FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 13, 2020

14220395 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 13, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/220,395 03/20/2014 Sangeetha Sangameswaran 83380333 4248
28866 7590 05/13/2020
MACMILLAN, SOBANSKI & TODD, LLC - FORD
ONE MARITIME PLAZA - FIFTH FLOOR
720 WATER STREET
TOLEDO, OH 43604
EXAMINER
HUTCHINSON, ALAN D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3669
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/13/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
MST@mstfirm.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SANGEETHA SANGAMESWARAN, MATHEW A. BOESCH,
JEFFREY A. PALIC, AARON L. MILLS, and REBECCA L. SEILER
Appeal 2019-006125
Application 14/220,395
Technology Center 3600
Before JAMES P. CALVE, WILLIAM A. CAPP, and
JEREMY M. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judges.
PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–23. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a method of controlling an engine.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of controlling an engine comprising:
automatically bringing a vehicle propelled by the engine
to a stop with a first system while a second system is active;
after a delay from the vehicle stopping, stopping the
engine of the stationary vehicle with the second system provided
a condition of the first system is met;
restarting the stopped engine with the second system upon
receipt of an input;
resuming propelling the vehicle with the first system using
the restarted engine.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Yamazaki US 2013/0296112 A1 Nov. 7, 2013
Seguchi US 2014/0207358 A1 July 24, 2014
Killy US 2015/0142265 A1 May 21, 2015
Fuji2 JP 2012206593 Oct. 25, 2012
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–4, 7–9, 13–17, 19, and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Seguchi and Killy.
Claims 1–11 and 13–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Fuji and Killy.

2 Citations are to the English language translation.
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Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Seguchi, Killy, and Yamazaki.3
Claims 12, 22, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Fuji, Killy, and Yamazaki.
OPINION
Seguchi Grounds
Appellant provides a number of arguments against the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1, including that “the examiner is eliminating ‘providing’
from the claim language.” Appeal Br. 9. The limitation in claim 1
referenced by Appellant requires “stopping the engine of the stationary
vehicle with the second system provided a condition of the first system is
met.” Similar to claim 1, claim 13 recites “stopping the engine of the
stationary vehicle with the second system based upon a status of the first
system.” Appellant provides similar arguments for claim 13. Appeal Br. 13.
The examiner’s findings for the limitations noted above in claims 1
and 13 are similar. See Final Act. 3, 5. For simplicity, we discuss claim 1,
with the understanding that the discussion applies equally to claim 13. The
Examiner finds that Seguchi’s adaptive cruise control system (“ACC”)
(ACC ECU 11) corresponds to recited “first system” and idle stop system
(idle stop ECU 10) corresponds to the recited “second system.” Id. 3. With
respect to the disputed limitation noted above, the Examiner finds that
Seguchi teaches “stopping the engine (8) of the stationary vehicle with the

3 The rejection of claims 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Seguchi,
Killy, and Yamazaki was withdrawn by the Examiner in the Answer.
Ans. 4.
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second system (10) provided a condition (ACC is active) of the first system
(11) is met.” Id. (citing Seguchi ¶ 7). Paragraph 7 of Seguchi explains:
The invention provides a control device and control method for
a vehicle, which are able to improve convenience at the time
when an automatically stopped internal combustion engine is
automatically started in the case where ACC and an idle stop
control are executed together.
Appellant contends that “Seguchi allows for the ACC to be inactive (not just
‘active’).” Appeal Br. 9.
In response to Appellant’s contentions, the Examiner indicates general
disagreement, and reproduces the language of Seguchi’s paragraph 7.
Ans. 6. The Examiner then “concedes that Seguchi discloses a method that
can take different paths dependent upon ACC being activated or not (see at
least Fig 2, S2),” but “notes that Seguchi only discloses th[e] ACC NOT
being executed after the idle control begins stopping the engine.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). The Examiner reasons that “[b]ecause Seguchi
discloses that the idle stop and the ACC are executed together at the start of
the method . . . the ACC must have been deactivated after the idle stop has
begun stopping the engine.” Id. at 6–7.
Based on the Examiner’s mapping of Seguchi’s teachings to those
recited in claim 1, the Examiner’s findings require that Seguchi’s adaptive
cruise control system brings the vehicle to a stop while the idle stop system
is active. After a delay from the vehicle being stopped by the adaptive
cruise control system, the engine of the stationary vehicle is stopped with
Seguchi’s idle stop system provided a condition of its adaptive cruise control
system is met.
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Figure 2 of Seguchi, referenced by the Examiner as noted above, is
reproduced below.

