Ford Global Technologies, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 28, 2020

15664524 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 28, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/664,524 07/31/2017 Howard Paul Tsvi Linden 83856717; 67186-427PUS1 1085
46442 7590 10/28/2020
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Ford
400 W. MAPLE RD.
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
KATCHEVES, BASIL S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3633
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/28/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HOWARD PAUL TSVI LINDEN,
ONOYOM ESSIEN EKANEM, JONATHAN WEILER,
ASAA HARAJLI, and RAJESH K. PATEL
Appeal 2020-002592
Application 15/664,524
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN C. KERINS, MICHAEL L. HOELTER, and
JEREMY M. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judges.
PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–21. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford
Global Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2020-002592
Application 15/664,524

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to vehicle lock and camera features. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A handle for a door of a motor vehicle, comprising:
at least one button configured to lock or unlock the door;
a camera; and
a printed circuit board including a processor electrically
coupled to the at least one button and the camera.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Huizenga US 2003/0031025 A1 Feb. 13, 2003
Salter US 2015/0345939 A1 Dec. 3, 2015
Park US 2016/0119518 A1 Apr. 28, 2016
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 3, 5, and 14–17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
as being anticipated by Park.
Claims 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 18–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Park and Salter.
Claims 8, 9, 12, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Park.
Claim 21 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Park and Huizenga.
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Application 15/664,524

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OPINION
Claims 1, 2, 3, 5, and 14–17
Appellant argues claims 1, 2, 3, 5, and 14–17 as a group. Appeal Br.
3–5. We select claim 1 as representative. Claims 2, 3, 5, and 14–17 stand or
fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant explains that the “main argument in the Brief is that the
Examiner has not properly identified a ‘handle’ in Park.” Reply Br. 1.
Initially, we note that it is debatable whether any particular handle structure
is even required by claim 1, as the term “handle” only appears in the
preamble, and neither the “handle” nor any other structure associated with a
“handle” is referenced anywhere else in the claim. Nevertheless, the
Examiner identifies a “handle” in Park. See, e.g., Ans. 3.
The Examiner explains that “[t]he Appellant should look to figs 1 and
2 of Park showing a handle and to the marked figure 2 below.” Ans. 3. The
figure referenced by the Examiner is reproduced below.

The figure reproduced above, is an annotated version of Park’s Figure 2,
which “illustrat[es] a structure of . . . a rear view camera, a trunk open
switch, a license lamp, and the like . . . mounted in a rear of a vehicle” (Park
Appeal 2020-002592
Application 15/664,524

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¶ 27), with the Examiner’s annotation circling the portion of Park’s Figure 2
that corresponds to a “handle” (Ans. 3).
The Examiner explains that the circled portion “protrudes from the
tailgate door itself and presents itself to the user in a workable placement,
[such that] it effectively becomes a handle when needed” (Ans. 4) and it
“may be used to lift up or push down on the door (rear tailgate or sometimes
referred to as hatchback) of a vehicle” (id. at 3). The Examiner finds that “it
is well known that many vehicles rely solely on the protruding portion (as
seen in [Park’s] fig. 1) of the tailgate to manipulate the tailgate,” and notes
that “Appellant does not include structural limitations which may exclude
the circled handle above.” Id.
Appellant does not apprise us of error in these findings. Rather than
identify any missing structure in Park, Appellant repeatedly alleges that
there is no handle in Park. Appeal Br. 3–5. Indeed, Appellant never even
attempts to characterize any particular structure required by the recitation of
the “handle” in claim 1’s preamble. Although Appellant contends that its
“disclosure is aimed at reducing parts and providing a compact assembly,
and thus, in Appellant’s disclosure, multiple components are incorporated
into an actual handle,” and “[i]n light of Appellant’s disclosure, one would
not consider an assembly of disparate parts a ‘handle’” (Reply Br. 2), we
decline to read any unspecified structure implied by Appellant into the
claim, particularly when the claim is silent as to any required handle
structure. 2

2 Appellant’s Specification contemplates arrangements where a handle is
simply a protrusion graspable by a user. See Spec. ¶ 29 (“In some examples,
the handle 14 is electronically actuated and is not rotatable.”).
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Application 15/664,524

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We are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s decision to reject
claims 1, 2, 3, 5, and 14–17.
Claims 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 18–20
Claim 4 ultimately depends from claim 1, and further recites that “the
processor is configured to interpret a signal from the camera to detect a level
of ambient light, and the processor is configured to adjust an intensity of
light emitted by the light source in response to the detected level of ambient
light.” The Examiner finds that “Salter discloses a light of a vehicle which
adjusts based on lighting conditions (para 0079).” Final Act. 4. The
Examiner reasons that “[i]t would have been obvious . . . to modify Park by
adding the sensor system as disclosed by Salter in order to improve visibility
and effectiveness of the light source under various conditions.” Id.
Appellant responds that “[t]he Examiner has not demonstrated that
Salter teaches use of a camera to detect the level of ambient light” because
“Salter teaches, at ¶ [0079], adjusting light based on information from a
photosensor 184,” which “does not support the rejection because claim 4
specifically relates to the use of a camera in lieu of a separate sensor, such as
a photosensor.” Appeal Br. 6.
In the Answer, the Examiner clarifies that the rejection “merely us[es]
Salter for the teaching of light adjustability based upon exterior lighting
conditions, not the means to adjust light,” and “[t]he use of a processer is
required for any such purpose.” Ans. 4. That is, as clarified in the Answer,
in the Examiner’s rejection, Park’s camera is modified to provide the
detected light to the processor to adjust the light source’s emitted light.
Again, Appellant responds with general allegations of error, without
identifying any particular reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection.
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We are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s decision to reject
claim 4. Appellant does not provide separate argument for the patentability
of claims 6, 7, 10, 11, or 18.
Claim 19 is independent and recites a “method” that includes
“illuminating a field of view of a backup camera by emitting light from a
light source,” “detecting a level of ambient light,” and “adjusting an
intensity of the light emitted from the light source based on the detected
level of ambient light.” The Examiner states that “[r]egarding claims 19 and
20, these claims are rejected for reasons cited in the rejections of claims 1
and 4, the method being obvious in view of the components disclosed by the
prior art cited.” Final Act. 5.
Appellant alleges error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19
because “neither Park nor Salter discloses ‘a printed circuit board within a
handle of a vehicle door,’ as claimed, nor do the references disclose or teach
‘detecting a level of ambient light based on a signal from [a] backup
camera.’” Appeal Br. 6.
Appellant’s contentions regarding ambient light detection are
unpersuasive for the reasons explained above with respect to claim 4. As for
Appellant’s contentions related to the location of the printed circuit board, as
explained above, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding
that Park’s camera is on a vehicle handle. Appellant does not dispute that
Park’s controller corresponds to a circuit board. See Final Act. 2 (citing
Park ¶¶ 14, 41, Fig. 7). Indeed, the cited portions of Park teach integration
of its camera and lights with a printed circuit board, meaning the circuit
board, too, is located on Park’s handle. See Park ¶¶ 14, 41, 47.
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We are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s decision to reject claim
19. Appellant does not provide separate argument for the patentability of
claim 20.
Claims 8, 9, 12, and 13
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8.
Claim 9 depends from claim 1, and adds “an antenna electrically
coupled to the processor, the antenna configured to detect a key of the motor
vehicle, and wherein the processor is configured to permit access to the
vehicle when the key is within range of the antenna.” With respect to this
additional feature, “[t]he examiner takes official notice that it is well known
in the art to use wireless keys, transmitting and receiving to lock or unlock
doors, usually known as comfort access,” and reasons that “[t]his would
have been an obvious design choice since most modern vehicle keys
unlock/lock vehicle doors wirelessly.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner
additionally finds that such a feature “can be found on most any car made
after 2000” and “[i]t would be almost impossible for an adult to not take
notice of a vehicle being opened by a remote key if said person has ever
entered a vehicle made in the 21st century.” Ans. 4–5.
Aside from once again presenting the unpersuasive contentions
regarding whether Park teaches a handle, Appellant notes that “[d]espite
Appellant traversing the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice, the Examiner
did not substantiate the noticed facts in violation of MPEP § 2144.03(C),”
and “[i]n fact, the Examiner did not even acknowledge Appellant’s
traversal.” Appeal Br. 7. Appellant misapprehends what is required to
traverse an Examiner’s Official Notice.
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The very MPEP section cited by Appellant clearly states that “[t]o
adequately traverse such a[n Official Notice] finding, an applicant must
specifically point out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, which
would include stating why the noticed fact is not considered to be common
knowledge or well-known in the art. See 37 CFR 1.111(b).” MPEP
§ 2144.03(C). Appellant offers no explanation as to “why the noticed fact is
not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.”3
We are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s decision to reject
claim 9.
Claim 12 depends from claim 1 and further recites that “the at least
one button includes a first button configured to unlock the door and a second
button configured to lock the door.” Appellant, again, reasserts the
unpersuasive contentions presented with respect to whether Park teaches a
handle. Appeal Br. 7. Claim 13 depends from claim 12, and Appellant
relies on the arguments presented for claim 12.
We are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s decision to reject
claims 12 and 13.
Claim 21
Claim 21 depends from claim 1, and further recites that “the handle
includes an interior surface and is rotatable when a force is applied to the
interior surface.” The Examiner finds that “Huizenga discloses the use of
rotating handle assemblies for tailgates (para. 0003).” Final Act. 6. The
Examiner reasons that “[i]t would have been obvious . . . to modify Park by

3 To the extent Appellant made some other unspecified arguments
previously to the Examiner, those arguments are not before us.
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Application 15/664,524

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using a rotating assembly, as disclosed by Huizenga as a mere design choice
to give the user a larger grabbing surface.” Id.
There is no dispute that rotating handle assemblies are known in the
art. Rather, Appellant disputes whether it would have been obvious to
include a rotatable handle in Park because “a ‘small-sized’ button . . . in
Park’s view, is better than ‘existing turning lever type switch[es].’” Appeal
Br. 8 (citing Park ¶ 44). Appellant’s contentions do not apprise us of
Examiner error.
“[D]esign choice” is appropriate where the applicant fails to set forth
any reasons why the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
art would result in a different function. In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 298–99
(Fed. Cir. 1995). Here, Appellant fails to apprise us of any difference in
function. Rather, the Specification supports the Examiner’s design choice
rationale, explaining that “[i]n order to open the liftgate 12, the user places
their fingers on the interior surface 22 and applies a force to the interior
surface to rotate the handle 14,” but “[i]n some examples, the handle 14 is
electronically actuated and is not rotatable.” Spec. ¶ 29.
We are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s decision to reject
claim 21.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
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Application 15/664,524

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 3, 5,
14–17
102(a)(1) Park 1, 2, 3, 5,
14–17

4, 6, 7, 10,
11, 18–20
103 Park, Salter 4, 6, 7, 10,
11, 18–20

8, 9, 12, 13 103 Park 8, 9, 12, 13
21 103 Park, Huizenga 21
Overall
Outcome
1–21

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED