Floyd Cadwell et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 2, 201915044338 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/044,338 02/16/2016 Floyd CADWELL 83612764 1083 28395 7590 08/02/2019 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL 1000 TOWN CENTER 22ND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 EXAMINER WERNER, ROBERT A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3747 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/02/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte FLOYD CADWELL, SHUNSUKE OKUBO, CAROL LOUISE OKUBO, AND KIMBERLY LOUISE TRICE Appeal 2019-000656 Application 15/044,338 Technology Center 3700 Before LINDA E. HORNER, DANIEL S. SONG, AND BRETT C. MARTIN, Administrative Patent Judges. MARTIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant,1 FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global Technologies, LLC ("Assignee"), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Michigan, and having a place of business at Fairlane Plaza South, 330 Town Center Drive, Suite 800, Dearborn, MI 48126, as set forth in the assignment recorded in the USPTO. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2019-000656 Application 15/044,338 2 claims 1–20, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a hybrid vehicle and method of reducing engine lugging. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A vehicle comprising: an electric machine; an engine; an engine mount securing the engine to the vehicle; and a controller configured to, in response to compression of the engine mount, increase an engine speed to a value that is greater than a base engine speed corresponding to electric machine speed and engine power demand to reduce engine lugging. REFERENCE The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: KOBAYASHI US 2014/0024491 A1 Jan. 23, 2014 REJECTIONS Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 2. Claims 1–2, 7–8, 13, 15, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Kobayashi. Final Act. 5. Appeal 2019-000656 Application 15/044,338 3 OPINION Written Description The Examiner rejects the claims as lacking written description. See Final Act. 2–3. According to the Examiner, “[t]he original disclosure does not describe how compression of the engine mount is determined in a manner understandable to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Final Act. 3. The Examiner also asserts that this is the case both with the measurement of the magnitude of the compression based on displacement of the engine relative to the vehicle and estimation of the compression based on a wheel torque demand and vehicle speed as recited in various dependent claims. Id. As Appellant correctly points out, however, “[t]he Examiner’s admission that the original disclosure specifies that the disclosed sensors measure displacement and that such sensors are known in the art is in direct contradiction with” the Examiner’s assertion regarding the knowledge of an ordinary skill in the art. Reply Br. 3. Although Appellant does not disclose any specific sensors, we agree that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the disclosed general class of displacement sensors is sufficient. The Examiner has identified no specific problem associated with the application at issue such that ordinary displacement sensors would be unsuitable. As to the claimed estimate of the compression, we agree with Appellant that “the current application clearly states that compression of the engine mounts increases as wheel torque increases . . . that wheel torque is a function of vehicle speed[, and t]herefore, engine mount compression is at least indirectly a function of vehicle speed.” Appeal Br. 5 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 31, 33). We find this description to be a sufficient disclosure to support Appeal 2019-000656 Application 15/044,338 4 Appellant’s claim language. Accordingly, we do not sustain the § 112 rejection. Anticipation The Examiner’s rejection over Kobayashi relies on a disclosure in Kobayashi that considers potential over-torque, which would result in engine compression if enacted, thus triggering an increase in engine speed. Final Act. 5 (citing Kobayashi ¶¶ 40, 46‒48); Ans. 9‒10 (citing Kobayashi ¶¶ 42, 46, Fig. 7). The claims, however, require actual compression of the engine mount to trigger the speed increase. See Appeal Br. 8 (Appellant arguing that “[s]imply checking if a desired torque is greater than an engine start to[r]que threshold (which happens to be less than a value where engine mounting compression occurs) is not an indicator that engine mount compression is occurring (which is a trigger condition for adjusting the engine speed in claims 1 and 15).”). Kobayashi runs a series of calculations to determine if engine mount compression would occur under the given parameters and then adjusts the parameters to avoid such engine mount compression. One could say that Kobayashi provides a superior alternative to Appellant’s method in that it avoids any compression at all by adjusting before such compression is experienced, but regardless, Kobayashi’s method is different from Appellant’s claims. The Examiner asserts that “[n]owhere is a ‘trigger’ claimed.” Ans. 9. We do not agree that this is a proper interpretation of the claims. Claim 1, for example, specifically requires that “in response to compression of the engine mount,” a controller is configured to “increase an engine speed.” Thus, actual engine mount compression must occur and then the controller Appeal 2019-000656 Application 15/044,338 5 increases speed to alleviate the compression. Independent claims 8 and 15 recite similar limitations. As noted above, Kobayashi never gets to actual compression because it runs a calculation to avoid such a condition. Appellant’s claims require a triggering condition by use of the phrase “in response to.” Although both Kobayashi and Appellant’s claims seek to achieve the same basic result, they do so in different ways such that Appellant’s claims do not read on Kobayashi. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections over Kobayashi. DECISION The Examiner’s rejections are REVERSED. More specifically, we REVERSE the Examiner’s written description rejection as well as the anticipation rejection over Kobayashi. REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation