable,” as called for by independent claim 1, because tuning “appears to
be the result of machining the coiled portions 141 and 142 from a hollow
cylinder,” and, thus, “does not appear to be something repeatable after the
initial tuning.” Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis omitted) (citing Higham, col. 2, ll.
21–24, col. 4, ll. 51–53). Thus, Appellant asserts that “there is no teaching
or reasonable suggestion in Higham that after performing the machining
process . . . the dynamic absorber 139 could be or is even desired to be
further tuned.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because
“[n]onobviousness cannot be established by attacking references
individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a
combination of references. [Each reference] must be read, not in isolation,
but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole.”
In re Merck & Co. Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In this case,
although Appellant is correct that Higham fails to disclose a “tunable”
damper, the Examiner acknowledged this precise point and relied upon
Sehgal to disclose this element of claim 1, that is, a “tunable” spring-mass
damping system that is tuned “by adjusting . . . either the mass or changing
the spring.” Final Act. 3–4 (citing Sehgal, col. 3, l. 55–col. 4, l. 10); Ans. 7.
Appellant has not persuasively challenged Sehgal’s disclosure in this regard.
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In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of independent claim 1 as unpatentable over Higham
and Sehgal. Dependent claims 2, 4, 6, 9 and 10 fall with claim 1.

Claim 3
Claim 3, which depends from independent claim 1, adds the limitation
“wherein said vibration damping device is tunable . . . to match the
resonance frequency of said fan.” Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.).
Appellant argues that Higham’s disclosure of tuning the resonance
frequency of Higham’s damping system to match the compressor’s operating
frequency is not a disclosure “involving the use of the resonance frequency
of the fan.” Appeal Br. 18 (citing col. 4, ll. 11–20) (emphasis omitted).
For the reasons discussed supra, the Examiner is on solid ground in
finding sufficient structural similarity between Higham’s damping system,
as modified by Sehgal, and Appellant’s claimed “vibration damping device,”
that the recited functional limitation “to damp the vibration of the fan”
would also be present in the damping system of Higham and Sehgal. We
further agree with the Examiner that because Higham’s damping system is
tuned to resonate at one frequency, that is, the compressor’s operating
frequency, and Sehgal discloses a tunable spring-mass damping system, the
damping system of Higham, as modified by Sehgal, would be capable of
being tuned to resonate at another frequency, that is, at a fan’s operating
frequency. Ans. 8. Appellant does not provide sufficient evidence or
persuasive reasoning that Higham’s damping system, as modified by Sehgal,
despite its structural similarity to the claimed “vibration damping device,”
would not be capable of performing the intended use or function of “being
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tunable to match the resonance frequency of said fan.” In particular,
Appellant does not adequately explain why Higham’s damping system, as
modified by Sehgal, would not be capable of resonating at a fan’s operating
frequency, when Higham specifically discloses a tuned damping system that
can resonate at a compressor’s operating frequency and Sehgal discloses a
tunable spring-mass damping system.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 103 of claim 3 as unpatentable over Higham and Sehgal.

Claims 5 and 7
Claims 5 and 7, which depend from independent claim 1, add the
limitations of “wherein said at least one solid resilient attachment is made of
a rubber material” and “wherein said one or more plates are made of a
metallic material,” respectively. Appeal Br. 25.
The Examiner determines that:
Because Higham teaches that these materials are suitable for
use within its pump environment, it would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill before the effective filing date of the
invention to modify the resilient attachment and plates by using
rubber and metallic materials, respectively, because these
materials are suitable for use within the pump.

Final Act. 5 (citing Higham, col. 3, ll. 42–43, col. 4, ll. 36–39).
Appellant argues that “the mere fact that certain materials might be
‘suitable for use’ within a particular environment provides no indication
regarding the reasonable expectation of success, for example, in the context
of usage for a particular purpose.” Appeal Br. 20.
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The Examiner responds that because Higham discloses the use of iron
to form a mass component and the use of elastomeric materials to perform a
damping function, “[t]here would be a reasonable expectation of success in
using the same material to perform the same function in the vibration
damping device because it would operate under the same conditions.” Ans.
9.
We are not persuaded by the Examiner’s position because the
Examiner has not established sufficiently that it would have been obvious to
a person of ordinary skill in the art to make the least one solid resilient
attachment from a rubber material and the one or more weight plates from a
metallic material. In particular, the Examiner’s reliance on Higham’s
disclosure of using iron (i.e., metallic material) to make armature 110
because of iron’s “high magnetic permeability and high magnetic induction”
is misplaced because the Examiner does not adequately explain why a
skilled artisan would want mass 140 of Higham’s damper to have magnetic
properties. See Higham, col. 4, ll. 43–44. The Examiner’s further reliance
on Higham’s disclosure of using an elastomeric material (i.e., rubber
material) to mount isolator springs 161, 171 because of the material’s
damping properties is also misplaced. The Examiner does not sufficiently
explain why making Higham’s resilient members 141, 142 from an
elastomeric material would be suitable when considering their respective
alternating compression and extension loading. See id., col. 2, ll. 19–20.
As such, the Examiner’s determination of obviousness is not
supported by sufficient explanation or citation to reflect a rational
relationship between choosing a metallic material to make the one or
more weight plates and a rubber material to make the at least one solid
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resilient attachment, and the suitability of making such a choice in the
context of Higham’s system, as modified by Sehgal. Hence, for foregoing
reasons, the Examiner fails to articulate a sufficient reason with rational
underpinnings to further modify the structure Higham, as modified by
Sehgal, and, thus, to arrive at the subject matter of claims 5 and 7.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims
5 and 7 as unpatentable over Higham and Sehgal.

Claims 11–17 and 19–23
With respect to independent claims 11 and 21, the Examiner makes
the same findings and reaches the same conclusion of obviousness as
discussed supra in the rejection of independent claim 1. See Final Act. 3–4.
In particular, the Examiner notes that “[t]he method of claim 11 and system
of claim 21 only nominally recite fan structure.” See Ans. 3 (emphasis
added).
We are not persuaded by the Examiner’s position because in rejecting
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner bears the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of obviousness. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Just because claims 11 and 21 “only nominally recite
fan structure” does not mean that the Examiner is excused from making
adequate findings regarding the limitations in claims 11 and 21 that recite a
fan structure. See Ans. 3 (emphasis added).
For example, independent claim 11, drawn to “[a] method of damping
vibration of a fan” recites, inter alia, “disposing and retaining said vibration
damping device between an inlet side of a frame and an exhaust side of the
frame retaining . . . by connecting the vibration damping device to the inlet
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side of the frame and the exhaust side of the frame.” Appeal Br. 26 (Claims
App.). The Examiner’s mere statement that “Higham . . . also teaches the
steps of providing the elements as claimed in the method claims” is not
supported by sufficient factual evidence. Final Act. 5.
Similarly, independent claim 21 recites, inter alia, “a fan including: a
fan mechanism; an inlet side of a frame; and an exhaust side of the frame,
the frame retaining the fan mechanism therewithin; and, a vibration damping
device configured to be connected to the frame.” Appeal Br. 28 (emphasis
added). The Examiner’s mere statement of “said frame is a substantially
rectangular frame that is configured to retain said fan mechanism” is
likewise not supported by sufficient factual evidence; especially in light of
the use of the phrase “configured to” which is generally used to mean “made
to” or “constructed to” perform the claimed function. See Final Act. 3
(citing Higham, Fig. 1); see e.g., In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
As such, the Examiner’s rejection fails to make adequate findings as
to how and where Higham discloses the recitations of claims 11 and 21
related to a fan structure. Instead, the Examiner merely cites to Higham’s
Figure 1 and refers to Higham’s fan 193 without explaining how Higham’s
damping system, which the Examiner equates to the claimed “vibration
damping device,” is related in any manner with damping the vibrations of
fan 193.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the Examiner’s legal conclusion of
obviousness is not supported by sufficient factual evidence, and thus, cannot
stand. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967) (holding that
“[t]he legal conclusion of obviousness must be supported by facts. Where
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the legal conclusion is not supported by facts it cannot stand.”).
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of
independent claims 11 and 21, and their respective claims 12–17, 19, 20, 22,
and 23, as unpatentable over Higham and Sehgal.

Rejection II
Claims 8 and 18
Each of dependent claims 8 and 18 recites “wherein said one or more
plates are of substantially triangular shape.” Appeal Br. 25, 28 (Claims
App.).
The Examiner finds that the combined teachings of Higham and
Sehgal fail to disclose the above noted limitation, but relies on Rodewalt to
disclose “a spring-mass system . . . wherein the masses are triangularly
shaped.” Final Act. 5 (citing Rodewalt, Abstract, col. 3, ll. 4–9). According
to the Examiner, Rodewalt discloses “that the mass element of a spring-mass
system may take any shape which allows it to be connected to the spring
element and stay attached while providing the required mass.” Id (citing
Rodewalt, col. 2, l. 67–col. 3, l. 9). Thus, the Examiner concludes that it
would have been obvious to a skilled artisan “to modify the system of
Higham as modified by Sehgal by using triangularly shaped masses as
taught by Rodewalt as a combination of prior art elements to achieve the
predictable result of attaching the mass to the spring and providing the
appropriate amount of mass.” Id. at 5–6.
Appellant argues that “[n]owhere in Rodewalt is there any teaching or
reasonable suggestion regarding damping of vibrations in general or
specifically with respect to vibrations originating from a fan.” Appeal Br.
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21–22. Stated differently, Appellant argues that because Rodewalt’s spring-
mass system does not damp vibrations, a skilled artisan would not have
modified the vibration damper of Higham, as modified by Sehgal, to have a
triangular mass, as taught by Rodewalt.
We appreciate that Rodewalt discloses a spring-mass system having
spring element 8 and triangular mass 9. See Rodewalt, col. 3, ll. 3–7, Fig. 4.
However, the mere fact that the shape of Rodewalt’s mass 9 is triangular, is
not, in itself, a reason to combine the respective teachings of Higham,
Sehgal, and Rodewalt. The Examiner offers no explanation for why a person
of ordinary skill in the art would modify the shape of Higham’s mass 140, as
modified by Sehgal, to be triangular. Conclusory statements are not enough
to satisfy the Examiner’s obligation to provide reasoned explanation for its
decision. In re Van Os, 844 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The
Examiner must explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would
modify the prior art references to create the claimed invention. In re Kotzab,
217 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Lastly, we note that Rodewalt’s mass 9, which the Examiner relies on
to modify the shape of Higham’s mass 140, as modified by Sehgal, to be
triangular, does not damp vibrations, but rather causes vibrations. See
Rodewalt, col. 3, ll. 9–10 (“weight of member 9 . . . cause[s] element 8 to
vibrate.”). Therefore, as Higham’s mass 140 is for dampening vibrations,
whereas Rodewalt’s element 9 causes vibrations, the Examiner’s reasoning
to modify the vibration damper of Higham, as modified by Sehgal, to have a
triangular mass, as taught by Rodewalt, lacks rational underpinnings.
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 8 and 18 as unpatentable over the combined
teachings of Higham, Sehgal, and Rodewalt.
In addition, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 18 over Higham,
Sehgal, and Rodewalt because the Examiner’s use of the disclosure of
Rodewalt does not remedy the deficiency of the Higham and Sehgal
combination, as applied by the Examiner to independent claim 11, from
which claim 18 depends. See Final Act. 5–6.

CONCLUSION

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 9–17,
19–23
103 Higham,
Sehgal
1–4, 6, 9–10 5, 7, 11–17,
19–23
8, 18 103 Higham,
Sehgal,
Rodewalt
8, 18
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6, 9–10 5, 7, 8, 11–23

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED IN PART