Floors, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 12, 1966

158 N.L.R.B. 848 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

848 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of the service of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.1o
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that unless on or before 20 days from the date of
this Decision and Recommended Order the Respondent has notified the said Regional
Director, in writing, that it will comply with the foregoing Recommendations, the
National Labor Relations Board issue an Order requiring the action aforesaid.
10 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL UNION No. 164, INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encourage any individual employed by
K & Z Electric Company to engage in, a strike or refusal in the course of his
employment to use, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, or commodities or to perform any services; or threaten, coerce,
or restrain K & Z Electric Company, with an object of forcing and requiring
K & Z Electric Company to cease doing business with East Rutherford Steel
Erectors, Inc.
LOCAL UNION No. 164, INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If members have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 614
National Newark Building, 744 Broad Street, Newark, New Jersey, Telephone No.
645-3088.
Floors, Inc. and Building Service Employees International
Union, Local No. 105, AFL-CIO. Case No. 27-C,41828.
May 12, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 11, 1966, Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway issued
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. He also found that allegations of additional unfair labor prac-
tices set forth in the complaint had not been sustained. Thereafter, the
General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief and Respond-
ent filed a reply brief to the General Counsel's exceptions.
158 NLRB No. 83.
FLOORS, INC 849
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Jenkins and Zagoria]
The Board has reviewed the iuhngs of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds no prejudicial error The rulings are hereby
afliimed The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision,
the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and
hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, con(lusions, and
recommendations i
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order ]
1In the absence of exceptions thereto we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner's find
logs of violations of Sections 8(a) (1) and (2) of the Act
We find it unnecessary to decide whether Respondent violated Se(tion 8(a) (1) by
allowing a speech to be given by Phillip Parsons the building manager to its employees
inasmuch as the remedy for such violation would be the same as the remedy for the
8(a) (1) violation which we have found Accord ugly we do not pass upon General
Counsels exception to the Trial Examinei 's failure to find that this speech violated
Section 8 ( a) (1) of the Act
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Outline of the Proceedings
Floois, Inc, is the Respondent herein Building Service Employees International
Union, Local No 105, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , filed a charge against
Respondent on May 21, 1965, alleging violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by
reason of the discharge of one Williams Thereafter on June 1, 1965, the Union
filed a first amended chaige, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, by the discharge of said Williams and of one Acosta The Union, on July 7,
1965, filed a second amended charge alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (2),
and (3) of the Act, the latter section based on the discharge of Acosta alone
The complaint, based on the first and second amended charges , was issued on
July 13, 1965 The Respondent duly find an answer dated July 20, 1965 The filing
date thereof does not appear in the record , but a copy was received in the Branch
Office of the Division of Trial Examiners on July 22, 1965 On September 17, 1965,
the General Counsel issued an amendment to the complaint , amending paragraph
VI thereof in minor respects
Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held before Trial Examiner James R Heming-
way in Denver, Colorado, on October 5 and 6 , 1965 Subsequent to the close of the
hearing the parties filed briefs with me
Issues
1 Whether or not Respondent coercively interrogated employees about their union
memberships , activities , and desires , threatened reduction of work opportunities if
they selected the Union, threatened an employee with loss of his job because of his
activities on behalf of and/or membership in the Union
2 Whether or not Respondent had dominated and/or interfered with the forma-
tion and/or administration of a labor organization
3 Whether or not Respondent discharged Max Acosta because of his activities on
behalf of and/or his membership in the Union
From my observation of the witnesses and upon the entire record in the case,,
I make the following
1 Certain errors having been discovered in the transcript of testimony the said tran
script is hereby amended
221-731-67-vol 158-55
850 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS
The complaint alleges and the answer admits that Respondent is, and has been
at all times material herein, a corporation duly organized under, and existing by
virtue of, the laws of the State of Georgia.
At all times material herein, Respondent has maintained its principal office and
place of business in Atlanta, Georgia, within which State it performs janitorial serv-
ices valued in substantial amounts.
At all times material herein, Respondent has maintained a branch office and place
of business in Denver, Colorado, and has been at all times material herein engaged
in said place of business in furnishing of janitorial services.
During the year immediately preceding the date of the complaint, Respondent, in
the course and conduct of its business operations, performed services valued in excess
of $50,000 of which services valued in excess of $50,000 were performed in States
other than the State of Georgia.
Jurisdiction is not contested. I find that the Board has jurisdiction and that it
will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this case .2
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the
Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Description of the office building
The Security Life Building, owned by Mid-America Building Corporation, is a
30-story office building in the business section of Denver, Colorado, at the corner
of 16th Street and Glenarm Place, with its other two sides bounded by alleys. The
building is a comparatively new one, completed in 1963. A public restaurant, pre-
sumably open into the night, is located on the 30th floor of the building. It is serviced
by an elevator which currently makes no stops between the ground and 30th floor .3
There are entrances to the lobby of the building from 16th Street and from Glen-
arm Place 4 as well as doors leading to each of the two alleys , to the south and to
the east. Between 5 p.m. and 7 a.m., two security guards are located in the building.
The 16th Street doors are kept unlocked, and the corridor leading in from the 16th
Street entrance runs down an arcade and then between two banks of elevators. At
least one of the guards is stationed by the elevators to check the identity of anyone
who wishes to go up in the building from the lobby. During the period of time
covered by the complaint, people entering the building at night were not required
to sign in or out. Although the record is not clear on this subject, I infer that the
guard would question the right of anyone to go upstairs unless he was going to the
restaurant or unless he had business with a tenant. Except when employees of a
tenant are in the offices, the offices are kept locked by the cleaning force of the
Respondent, and the guards would periodically check to see that the doors were kept
locked by the cleaning people when they left an office.
B. Interference, restraint, and coercion; domination and interference
with the formation of a labor organization
1. The facts
From the time of the completion of the building, Mid-America has had a cost-plus
maximum charge contract (cancelable on 30-day notice) with Respondent for jani-
torial services. It is Respondent's practice to send a branch manager to a new area,
where he hires local people to perform the required work. The janitorial work is
done at night after most of the offices have been closed for the day.
2 Siemons Heeling Service, 122 NLRB 81 ; Connecticut State Board of Labor Retahons
(Hartford Bi,'ding Maintenance Company, Inc.), 145 NLRB 1415; National Car Rental
Company, 141 NLRB 1086.
,'The witness, Acosta, testified that recently the elevator to the restaurant stopped
orly at the top floor, but that It had formerly stopped at all floors. There is no way to
fix the date of the change
4 The record refers to Glenarm Street. On Denver maps It Is designated Gleni',m
Place. Escalators operate In the lobby near the Glenarm entrance.
FLOORS, INC. 851
James Quattlebaum was transferred to, and took over management of, the Denver
branch of the Respondent about February 1965. One of the first changes that he
made was to give the employees a 1-cent-an -hour increase . He also effected changes
in operating methods. Before Quattlebaum 's arrival , groups of employees had worked
in gangs under gang leaders . Quattlebaum discontinued this practice , and the
employees thereafter worked individually in certain assigned areas. Two of the
former gang leaders continued to work for the Respondent during the period covered
by the complaint . One of them , Marian Peckham , returned to cleaning duties her-
self, but her services were utilized to an increasing degree in the inspection of the
work of the maids. Another former gang leader was Carlos Balderrama . There is
no evidence that he did any work other than janitorial work after the change effected
by Quattlebaum . In about March , Quattlebaum gave a 5-cent wage increase to
employees on the basis of merit.
During the fall of 1964 , the Union had attempted to organize the Respondent's
employees and had filed , but later withdrawn , a petition for a representation election.
At some point after the arrival of Quattlebaum as manager , presumably in April,
employee interest in the Union revived . Quattlebaum became aware of this in mid-
April 1965, and on a night in mid-April , during a break in the work of the "graveyard"
shift, Quattlebaum , in the presence of Assistant Manager Bob Pflieger and Supervisor
Ron Armstrong , asked Balderrama if the latter knew anything about the passing out
of union cards. When Balderrama answered negatively , Quattlebaum commented,
in the language of Balderrama ( Quattlebaum not being asked about this conversa-
tion ), "Well, I don't see no reason why they want a union in here. I try to give them
all the benefits I can ." The place of this conversation was not brought out. Since
it was during a break, it could have taken place in the lunchroom.
At or about the same period of time, Quattlebaum sent word by another employee
to Frank Lewis , an employee , that Quattlebaum wished to talk with him. At or
about 9 or 9:30 p .m., when Lewis went to Quattlebaum 's office , Quattlebaum asked
him if he was one of the leaders organizing the Union . Lewis affirmed that he was.
A lengthy conversation followed . During the course of this conversation , according
to Lewis ( Quattlebaum not being questioned about it), Quattlebaum talked about
bettering the jobs and wages, said that the Respondent was trying to arrange for vaca-
tions for employees who had worked for more than a year , and said that he was
trying to get them holidays. Lewis testified that, during his conversation with
Quattlebaum , which he testified lasted an hour or an hour and a half, the door was
locked , except when an employee would come to speak to Quattlebaum , and then
the latter would get up to open the door . Lewis' testimony that the door was kept
locked was an inference drawn from the fact that Quattlebaum got up to open the
door when an employee came to speak with him.
The employees of the Respondent who started work at 6 p .m. were given a half-
hour break between 7:30 and 8 p .m. in which to eat or get refreshments . Apparently
there was no facility for this in the space occupied by the Respondent in the base-
ment of the building, but the Respondent had made an arrangement with the Security
Life Insurance Company, which had an office, among other places, on the fourth
floor of the building divided into smaller spaces to make a suite of offices , one room
being set aside as a canteen , to permit the Respondent 's employees to eat their supper
in this room , a space of about 20 by 30 feet. In this room were vending machines,
including a coffee dispenser , tables, and chairs. Access to this room from the fourth
floor public corridor required that one pass through the double doors entering into
the Security Life space known as the controller 's department , turn right in a corridor
for about 30 feet, make another right angle turn into another corridor for a distance
of about 10 feet , and then turn left through a doorway into the room variously called
the lunchroom , the snackroom , or the canteen.
Within a• week after his conversation with Frank Lewis, Quattlebaum posted a
notice on the Respondent 's bulletin board announcing that there would be a meeting
on the evening of April 21, 1965, at 7:30 p.m. in the Security Life lunchroom here-
tofore described . To this meeting Quattlebaum invited Phillip Parsons, the building
manager . At the appointed time, with all the employees present, Quattlebaum told
them that they would have to wait until Parsons arrived to speak on the building's
behalf. When Parsons arrived , Quattlebaum introduced him. Parsons stated that,
before Quattlebaum 's arrival as manager, he had not been satisfied with the way in
which the building had been cleaned ; that before Quattlebaum had arrived, he
[Parsons] used to be able to walk down the halls where they had the crew leader
organization , and he would see two or three people standing around talking, and
now with everyone working individually , he did not see people standing around talk-
ing to each other , that they were all working . He said that since Quattlebaum's
852 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
arrival work had improved 100 percent . Parsons told the employees that the con-
tract with the Respondent had a 30 -day cancellation clause , and if the Respondent,
through its employees, did not provide the type of service that the building wanted,
Mid-America ( the building owner ) could cancel at any time in 30 days , and, if this
happened , the Respondent would be out of the picture . One other statement made
by Parsons is disputed. Because this is alleged by the General Counsel to constitute
a coercive threat by an agent of the Respondent of loss of employment by the
employees , I shall relate what each of the General Counsel's witness testified to. On
direct examination for the General Counsel , Max Acosta, the principal witness to
testify about this meeting, testified variously about what Parsons had said. He first
testified that Parsons said , "roughly," that "if any other time there is another orga-
nization other than the one they put in there to clean the building, Floors would be
given their 30-day notice to get out ." Acosta conceded on cross-examination that
Parsons had said that "they worked under a contract which had a 30-day cancellation
clause, and if Floors, through its employees, did not provide the type of service that
Mid-America wanted, they would cancel anytime within 30 days" and that, "of
course," the Respondent would be out of the picture if that happened. Acosta had,
at one point, testified that Parsons had stated that the employees would lose their
jobs if any other organization than Floors came in. He put this in a slightly different
way on cross-examination, when he testified, "He just said what you said, that we are
under a 30 day contract, and that if there is any other organization than the one they
put in there, then they will cancel the contract with Floors, Inc." Counsel for
Respondent then asked, "Didn't he rather say, Mr. Acosta, that if Floors did not
perform the services that he had desired, he had the right under the 30-day cancella-
tion clause in the contract, to cancel the contract for these services?" Acosta began
to answer by saying, "He said if any, from the way, the impression he left me-"
Respondent's counsel interrupted and asked Acosta, not for his impression, but for
what Parsons had said. Then, Acosta replied, "If any other organization than the
one they put in there comes in, they will give Floors, Inc., their 30-day notice. He
may have said what you said, but he put that in, also." General Counsel's witness
Betty Jane Gomez quoted Parsons as saying "that the building needed a lot of clean-
ing, and there was a lot of work to be done, and he says he didn't want any other
organizations coming in other than Floors, Inc., and if so, Floors, Inc. would be
kicked out." General Counsel's witness Frank Lewis quoted Parsons as saying "that
the building wasn't up-to-date for one thing, and he also said that if any organization
other than the organization would come in there, that he'd terminate Floors, Inc.,
contract immediately." On cross-examination, Lewis testified that Parsons did not
say anything at the meeting of April 21 about a union. Quattlebaum, called as a
witness for the Respondent, denied that Parsons had made any statement "to the
effect that if any organization came in other than Floors, Inc., he would cancel the
contract of Floors." Quattlebaum testified that Parsons had stated that the cancella-
tion of the contract on 30-day notice required no reason other than satisfaction of
the customer (Mid-America Building Corporation). Although Parsons was called
as a witness for the Respondent, he was not asked by Respondent or the General
Counsel what he had said at the meeting of April 21, 1965. The General Counsel
argues that the words "any other organization," as attributed to Parsons, was a veiled
reference to the Union. Taking portions of the testimony of the General Counsel's
witnesses literally, I could give those words such an interpretation. However, it
appeared to me that the witnesses for the General Counsel did not have a very clear
memory as to what Parsons did say-at least not clear enough to select a particular
statement and quote it word for word. Apparently, it is not contested that Parsons
said nothing specifically about the Union as such. The whole tenor of his remarks
appeared to go to the quality of Respondent's cleaning work, the satisfaction of Mid-
America, and the right of Mid-America to terminate Respondent's contract on 30-day
notice if Mid-America was not satsified with the work being done by Floors. In this
context, I consider it probable that Parsons had made some comment to the effect
that Mid-America did not want to have any other organization but Respondent do
the work, but that if Respondent did not do the work to the satisfaction of Mid-
America, Mid-America would terminate the contract on 30-day notice and then
another organization would do the work and the employees of Floors would be out.
Some reason to believe that this was the statement is supplied by Acosta's testimony
of what Quattlebaum said with reference to Parsons' statement. He testified that
Quattlebaum said "that Floors, Incorporated, was on a thirty-day notice , that if
Mid-America didn't like Floors, Incorporated, work, they'd give them a thirty-day
notice in which to leave and get another janitor service into the building, and we
could all lose our jobs." Acosta could have been confused as to whether Parsons
FLOORS, INC. 853
or Quattlebaum made the statement attributed to Parsons . Because the three wit-
nesses for the General Counsel were the three who were attempting to promote the
Union , because they had a degree of bias in the matter , and because they were testi-
fying rather from impressions than from clear memories , I am not convinced that
Parsons ' use of the word "organization" as meaning "a union" is a correct inference.
If the employees generally had made such interpretation , it might be considered a
reasonable one. But the only ones to testify for the General Counsel about this were
the three employees who were attempting to organize the Union . In their minds
"organization" might well have been taken to mean a union . However, I find that
this is not a reasonable interpretation considering the context in which it was used.
There appears to be little doubt that one of the purposes of the Respondent in
calling the meeting of April 21 , 1965, was to attempt to counteract the revived inter-
est in the Union , but this was not the sole purpose , nor is it illegal so long as coercion
was not used . Following Parsons' talk, Quattlebaum pointed out to the employees
how Respondent 's contract depended on Mid -America's satisfaction . Whether or
not he specifically explained to the employees the nature of that contract as a cost-
plus contract , he told the employees that all increases in cost , all overtime, pay
increases , and the like were subject to Parsons ' approval . Quattlebaum also said that
the Respondent was on a 30-day notice , that if Mid -America did not like the Respond-
ent's work , Mid-America could give Respondent a 30-day notice in which to leave
and would get another janitor service into the building and the employees would then
lose their jobs. According to Quattlebaum , he told the employees what benefits were
in effect and what ones were being worked on. Quattlebaum had with him a copy
of the Union 's standard contract for the Denver area, and he held this up and said
that the Respondent 's standard of pay was higher than the Union 's. Quattlebaum
explained Respondent 's supervisorial setup in the building and then told about a new
procedure which would be followed to determine the honesty of employees . He said
that , as time went one, he would determine the pay raises of employees who had
established their honesty, who were good workers, who were at work every day and
did not have any bad marks . At the conclusion , Quattlebaum said that in order to
get things working smoothly he would suggest that the employees have a three-
member committee , one representative from the maids, one from the porters, and
one from the general halls. This committee was to represent the employees in pre-
senting their "gripes." 5 Quattlebaum took nominations , and the employees elected
Frank Lewis, Betty Gomez, and Max Acosta as representatives . However, the com-
mittee never met with Quattlebaum , although Quattlebaum apparently had set up
several dates for them to meet with him. According to Acosta , Quattlebaum had
set the dates during the break time "and it was always inconvenient for us ... so we
couldn 't go to the meetings . He did say once that he would try to get it on his time,
on the Company 's time ... but ... nothing ever came of that."
2. Conclusions concerning interference , restraint , and coercion
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent , by Quattlebaum 's questioning
of Balderrama and Lewis , violated Section 8 (a)( 1 ) of the Act . Questioning is not
per se coercive .6 The evidence concerning the questioning of Balderrama was so
sketchy as to make it difficult to draw any inferences . Balderrama was not asked
where the questioning took place. Inferentially , it was in the Security Life Building,
but other than that, the place was not identified .' From the fact that the incident
took place during a break, I might well infer that the conversation took place in the
employees ' lunchroom over a cup of coffee as easily as that it took place in the halls
or corridors of the building . No questions were asked of Balderrama when he was
on the witness stand concerning any antecedent conversation that might have taken
place . The General Counsel in his brief recites that Quattlebaum "approached"
Balderrama and asked him the question above quoted . I find no evidence to indicate
that Quattlebaum "approached" Balderrama on this occasion . Quattlebaum was
not shown at the time to have been angry or to have made any threats . Quattle-
baum's remark that he could see no reason why the employees would want a union
signifies more wonderment than anger. If this incident stood as an isolated matter,
it could easily be dismissed . Before reaching any conclusion , however, I shall
analyze the rest of the evidence.
'Acosta, in quoting Quattlebaum , testified that he said, "If they had any gripes, if
their workload was too heavy, and they didn ' t think their pay was right , they - could go
to the gripe committee , and they'd look it over and ' they 'd have regular meetings-to
discuss these things."
6 Blue Flash Express , Inc., 109 NLRB 591.
S54 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At least two additional factors not present in the questioning of Balderrama are
involved in the questioning of Lewis. It is undisputed that Quattlebaum did not
merely encounter Lewis; he sent for him to come to his office during working hours;
and the question which Quattlebaum asked Lewis concerned his personal activities
.rather than just a general question concerning observation of the distribution of
cards. The General Counsel contends that the questioning was behind a locked door
and that this made the questioning more coercive. The -evidence that the door was
locked depends on Lewis' testimony that Quattlebaum got up once or twice to
open the door for an employee who wished to speak to Quattlebaum. This was an
inference on Lewis' part. Quattlebaum's office was enclosed in glass. An employee
coming to speak to Quattlebaum could see that he was occupied and might hesitate
to enter unless Quattlebaum himself opened the door. The evidence does not show
that the employees who knocked were invited by Quattlebaum to enter the room
when he opened the door. -Quattlebaum might have spoken with them at the door
to forestall their entering, in the interest of making the interruption as brief as pos-
sible. I do not attribute much importance to the position of the latch. Lewis was
certainly not detained by a locked door. The General Counsel's brief states that the
questioning continued for 1 to 11/2 hours. Although the evidence is that the conver-
sation between Quattlebaum' and Lewis lasted for about that length of time, there is
no evidence that the entire period was given over to questioning. In fact the opening
question was the only one testified to by Lewis. I would infer that Quattlebaum was
spending most of his time explaining his plans and the benefits that the employees
already had-in other words, attempting to persuade Lewis by argument that the
employees were as well or better off without a union as with one. There is nothing
to indicate that Lewis was cowed or placed in fear of his job as a result of this con-
versation. He openly answered the only question Quattlebaum was proved to have
asked him by admitting that he was one of the employees who were attempting to
organize the Union, and following this incident, Lewis continued with his union
activities unrestrained. There is no evidence that other employees were aware of
the nature of Lewis' interview with Quattlebaum. On the other hand, there is evi-
dence that, in May, Quattlebaum posted a notice to the employees to the effect that
management would not interfere with employee meetings which they chose to have
on their own time. Quattlebaum did not appear to me to have any strong resentment
toward Lewis or other employes who favored the Union because of their preference.
In most of the cases in which the Board has found coercion in the type of questions
asked of Lewis there has been considerably more evidence of hostility on the part
of the employer than was here shown.? As an isolated incident, I might consider the
questioning in this case to be noncoercive, but considering the pattern of the question-
ing of'Balderrama and Lewis and the Respondent's subsequent part in establishing
the committee, I find that Respondent did interfere with, restrain, and coerce its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
3. Conclusions as to dominating the formation of a labor organization
Two questions are raised by Respondent in its brief regarding the alleged violation
of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. First, it is contended that the Respondent merely
suggested the formation of the committee and that a committee was not forced on
the employees; and second, it is argued, the committee was merely to make sugges-
tions and was not, therefore, a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
With respect to the first contention, I might find more merit in it had Quattlebaum
made a general suggestion and then departed. However, he did not do so. Both he
and Parsons remained throughout the selection of the committee. Compulsion by
an employer need not depend upon a direct order. The suggestion in this case was
not just a germ of an idea; the whole plan was laid before the employees (one repre-
sentative from each class of employees) and, without even a chance for open discus-
sion in the absence of management, the employees were called on to nominate
representatives and to hold an election in the presence of management. Under the
circumstances, I find that the employees had little chance for dissent. Accordingly,
I find that the Respondent did dominate the formation of the committee.
In arguing that the committee was not a labor organization, the Respondent
stresses the fact that no meetings were held between management and the committee.
It contends that some participation by the committee and dealings with the commit-
tee were essential prerequisites to the finding that it was a labor organization. See-
7 E.g., General industries , Inc., 121 NLRB 1608; Mid-West Towel & Linen Service, Inc.,
143 NLRB 744; Wyatt Food Stores (Division of Kroger Company), 127 NLRB 262.
FLOORS, ;INC. 855
tion 8(a) (2) of the Act does not require meetings between a labor organization and,
an employer before that organization can be defined as a labor` organization. The
definition requires participation by the employees but does not specify the extent' of
that participation. In this case, the employees did participate by electing the com-
mittee to act for them. At that time, all parties expected that the committee would
meet with management. If, then, the committee existed for the purpose of dealing
with the Respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or conditions of work, it would meet the definition of a "labor orga-.
nization" in Section 2(5) of the Act. Where an organization formed by employees
is clearly a labor organization, as, for example, when it has adopted a constitution
and bylaws and defined its purpose to be to bargain collectively with an employer,
there could scarcely be doubted that the definition of the Act would have been met
even if that labor organization had not yet met with an employer, so long as there
was an expectation that such meetings would occur. The fact that the committee
was an informal organization is immaterial. When the committee here was selected,
the employees and the Respondent both contemplated meetings. Perhaps in some
cases where the labor organization is informal and its nature is not otherwise clearly
defined, it may be that its character can be clarified by evidence that it has met with
an employer about grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employ-
ment, or conditions of work, thereby demonstrating that the organization was, in
fact, organized for that purpose. But actual meetings are not an indispensible ele-
ment of a labor organization. I find, therefore, that the mere fact that the parties
were unable to hold an actual meeting because of difficulty with dates and hours,
does not prevent the committee from being established as a labor organization.
If anything would negative the committee as a labor organization, it would be a
limitation of its authority to the making of suggestions. This is, Quattlebaum testi-
fied, what he had in mind, but he certainly did not make this clear to the employees.
The evidence as a whole warrants an inference that Quattlebaum had in mind the
learning of any employee dissatisfaction that might move them to organize a union,
thinking that he would then be able to adjust any grievances or urgent needs in order
to render it unnecessary for them to organize a union. This purpose in itself implies
more than just a suggestion committee. Acosta quoted Quattlebaum as saying that
he was going to put in a committee "to represent the employees on their gripes."
Lewis quoted Quattlebaum as proposing to organize a committee of three people
"so we could discuss our problems, like bettering the wages and those sort of things."
In view of all the evidence of the purpose of the committee, I find that it was
intended to be more than a suggestion committee.8 Accordingly, I find that the
committee was a labor organization and that its formation was dominated by the
Respondent.
C. Discrimination
1. Discharge of Max Acosta
LeRoy Max Acosta, who is called by his middle name, was employed by the
Respondent in the fall of 1964. He was already employed elsewhere during the day
but- then put in additional hours with` Respondent usually between 5:30 and 11:30
p.m. 5 days a week. He started at the rate of $1.74 an hour and received a 1 cent
increase in rate in February 1965. About a month later he received another increase
to $1.80 following Quattlebaum's establishment of an incentive program .9 Acosta's
duties were to sweep the floors with a dustmop from the eighth floor to the basement.
Normally, Acosta started at the top, working down. If some office worker was
working late, he would skip that space and return to it later. As did the other
employees, he had a break between 7.30 and 8 p.m.
Although talk about the Union among the employees started in the first half of
April 1965, Acosta did not become active until after the meeting called by Quattle-
baum for April 21. Lewis induced Acosta and Gomez, the other members of the
committee, to go with him to talk with Christal, the Union's business representative.
Afterward, they set a date for a meeting at the union hall for Saturday, May 8, and
notified the employees thereof. Few employees turned up at the meeting on that
e Boyce Machinery Corporation , 141 NLRB 756; F. F. Fields of N.Y., Inc., 148
NLRB 1515.
00n direct examination , Acosta fixed the time of his raise as about a month after
the first raise. On cross-examination, he fixed it as between April 21 and May 17. I
accept his original testimony as more accurate.
856 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
date . Acosta and Lewis then decided to bring the Union to the employees. They
scheduled a meeting for Friday night, May 28, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., in the lunchroom
on the fourth floor of the Security Life Building and invited Christal to it. They
then notified the employees of the meeting and invited them to attend at the break
that night. So far as I can determine, the invitation to Christal was not announced.
The largest space occupied by any one tenant of the Security Life Building is that
of Pan-American Petroleum Company. That company was moving its equipment
and files into the building every evening between May 20 and 30, 1965. Before
moving, Pan-American had taken certain steps toward the assurance of security. In
addition to the regular building guards, a city policeman had been procured to
patrol the alley from Glenarm south to the junction with the alley running east from
16th Street. Each set of files that it transported from Casper, Wyoming, was accom-
panied by one of Pan American's employees. In addition, Building Manager Parsons
was present to supervise the maintenance of security. Because of the moving, doors
to the lobby were open on each street and from the alley to the south.
On May 28, Quattlebaum was out of town, and Supervisor Ron Armstrong was
in charge of the cleaning employees. Having learned, apparently on that night, that
the employees were planning to have Christal at a meeting at 7:30 p.m. in the lunch-
room Armstrong, at or about 7 p.m. went to the lobby and told Parsons that Christal
was coming to address the employees in the fourth floor lunchroom. The evidence
is less than satisfactory with respect to whether or not Armstrong and Parsons were
then familiar with the name or appearance of Christal, but, in testifying, both Arm-
strong and Parsons spoke of Christal by name. Parsons told Armstrong that Christal
would not be allowed to go above the lobby. At or about 7:15 p.m., Armstrong
observed Acosta at the halfway landing of the stairs at the east side of the lobby
looking in the direction of 16th Street. Acosta was looking toward 16th Street.
Acosta then came down and entered the Braniff Airlines ticket office, which faces
Glenarm adjacent to the recessed Glenarm entrance to the lobby and has a street
entrance , but which also has a door to the interior of the lobby. Acosta started
working there. Between 7:20 and 7:25 p.m. Christal entered the lobby by way of
the 16th Street entrance. Armstrong and Parsons were standing between the banks
of elevators. The arcade from the 16th Street entrance opens into the lobby just
short of the north bank of elevators which form a part of the corridor from that
entrance . Christal turned left at this point and proceeded in the direction of the
Braniff office. Acosta signaled to Christal to come to the street entrance to the
Braniff office. Parsons followed a few paces past the elevators and saw Christal
leaving through the Glenarm doors. Acosta opened the street door of the Braniff
office and told Christal that he was being followed. Acosta testified that he told
Christal also that he could not leave work before 7:30 p.m. and that he would meet
him on the second floor at that time. An inference may be drawn that Acosta told
Christal how to get into the building without being observed, because when ChristaI
left Acosta, he proceeded up Glenarm to 16th Street, turned left at 16th Street,
proceeded past the 16th Street entrance, and turned left again in the alley. Shortly
after Christal had left him, Acosta left the Braniff office-by the lobby door and went
up the escalator on the Glenarm side of the lobby to the second floor. He testified
that he proceeded then to a second floor Braniff office and began working there until
7:30 p.m. Parsons, however, testified that he saw Acosta leave his cleaning equip-
ment in the lobby when he went to the second floor. Whether or not Parsons could
have been mistaken in this, and saw the equipment of another worker instead, it is
an almost certain inference that Acosta either gave Christal a key or went to a fire
stairway leading from the second floor to the alley off of 16th Street and admitted
Christal. Both the door at the ground level and the one at the head of these stairs
at the second floor were locked so that, without a key, they could not have been
opened from the outside.'° From the inside, the door could be opened without a
key. All other means of access to the second floor had been in sight of Parsons or
the guard stationed between the Glenarm entrance and the doors from the lobby to
the alley. An employee saw Acosta and a man, conceded to be Christal, on the
second floor, turning into the stairway leading to the third floor. Here Acosta
stopped and brought an automatic elevator up from the ground floor. He and
Christal then rode to the fourth floor, got off, and walked to the employees' lunch-
room by the route herein earlier described." When they arrived, there were two
10 Another stairway outside the lobby near the alley was also behind locked doors. But
this one was visible to the guard stationed at the stairway inside the lobby.
11 See section B, 1, ante.
FLOORS, INC. 857
employees already there. The others had not yet arrived. Acosta got Christal a
cup of coffee and was getting one for himself when Parsons, having learned from
Armstrong that Christal had one up in the building, arrived at the door and told
Christal that he was in an unauthorized area and would have to leave. After a brief
altercation, Christal said that if the area was security, he would leave. He turned to
the employees, by that time 6 or 7 in number and invited them to a restaurant across
the street for a cup of coffee and to attend a meeting there. Parsons, a guard, and
Armstrong, who arrived at the scene as the others were leaving, accompanied Christal
downstairs and to the door of the building. Christal and some of the employees,
including Acosta, who had followed him, went to a restaurant across the street and
had a meeting. They returned in time to be at work at 8 p.m.
Acosta returned to the second floor, did his work in the Braniff office there, then
was about to enter another office when Armstrong appeared and told Acosta that he
wanted to speak with him. Acosta waited and Armstrong said that he did not
appreciate what Acosta had done that night, that there was a security program on,
and that this might cost Acosta his job. Acosta quoted Armstrong as saying that he
wanted to speak with Parsons. Armstrong said he would speak with Acosta later.12
Following this conversation with Acosta, Armstrong told Marian Peckham, part
of whose duties were to inspect the work of the maids, to check Acosta's work and to
let him know how it looked. At or about 10:40 p.m., Peckham used her key to open
the door to a Security Life office on the third floor. This was one assigned to be
cleaned by Acosta. At this time Peckham supposed Acosta to be working on the
fifth floor, which Acosta had had to pass by earlier because of late office workers.
Opening the door, she flipped the light switch by the entrance which lights a suite of
offices and entered. She then noticed Acosta in a remote part of the rear office.
She left and reported the incident to Armstrong, saying that Acosta did not have any
of his cleaning equipment with him. Armstrong then brought Parsons with him to
the fifth floor where Acosta was working on his last floor for the night. He asked
Acosta what he had been doing on the third floor with the lights out. Armstrong
testified that Acosta did not answer but "just kept walking away," but that finally he
got out of Acosta the explanation that he had gone back to check his area. Arm-
strong said that, in view of the incidents that night, he was going to take it on himself
to let Acosta go. He asked Acosta if he wanted Armstrong to tell him the reasons.
Acosta said, "No." Acosta asked if Armstrong wanted him to finish his work on
the fifth floor or to stop then. Armstrong let Acosta decide which. Acosta said he
would finish up and then asked if he could have his pay check. Armstrong said
that he would have it ready. Armstrong and Parsons left, but Armstrong returned
in 15 minutes to ask Acosta how many dependents he claimed. Acosta said none,
but then asked Armstrong if he could have a written statement as to why he was
being discharged. Acosta testified that Armstrong said he did not see why not.
Whether or not Armstrong did then agree to give it, he later refused to make it out,
himself. When Acosta went for his check at 11:30 p.m., Armstrong told Acosta he
would have to get a written statement from Quattlebaum or Respondent's lawyers,
but he enumerated the reasons, which Acosta wrote down. They were (1) making
a work interruption by taking off early in order to bring an unauthorized person
into the building; (2) bringing an unauthorized person into the building; and (3)
being on the third floor (when it was not Acosta's scheduled work area at the time)
with the lights out.
Armstrong told Acosta that he could come back the following week to speak with
Quattlebaum, if he wished, in case Quattlebaum did not approve his discharge of
Acosta. Acosta left, but did not return to speak with Quattlebaum. As it trans-
pired, Acosta would have made a futile trip because Quattlebaum was informed by
long distance telephone call of Acosta's discharge before his return, and he approved it.
2. Conclusions concerning Acosta's discharge
The primary question to be answered in determining the propriety of Acosta's
discharge is whether or not Acosta's activities on the night of May 28, 1965, for
which he was discharged, were protected union or concerted activities: That part of
his activities involved in spiriting Christal into the Security Life Building to the fourth
floor for the purpose of letting him address the other employees undoubtedly can be
described as. union activity. If that activity was unprotected, it is because either the
v Acosta placed Parsons as there with Armstrong at the time of this conversation but
I find that he had confused this conversation with a later one when Parsons was present.
858 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
- objective , or manner of reaching that objective involve conduct or ends which the law
will not countenance . The end sought by Acosta-presenting Christal to the employ-
ees to tell them of advantages to be gained through the Union-was a lawful one.
The question then is, essentially , one of the propriety of the means used to that end.
The General Counsel argues that there was no rule against , employees taking
outsiders up into the building-that the employees had never been told that they
should not do so and that , in fact , on several occasions , they had done so . The latter
is based on Gomez ' testimony that she, her sister-in-law, and her sister had , on sepa-
rate occasions brought their relatives into the building . The evidence shows that
during April , Gomez had brought her 8-year -old son to work with her on a holiday,
perhaps Easter . Quattlebaum permitted her to keep the boy with her for the 2
hours or so that she worked . There was a limited schedule on holidays . Gomez'
sister-in-law brought her child to a meeting held by management on the evening of
June 30 , 1965 . Quattlebaum , to induce her to work , offered to babysit, but she
declined and did not work . Gomez' sister, Mrs. Menzer , an employee , brought her
husband with her on a holiday once and asked Quattlebaum if he could help her.
Quattlebaum said he could not let anyone work in the building unless he was on the
payroll . There is only hearsay evidence that Menzer went around the building with
his wife and no evidence that Quattlebaum knew of it. It was not shown that Parsons
was in the building on any of the foregoing occasions.
The Respondent was not in charge of the building . It was in charge only of the
janitorial employees . It actually had no right to decide for itself whether or not its
employees could take guests into the building . Armstrong properly spoke to Parsons
about Christal 's visit and Parsons decided against it. Whether or not Parsons would
have made the same decision on a night when Pan American Petroleum was not
moving and was not demanding security is not known . But the Respondent was
bound by Parsons ' decision.
Many questions are left unanswered by the evidence . If Armstrong and Parsons
had recognized Christal as he entered the 16th Street entrance to the building, why
did they not (knowing of a plan to have him present at an employees ' meeting) stop
Christal right then and tell him that he could not go up into the building? That
question was not asked of either Armstrong or Parsons . Neither Armstrong nor
Parsons was asked whether or not he knew Christal by sight or whether he only
inferred that it was Christal after Parsons had seen Christal speak to Acosta at the
door of the Braniff ticket office on Glenarm Place. There is no evidence that, before
that night , Respondent knew that Acosta was active in the union movement; so
unless Christal was known to Armstrong or Parsons, they might not have inferred
his identity even after seeing him speak with Acosta. There is some suggestion,
however, that Armstrong , at least, knew or surmised that the man who entered the
lobby was Christal, because he later reported to Parsons that Christal was apparently
on his way up to the fourth floor . However , it does not necessarily appear that
Armstrong knew that the man then on his way to the fourth floor was the same man
he had seen in the lobby . Under all the circumstances , I cannot treat as significant
Armstrong's or Parsons' failure to notify Christal at once that he could not go
upstairs because of the security regulations on that night.
Another question left unanswered is why permission to have Christal come to a
meeting was not sought by the employees in advance . Although Armstrong had
known of an intention to have an employees ' meeting that night, he apparently did
not learn until just before 7 p.m. that Christal was expected to be there. How he
learned this is not shown. I have no reason to suppose , however, that it was because
an employee had asked Armstrong's permission to have Christal present. There is
no evidence that the meeting planned for the night of May 28 had been planned by
any substantial group of employees. Lewis and Acosta appear to have been the
prime sponsors . Their failure to disclose an intent to have Christal meet with the
employees during their break suggests a reason for surreptitiousness . The evidence
suggests that Lewis and Acosta, having been unsuccessful in getting the employees to.
go to the union hall to meet Christal, had decided, as it were, to bring Mohammed
to the Mountain. Not only did Acosta act in a surreptitious manner but Christal,
himself, adopted the role of a conspirator . When asked by Respondent 's counsel
why he had not come to the 16th Street entrance a second time , after being told by
Acosta at the Braniff office door that he could not leave his work yet, and that he
would meet Christal on the second floor, Christal answered that he did not wish to
be seen if he was being followed, as Acosta had informed him. I have already
deduced that Acosta opened an alley door to the fire escape stairs to permit Christal
FLOORS, INC. 859
to enter unobserved.13 Such conduct does not square with-an innocent belief that
there was no rule against taking strangers up into the building. The General Counsel
argues that "everywhere that Christal went with Acosta he could very well hate
gone by himself if he had known where the meeting was." But unless Christal had
been able to get by Parsons or the security guard, he could not very well have done so.
With respect to the absence of a stated rule that employees should not take unau-
thorized persons up in the building, it may be said that rules are made to take care
of foreseeable eventualities. Since the Respondent's employees were in the building
to work, and since the only instances when any employees who had brought non-
employees into the building (when the employees involved were going to work)
concerned relatives apparently waiting for an employee to finish a short schedule on
a holiday, a rule may not have been thought a necessity. In my opinion, the entire
circumstances were such that any employee could be expected to presume that, with-
out permission, he should not take a stranger up into the building at night after
hours for the public.
The incident on the third floor at 10:40 p.m. when Acosta was discovered deep
in an office with the lights out was probably not of as serious consequence as his
other deviation from propriety. Respondent had reason to believe, from the report
of Peckham, which it relied on, that Acosta was not in that office to work, that he
was away from the place where he should have been working-on the fifth floor.
There is, however, no indication that Respondent believed Acosta to have been in
the darkened office on the third floor to pilfer. Apparently, Respondent deduced
that he was there to make a telephone call. From the Respondent's point of view,
however, Acosta was wasting time when he should have been working. This could
have been considered grounds for discharge alone if the Respondent were usually
as strict as that or it could have been relied on in conjunction with Acosta's earlier
conduct.
Because Acosta's activities on the night of May 28, 1965, involved union activity,
the question naturally arises as to whether or not the Respondent had mixed motives
in discharging Acosta. Although Respondent showed a preference for nonorgani-
zation of its employees, there is no evidence of strong hostility from which I might
find a mixed motive. And, in the absence of any evidence that Respondent treated
differently employees who did not diligently apply themselves, I cannot say that the
punishment was too severe in Acosta's case. I note that Lewis, who had a part in
arranging the meeting for May 28 but who did not leave work to participate in get-
ting Christal into the building, was not disciplined. I conclude and find, on all the
evidence, that Respondent did not discriminate against Acosta because of his union
membership or activity when it discharged him for the cause set forth above.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has committed certain unfair labor practices I
shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Although the committee never func-
tioned as the Respondent intended that it should, the Respondent has never notified
the employees of the disestablishment of said committee. Because there is a danger
that such a committee might be reactivated, I find that a disestablishment order is
essential to effectuate the policies of the Act, and I shall so recommend.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. The committee is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
is The General Counsel relies on Acosta's testimony, when asked if he had unlocked
and let Christal pass through "any doors which you unlocked," that he had not. Acosta's
answer was, "No, I did not unlock any and let him pass through any." From the
Inside, the door to the alley would not have to be unlocked in the sense of using a key
or throwing a bolt or a nightlatch. It could be opened from the Inside merely by turn-
ing a door knob. I sense that Acosta was quibbling. Christal was very vague about the
way he entered , and even when he finally concluded that he must have entered the back
of the lobby from the alley, he was not describing his route by memory but was only
trying to identify the stairs from the blueprint
860 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4. By questioning employees with regard to their union sentiments or activities,
Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
5. By dominating and interfering with the formation of a labor organization,
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a) (2) of the Act.
6. The Respondent has not discriminated in regard to the hire or tenure of
employment of LeRoy Max Acosta by discharging him on May 28, 1965.
7. The unfair labor practices herein found are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire
record in the case, I recommend that the Board order that Respondent Floors, Inc.,
Atlanta, Georgia, its agents, successors, and assigns, as to its Denver, Colorado,
operations, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Questioning any of its employees concerning their union membership, activi-
ties, preference, or sympathies.
(b) Dominating or interfering with the formation of the committee or any other
collective-bargaining representative of its employees.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees
in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist Building
Service Employees International Union, Local 105, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization of their own choosing.
2. Take the following affirmative action, designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act
(a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from and completely disestablish the
committee or any successor thereto, as a representative of any of Respondent's
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining or dealing in respect to grievances,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
(b) Post at its place of business in the Secuiity Life Building, Denver, Colorado,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 14 Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for Region 27, shall, after having been
duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted, and be maintained by Respondent for no
less than 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respond-
ent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 27, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of service of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.15
14 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
15In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT question any of our employees concerning their union member-
ship or activities, their preferences for a union, or their sympathies with a union.
WILLIAMS FURNACE CO. 861
WE WILL NOT dominate or interfere with the formation of the Committee (a
collective -bargaining representative of our employees ) or any other collective-
bargaining representative of our employees.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the right to
self-organization , to form, join, or assist Building Service Employees Interna-
tional Union , Local No. 105, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of their
own choosing.
WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recognition from , and completely dises-
tablish , the Committee or any successor thereto, as a representative of any of our
employees for the purpose of dealing with respect to grievances , wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment , or any other conditions of employment.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of Building Service
Employees International Union, Local No. 105, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization.
FLOORS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provi-
sions, they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 609 Railway
Exchange Building, 17th and Champa Street, Denver, Colorado, Telephone No.
297-3551.
Williams Furnace Co. and Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association, Local Union 170, AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Case No.
21-RC-9806. May 12, 1966
DECISION AND DIRECTION
Pursuant to a stipulation for certification upon consent election,
an election by secret ballot was conducted on November 17, 1965,
under the direction and supervision of the Regional Director for
Region 21. At the conclusion of the balloting , the parties were
furnished with a tally of ballots which showed that of approximately
54 eligible voters , 49 cast ballots , of which 24 were for the Petitioner,
22 were against the Petitioner , and 3 were challenged. The three
challenges were sufficient in number to affect the results of the election.
Thereafter , the Employer filed timely objections to conduct affecting
the election.
The Regional Director investigated the objections and challenges
and, on December 30, 1965, issued his report thereon, recommending
that the objections be overruled , that the challenge to the ballot cast
by employee Carl Bond be sustained , and that the challenges to the
ballots of employees Gary Delaware and William Kampe be over-
ruled . Inasmuch as these two remaining ballots were sufficient in
number to affect the results of the election , the Regional Director
directed that they be opened and counted to determine the result of
the election . Thereafter , the Employer and the Petitioner filed timely
exceptions to the Regional Director 's Report and supporting briefs.
158 NLRB No. 82.