FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 26, 2020

14976249 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 26, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/976,249 12/21/2015 Cynthia M. NEUBECKER 83588161 1080
28395 7590 08/26/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
ELCHANTI, ZEINA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/26/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CYNTHIA M. NEUBECKER
and OMAR MAKKE

Appeal 2020-002636
Application 14/976,249
Technology Center 3600

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DAVID M. KOHUT, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.

KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Appeal Br. Front Page. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Ford
Global Technologies, LLC.” Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 14/976,249

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s invention relates to a “wireless parking meter payment.”
Spec. ¶ 1. Independent claims 1, 7, and 14, reproduced below, are
illustrative of argued subject matter.
l. A system comprising:
a processor, included in a parking meter system, configured to:
add time to a parking meter in response to wirelessly receiving
a request to add additional time from a vehicle computer,
including charging a payment method, included with the
request, for the added time, the request being received in
response to a notification sent by the processor to the vehicle
computer a predetermined amount of time before time on the
parking meter expires.
7. A system comprising:
a vehicle-based processor configured to:
wirelessly request addition of a specified time amount to a
parking meter, in response to a wireless instruction having been
received from a mobile device, the instruction including the
specified time amount.
14. A computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving a wireless notification at a vehicle computer from a
parking meter that time is about to expire;
sending a first request from the vehicle computer to a mobile
device requesting an amount of time to add to the parking meter;
and
sending a second request to the parking meter from the vehicle
computer to add a specified amount of time, included in an
instruction received responsive to the first request.
Appeal Br., Claims Appendix.
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Rejections
Claims 1, 2, 7–10, 12, 13 and 14–17 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Gupta (US 2017/0120846 A1;
May 4, 2017).2 Final Act. 5–8.
Claims 3 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Gupta and Kim (US 9,390,567 B2; July 12, 2016). Final Act. 8–10.
Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Gupta and Shangguan (US 2016/0071172 A1; Mar. 10, 2016).
Final Act. 10–11.
Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Gupta and Moran (US 2017/0032584 A1; Feb. 2, 2017). Final Act. 11–12.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Gupta and Levy (US 2016/0284137 A1; Sept. 29, 2016). Final Act. 12–13.
Claims 18 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Gupta and Tziperman (US 2013/0124270 A1; May 16,
2013). Final Act. 13–14.
Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Gupta and Levy. Final Act. 14–15.

2 The Examiner did not clarify the status of claim 13, however both the
Examiner (see PTOL-326 mailed May 15, 2019) and Appellant (see Appeal
Brief Front Page filed October 15, 2019) acknowledges the rejection of
claim 13. For purposes of this appeal, we treat dependent claim 13 as
rejected based upon its dependency on rejected claim 7.
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OPINION
Claims 1 and 2
For the following reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in the rejection
of claim 1. Dependent claim 2 is not separately argued. Appeal Br. 7. We
accordingly sustain the rejections of claims 1 and 2.
Gupta’s invention is a vehicle computer that facilitates parking
enforcement. Gupta Abst. In the at-issue process (Final Act. 6; Ans. 7–9), a
vehicle owner (computer 104) pays for an electronic parking receipt by an
undisclosed manner and stores the parking receipt to the vehicle
(computer 110). Gupta ¶ 76. The parking meter (computer 102) wirelessly
communicates with the vehicle to request and read the parking receipt.
Id. ¶¶ 25–26, 72–73, 107, 117; Figs. 6A(prong C), D. The request causes
the vehicle to remind the vehicle owner that parking time needs to be
extended. Id. ¶ 76; Fig. 6D. The vehicle owner may, in response to the
reminder, pay for a new parking receipt (i.e., an updated receipt) and store
the new receipt in the vehicle. Id.
Appellant agrees with the above description of Gupta’s invention. See
Appeal Br. 6. Appellant contends, however, Gupta’s above features do not
teach the following limitation of claim 1 (paragraphing omitted): “a
processor, included in a parking meter system, configured to[] add time to a
parking meter in response to wirelessly receiving a request to add additional
time from a vehicle computer, including charging a payment method,
included with the request, for the added time.” Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br.
3–5. Specifically, Appellant contends this limitation requires the claimed
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parking meter3 to add parking time: in response to a request from a vehicle
computer; and via a payment method identified in the received request. Id.
Appellant further contends that Gupta’s parking meter does not accept
payment for parking time in response to and per a request from a vehicle.
Id. For example Appellant contends:
The Examiner cites [Gupta] paragraph [0076], wherein the
phone, not the meter, “perform[s] a monetary transaction to
extend the time[.]” [However], the claim requires that the
processor (meter) “charge” the “payment method” included in
the “request to add time.” If the “payment method” is simply
the receipt[,] as indicated by the Examiner[] . . . , then it is
utterly unclear how the meter would charge the receipt.
Notwithstanding the fact that the prior art actually tells us . . .
the charging . . . is [done by] the mobile device, not the meter.
Reply Br. 4 (addressing Gupta ¶ 76 for “the prior art actually tells us”).
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error because the Examiner finds
the claimed “add time . . . , including charging a payment method, included
with the request,” reads on a meter that allots more parking time by
accepting an electronic receipt’s confirmation of payment as both a request
and form of payment to the meter. Ans. 4–5, 10. Appellant merely alleges

3 Claim 1’s processor—i.e., the “processor . . . included in a parking meter
system [and] configured to[] add time to a parking meter”—is not
necessarily comprised by the parking meter. However, the Examiner reads
the processor and parking meter on Gupta’s parking meter. See Ans. 4–5
(discussion of Gupta’s “first electronic device 102 (i.e., the parking meter)”);
Reply Br. 4 (recognizing the rejection conflates the claimed “processor
(meter)” when reading the claim on Gupta). Therefore, to simplify our
discussion of the issues, we herein reference claim 1’s processor and parking
meter as a same device and namely as “the claimed parking meter.” We do
not thereby construe claim 1 as restricting the processor and parking meter
to a same device.
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(i.e., contends without presenting an accompanying reason) the claimed “add
time . . . , including charging a payment method, included with the request,”
does not read on Gupta’s meter allotment of more parking time in exchange
for the parking receipt. Appellant does not provide a meaning of the
claimed “charging a payment method,” much less identify a required feature
that distinguishes Gupta’s meter over accepting a receipt as a form of
payment. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Applicants
must “articulate what gaps, in fact, exist” between an argued claim feature
and applied prior art.); In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to examine the claims in
greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for nonobvious
distinctions over the prior art.”). The Specification also does not describe
such “charging” and, rather, uses the term only in the same nondescript
manner as claimed. Spec., Abst.; ¶¶ 4, 33; claim 1.
Appellant contends that Gupta provides a meaning of “charging” in
the art by “tell[ing] us . . . the [cited] charging . . . is [done] by the mobile
device [and] not the meter.” Reply Br. 4 (above block quote). However, we
note that Gupta never uses the term “charging” (or a like term, e.g.,
“charge”) in regards to a payment. Moreover, this contention actually
supports the rejection by equating the claimed “charging” to a “monetary
transaction” (Gupta ¶ 76). Reply Br. 4 (above block quote). Even assuming
(arguendo) the claimed “charging” is a monetary transaction, the
confirmation of a prior monetary payment to one entity or agent thereof
(e.g., a receipt, token, voucher, postage stamp, traveler’s check) can be
provided as a subsequent monetary payment to another entity or agent; and,
Gupta’s parking receipt is used in this manner.
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Another disputed limitation recited in claim 1 is: “the request [to add
time] being received [by the parking meter] in response to a notification sent
by the [meter] to the vehicle computer.” Appeal Br. 4–5; Reply Br. 2–5.
The Examiner finds Gupta’s cited process (supra 3–4) teaches the limitation
because the parking meter receives the parking receipt from the vehicle (i.e.,
receives a request to add time) as a consequence of (i.e., in response to)
sending the vehicle a request to check the parking receipt (i.e., sending a
notification that time will expire). Ans. 4–5. Appellant contends Gupta’s
vehicle provides the parking receipt in response to the vehicle owner’s
actions and, therefore, not “in response to a notification sent by the [parking
meter] to the vehicle computer,” as is claimed. Appeal Br. 4–5;
Reply Br. 2–5.
We are unpersuaded of error because Appellant’s arguments are not
commensurate with the scope of the claim. The disputed claim limitation
does not recite that the vehicle computer provides the request to add time in
response to the notification. Rather, the limitation recites that the claimed
parking meter (and particularly the “processor” thereof) “receive[s]” the
request to add time “in response to [the] notification.” Even assuming
(arguendo) this “receive[s] in response” language implies a corresponding
action by the recited but unclaimed vehicle computer, the language
constitutes merely an intended use of the claimed meter and particularly its
sending of the notification—to elicit a request to add time. Because Gupta’s
request to check the parking receipt (notification) is sent by the parking
meter and capable of eliciting the parking receipt (request to add time),
Gupta teaches the claimed “receive[s] in response” restriction and thus the
disputed claim limitation. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477–79
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(Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining why a claim feature’s “intended use” is taught
by prior art capable of the same use); see also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399,
1405 (CCPA 1974).4
Thus, for the reasons indicated supra, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 and dependent claim 2.
Claims 3 and 4
Appellant argues that claims 3 and 4 should be allowable for the same
reasons as independent claim 1, from which the claims depend. Appeal Br.
7. Because we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, we also sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 4.
Claim 5
Appellant argues that claim 5 should be allowable for the same
reasons as independent claim 1, from which the claim depends. Appeal Br.
7. Because we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, we also sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5.
Claim 6

4 We add that, even assuming (arguendo) the disputed claim limitation
conveys a structural or functional relationship of the claimed invention (i.e.,
of the claimed system or processor) to the unclaimed vehicle computer, the
limitation is indefinite unless the relationship defines a scope (i.e., metes and
bounds) of structure or functionality of the claimed invention itself. See e.g.,
Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1212 (BPAI 2008) (precedential)
(“[C]laim 1 attempts to claim the height of the [printer’s] paper feeding unit
in relation to a user . . . [but] fails to specify . . . a positional relationship of
the user and the printer to each other. . . . [Because a]n infinite number of
combinations of printer and user positions could be envisioned[,] . . . claim 1
does not . . . impose a structural limitation on the height of the paper feeding
unit[.]”).
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Appellant argues that claim 6 should be allowable for the same
reasons as independent claim 1, from which the claim depends. Appeal Br.
7. Because we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, we also sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6.
Claims 7–10 and 12−17
For the following reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in the rejection
of claims 7 and 14. Respectively dependent claims 8–10, 12, 13, and 15−17
are not separately argued. Appeal Br. 4–7. We accordingly sustain the
rejections of claim 7–10 and 12−17.
The disputed limitations of claims 7 and 14 are: “wirelessly request
addition of a specified time amount to a parking meter, in response to a
wireless instruction having been received from a mobile device, the
instruction including the specified time amount” (claim 7); and “sending a
second request to the parking meter from the vehicle computer to add a
specified amount of time” (claim 14). Appellant contends these limitations
do not read on Gupta’s vehicle providing a parking receipt to the parking
meter because Gupta’s “vehicle . . . is not . . . adding time,” but rather the
vehicle owner’s “device 104 is always adding the time.” Appeal Br. 6.
Appellant further contends that “at best [Gupta’s] vehicle can simply inform
the meter of a newly stored receipt that reflects time already added by the
mobile device.” Id.
We are unpersuaded because Appellant merely shows that Gupta’s
vehicle owner adds parking time to the parking receipt via a payment to the
parking system’s server 116. This transaction of the vehicle owner is
immaterial to the Examiner’s finding that the vehicle requests and pays the
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parking meter to add parking time—i.e., adds parking time to the meter via a
payment to the meter—by providing the parking receipt to the meter.
Thus, for the reasons stated supra, we sustain the rejections of claim
7–10 and 12−20.
Claim 11
Appellant argues that claim 11 should be allowable for the same
reasons as independent claim 7, from which the claim depends. Appeal Br.
8. Because we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7, we also sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11.
Claims 18 and 19
Appellant argues that claims 18 and 19 should be allowable for the
same reasons as independent claim 14, from which the claims depend.
Appeal Br. 8. Because we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14, we
also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 18 and 19.
Claim 20
Appellant argues that claim 20 should be allowable for the same
reasons as independent claim 14, from which the claim depends. Appeal Br.
8. Because we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14, we also sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20.
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OVERALL CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 7–10,
12, 14–17 102(a)(1) Gupta
1, 2, 7–10,
12, 14–17
3, 4 103 Gupta, Kim 3, 4
11 103 Gupta, Shangguan 11
5 103 Gupta, Moran 5
6 103 Gupta, Levy 6
18, 19 103 Gupta, Tziperman 18, 19
20 103 Gupta, Levy 20
Overall
Outcome 1–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED