Forrest City Grocery Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 17, 1992

306 N.L.R.B. 723 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

723
306 NLRB No. 144
FORREST CITY GROCERY CO.
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
The Respondent excepts to the judge’s finding that the Respond-
ent’s Philip Morris cigarette promotional campaign was showing a
profit at the time the Respondent discharged Melinda Hawkins. Even
assuming arguendo that the Respondent was losing money on the
campaign, such factor, contrary to the Respondent’s contention, did
not form the basis for Hawkins’ discharge in light of the fact that
the Respondent did not examine its books to ascertain its profit or
loss on the campaign until July 12, 1991, well after Hawkins’ May
14, 1991 discharge.
We find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s finding that the Re-
spondent’s manager, David Cohn, created the impression of surveil-
lance by displaying a blank union authorization card at employee
meetings since this finding is cumulative.
2 We have modified the judge’s recommended Order and notice to
conform to the violations found.
Forrest City Grocery Co. and International Union
of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and
Furniture Workers, AFL–CIO. Cases 26–CA–
14486, 26–CA–14525, and 26–CA–14702
March 17, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND RAUDABAUGH
On December 11, 1991, Administrative Law Judge
Marvin Roth issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, For-
rest City Grocery Co., Forrest City, Arkansas, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
‘‘(a) Discouraging membership in the International
Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and
Furniture Workers, AFL–CIO, or any other labor orga-
nization, by discriminatorily terminating employees or
otherwise discriminating against them with regard to
their tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment.’’
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(c).
‘‘(c) Creating the impression of surveillance of
union activity.’’
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad-
ministrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the Inter-
national Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Ma-
chine and Furniture Workers, AFL–CIO, or any other
labor organization, by discriminatorily terminating em-
ployees, or otherwise discriminating against them with
regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning
their union attitude or activities or those of other em-
ployees.
WE WILL NOT create the impression of surveillance
of union activity.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discharge or
other reprisal because of their union or other concerted
activity, or warn them not to engage in such activity.
WE WILL NOT inform employees that it would be fu-
tile for them to select a union as their bargaining rep-
resentative, by indicating that we would not bargain in
good faith with such union.
WE WILL NOT promise or grant employee benefits,
or solicit employee complaints and grievances and
thereby promise improved terms and conditions of em-
ployment, in order to discourage support for Inter-
national Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Ma-
chine and Furniture Workers, AFL–CIO, or any other
labor organization, provided however, that this does
not require us to vary or abandon any economic ben-
efit or any term or condition of employment which we
have established.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make whole Melinda Hawkins for losses
she suffered by reason of the discrimination against
her, with interest.
WE WILL expunge from our files any reference to
the termination of Melinda Hawkins, and notify her in
writing that this has been done and that evidence of
724 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 All dates are for 1991 unless otherwise indicated.
the unlawful discharge will not be used as a basis for
future personnel actions against her.
FORREST CITY GROCERY CO.
Susan B. Greenberg, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Bart Sisk, Esq., of Memphis, Tennessee, for the Respondent.
Ernestine Weaver, Esq., of Forrest City, Arkansas, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARVIN ROTH, Administrative Law Judge. These consoli-
dated cases were heard at Memphis, Tennessee, on October
9 and 10, 1991.1 The charges were filed respectively on May
22, June 10, and September 12, and the amended charges in
Cases 26–CA–14525 and 26–CA–14702 were filed respec-
tively on July 10 and October 3, by International Union of
Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Work-
ers, AFL–CIO (the Union). The consolidated complaint,
which issued on October 4, alleges that Forrest City Grocery
Co. (Respondent or the Company) violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
The gravamen of the complaint is that the Company alleg-
edly discharged employee Melinda Hawkins because of her
union or other protected concerted activities, and allegedly
threatened its employees with reprisal, expressly and
impliedly promised and granted benefits, stated that it would
not hire union adherents, and that it would be futile for its
employees to select the Union as their representative, and en-
gaged in interrogation and created the impression of surveil-
lance, all in order to discourage support for the Union. The
Company’s answer denies the commission of the alleged un-
fair labor practices. All parties were afforded full opportunity
to participate, to present relevant evidence, to argue orally,
and to file briefs. General Counsel and the Company each
filed a brief. At the close of General Counsel’s direct case
I granted the Company’s motion to dismiss paragraph 7 of
the complaint, and General Counsel’s motion to strike, para-
graph 8, subparagraphs (e), (f), (g), (l), (m), and (n) of the
complaint. In its brief, General Counsel also requests that
subparagraph (r) be withdrawn. The request is granted.
On the entire record in this case and from my observation
of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having considered the
arguments of counsel and the briefs submitted by General
Counsel and Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The Company, a corporation with an office and place of
business in Forrest City, Arkansas, is engaged in the whole-
sale distribution of grocery products. In the operation of its
business the Company ships and receives products valued in
excess of $50,000 directly across state lines. The Company
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Melinda Hawkins applied for work with the Company on
March 18, and was interviewed by Company Manager David
Cohn. Her application indicated that she worked 8 years for
the Sanyo Company, and was laid off. Cohn said he would
get back to her. She called about 2 weeks later. Cohn said
he had nothing then, but she should call again the following
week. Hawkins called, and Cohn told her to come in the next
morning (April 5). She did. Hawkins testified in sum as fol-
lows: Cohn offered her a job, saying that she would be doing
promotions for Phillip Morris. He did not say how long the
job would last. He said she would make $5.30 or $5.45 per
hour (Hawkins was not sure) and would get a raise in 30
days. Hawkins initially testified that she did not recall what
if anything was said about her prior employment history. She
subsequently testified that when she came in for interview,
Cohn asked where she worked, and she mentioned Sanyo
(Hawkins did not make clear whether this discussion took
place on March 18 or April 5. The context suggests that it
probably occurred in the initial interview). Cohn told her
‘‘that he had promised hisself [sic] that he was not going to
hire any Sanyo peoples because he hoped that we had
learned a lesson that the union had got us without a job.’’
Cohn also asked if she knew Ronald Rucker. Other testi-
mony indicates that there was a strike at Sanyo. The record
fails to identify Ronald Rucker.
Hawkins accepted the offer and began working that same
day. She further testified in sum as follows: Basically her
only work involved the Phillip Morris promotion, which sub-
stantially consisted of assembling Phillip Morris’ promotional
items, e.g., T-shirts, for shipment with cigarette orders to the
Company’s customers. She spent a small amount of time
stamping cigarette packs. Phillip Morris Area Manager Bryan
Spotts came to the Company about every 2 or 3 weeks. In
early May Spotts came by, told her she was doing a good
job, and said he had just paid Cohn. In her investigatory affi-
davit, Hawkins said Spotts told her on April 12 that she was
doing a very good job (not indicating any other date). Haw-
kins testified that Spotts complemented her on more than one
occasion. As of the date of her termination (May 14), Haw-
kins had just completed one promotional order and had eight
other orders remaining to be filled.
Hawkins further testified in sum as follows: Some 2 or 3
weeks after she began work, in the breakroom, she discussed
a union with other employees. After their conversation she
contacted Union Representative Dickey Banks, who fur-
nished her with authorization cards. Hawkins solicited and
obtained four signed cards away from the company facility,
including one at her home. At about 10 a.m. on May 14, dur-
ing the morning break, in the breakroom, Hawkins distrib-
uted cards to employees, and obtained six or seven signed
cards. No supervisor was present. This was the only time she
distributed cards on company premises. At about 3:30 p.m.
she was summoned to Cohn’s office. Cohn initially said that
she was terminated, and then said she was laid off, that ‘‘the
job had played out.’’ Hawkins testified that Cohn did not say
he was losing money on the promotional program. However
725FORREST CITY GROCERY CO.
in her affidavit Hawkins stated that Cohn said he had to let
her go because he was losing money with the job, and this
was the end of the job. Hawkins’ testimony concerning her
union activity was corroborated by then employee Edward
Sparks and current employee Eddie Adams. Sparks and
Adams testified in sum that on the morning of Hawkins’ dis-
charge, almost the entire day shift was present in the
breakroom, Hawkins asked the employees to sign union au-
thorization cards, and some seven employees signed cards.
Manager Cohn testified in sum as follows: Phillip Morris
has a promotional program whereby promotional items are
shipped to the distributor’s customers together with ciga-
rettes. The Company participated in the program, with Phillip
Morris sales representative Herbert Versie doing the nec-
essary work of assembling promotional items with cigarettes.
Area manager Spotts proposed that instead the Company
could use its own employee to do the work. The employee
would be paid $5 per hour (less than the pay of Phillip Mor-
ris’ representative) and Phillip Morris would reimburse the
Company monthly, paying enough to ensure that the Com-
pany would also make a profit on the arrangement. Cohn
agreed to the arrangement. There was no written contract, al-
though Spotts wrote up the plan to show how the Company
would make a profit. Cohn hired Hawkins do to the pro-
motion, and Spotts and Versie trained her. He did not tell
Hawkins or anyone else that he would not hire anyone from
Sanyo. The Company has many employees who worked at
Sanyo. Cohn was satisfied with Hawkins’ work, and he re-
ceived no complaints from Phillip Morris. The promotion ac-
counted for about 90 percent of her work. However, Cohn
decided to end the program because the Company was losing
money on it. On May 14, without consulting with or noti-
fying Phillip Morris or his father, Company President Wil-
liam Cohn, he discharged Hawkins. Spotts and Versie com-
pleted the remaining work, and the Company no longer par-
ticipates in the promotional program. Cohn did not hire any-
one to replace Hawkins. However, on May 13 he hired Mi-
chael Reeves as a helper on trucks, and on May 14 he hired
Lester Brooks as a warehouseman. At the time Cohn termi-
nated Hawkins he did know of her union activity, and it
would have made no difference to his decision if he had
known. He first learned about the union activity from em-
ployee Adams on May 16. In his investigatory affidavit to
the Board, Cohn stated that he had not received any money
from Phillip Morris even as of the time he gave the affidavit.
This was not true. Cohn testified that ‘‘I think he [Spotts]
paid me $500 coming in here,’’ i.e., Phillip Morris gave the
Company an initial payment of $500 when they began the
program. The Company’s records also indicate that Phillip
Morris made a payment on May 2, thereby corroborating
Hawkins’ testimony. The payment was evidently in the
amount of $516 (as indicated by Spotts’ calculations) al-
though the cancelled check or ledger entry was not produced
at the hearing. Cohn testified that he did not learn until July
12 that Phillip Morris made the payment. His assertion is in-
credible. If Cohn were concerned that the Company was los-
ing money on the program, then it is probable that he would
have checked whether the Company had received any pay-
ments, and how much, and if not, why, before making a de-
cision. Cohn’s assertion that the Company was losing money
on the program was also false. As indicated, as of May 2
the Company had received a total of $1016 from Phillip
Morris. The Company’s payroll records indicate that Haw-
kins received total wages of $499.60 in April and $577.75
in May. As Phillip Morris had not yet compensated the Com-
pany for May, it is evident that the Company was ahead the
time of Hawkins’ discharge. If Cohn wanted to terminate the
program for economic reasons, rather than as an excuse to
get rid of Hawkins, then it is probable that Cohn would have
first notified Phillip Morris that he wished to withdraw from
the program, and permitted Hawkins to finish the remaining
work, instead or abruptly firing her. However in order to
fully evaluate Hawkins’ case, it is necessary to consider al-
leged conversations and meetings involving management,
which are the subject of additional unfair labor practice alle-
gations.
General Counsel presented testimony concerning alleged
conversations between individual employees and Cohn and
Day Supervisor McKinley Watson. Eddie Adams, who pulls
orders on the night shift, testified in sum as follows: On
Wednesday, May 22 at about 3:45 p.m. on the shipping
dock, he had a conversation with Cohn and Watson. At that
time Adams was working days. Cohn asked Adams if he at-
tended the union meeting on Saturday (evidently May 18).
Cohn also asked if three other named employees were
present, specifically, Donald Strong, Jimmy Ross, and Jimmy
Kidd. Adams, who attended the meeting, asked Cohn how he
knew they were there. Cohn answered ‘‘because I was
there,’’ although he was not. Watson then asked whether
Melinda Hawkins was the leader of the union campaign and
whether she made house calls to solicit signed union cards.
Adams answered no to both questions. He considered his an-
swers to be true, because to his knowledge she did not make
house calls, and he made his own decisions and did not con-
sider anyone to be his leader. Watson also asked Adams if
he signed a union card. Adams answered truthfully, that he
did. Watson responded that he should not have done that.
Adams did not give Cohn a blank union card or say that he
was against the Union.
Jimmy Ross was also called as a General Counsel witness.
He works as a stocker on the day shift. Ross, an obviously
reluctant witness, initially testified that Cohn asked him if he
knew Melinda Hawkins was fired, and whether he thought
she was with Sanyo. Ross subsequently backed away from
this testimony, saying that he did not have a conversation
with Cohn after Hawkins was fired. General Counsel con-
fronted Ross with his affidavit in order to impeach his testi-
mony. The affidavit may not be used as substantive evidence.
Ross subsequently testified that ‘‘a guy’’ asked him if he
thought Hawkins was with Sanyo or Ernestine Weaver or
Dickey Banks (Weaver and Banks being union representa-
tives). Ross also testified that following a Saturday union
meeting he told Cohn that he did not see Hawkins because
she was dodging him. I find with respect to this matter that
General Counsel failed to establish a prima facie case of un-
lawful interrogation. Therefore I am recommending that the
pertinent allegation of the complaint (par. 8(c)) be dismissed.
Willie Cross works in the freezer department on the night
shift. Cross testified in sum as follows: In February or March
Cohn summoned Cross to his office. Cohn asked if Cross
knew that the Union was getting started back up. Cross an-
swered no. Cohn said he would put Donald Strong in the
freezer with his partner (Bennie) Graham, so that they could
talk about the Union.
726 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 I have also taken into consideration in evaluating Cohn’s credi-
bility, the fact that in 1987 he was convicted of Federal income tax
evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201), a crime punishable by more than 1
year’s imprisonment, and which involves dishonesty or false state-
ment. See Rule 609, Federal Rules of Evidence. However, I have not
taken into consideration with respect to the credibility of either Cohn
or Adams, an assertion that Cohn attempted to improperly influence
a juror in a civil lawsuit. The testimony concerning this matter is
disputed, and does not afford an adequate basis for resolving the
merits of the present case. In sum, I cannot resolve the present credi-
bility question by attempting to resolve another credibility issue
which is unrelated to this case. See Rule 608, Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. I am not persuaded by other arguments advanced by the
Company as to why Adams should not be credited. As indicated,
Adams did not lie to Watson and Cohn concerning Hawkins’ union
activity. If he had, this would not have impugned Adams’ credibility,
because the supervisor had no right to question him concerning other
employees’ union activity. Adams also readily admitted that he has
borrowed money from Cohn. His testimony that he did not borrow
money in May has minimal significance to his credibility, particu-
larly since the alleged falsity of this testimony is dependent on ques-
tionable alleged informal notations.
Strong was transferred to the refrigerator section in March,
and has worked there since that time. He was twice laid off
by the Company. Strong testified in sum as follows: Prob-
ably in April, at a time when he was on layoff, he went to
Cohn to ask why he was laid off. Cohn told him that it was
because he did not attend a meeting for the section per-
sonnel. Cohn also told Strong that Strong thought he was a
big shit, going around soliciting votes for the Union and talk-
ing to other employees about the Union. He said he wanted
to show Strong who were his friends and who were not, and
that Bennie Graham was not his friend. Cohn said that he
paid Strong’s bills and took care of his family, and they
could work out their own problems. Strong responded that
Cohn was not his friend and that Strong took care of his own
family. General Counsel does not allege in this proceeding
that the transfer or layoffs were unlawful. An allegation that
Strong was unlawfully given a 3-day suspension in June, was
amended out of the complaint.
The Union has engaged in some four or five organizational
campaigns at the Company. There is a history of prior unfair
labor practice charges against the Company, none of which
were litigated. Among General Counsel’s present witnesses,
Eddie Adams, Bennie Graham, and Willie Cross were pre-
viously named as alleged discriminatees, and their cases were
settled. Manager Cohn testified in sum as follows: He first
learned about the present union organizational campaign on
May 16, when Adams showed him an authorization card.
Adams said, ‘‘They’re working on us and I want you to
know I’ve learned my lesson and I’m on your side, and I’m
not getting involved.’’ Cohn never asked Adams about his
union activities or whether he attended a union meeting, or
if other employees attended. He did not have a conversation
in his office with Donald Strong about the Union, and he did
not say that Strong thought he was a big shit because of the
Union. In February or March he assigned Strong to the freez-
er because the employees there were not rotating perishables
properly, and he knew Strong to be a good picker. He ex-
plained this to Strong, and he did not say that he assigned
Strong there to talk about the Union with Bennie Graham.
He did not discuss the Union in his office with Willie Cross.
He talked to Cross about the problems in the refrigerator sec-
tion. Cross had been a union observer in a prior election, but
Cohn promoted him to a leadman position in the refrigerator
department and gave him a raise. Cohn did not testify con-
cerning the alleged conversation with Jimmy Ross. Super-
visor Watson testified that he did not have a conversation
with Adams on May 22 in which he asked him about his
union activities, or ever ask him whether he or other employ-
ees went to a union meeting, or ask him about Hawkins’
union activity. However, although Adams testified that both
Cohn and Watson were involved in the alleged May 22 con-
versation, they did not corroborate each other’s testimony
concerning the matter; i.e., concerning what the other super-
visor said or did not say, or whether both were present in
a conversation in which union activity was discussed.
I credit Adams’ testimony concerning his conversation
with Cohn and Watson, but with a qualification. As indi-
cated, I have problems with Cohn’s credibility, as dem-
onstrated by his testimony concerning Hawkins’ discharge. I
have no comparable reservations with respect to Adams’
credibility. Adams was still in the Company’s employ at the
time of the present hearing, and therefore his testimony is
entitled to special weight. He demonstrated a clear recollec-
tion of the conversation.2 However, I find it probable that as
indicated by Cohn, Adams began the conversation by assur-
ing Cohn that he was no longer a union adherent. At this
point Cohn and Watson sought to test Adams by determining
whether he could be used as a reliable source of information
concerning the union campaign. It is unlikely that they would
probe Adams as a source of information if they still believed
he was a strong union supporter. I find that the Company,
by Cohn and Watson, violated Section 8(a)(1) by coercively
interrogating Adams concerning his union activity and that of
other employees. They had no legitimate reason to question
Adams, and they gave him no assurance against reprisal. On
the contrary, Watson warned Adams that he should not have
signed a union card. Cohn was a high level official, not only
company manager, but a member of the family which owned
the Company. The circumstances indicate that Cohn and
Watson were seeking information for the purpose of defeat-
ing unionization by unlawful means, through determining the
extent of union support and the means by which union activ-
ity was conducted. The interrogation was accompanied by
unlawful statements, and as will be further discussed, oc-
curred in the context of other unfair labor practices. Specifi-
cally, in the present conversation, Cohn created the impres-
sion of surveillance of union activity, by telling Adams that
he knew who was present at the Saturday union meeting be-
cause he was there. As Adams knew that Cohn was not
present at the meeting, the plain implication of Cohn’s re-
mark was that he had an employee informer or informers.
Although the complaint does contain an allegation that the
Company created the impression of surveillance in this con-
versation, the matter of the conversation was fully and fairly
litigated, and therefore the remark may be the basis of a
finding of unfair labor practice. The remark is also signifi-
cant because it constituted an admission that Cohn did in fact
have an employee informant or informants, and therefore had
a source of information from which he could have learned
of Hawkins’ union activity prior to her discharge. I further
find that Watson’s warning that Adams should not have
signed a union card, coming only 8 days after Hawkins’ dis-
charge, conveyed the clear implication of reprisal against em-
727FORREST CITY GROCERY CO.
ployees who joined the Union. The warning constituted an
implied threat, and was violative of Section 8(a)(1). See
Whitewood Maintenance Co., 292 NLRB 1159, 1164 (1989),
enfd. sub nom. Texas World Service Co. v. NLRB, 928 F.2d
1426 (5th Cir. 1991). The allegations of paragraphs 8(o) and
9 of the complaint have been sustained by the evidence.
With regard to Cross’ testimony, the complaint alleges
(par. 8(p)), that in late March Cohn interrogated an employee
about the union activities of other employees. (G.C. Br. 18,
23.) Strangely, the complaint does not allege that Cohn un-
lawfully told Cross that he would transfer Strong to the
freezer because of his union activity, although this was
central to the alleged conversation. The complaint also does
not allege that Strong’s transfer was unlawful. This suggests
that General Counsel has reservations about Cross’ credibil-
ity. It is also significant that the evidence fails to indicate
any union activity among the Company’s employees in Feb-
ruary or March, or even rumors of such activity. Therefore
it is unlikely that Cohn would question Cross about such ac-
tivity at that time. I do not credit Cross, and I am rec-
ommending that paragraph 8(p) of the complaint be dis-
missed.
With regard to Strong’s testimony the complaint alleges
(par. 8(b)) that in early April Cohn threatened an employee
with unspecified reprisals because of the employee’s mem-
bership in or support of the Union. General Counsel does not
discuss this allegation in its brief, leaving me in the dark as
to what in this conversation constituted an unlawful threat.
I credit Strong’s testimony. Strong was still in the Com-
pany’s employ at the time of the present hearing. He im-
pressed me as a candid witness. Strong unhesitatingly admit-
ted that Cohn gave him a legitimate reason for his layoff.
However I find that Cohn did not, as alleged in the com-
plaint, threaten Strong in this conversation. Strong was an
outspoken union adherent who did not hesitate to speak his
mind to Cohn. His testimony indicates that they engaged in
a robust and freewheeling argument about unionization, in
which Cohn momentarily lost his temper and made an insult-
ing but nonthreatening remark about Strong. Therefore I am
recommending that this allegation of the complaint be dis-
missed. See Hudson Hosiery, 109 NLRB 1410, 1421 (1954),
and Montgomery Ward & Co., 187 NLRB 956, 964 (1971)
(Board held in sum that employer did not violate the Act by
calling union activists union stooges, persons of low char-
acter, scum and dumb-dumb).
General Counsel alleges that Cohn, through and in connec-
tion with speeches to employees following Hawkins’ dis-
charge, committed further violations of Section 8(a)(1). The
Company operates with a day and a night shift. The Com-
pany ships goods at night and receives goods during the day.
Employees Donald Strong and Bennie Graham testified con-
cerning a speech to night-shift employees shortly after Haw-
kins’ discharge. Strong testified in sum as follows: About a
week or two after Hawkins’ discharge, Cohn called a meet-
ing of the night crew on the loading dock. He held up a
union card and said ‘‘they’re back.’’ He said they were like
a family, the employees did not need the IUE or to pay
someone to solve their problems. Cohn asked if he ever lied
to the employees. At this point Strong spoke up. He said
Cohn was a liar, because during the last union campaign in
1988 he made promises which were not fulfilled. Cohn re-
sponded that Strong was in a hole, and without explaining
his remark, angrily left the dock. No other employees spoke
at the meeting. Graham testified in sum as follows: The
meeting took place on May 16. Cohn held up a union card
and said ‘‘it’s back, the IUE.’’ He appeared to be reading
off a paper. He said ‘‘if anyone approach you with union
cards the best thing for you to do is not sign them.’’ Cohn
asked anyone who believed he could not fire anyone to raise
their hand. Only three foremen raised their hands. Cohn
asked if he had ever lied to anyone. Strong stood up, and
said that Cohn lied in the first campaign, and was now ma-
nipulating the employees and biased. Cohn said Strong was
in a hole, without explaining his remark. Strong said that
Cohn fired Graham for no reason at all. Cohn answered that
he took Graham back. Strong replied that the IUE and the
Board got him back (Graham was reinstated pursuant to set-
tlement of an unfair labor practice charge).
Employees Eddie Adams, Joe Willie Mays, and then em-
ployee Edward Sparks testified concerning a meeting for
day-shift employees. Sparks testified in sum as follows: One
or two days after Hawkins’ discharge, Cohn addressed a
meeting of day-shift employees. He said ‘‘our friend,’’ the
IUE is back. Cohn said that if the Union got in it would be
like him on one side and the Union on the other, they would
make suggestions and it would be up to him to agree, and
they would probably go back and forth and get nowhere. He
said it was possible to come to a strike, referring to Sanyo
and Greyhound, and if so it was possible the employees
would be out of a job, because he could call in workers and
if nothing happened, he would not have to call back the
striking employees. Toward the end of the meeting, Cohn
said that if the employees had problems they could come to
see him. After the meeting broke up, but while employees
were still present, Joe Willie Mays told Cohn he needed
some money. Cohn told Mays to see him in his office. Cohn
conducted meetings for employees only during union organi-
zational campaigns. Sparks never borrowed money from the
Company, but he knew of employees who did. Sparks did
not hear any discussion concerning handbooks. Adams testi-
fied in sum as follows: At the meeting, Cohn held up a blank
union card and said ‘‘our old friend the IUE is back.’’ He
said they did not need anyone to come into the warehouse
and clean up their act for them, that they were all one big
family and could handle their own situation. Cohn told the
employees that if they had any problems they could write a
note on a pad and bring it to him and leave it on his desk,
and he would look it over. Joe Willie Mays testified in sum
as follows: At the meeting Cohn said the Union was back
again. He said that the employees could talk to him about
their problems. He said the Company would give them hand-
books. As Cohn was leaving, Mays asked to borrow $200.
Cohn told Mays to see him in his office about the money.
Mays went to his office, and Cohn gave him a check for
$200. Mays repaid the loan. He has previously borrowed
money from Cohn. Cohn has previously asked the employees
to come forward if they had problems, and he told them they
could form a group to discuss problems with him.
Cohn and Day Supervisor Watson, the only company wit-
nesses, did not testify concerning either the day-or night-shift
meetings. Cohn testified that the Company has a policy per-
mitting loans to employees, and he and his father have tried
to accommodate requests for loans in small amounts, such as
$15 or $20, or in important situations, in amounts as large
728 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3 Therefore the Company’s reliance on Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 277 NLRB 424 (1985), is misplaced. (Br. 23.) Clark Equip-
ment Co., 278 NLRB 498 (1986), also relied on by the Company,
as $100. The Company introduced informal records indi-
cating loans to Eddie Adams in amounts ranging from $15
to $30. Mays repaid the $200 loan at the rate of $50 per
week. Cohn testified that he did not loan employees money
in order to influence their union sentiments.
The complaint alleges (pars. 8(h), (i), (j), and (k)) that in
his speeches to the day-and night-shift employees, Cohn un-
lawfully: (1) threatened employees with termination of their
employment if they joined or supported the Union; (2) solic-
ited employee complaints and grievances and thereby prom-
ised improved terms and conditions of employment in order
to discourage union support; (3) told the employees that it
would be futile for them to select the Union as their bar-
gaining representative; and (4) granted an employee (Mays)
a $200 advance in order to discourage support for the Union.
General Counsel further alleges invoking paragraph 8(d) of
the complaint (G.C. Br. 12) that Cohn created the impression
of surveillance of union activities by displaying the blank
union authorization card. The Company argues (Br. 20) that
the day-shift meeting is not properly before me for decision,
because paragraphs 8(h), (i), (j), and (k) refer to speeches to
the day and night shifts in the dock area, whereas the em-
ployee witnesses testified to a day-shift meeting in the
breakroom. Paragraphs 8(d), (e), (f), and (g) of the complaint
which were dismissed on motion of General Counsel, do not
refer to a meeting. Rather the text, which refers to ‘‘an em-
ployee’’ indicates an alleged conversation in the breakroom
on or about May 16 between Cohn and an employee. Jimmy
Ross’ affidavit (Tr. 147–148) suggests that General Counsel
anticipated proving these allegations through Ross’ testi-
mony. However, the language of paragraph 8(d) could lit-
erally apply to the day-shift meeting. The Company did not
object at the hearing to testimony concerning the day-shift
meeting on grounds that it exceeded the scope of the com-
plaint. It is evident that about 2 days after Hawkins’ dis-
charge, Cohn addressed assembled day-and night-shift em-
ployees concerning the union organizational campaign. The
deviation between the pleadings and the testimony, i.e., that
the day shift meeting took place in the breakroom rather than
in the dock area, was minor. The Company was on notice
that both employee meetings were in litigation and could be
made the basis for unfair labor practice findings. The meet-
ings were fully and fairly litigated. The Company chose not
to present its own witnesses concerning the meetings, but ex-
ercised its right to cross-examine General Counsel’s wit-
nesses. The day and night shift meetings are properly in evi-
dence and may be considered on the allegations of para-
graphs 8(d), (h), (i), (j), and (k) of the complaint.
The Company did not contradict the testimony of General
Counsel’s witnesses concerning the meetings. I am not per-
suaded that Cohn mentioned a handbook at either meeting.
Only one witness (Mays) referred to a handbook, and Sparks
testified that he did not hear any discussion of handbooks.
If Cohn promised a handbook at the day shift meeting, then
he probably would have also done so at the night shift meet-
ing. With this qualification, I credit the employees’ testimony
as collectively reflecting what transpired at the meetings. I
find that at the night shift meeting, Cohn twice impliedly
threatened employees with discharge because or if they en-
gaged in union or other protected concerted activity. Cohn,
in the presence of the employees, impliedly threatened
Strong with discharge by telling him he was in a hole. At
the time Strong was engaged in protected concerted activity.
Cohn invited discussion from the employees, and Strong
spoke by accusing Cohn of making unkept promises during
the last union campaign. Cohn’s retort was in direct response
to Strong’s expression of opinion concerning terms and con-
ditions of employment. His remark could reasonably be inter-
preted by the employees as indicating that Strong’s job was
in jeopardy because of his statement. Cohn further impliedly
threatened discharge by telling the employees that they
should not sign union cards, and following this statement by
asking whether they believed he could not fire anyone. The
plain implication was that employees who disregarded his
warning by signing union cards, risked discharge. The allega-
tions of paragraph 8(h) have been sustained by the evidence.
I further find that at the day-shift meeting, Cohn solicited
employee grievances, thereby impliedly promising redress of
such grievances, and gave Mays a $200 loan in order to dis-
courage employee support for the Union. With regard to so-
licitation of grievances, the applicable standard is set forth in
Uarco, Inc., 216 NLRB 1 (1974):
the solicitation of grievances at preelection meetings
carries with it an inference that an employer is implic-
itly promising to correct those inequities it discovers as
a result of its inquiries. Thus, the Board has found un-
lawful interference with employee rights by an employ-
er’s solicitation of grievances during an organizational
campaign although the employer merely stated it would
look into or review the problem but did not commit
itself to specific corrective action; the Board reasoned
that employees would tend to anticipate improved con-
ditions of employment which might make union rep-
resentation unnecessary. However, it is not the solicita-
tion of grievances itself that is coercive and violative of
Section 8(a)(1), but the promise to correct grievances or
a concurrent interrogation or polling about Union sym-
pathies that is unlawful; the solicitation of grievances
merely raises an inference that the employer is making
such a promise, which inference is rebuttable by the
employer.
Uarco was cited with approval in NLRB v. Okun Bros. Shoe
Store, 825 F.2d 102, 108–109 (6th Cir. 1987). In the present
case, the testimony of employees Adams, Sparks, and Mays
indicates that after Cohn asserted that the employees did not
need a union, Cohn solicited the employees to come directly
to him with their problems and he would look them over. He
did not either expressly or by implication say that he was not
making any promises. On the contrary, Cohn made use of an
opportunity to demonstrate that he was making promises.
When Mays asked for a $200 loan, Cohn immediately ac-
commodated him, notwithstanding company policy of giving
loans to employees only in much smaller amounts. Mays
made his request in direct response to Cohn’s solicitation of
grievances. Cohn had previously conducted meetings at
which he invited employees to air their problems, but he
conducted such meetings only during union organizational
campaigns. He did not have an ‘‘established practice’’ of
conducting such meetings.3 Therefore Cohn violated Section
729FORREST CITY GROCERY CO.
is also not in point. In that case, the Board held in sum that an em-
ployer does not solicit grievances by reminding employees of the
good conditions they enjoy. In the present case, Cohn did not rely
on that argument. Rather, he indicated that he knew there was em-
ployee dissatisfaction, and he solicited the employees to come to him
with their problems, without a union, so that he could deal with
them.
8(a)(1) both by soliciting grievances with the implied prom-
ise they would be redressed, and by the unprecedented action
of granting an employee a $200 loan, all in order to discour-
age support for the Union. See Downtown Toyota, 276
NLRB 999, 1019 (1985); National Micronetics, 277 NLRB
993, 1003 (1985). However, the testimony fails to dem-
onstrate that Cohn promised or granted benefits at the night
shift meeting. The allegations of paragraphs 8(i) and (k) have
been sustained with respect to the day-shift meeting.
General Counsel’s allegation (par. 8(j)) that the Company
violated Section 8(a)(1) by informing the employees that it
would be futile for them to select the Union as their bar-
gaining representative, rests on the testimony of Sparks con-
cerning the day-shift meeting. The allegation presents a close
question, as Cohn’s statements fall between statements found
to be unlawful in cases cited by General Counsel (Br. 15),
and statements held lawful in cases cited by the Company
(Br. 24). In the former, the employer spoke in absolute terms
concerning the consequences of unionization. In Pioneer
Concrete Co., 282 NLRB 749, 753 (1987), the employer told
the employees that ‘‘selection of the Union would result in
them going on strike and would result in the employees los-
ing their jobs.’’ (Emphasis added.) The employer thereby un-
lawfully anticipated a refusal to bargain in good faith with
that Union. In Taylor Chair Co., 292 NLRB 658 fn. 2
(1989), the employer asserted that ‘‘it would close the plant
if the Union won the election.’’ (Emphasis added.) However
in Clark Equipment Co., supra, the employer spoke of strikes
as a ‘‘possibility.’’ In Pilliod of Mississippi, 275 NLRB 799
(1985), the employer said that bargaining ‘‘could’’ begin at
ground zero, and the employees ‘‘might’’ lose their benefits.
In Telex Communications, 294 NLRB 1136 (1989), the em-
ployer asserted that bargaining involved give-and-take and
the employees might ‘‘win, lose or draw.’’ The Board held
the employer’s statements unlawful in Pioneer and Taylor,
but lawful in Clark, Pilliod, and Telex. In the present case,
Cohn said that it was up to him to agree to the Union’s
‘‘suggestions,’’ and they would ‘‘probably get nowhere’’
(emphasis added). Cohn then talked about the possibility of
a strike, referring to Sanyo and Greyhound, and the possi-
bility of permanent replacement. Cohn offered no objective
basis for his assertion that the parties ‘‘probably’’ would get
nowhere in bargaining. Cohn emphasized that it was up to
him to agree with the Union’s ‘‘suggestions,’’ thereby indi-
cating that it would be his actions which would probably re-
sult in the parties getting nowhere. The implication of
Cohn’s remarks is that he would not bargain in good faith
with the Union, thereby probably foreclosing agreement.
Therefore I find that Cohn violated Section 8(a)(1) by in-
forming the employees that it would be futile for them to se-
lect the Union as their bargaining representative. See NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617–620 (1969). The
allegations of paragraph 8(j), with respect to the day-shift
meeting, have been sustained by the evidence.
I further find that Cohn created the impression of surveil-
lance of the employees’ union activity by displaying a blank
union authorization card and announcing that the IUE was
back. The employees did not know where Cohn got the card.
They could reasonably infer that Cohn was using an em-
ployee informer. As found, Cohn impliedly admitted to
Eddie Adams that he was using an informer or informers.
The Company violated Section 8(a)(1), and the allegations of
paragraph 8(d) have been sustained by the evidence.
Employees Strong, Sparks, and Graham testified con-
cerning a speech by Cohn at a company-sponsored barbeque
for its employees at the Civic Center in Forrest City. (Em-
ployee Cross did not attend the barbeque.) Most company
employees attended. Graham testified that the barbeque took
place about June 1. Strong, Sparks, and Graham testified in
sum as follows: Cohn said the area employers all felt bad
about the Union trying to get into the Company. He said 1
man called him a liar, but 20 others did not, and Strong was
wrong for calling him a liar. He said he cared about the em-
ployees, and the employees had an opportunity to speak if
they had ideas to better the Company. Employee Napoleon
Sergeant (who signed a union card given to him by Hawkins)
said that if they had hospitalization and pension benefits it
would not bother him to get only $150 in take home pay.
Cohn said that was a good idea and would look into it. He
said the Company would bring in a consultant who would
conduct a survey to determine the Company’s problems, and
it would not cost the employees anything. The Company had
not previously conducted such a survey. Employees Strong,
Graham, and Mays further testified in sum as follows: Some
time after the barbeque, Night Supervisor Alfred Davis dis-
tributed and subsequently collected questionnaires for the
employees. They were not required to answer the questions,
although some employees did so. Among other questions, the
questionnaire asked whether the employees thought passing
the buck was a problem in the Company, what the employ-
ees thought of their job, and whether the employees preferred
a credit union or the Company to handle their money. The
Company never previously distributed such a survey. The
employees heard nothing more about the survey. Cohn did
not testify about either the barbeque or the subsequent sur-
vey.
The complaint alleges in sum (pars. 8(q) and (s)) that on
or about June 18, the Company by Cohn’s speech to day-
shift employees, promised its employees improved terms and
conditions of employment in order to discourage union sup-
port, and in or about mid-August, solicited employee com-
plaints and grievances through a questionnaire, thereby prom-
ising improved terms and conditions of employment in order
to discourage employee support for the Union. The Company
argues that paragraph 8(q) should be dismissed because ‘‘the
record is devoid of any evidence of a June meeting.’’ (Br.
28.) The argument is without merit. The Company did not
object to receipt of testimony concerning Cohn’s speech at
the barbeque. The matter of the speech was fully and fairly
litigated. The Company chose not to present Cohn’s testi-
mony concerning the speech. Moreover, the speech arguably
falls within the allegation of paragraph 8(q). The barbeque
speech and subsequent distribution of the questionnaire are
properly before me for decision, and may be considered in
connection with the allegations of paragraphs 8(q) and (s). I
credit the employees’ testimony, and find that they collec-
730 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 That fact distinguishes the present case from Bell Hatter, 276
NLRB 1208, 1215–1216 (1985), cited by the Company (Br. 27). In
Bell Hatter, the employer’s survey questionnaire conspicuously stat-
ed that the questionnaire did not imply that the employer was mak-
ing or promising any changes in employees’ wages, benefits, or
working conditions.
tively reflect what Cohn said at the barbeque. I find that the
Company, through Cohn’s barbeque speech and subsequent
distribution of the questionnaire, solicited employee com-
plaints and grievances and thereby impliedly promised im-
proved terms and conditions of employment in order to dis-
courage employee support for the Union. Cohn coupled
antiunion remarks with an express request for the employees
to make suggestions as to how to improve the Company.
Cohn did not say that he was not making any promises. On
the contrary, when employee Sergeant asked for hospitaliza-
tion insurance and pension benefits, Cohn answered that this
was a good idea and he would look into it. Cohn expressly
promised a survey, which would impliedly lead to improve-
ment in existing terms and conditions of employment. The
subsequent questionnaire was a direct consequence of that
promise. Like Cohn in his speech, the questionnaire did not
say that the Company was not making any promises.4 The
Company violated Section 8(a)(1), and the allegations of
paragraphs 8(q) and (s) have been sustained by the evidence.
See Mid-State Distributing Co., 276 NLRB 1511, 1557–1558
(1985).
This brings me back to the matter of Melinda Hawkins.
The complaint (par. 8(a)) alleges that on or about April 5,
Cohn told an employee (Hawkins) that the Company would
not hire applicants for employment who had previously
joined and supported a union. As previously indicated, I have
reservations concerning the credibility of both Cohn and
Hawkins. I am not persuaded that Cohn told Hawkins he
would not hire anyone from Sanyo. Cohn probably made a
disparaging remark about the employees who went on strike
at Sanyo, but Hawkins probably got it garbled. If Cohn be-
lieved that the employees at Sanyo learned a lesson, i.e., that
the Union lost their jobs by going on strike, then it is un-
likely that he would say he would refuse to hire them. It is
uncontroverted that the Company has hired employees who
worked at Sanyo. Cohn hired Hawkins, although he could
easily have avoided doing so, and she never told him she did
not support the Union. Therefore I am recommending that
this allegation of the complaint be dismissed. However, I
find that Cohn discharged Hawkins because of her leading
role in the union campaign, and thereby violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. I specifically find that Cohn knew
of Hawkins’ union activity at the time he discharged her.
Cohn made use of an employee informer or informers. He
and Supervisor Watson engaged in intensive interrogation to
determine the extent of union support among the employees.
Hawkins did not attempt to conceal her activity. She solicited
cards in the breakroom at a time when nearly all day-shift
employees were present. That same day Cohn discharged
Hawkins, giving a false reason. The inference is warranted,
and I so find, that Cohn learned she was the principal figure
in the union campaign, and decided to get rid of her imme-
diately. Cohn was demonstrably opposed to unionization to
the point of engaging in unlawful threats and other unfair
labor practice conduct following Hawkins’ discharge. In light
of the Company’s strong hostility to unionization, Hawkins’
leading role in the union campaign, the timing of Hawkins’
discharge, and circumstantial evidence that Cohn knew of
Hawkins’ union activity, General Counsel presented a prima
facie case that the Company terminated Hawkins because of
her union activity. For the reasons previously discussed, the
Company’s professed reason for terminating Hawkins was
false and pretextural. It follows that the Company failed to
meet its burden of establishing that it would have terminated
Hawkins in the absence of her union activity. The Company
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by discharging Hawkins.
The Company reinstated Hawkins in August (apparently
on August 5), and General Counsel does not seek a reinstate-
ment order in this proceeding. However the parties disagree
as to the measure of backpay. I find that Hawkins is entitled
to backpay from the time of her discharge until the date of
her reinstatement. The Company terminated its participation
in the Phillip Morris promotional program as a means of get-
ting rid of Hawkins, and not vice versa. Therefore the Com-
pany’s termination of its participation in the plan was also
unlawful, and cannot be used as a basis for cutting off back-
pay. See O.K. Trucking Co., 298 NLRB 804 (1990).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section
7 of the Act, the Company has engaged in, and is engaging
in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By discriminatorily discharging Melinda Hawkins,
thereby discouraging membership in the Union, the Company
has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Company has committed violations
of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, I shall recommend that
it be required to cease and desist therefrom, to post appro-
priate notices, and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Company discriminatorily termi-
nated Melinda Hawkins, it will be recommended that the
Company be ordered to make her whole for any loss of earn-
ings and benefits that she may have suffered from the time
of her termination to the date of her reinstatement. I shall
recommend that the Company be ordered to expunge from
its records any reference to the unlawful termination of Haw-
kins, to inform her in writing of such expunction, and to in-
form her that its unlawful conduct will not be used as a basis
for further personnel actions against her. Backpay shall be
computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90
NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as computed in New Hori-
731FORREST CITY GROCERY CO.
5 Under New Horizons, interest on and after January 1, 1987, is
computed at the ‘‘short-term Federal rate’’ for the underpayment of
taxes as set out in the 1986 amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621.
6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).5 The Com-
pany shall be required to preserve and make available to the
Board, or its agents, on request, payroll and other records to
facilitate the computation of backpay due.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended6
ORDER
The Respondent, Forrest City Grocer Co., Forrest City,
Arkansas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discouraging membership in the International Union of
Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Work-
ers, AFL–CIO, or any other labor organization, by
discriminatorily terminating employees, or in any other man-
ner discriminating against them with regard to their tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Interrogating employees concerning their union attitude
or activities or those of other employees.
(c) Creating the impression of surveillance of union activ-
ity, by displaying union authorization cards or indicating that
it spies on union meetings.
(d) Threatening employees with discharge or other reprisal
because of their union or other concerted activity, or warning
them not to engage in such activity.
(e) Informing employees that it would be futile for them
to select a union as their bargaining representative, by indi-
cating that it would not bargain in good faith with such
union.
(f) Promising or granting employee benefits, or soliciting
employee complaints and grievances and thereby promising
improved terms and conditions of employment, in order to
discourage support for the Union or any other labor organiza-
tion; provided however, that nothing shall be construed as re-
quiring Respondent to vary or abandon any economic benefit
or any term or condition of employment which it has here-
tofore established.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make Melinda Hawkins whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against her, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of
this decision.
(b) Remove from its files any reference to the termination
of Melinda Hawkins, and notify her in writing that this has
been done and that evidence of this unlawful discharge will
not be used as a basis for future personnel actions against
her.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due.
(d) Post at its Forrest City, Arkansas office and place of
business copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’7
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 26, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.