Seguchi’s Figure 2 provides “a flowchart that shows the procedure of
automatically starting an internal combustion engine.” Seguchi ¶ 21.
As Appellant explains, Seguchi’s “[p]aragraph [0007] discusses a
condition for automatically starting, not ‘stopping’ the engine.”
Appeal Br. 9. The control scheme in Seguchi’s Figure 2 depicts a scenario
at step S2, referenced by the Examiner, when the engine is already stopped
using the idle stop system. A determination is subsequently made at step S4
or S7 regarding when to re-start the engine. The Examiner fails to provide
sufficient basis to support a find that these portions of Seguchi teach
“stopping the engine of the stationary vehicle with the [idle stop] system
provided a condition of the [adaptive cruise control] system is met.” Simply
stated, the rejection fails because these portions of Seguchi have already
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stopped the engine using the idle stop system before any evaluation is made
regarding the adaptive cruise control system.
The Examiner further explains that
even assuming that the ACC is not activated at the time of the
automatic stopping, (which the Examiner does not concede) the
claims merely say “stopping the engine . . . provided a condition
. . . is met” and NOT --stopping the engine . . . only provided . . .
a condition . . . is met-- in the claimed language, the reference
must merely disclose stopping the engine provided a condition is
met, but does not preclude the reference from stopping the engine
in other conditions.
Ans. 7. Appellant responds that “the examiner reads the word ‘provided’
out of the claim language in limiting the action of the second step of claim 1
to the condition of the first system having to be met.” Reply Br. 4.
Appellant is correct that the Examiner fails to give any meaning to the
“provided” limitation under his reading of the claim. Although the claim
allows for the engine to be stopped under a variety of different conditions, it
implicitly requires a determination that “a condition of the first system is
met” in order to stop the engine as one of those conditions. That is, because
the Examiner relies on Seguchi as teaching this limitation, the Examiner
needs a finding that in at least one instance, Seguchi teaches “stopping the
engine of the stationary vehicle with the [idle stop] system provided a
condition of the [adaptive cruise control] system is met.” As explained
above, the Examiner has failed to establish such a finding.
Claims 2–4, 7–9, and 12 depend from claim 1. Claims 14–17, 19, and
21 depend from claim 13. The stated bases for the rejections of these claims
do not cure the deficiencies noted above in the rejection of claims 1 and 13.
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For the reasons set forth above, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–4, 7–9, 12–17, 19, and 21.
Fuji Grounds
In the rejection of claims 1–11 and 13–21, Appellant does not dispute
any finding made by the Examiner in relation to Fuji. Rather, Appellant
focuses on the teachings of Killy and the Examiner’s proposed combination
of those teachings with the teachings of Fuji. Appeal Br. 16–21.
Appellant’s contentions for the rejection of claim 13 are identical to
those presented for claim 1.4 See Appeal Br. 16–21. Appellant does not
present separate arguments for claims 2–11 and 14–21. See id. at 19, 21.
For simplicity, we discuss the rejection of claim 1 and Appellant’s response
in connection with claim 1, with the understanding that our discussion also
applies claim 13.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 13 relies on Fuji teaching
the majority of the limitations recited in those claims, but finds that “Fuji
appears to be silent as to after a delay from the vehicle stopping.” Final
Act. 8.5 The Examiner finds that “Killy . . . teaches after a delay from the
vehicle stopping, stopping the engine of the stationary vehicle with the
second system provided a condition of the first system is met.” Id.
Specifically, the Examiner explains that
Killy teaches that “when performing a parking maneuver or a
parking-like maneuver, the driver may (1) stop the car, (2) turn

4 Appellant appears to have simply reproduced the contentions for claim 1
when addressing claim 13, even mistakenly referencing claim 1 rather than
claim 13 in those contentions. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 20–21.
5 The Examiner’s findings and rationale are the same for the portions of the
rejection of claims 1 and 13 in dispute. See Final Act. 8–9.
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the steering wheel” and consequently “an engine auto stop is
inhibited” until “a time since the delay is greater than a
threshold” i.e. Killy teaches that the vehicle is stopped and the
engine auto stop is delayed so as to allow the vehicle to perform
necessary maneuvers).
Appeal Br. 17 (citing Killy ¶¶ 21–23, Fig. 4). The Examiner reasons that
“[i]t would have been obvious . . . to provide the invention of Seguchi with
. . . a delay from the vehicle stopping . . . to ensure that the engine is
available to permit maneuvers necessary for the ACC can be performed.”
Id. The Examiner further explains that “all the claimed elements were
known in the prior art and . . . could have [been] combined . . . by known
methods with no change in their respective functions, and . . . would have
yielded predictable results.” Id.
Appellant contends that Killy does not provide the teaching missing
from Fuji because “it also does not teach or suggest a delay from the vehicle
stopping before stopping the engine provided a condition of the first system
(ACC of Fuji as cited by the examiner) is met.” Appeal Br. 16. Appellant
explains that “Killy (see Abstract, [0006]) is directed to a power steering
system, with the delay in an automatic engine stop if the current drawn by
the electric power steering system is above a threshold-thus not related to the
ACC of Fuji at all.” Id. at 17. Noting the Examiner’s citation to paragraphs
21–23 of Killy, Appellant contends that: (1) “Paragraph [0021] is directed
to the graph of Fig. 3 and does not seem to indicate the vehicle stopping, as
recited in the claim, as none of the graph lines appears to end at zero speed;”
(2) “Paragraph [0022] . . . again repeats . . . that an engine automatic stop
may be delayed based on power steering current being drawn––this process
checks not only the speed threshold (step 310), but also whether the brakes
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are applied (step 314);” and (3) The “end of paragraph [0022] through
paragraph [0023] further discusses Fig. 4,” where “[i]f no parking maneuver
is detected (step 324), then there is no delay mentioned, which is not
consistent with the claim language.” Id. Appellant “note[s] that unless the
driver is applying the brakes (step 314) and does not release them (step 320),
there is no automatic engine stop (step 332)––this is the opposite of Fuji
where the ACC system is braking, not a driver being required to apply the
brakes in Killy.” Id. Appellant explains that Killy’s “method only reaches
this step 358 when the brakes are manually applied (step 314) and not
released (step 320), thus ACC would not be active.”6 Id.
The Examiner responds that “Appellant appears to argue against the
references individually.” Ans. 10. The Examiner explains that “Fuji
discloses an ACC stopping a vehicle and Killy teaches a driver stopping a
vehicle,” which are “both methods of stopping a vehicle [that] are well
known.” Id. at 11. The Examiner explains that “a person of ordinary skill
could easily have realized that the substitution of one known element for
another would have yielded predictable results,” and “a person of ordinary
skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton, and it is not
necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable,
without change, to render obvious the invention under review.” Id. The
Examiner further explains that “a person having ordinary skill in the art
would have the requisite common sense and creativity to realize how to
modify an engine idle stop after stopping from a driver to include a delay to

6 Step 358 “determines whether a time since the delay is greater than a
threshold.” Killy ¶ 23.
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said stopping” and “that it was capable of being used on an engine idle stop
after stopping from an ACC.” Id.
Appellant contends that
the examiner’s reasons for combining with Killy “so as to assure
that the engine is available to permit maneuvers necessary for
ACC can be performed” does not seem to make sense since the
claim language in the first step is to stop the vehicle and the claim
language in the second step is applied to the stationary (i.e., not
parking maneuvering) vehicle.
Appeal Br. 18. Appellant’s contention does not apprise us of error because
it, in fact, does make sense to delay stopping Fuji’s engine as explained by
the Examiner. Even with the vehicle stopped, permitting maneuvers by the
ACC means that resumed vehicle activity (e.g., resumed movement based on
the ACC control) can occur without first requiring a vehicle re-start.
Although Killy’s delay is directed to a different situation (parking,
rather than cruise control), the idea of including a delay is effectively for the
same purpose. The delay is meant to prevent the engine idle stop when such
operation may not be desirable. This is done in Killy to prevent engine idle
stop when a person is attempting to park. In the Examiner’s proposed
modification to Fuji, this is to prevent engine idle stop when the vehicle is
momentarily stopped based on ACC protocol (i.e., to control the following
distance from a vehicle) and to allow resumed acceleration and cruising in
such situations without unnecessary delay from an overly sensitive engine
idle stop system.
We are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s rejection because
Appellant does not apprise us of any erroneous findings and, contrary to
appellant’s contentions, the rationale provided by the Examiner does make
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sense, as explained above. Appellant does not provide separate argument for
the patentability of dependent claims 2–11 and 14–21. Appeal Br. 19, 21.
Claim 12 depends from claim 1. Appellant relies on the contentions
regarding claim 1 for the patentability of claim 12, which are unpersuasive
for the reasons explained above. Appeal Br. 22.
Claim 22 is independent, and claim 23 depends from claim 22. Claim
22 requires “holding the vehicle stationary with the first system, without
manual braking and while the second system keeps the engine stopped.”
The Examiner considers Fuji’s ACC system as the recited “first system” and
its idle stop system as the recited “second system.” Final Act. 12. The
Examiner finds that Fuji teaches holding the vehicle stationary with the ACC
system, but also “restart[ing] the engine [with the idle stop system] prior to
releasing the brakes.” Id. at 13. The Examiner finds that “Yamazaki
however teaches manually releasing the brake while the first and second
systems are activated and the engine stopped; holding the vehicle stationary
with the first system, without manual braking while keep[ing] the engine
stopped.” Id. (citing Yamazaki ¶ 23).
The Examiner simply proposes further modifying the teachings of
Fuji with those of Yamazaki, such that the vehicle is held in a stopped
condition with ACC without manual braking without first restarting the
engine. Final Act. 13–14. The Examiner explains that
all of the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one
skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed
by known methods with no change in their respective functions,
and the combination would have yielded predictable results to
one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing.
Id.; see also Ans. 12 (providing similar explanation).
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Appellant contends that Yamazaki does not overcome the deficiency
in Fuji because “[t]he system cited in Yamazaki, being hill hold, does not
teach that the first (ACC) and second (ESS) systems are activated as they are
not relevant to Yamazaki.” Appeal Br. 23. The Examiner has the better
position.
As the Examiner explains, “Appellant appears to argue against the
references individually.” Ans. 12. The Examiner does not rely on
Yamazaki teaching ACC and idle stop control systems that are active during
the hill hold operation. The rejection is based on “Fuji disclos[ing] the use
of idle stop control on an uphill slope and ensuring the vehicle remains
stationary without the brake operation by the driver.” Id. (citing Fuji ¶¶ 5,
26, 38). The Examiner explains that “Yamazaki . . . teaches a method by
which a vehicle can remain motionless on an incline while the engine is off
and the brake pedal is manually released,” and explains that the rejection
proposes “modify[ing] the hillhold of Fuji with the methods of Yamazaki.”
Id. These findings are not disputed.
Although Appellant alleges that “[t]he Examiner admitted that . . .
Fuji” does not “hold the vehicle stationary with the first system, without
manual braking and while the second system keeps the engine stopped”
(Appeal Br. 23), the Examiner finds that Fuji teaches “holding the vehicle
stationary with the first system (ACC) while the second system (idle stop)
keeps the engine stopped” (Final Act. 13). Holding the vehicle stationary
with the ACC system is holding that vehicle stationary without the user
manually braking.
Appellant also alleges a teaching away from the proposed
modification in Fuji, but identifies nothing that disparages the proposed
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modification, which appears to be nothing more than use of the normal
features of an ACC system.
Accordingly, we are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s decision
to reject claims 22 and 23.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections based on Seguchi and various other
references are reversed, and the rejections based on Fuji and various other
references are affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 7–9,
13–17, 19,
21
103 Seguchi, Killy 1–4, 7–9,
13–17, 19,
21
12 103 Seguchi, Killy,
Yamazaki
12
1–11, 13–
21
103 Fuji, Killy 1–11, 13–
21

12, 22, 23 103 Fuji, Killy,
Yamazaki
12, 22, 23
Overall
Outcome
1–23
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED