FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 26, 2020

2019005721 (P.T.A.B. May. 26, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/342,891 11/03/2016 Frederic STEFAN 83741933 5146
28395 7590 05/26/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
MUSTAFA, IMRAN K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3665
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/26/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FREDERIC STEFAN, UWE GUSSEN, and
CHRISTOPH ARNDT
Appeal 2019-005721
Application 15/342,891
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–6, 8–10, and 12–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford
Global Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 15/342,891

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to Appellant, “[t]he disclosure relates to a method and to a
system for preventing driver concentration errors when driving a motor
vehicle.” Spec. ¶ 2. Independent claims 1 and 15, reproduced below, are
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for preventing driver concentration
errors comprising:
acquiring parameters that characterize a current driving
situation of a vehicle;
calculating, based on the acquired parameters, a current
level of monotony as a characterization of a monotony of the
current driving situation;
checking whether the calculated current level of
monotony exceeds a predetermined threshold; and
driving according to a specified behavior to increase
concentration on driving the motor vehicle when the threshold
is exceeded.
15. A method for improving driving focus comprising:
in response to acquired driving parameters, via an
acquisition device, indicative of a monotony level of a driving
situation being above a predetermined threshold, instructing a
driver, via an exercise module, to perform an exercise to
increase a concentration level, wherein the exercise is a set of
exercises performed at predefined times specified by a preset
schedule.
REJECTION AND PRIOR ART
The Examiner rejects the claims as follows:
I. Claims 1–3, 6, 8–10, 12–17, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Demirdjian et al. (US 2010/0219955 A1,
published Sept. 2, 2010) (“Demirdjian”) and Kuntzel
(US 2012/0154156 A1, published June 21, 2012); and
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II. Claims 4, 5, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Demirdjian, Kuntzel, and Nordbruch et al.
(US 2014/0371981 A1, published Dec. 18, 2014)
(“Nordbruch”).
ANALYSIS
Rejection I—Obviousness rejection of claims 1–3, 6, 8–10, 12–17,
and 20
Independent claim 1, and its dependent claims 2, 3, and 8
The Examiner finds that Demirdjian discloses most of independent
claim 1’s recitations, but fails to teach the claim recitation of “driving
according to a specified behavior to increase concentration on driving the
motor vehicle when the threshold is exceeded,” which the Examiner finds
Kuntzel discloses in paragraph 46. Final Action 4–5. Appellant argues that
the Examiner errs because “Kuntzel simply issues a ‘sharp wake-up
alarm . . . if the higher alarm threshold is reached,’” and “does not explicitly
pertain to ‘driving behavior’ within the context of the claims.” Appeal
Br. 5–6. For the following reasons, we disagree with Appellant.
Kuntzel “relates to a method to wake up a sleeping motor vehicle
driver.” Kuntzel ¶ 1. Kuntzel teaches alerting a driver with a “wake-up
alarm” based on detection systems that monitor driver inactivity and vehicle
motion cross pre-determined thresholds. Id. ¶ 12. Kuntzel teaches a “sharp”
alarm, such as in the situation where if a steering wheel activity threshold is
exceeded, “a sharp wake-alarm . . . is initiated to wake up the driver . . . by
means of a mechanical vibration . . . generated in the steering wheel.” Id.
¶ 35.
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In addition, Kuntzel teaches a “mild warning alarm,” where an
active driver, who is being alerted by a mild warning alarm . . .
may be expected to take necessary actions to eliminate the
situation, which caused the alarm. Such actions may be to
activate the travelling direction indicator, which ought to be
used when changing lanes, or to bring back the vehicle into a
better lane position by corrective steering or to brake the
vehicle to avoid an indicated danger.
Id. ¶ 46. Kuntzel explains that a “sleeping/inactive driver may not take
notice of the mild alarm . . . and thereafter [the] sharp wake-up alarm . . .
will consequently follow, if the higher alarm threshold is reached.” Id.
Appellant’s Specification describes “acquiring . . . parameters that
characterize the current driving situation and are suitable for calculating a
level of monotony.” Spec. ¶ 37 (cited at Appeal Br. 2). The parameters are
used to calculate a current level of monotony, which is checked against a
threshold. Id. ¶¶ 38–39 (cited at Appeal Br. 2). If the threshold is exceeded,
“a selection . . . of exercises for the driver is offered,” where “the driver is
first presented with a plurality of different exercises. This can be done by a
voice output or a display on a screen, for example.” Id. ¶¶ 40, 42. The
Specification further teaches that “[e]xamples of exercises are driving
according to a specified driving behavior,” and that an “example of a
specified driving behavior as an exercise may be a change of lane, driving at
a certain speed, decelerating or accelerating slightly, assuming a certain
lateral alignment of the vehicle inside a lane, switching on a high beam or a
direction indicator, and the like.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 45.
Although claim 1 does not recite a manner by which a driver is alerted
when a level of monotony exceeds a threshold, some notice to the driver is
implied in the claim, and described in the Specification. See id. ¶ 17 (“[T]he
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driver can be invited to change lanes, to drive at a certain speed, to
decelerate or accelerate slightly, to assume a certain lateral alignment of the
vehicle inside a lane, or to switch on a high beam or direction indicator.”)
(emphasis added). We interpret Kuntzel’s mild alarm as a form of invitation
for the driver to take action that meets this implied notice.
Kuntzel further teaches driver actions that include “to bring back the
vehicle into a better lane position by corrective steering or to brake the
vehicle to avoid an indicated danger.” Kuntzel ¶ 46 (cited at Final
Action 5). These actions meet the claim language of “driving according to a
specified behavior,” because the actions are consistent with the example in
the Specification as forms of “decelerating or accelerating slightly, assuming
a certain lateral alignment of the vehicle inside a lane.” Spec. ¶ 45.
Because Appellant has not demonstrated persuasively that the
rejection is erroneous, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2, 3,
and 8, which are not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 7.
Dependent claim 6
Dependent claim 6 recites “wherein calculating the current level of
monotony accounts for previous levels of monotony over one or more of a
specified time period and a specified distance.” The Examiner finds that
Demirdjian teaches the claim recitation at paragraph 45. Final Action 6.
The Examiner determines that because Demirdjian teaches “continuously
determining” and “continuously monitoring the driver performance,”
Demirdjian thus teaches “determining [a] previous[] level of monotony over
a specified time and distance as the driver is driving along a road.”
Answer 6. Appellant argues that the Examiner errs because “Demirdjian
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discloses various categories of exercises, but does not describe any previous
levels of monotony.” Appeal Br. 7.
We agree with Appellant that continuous monitoring, and continuous
determination, do not necessarily involve a “previous levels of monotony.”
Thus, the Examiner has not shown that Demirdjian relies on any previous
level of monotony in the determination of driver fatigue. Instead, the
Examiner points out the monitored level of monotony is compared to a
threshold, not a previous level monitored. Answer 6. Accordingly, we do
not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 6.
Dependent claim 9
We are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s argument that “Demirdjian
does not disclose such exercises at “certain times given by a preset
schedule,’” as recited in dependent claim 9. Appeal Br. 8.
Specifically, we agree with the Examiner that this limitation is taught
in paragraph 11 of Demirdjian. Answer 6. This portion of Demirdjian,
which summarizes the invention, states that the “data processor also
provides a drowsiness reduction exercise to the driver at predetermined time
intervals.” Demirdjian ¶ 11. A preset schedule would encompass
predetermined time intervals. For this reason, we sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of dependent claim 9.
Independent claim 10, and its dependent claims 13, and 14
The Examiner finds that independent claim 10 is similar to claim 1,
and rejects claim 10 using the same rationale as claim 1. Final Action 6.
Independent claim 10, which recites “to present an exercise such that
a driver drives according to a specified behavior,” is argued primarily by
reference to the arguments advanced for claim 1, and that “Kuntzel does not
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‘present an exercise such that a driver drives according to a specified
behavior.’” Appeal Br. 6.
Appellant’s Specification describes that:
[D]riving according to a specified driving behavior is
performed as an exercise for the driver. For example, the driver
can be invited to change lanes, to drive at a certain speed, to
decelerate or accelerate slightly, to assume a certain lateral
alignment of the vehicle inside a lane, or to switch on a high
beam or direction indicator.
Spec. ¶ 17.
The claimed presentation of an “exercise,” which does not appear in
claim 1, is nonetheless similar in meaning to the language of claim 1, in that
the presentation corresponds to the implied invitation in claim 1, and the
exercise corresponds to the actions for “driving according to a specified
behavior.” Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 10 for the same reasons as for claim 1. We also sustain
the rejection of dependent claims 13 and 14, which are not argued
separately. See Appeal Br. 7.
Dependent claim 12
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 12
is erroneous for “the same reasons” as claim 9. Because we sustain the
claim 9’s obviousness rejection (supra), we also sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of dependent claim 12.
Independent Claim 15, and its dependent claims 16 and 17
The Examiner finds that independent claim 15 is similar to claim 1,
and rejects claim 15 using the same rationale as claim 1. Final Action 6.
Appellant argues that the Examiner errs because “[n]either Demirdjian nor
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Kuntzel teach[es] such instructions to a driver where the instructions include
an exercise that is ‘a set of exercises performed at predefined times specified
by a preset schedule.’” Appeal Br. 6.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, however, because we
agree with Examiner that the limitation is taught in Demirdjian’s
paragraph 11. Answer 5. This portion of Demirdjian, which summarizes the
invention, states that the “data processor also provides a drowsiness
reduction exercise to the driver at predetermined time intervals.”
Demirdjian ¶ 11. A preset schedule would encompass predetermined time
intervals.
For this reason, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claim 15. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 16
and 17 because they are not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 7.
Dependent claim 20
Dependent claim 20 recites a similar recitation as that discussed above
with respect to claim 6. Further, the Examiner’s rationale for rejecting
claim 20 is similar to that of claim 6. Thus, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 20 for the same reasons that we
do not sustain claim 6’s rejection.
Rejection II—Obviousness rejection of claims 4, 5, 18, and 19
With respect to the dependent claim 4, the Examiner finds that
Nordbruch teaches “wherein the acquired parameters include at least one
live status parameter for characterizing a vehicle status.” Final Action 7.
This section of Nordbruch discloses, in relevant part, “the monitoring device
encompasses one or more sensors.” Nordbruch ¶ 46.
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We are not persuaded that the Examiner errs by Appellant’s argument
that “Nordbruch does not appear to have anything to do with ‘preventing
driver concentration errors,’ but instead is directed to mimicking driver
behavior though autonomous driver assistance systems.” Appeal Br. 9.
The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). In this
case, the Examiner supports adequately that the use of Nordbruch’s sensors
with components of Demirdjian and Kuntzel yields predictable results; and,
Appellant does not persuasively argue otherwise. See, e.g., Answer 7; see
also Final Action 6. To the extent that Appellant is arguing that Nordbruch
is non-analogous art, Appellant fails to establish that the art is from a
different field of endeavor than the claimed invention, or that the reference is
not reasonably pertinent to the particular problem faced by the inventor. See
In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claim 4. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claim 18,
which Appellant argues for the “same reasons” as claim 4. Appeal Br. 9.
Appellant does not argue against the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of dependent claims 5 and 19. Thus, inasmuch as we sustain the
rejection of independent claims 1 and 15 from which claims 5 and 19
depend, we sustain the rejection of these dependent claims.

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CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1–5,
8–10, and 12–19.
We REVERSE the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 6
and 20.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 6,
8–10,
12–17,
20
103 Demirdjian,
Kuntzel
1–3, 8–10,
12–17
6, 20
4, 5, 18,
19
103 Demirdjian,
Kuntzel, Nordbruch
4, 5, 18, 19
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 8–10,
12–19
6, 20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART