Flamingo Las Vegas Operating Company, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 25, 2013

359 N.L.R.B. 873 (N.L.R.B. 2013)

FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 873

359 NLRB No. 98
Flamingo Las Vegas Operating Company, LLC and
International Union, Security, Police and Fire
Professionals of America (SPFPA). Cases 28–
CA–069588 and 28–CA–073617
April 25, 2013
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS GRIFFIN
AND BLOCK
On June 25, 2012, Administrative Law Judge Gregory
Z. Meyerson issued the attached decision. The Respond-
ent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the Acting
General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,
1
and conclusions, as modified, and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order as modified and set forth in full be-
low.
2

This case arises in the context of a union organizing
drive among the Respondent’s security officers. The
judge found that the Respondent committed several vio-
lations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. We adopt most of
the judge’s findings.
3
However, for the reasons set forth

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to our
findings herein, and we shall substitute a new notice to conform to the
Order as modified and to the Board’s standard remedial language.
3 For the reasons stated in the judge’s decision, we affirm his find-
ings that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by threatening its em-
ployees with unspecified reprisals because the employees engaged in
concerted activities; creating an impression among its employees that
their union activities were under surveillance by displaying a blank
union authorization card; interrogating its employees about their union
membership, activities, and sympathies; soliciting its employees’ com-
plaints and grievances, and promising them improved terms and condi-
tions of employment to dissuade them from supporting the Union;
promising its employees improved terms and conditions of employment
by informing them that an objectionable supervisor had been trans-
ferred from its facility to dissuade them from supporting the Union;
threatening its employees with more strictly enforced work rules and
job loss if they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative; creating an impression among its employees by printed
communication that their union activities were under surveillance;
threatening employees with discipline or discharge if they selected the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative; and threatening its
employees by informing them that they were disloyal because they
supported the Union and engaged in union activity.
In view of the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(1) by threatening its employees with unspecified reprisals because
the employees engaged in concerted activities, we find it unnecessary
below, we reverse the judge and dismiss two 8(a)(1) al-
legations, one involving the alleged oral promulgation
and enforcement of a work rule that employees had to
follow the chain of command to resolve their complaints,
and the other involving statements allegedly creating an
impression among its employees that their union activi-
ties were under surveillance.
I. RELEVANT FACTS
The Respondent is one of five properties forming a
“pod” of properties under Caesars Entertainment, Inc.
The “pod,” known as “HIFOB,” has a senior chain of
command including Assistant General Manager Paul
Baker and Security Director Eric Golebiewski. The
HIFOB security operation under Golebiewski’s direction
includes 7 security shift managers (including Charles
Willis), 11 security shift supervisors, and a number of
field training officers or “FTO Golds,” who are in train-
ing for supervisory positions.
The casino and hotel industry in Las Vegas is very
competitive, and HIFOB therefore regularly takes cus-
tomer surveys to determine how well its properties are
meeting customer needs and how satisfied customers are
with the level of service they receive from HIFOB em-
ployees. As a result of unacceptably low customer ser-
vice scores, in late August and early September 2011
HIFOB held a series of meetings with supervisors and
managers emphasizing the importance of customer ser-
vice and introducing the concept of “Believe or
Leave”—intended to stress to employees that they need-
ed to believe in the importance of customer service.
Francis Bizzarro is a security officer employed by the
Respondent since August 2010. The judge found that
Bizzarro was the security officer most active in trying to
organize the Respondent’s facility on behalf of the Un-
ion. He originally contacted the Union seeking represen-
tation and distributed union authorization cards to those
security officers expressing interest.
II. WORK RULE
Bizzarro and Assistant General Manager Baker knew
each other socially before Bizzarro began working for
the Respondent. In fact, Baker gave Bizzarro a reference

to pass on whether the Respondent also threatened its employees with
unspecified reprisals because the employees engaged in union activity.
Such a finding would not materially affect the remedy. In light of the
judge’s finding that the Respondent unlawfully created an impression
of surveillance by displaying a blank union authorization card, Member
Block also would find it unnecessary to pass on whether the Respond-
ent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by creating an impression of surveillance
through its circulation of the “BIZARRE” flyer on October 16, 2011.
We note that there are no exceptions to the judge’s dismissal of
certain complaint allegations.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

874
for the security officer position. In mid-January 2012,
Bizzarro was on his way into work when he encountered
Baker. After Bizzarro asked Baker how he was doing,
Baker replied, “Not so well.” Yelling and red-faced,
Baker then told Bizzarro he was upset and felt “betrayed”
because Bizzarro had tried to bring the Union into the
facility and thereby placed Baker’s job in jeopardy. We
agree with the judge that these statements conveyed an
unlawful threat of discharge.
However, Baker also made several comments regard-
ing the “chain of command.” Baker stated that all of
Bizzarro’s issues had been taken care of by management,
questioned why Bizzarro had not gone to human re-
sources with his complaints, and asked how Bizzarro
could get the Union involved with the security officers.
The judge concluded that Baker, “for all practical pur-
poses,” was promulgating a rule requiring employees to
bring complaints through the human resources depart-
ment and through the chain of command. The judge then
went on to analyze this “rule” under the Board’s two-step
inquiry for determining whether the maintenance of a
rule violates the Act. Applying the standard articulated
in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646
(2004), he found that such a rule would reasonably be
construed by employees as prohibiting Section 7 activity,
thereby chilling those employees from exercising their
right to organize.
The Respondent argues, and we agree, that Baker did
not promulgate a rule. Although the Board has not artic-
ulated a specific standard defining when an oral state-
ment by a supervisor constitutes a rule, St. Mary’s Hospi-
tal of Blue Springs, 346 NLRB 776 (2006), is instructive.
In St. Mary’s, a supervisor reprimanded an off-duty em-
ployee who was an active union supporter for telephon-
ing another employee to discuss a labor-management
issue while that employee was working at the hospital.
Id. at 776. During a heated phone call, the supervisor
told the off-duty employee, “You cannot call and you
cannot talk and you cannot call the nurses while I am
here and talk about the union.” Id. at 776–777. Noting
that the supervisor was reprimanding one employee spe-
cifically, the Board found that the supervisor’s comments
“could not reasonably be interpreted as establishing that
he intended to implement a new, more restrictive solici-
tation policy regarding employees in the hospital.” Id. at
777.
The same reasoning applies here. Baker directed his
chain of command comments solely to Bizzarro. Fur-
ther, there is no evidence that a “chain of command” rule
was ever communicated to the security officers as some-
thing they were expected to obey. To the contrary, Biz-
zarro and the other officers involved in the union organ-
izing campaign had been independently pursuing their
grievances for at least 3 months when Baker made his
comments to Bizzarro. Apart from Baker’s isolated
statements to Bizzarro, there is no evidence that any of
the Respondent’s managers objected to a failure to fol-
low the chain of command. Under these circumstances,
we find that Baker’s comments regarding the “chain of
command” could not reasonably be interpreted as im-
plementing a new policy regarding how employee com-
plaints were to be handled. Accordingly, we find that the
Acting General Counsel failed to establish that the Re-
spondent, by Baker, promulgated an oral “chain of com-
mand” rule, and we dismiss this allegation.
4

III. IMPRESSION OF SURVEILLANCE
In January 2012, Supervisor Willis made several
comments to security officers regarding an unnamed
officer that Willis described as the “instigator of the un-
ion situation” who was given his job as a favor because
he had family problems, and also as someone trying to
represent the employees who got his job because he was
“juiced in.”
5

The judge determined that it would have been obvious
to the security officers who heard the remarks that Willis
was referring to Bizzarro. Even though he found that it
was at least an “open secret” that Bizzarro was the chief
union organizer, the judge determined that Bizzarro had
not directly represented himself to management as such.
On that basis, the judge found that Willis’ comments
violated Section 8(a)(1) by creating an impression of
surveillance. The Respondent excepts, arguing that at
the time of Willis’ comments Bizzarro was a self-
identified union leader, and therefore employees reason-
ably would not understand Willis’ comments as creating
an impression of surveillance. We agree.
The Board’s test for determining whether an employer
has created an impression of surveillance is whether an
employee would reasonably assume from the statement
in question that his or another employee’s union activi-
ties had been placed under surveillance. Mountaineer
Steel, Inc., 326 NLRB 787, 787 (1998), enfd. 8 Fed.

4 There is no other basis on which to find Baker’s chain of command
comments unlawful. By contrast, we agree with the judge that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) when FTO Gold Larry Myatt threat-
ened Bizzarro with unspecified reprisals for allegedly inciting other
security officers against the Respondent’s “believe or leave” program.
Myatt’s instructions violated the Act, and ordering the Respondent to
cease and desist from repeating any similar instructions in the future
will fully remedy the violation, regardless of whether those instructions
take the form of a threat or a work rule. Therefore, we need not and do
not pass on the judge’s additional finding that Myatt promulgated an
unlawful work rule with these instructions.
5 The judge took judicial notice that the term “juiced” is a colloquial
expression meaning having or using influence to get some benefit.
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 875
Appx. 180 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing United Charter Ser-
vice, 306 NLRB 150 (1992)). Applying that test here,
we find that the Respondent’s employees would not so
assume. Contrary to the judge’s finding, it is clear from
the record evidence that by the time of this incident Biz-
zarro had directly represented himself to management as
involved in the union organizing process. On January 7,
2012, Bizzarro responded to email messages regarding
the union organizing campaign, noting, among other
things, that he had asked management if a union repre-
sentative could come speak to the officers, and offering
his services to officers if they had questions about the
Union. Those messages were sent to most, if not all, of
the Flamingo security officers, and all “HIFOB Security
Supervisors” were copied as well. The complaint alleges
that Willis’ comments were made on January 15, 2012,
and the judge credited testimony from security officers
Ty Evans and Christopher Rudy that placed the com-
ments in mid-January and late January, respectively. So,
at the time of Willis’ comments, Bizzarro had openly
identified himself to management and to the other securi-
ty officers as a union organizer. In these circumstances,
we find that security officers hearing Willis’ remarks
would not reasonably conclude that he learned of Biz-
zarro’s union activity through surveillance. We therefore
dismiss this allegation.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Flamingo Las Vegas Operating Company,
LLC, Las Vegas, Nevada, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Instructing employees that they should not incite
other employees and should keep their mouths shut or
there will be consequences, or otherwise instructing em-
ployees not to engage in concerted activities.
(b) Threatening employees with more strictly enforced
work rules and job loss if they select the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative.
(c) Threatening employees with discipline, including
discharge, if they select the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative.
(d) Threatening employees by informing them that
they were disloyal because they supported the Union and
engaged in union activities.
(e) Coercively interrogating employees about their un-
ion membership, activities, and sympathies.
(f) Soliciting complaints and grievances from employ-
ees and promising improved terms and conditions of em-
ployment in order to discourage employees from sup-
porting the Union.
(g) Promising employees improved terms and condi-
tions of employment by informing them that an objec-
tionable supervisor had been transferred from its facility
to dissuade them from supporting the Union.
(h) Creating an impression among employees by print-
ed communication that their union activities were under
surveillance.
(i) Creating an impression among employees that their
union activities were under surveillance by displaying a
blank union authorization card.
(j) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
the Flamingo, O’Sheas, and Bill’s, all located in Las Ve-
gas, Nevada, copies of the attached notice marked “Ap-
pendix.”
6
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 28, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent at all three properties men-
tioned above and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physi-
cal posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or
an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Re-
spondent customarily communicates with its employees
by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall du-
plicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current and former security officers employed by
the Respondent at any time since September 3, 2011.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 28 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

876

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT instruct you that you should not incite
other employees and should keep your mouths shut or
there will be consequences, or otherwise instruct you not
to engage in concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with more strictly enforced
work rules and job loss if you select International Union,
Security, Police and Fire Professionals of America
(SPFPA) (the Union) as your collective-bargaining rep-
resentative.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discipline, including
discharge, if you select the Union as your collective-
bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT threaten you by informing you that you
are disloyal because you support the Union and engage
in union activity.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate you about your
union membership, activities, and sympathies.
WE WILL NOT solicit your complaints and grievances
and promise you improved terms and conditions of em-
ployment in order to dissuade you from supporting the
Union.
WE WILL NOT promise you improved terms and condi-
tions of employment by informing you that an objection-
able supervisor has been transferred from the property to
dissuade you from supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT create an impression among you through
our printed flyers that we are watching your union activi-
ty.
WE WILL NOT create an impression among you by dis-
playing a blank union authorization card that we are
watching your union activity.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING COMPANY,
LLC
Larry A. Smith, Esq., for the General Counsel.
John D. McLachlan, Esq., of San Francisco, California, for the
Respondent.
Scott A. Brooks, Esq., of Detroit, Michigan, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GREGORY Z. MEYERSON, Administrative Law Judge. Pursu-
ant to notice, I heard this case in Las Vegas, Nevada, on March
13–16, 2012. This case was tried following the issuance of an
order consolidating cases, consolidated complaint, and notice of
hearing (the complaint) by the Regional Director for Region 28
of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) on February
24, 2012. The complaint was based on a number of unfair la-
bor practice charges, as captioned above, filed by International
Union, Security, Police and Fire Professionals of America
(SPFPA) (the Union or the Charging Party).1 It alleges that
Flamingo Las Vegas Operating Company, LLC (the Respond-
ent, the Employer, or the Flamingo) violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The Respondent
filed a timely answer to the complaint denying the commission
of the alleged unfair labor practices.2
Counsel for the General Counsel, counsel for the Charging
Party, and counsel for the Respondent appeared at the hearing,
and I provided them with the full opportunity to participate, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to argue and file briefs. Based on the record, my
consideration of the briefs filed by counsel for the General
Counsel and counsel for the Respondent,3 and my observation
of the demeanor of the witnesses,4 I now make the following.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that at
all times material, the Respondent has been a limited liability
company, with an office and place of business in Las Vegas,
Nevada (the Respondent’s facility), where it has been engaged
in operating a hotel and casino providing food, lodging, and
gaming. Further, I find that during the 12-month period ending
November 23, 2011, the Respondent, in conducting its business
operations as just described, derived gross revenues in excess
of $500,000; and during the same period of time, also pur-
chased and received at its facility goods valued in excess of

1 GC Exhs. 1(a) through (v), the “Formal Papers,” establish the filing
and service of the enumerated charges as alleged in the complaint.
2 All pleadings reflect the complaint and answer as those documents
were finally amended at the hearing. (See GC Exh. 1(q).)
3 Counsel for the Charging Party did not file an independent brief,
but, rather, incorporated and adopted counsel for the General Counsel’s
brief.
4 The credibility resolutions made in this decision are based on a re-
view of the testimonial record and exhibits, with consideration given
for reasonable probability and the demeanor of the witnesses. See
NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). Where witnesses
have testified in contradiction to the findings herein, I have discredited
their testimony, as either being in conflict with credited documentary or
testimonial evidence, or because it was inherently incredible and un-
worthy of belief.
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 877
$50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Neva-
da.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent is now, and at
all times material has been, an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that at
all times material herein, the Union has been a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Facts
The Respondent is one of five properties forming a “pod” of
properties under Caesars Entertainment, Inc., which is the par-
ent entity. The properties in the pod are: the Flamingo,5 Har-
rah’s, Imperial Palace, O’Sheas, and Bill’s Gamblin Hall and
Saloon. These five properties are collectively referred to by
Ceasars Entertainment in its business as “HIFOB.” HIFOB is
an acronym consisting of the first letter of each of the five
properties in the pod. Although there is significant interaction
among some of the properties, especially the Flamingo,
O’Sheas, and Bill’s, the Respondent consists solely of the Fla-
mingo, which is the only legal entity charged in this proceed-
ing. The HIFOB senior chain of command consists, in relevant
part, of President and General Manager Rick Mazer, Assistant
General Manager Paul Baker, and various vice presidents for
several departments. Eric Golebiewski is the security director
for HIFOB.
The HIFOB security operation is extensive. Under Golebi-
weski’s direction is the investigations manager, Jack Burgess,
three investigators and seven security shift managers. Four of
the seven security shift managers are assigned to the Flamingo,
and include Charles Willis, Cedric Johnson, Keith Berberich,
and John Schultz. There are 11 security shift supervisors for
the 5 HIFOB properties under the security shift managers, the
following 6 of whom are assigned to the Flamingo: Curtis
Walker, Janice Miller, Russ Roake, Kevin Quaglio, Thomas
Health, and Zina Miner. Further, there are a number of field
training officers (FTO Golds), who are security officers in
training for supervisor positions, employed at the Flamingo,
including Dan Hayes and Larry Myatt.6
The Respondent’s operations require security officers 24
hours a day, 365 days a year. There are approximately 300
security officers employed among the 5 HIFOB properties. As
set forth in the Caesars Entertainment job description for secu-
rity officer, their “main function is to provide a friendly and
safe environment for [hotel/casino] guests and team members
while protecting company assets.” (GC Exh. 4.) The security
officers may rotate through various properties as part of their
shifts. Approximately 120 of those security officers rotate
through the Flamingo, O’Sheas, and Bill’s as part of a posted

5 The Margaritaville Casino is physically located within the Flamin-
go, and does not constitute a separate entity.
6 The parties have agreed that Paul Baker, Eric Golebiewski, Charles
Willis, Cedric Johnson, Keith Berberich, Kevin Quaglio, and Larry
Myatt are all supervisors and agents as defined by the Act.
schedule limited to those three properties. Between 50 and 70
of those security officers are assigned to the Flamingo.
The security officers perform various tasks and interact with
a variety of people. In the course of their job duties, while they
patrol their assigned “posts,” the security offices perform two
types of “sweeps.” As needed, they perform sweeps of “unde-
sirables,” such as homeless persons, prostitutes, pimps, thugs,
drug dealers, etc. These security sweeps are often conducted
by several security officers acting collectively, and are intended
to remove these undesirables from the facility. Security offic-
ers also perform “total service” sweeps. This is the process by
which they meet and greet customers and perform certain steps
that involve engaging the customers in conversations so as to
make them feel comfortable and welcome at the facility. While
it is not totally clear, the record indicates that during a security
guard’s shift, he or she is expected to engage at least 6 custom-
ers in this interaction. Shift supervisors will periodically ob-
serve security officers engaged in total service sweeps and
grade the officers on their contact with the guests. This grading
process is called the “spotlight.”
Security officers attend preshift meetings held at the begin-
ning of every shift. It is at these meetings that the officers re-
ceive information from various supervisors, including proce-
dures, policies, fliers, alerts, and anything that they need to
know in order to properly perform their shifts. The preshift
meetings generally last between 15 to 30 minutes, although
occasionally much longer.
Francis Bizzarro is a security officer employed by the Re-
spondent since August 2010. Prior to being hired, Bizzarro and
his wife had a friendly relationship with the Respondent’s assis-
tant general manager, Paul Baker, and his wife. In fact, Baker
recommended Bizzarro for the security officer position, and
one would logically assume that he was instrumental in helping
Bizzarro secure employment. It is clear from the testimony of
numerous witnesses that Bizzarro was the security officer most
active in trying to organize the Respondent’s facility on behalf
of the Union. He originally contacted the Union seeking repre-
sentation and was the person who distributed union authoriza-
tion cards to those security officers expressing an interest. At
the time of the hearing, Bizzarro was still employed as a securi-
ty officer by the Respondent.
The following chronology of events has been stipulated to by
the parties (Jt. Exh. 1) and is not in dispute: On November 4,
2011, the Union filed a representation petition in Case 28–RC–
068280; on November 17, 2011, the Union filed a petition in
Case 28–RC–069125; on November 23, 2011, the Union filed a
petition in Case 28–RC–069491, but prior to doing so it with-
drew the two earlier petitions; on November 30 and December
1, 2011, a hearing was conducted at the offices of the Board in
Las Vegas, Nevada, in Case 28–RC–069491; on December 20,
2011, the Regional Director for Region 28 issued a Decision
and Direction of Election in Case 28–RC–069491;7 subsequent-

7 I take administrative notice of the following documents filed in
connection with Case 28–RC–069491: the Decision and Direction of
Election (CP Exh. 1); the Board’s Order denying the Employer’s re-
quest for review of the Regional Director’s Decision and Direction of
Election (CP Exh. 2); and the Employer’s request for review (CP Exh.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

878
ly, an election was scheduled for January 19, 2012; however,
on January 17, 2012, the Regional Director issued an order
postponing election indefinitely pending the investigation and
disposition of an unfair labor practice charge filed by the Union
against the Respondent; and finally, on January 26, 2012, the
Regional Director issued a corrected order postponing election
indefinitely pending the investigation and disposition of the
unfair labor practice charge in Case 28–CA–069588 filed by
the Union against the Respondent.
B. The Dispute
It is the position of the General Counsel that the Respondent
engaged in a campaign designed to thwart its employees’ pro-
tected concerted activity and subsequently their union activity.
The Respondent’s alleged unlawful conduct included: threaten-
ing employees, promulgating and enforcing overly broad and
discriminatory work rules, creating the impression of surveil-
lance of employees’ union and protected concerted activities,
interrogating employees about their union sympathies, solicit-
ing employee complaints and grievances, promising increased
benefits and improved terms and conditions of employment,
supervising its employees more closely, and discriminatorily
restricting access to its bulletin boards. Such conduct is alleged
in the complaint to have constituted an unlawful attempt by the
Respondent to interfere with, restrain, and coerce its employees
in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
Further, the General Counsel contends that the Respondent
specifically targeted Francis Bizzarro for harassment because
he was the employee most active in engaging other employees
in protected concerted activity, and who was the primary organ-
izer and principal union supporter among the security officers.
The complaint alleges that all such conduct constitutes a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Counsel for the Respondent contends that none of its actions
were in violation of the law. Rather, it is the position of the
Respondent that its employees were free to engage in an open
campaign in support of the Union, and did, in fact, communi-
cate openly with each other by means of the Employer’s email
system and through the posting of union notices and fliers on a
bulletin board at the Flamingo.
Regarding Francis Bizzarro, counsel argues that Bizzarro
made no effort to hide or disguise his role as the principal union
organizer. Moreover, it is the Respondent’s position that Biz-
zarro was simply a disgruntled, insubordinate employee whose
incredible testimony was an attempt to support meritless unfair
labor practice charges filed in an effort to block the holding of a
representation election, which the Union feared that it would
lose. According to counsel, no reprisals were taken against
Bizzarro, other union supporters, or any other employees be-
cause of their union or protected concerted activities. Finally,
counsel argues that any oral statements or written material
about the Union emanating from the Respondent or its manag-
ers and supervisors was the lawful expression of opinion, as
permitted under Section 8(c) of the Act.

3). While the Regional Director’s Decision and Direction of election is
not controlling regarding those issues before me, it constitutes some
evidence on said issues, and may be relied on by me to the extent noted.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. The Protected Concerted Activity
The Respondent stresses to all its employees the importance
of customer service. Without doubt, the casino and hotel indus-
try in Las Vegas is very competitive. To that end, HIFOB
regularly takes customer surveys to determine how well its
properties are meeting the needs of its customers, and how
satisfied those customers are with the services that they receive.
As a result of those surveys, HIFOB determined that its
“scores” were unacceptably low. Therefore, from late August
through September 2, 2011,8 a number of mandatory meetings
for supervisors and managers were conducted at all HIFOB
properties to address those low scores.
During the hearing a number of supervisors testified about
these meetings, and no evidence was offered to rebut their tes-
timony. Therefore, it is undisputed that at those meetings the
presenters again stressed to managers and supervisors the criti-
cal importance of customer service and the need to immediately
begin to raise the low scores the HIFOB properties had been
receiving. Apparently in an effort to emphasize the importance
of this mission, the phrase “believe or leave” was introduced. It
is also undisputed that this phrase was intended to be used by
managers and supervisors to motivate employees at all the
HIFOB properties and in all departments within those proper-
ties. There is no credible evidence to suggest that the phrase
was intended only for the Flamingo or, even more restrictive,
just for the Respondent’s security department.
Much testimony was taken during the hearing regarding the
meaning of the phrase “believe or leave” as explained to the
security officers by their supervisors. Attendees at the supervi-
sors’ meetings had been told to return to their respective
HIFOB properties and departments and to instruct their em-
ployees on what had been stressed to them regarding customer
service, apparently including the “believe or leave” phrase. In
early September, including specifically on September 3, there
were pre-shift meetings held with the Respondent’s security
officers where these matters were discussed.
1. The preshift meeting of September 3, 2011
In complaint paragraphs 5(a), (b), and (c) the General Coun-
sel alleges that on September 3, certain conduct of the Re-
spondent’s supervisors violated the Act. It was at the time of
the preshift briefing on that date that the assembled security
officers were first told about the Respondent’s new “believe or
leave” phrase. Contrary to the arguments of counsel for the
General Counsel, I do not view this statement as a threat to
terminate employees who engaged in protected concerted activ-
ity, but, rather, simply as part of a management philosophy
intended to motivate the security officers to improve their cus-
tomer service scores. Such a philosophy is clearly legitimate,
and the phrase was intended to be utilized throughout the
HIFOB properties and certainly not limited to the Flamingo’s
security officers.
According to the testimony of Francis Bizzarro, during this
preshift meeting certain of the security officers raised a number
of issues that they had previously been discussing only among

8 All dates are in 2011, unless otherwise indicated.
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 879
themselves. Bizzarro mentioned that in earlier conversations
between the security officers that they had discussed com-
plaints that they had about the “shortening of breaks, and the
memorization of [spotlight] cards,” and about the use of the full
names of security officers on their name tags. The “spotlight”
was the procedure that supervisors used to rate security officers
on their interaction with guests. The officers were expected to
follow a kind of script or outline in these interactions. The
name tag issue involved the officers not wanting to have their
full last names displayed on the tag so as to prevent “undesira-
bles” from being able to trace them to their homes.
While Bizzarro testified that these were the same issues
raised by the security officers at the September 3 briefing, he is
very vague and unclear regarding who actually raised these
issues. He mentioned a number of other officers who were
with him at this briefing, including Eric Cregeen, Brian Mead-
ows, and Tomas Williquer, but is rather unfocused when asked
to relate specifically which officers complained about these
matters during the meeting. Further, the other officers do not
seem any more focused regarding this meeting than Bizzarro,
and none of them seems able to take ownership of the alleged
remarks.
Bizzarro testified that during the meeting Supervisor Quaglio
told the security officers that if they were not happy with the
total service sweeps, that they could take their resumes and go
apply to work at the Wynn Casino. Quaglio alleged advised
them that as there existed a 14-percent unemployment rate in
the Las Vegas area that there were plenty of unemployed peo-
ple waiting to get security officer jobs, and if they did not like
what management was doing that they could look for a job
elsewhere. Quaglio denies making such threatening statements.
After listening to Bizzarro testify regarding the September 3
pre-shift meeting, I had the strong impression that he was doing
his utmost to tie the “believe or leave” statement to the com-
plaints allegedly made by security officers during the meeting.
However, I do not believe such a connection has been made.
Bizzarro is an intelligent witness, and he clearly understood
that employees are engaged in protected conduct when they
complain to their supervisors about wages, hours, or working
conditions. However, even assuming such complaints were
made by the security officers during the meeting, and even
further giving Bizzarro the benefit of the doubt and concluding
that Quaglio made the statement that if employees were unhap-
py they could seek work elsewhere, I do not believe such com-
ments by Quaglio were related to employee complaints. Ra-
ther, I believe that those comments were directly related to the
“believe or leave” phrase and the HIFOB-wide campaign to
improve customer service scores.
Certainly the big news at the preshift meeting was the “be-
lieve or leave” phrase and the campaign to improve the cus-
tomer service scores, which program the supervisors had
brought back with them from the recent HIFOB-wide supervi-
sors’ meetings. That was likely the matter discussed most at
the preshift meeting. It is certainly conceivable that Quaglio in
emphasizing this new program informed the security officers
that any employee who could not get behind the program to
improve customer service scores, and who in effect could not
“believe” in the program, should “leave” the Respondent’s
employment. I see nothing improper about telling employees
that they are expected to implement the Respondent’s new poli-
cy and program or to seek work elsewhere. I do not believe
that it is reasonable to conclude, based on the record evidence,
that any threats were made to employees regarding their com-
plaints about working conditions, assuming that such com-
plaints were even made at this meeting.
I conclude that any suggestion by Quaglio that employees
seek work elsewhere was not made in connection with those
employees’ protected concerted activity, and that it would not
have been reasonable for employees to have assumed so. Ac-
cordingly, any such statement would not constitute a violation
of the Act. Therefore, I shall recommend to the Board that
complaint paragraph 5(a) be dismissed.
In any event, it seems that Bizzarro was unhappy with the
tone of the preshift meeting. He testified that near the end of
the meeting he “mentioned to security assistant manager (FTO
Gold) Larry Myatt, that Kevin Quaglio’s comments were
threatening and harassing toward the officers.”9 He contends
that Myatt then ordered him out of the briefing room and into
the manager’s office. Allegedly, Myatt said that Bizzarro
needed to stop talking as he was “inciting the men.” At that
point, according to Bizzarro, Myatt, Bizzarro, and Supervisor
Cedric Johnson went into the manager’s office. Once in the
office, Myatt allegedly repeated that Bizzarro’s comments were
“inciting the men,” and that he “needed to stop making those
comments or there would be consequences.” Myatt allegedly
went on to deny that Quaglio’s remarks had been threatening or
harassing, and that Bizzarro “should keep [his] mouth shut.”
According to Bizzarro, he responded by simply asking if he
could return to work, which he was permitted to do. Bizzarro
testified that during this exchange in the manager’s office,
Cedric Johnson had remained silent. Further, Bizzarro con-
tends that he filed a complaint with the human resources de-
partment regarding this incident, but is uncertain as to what
happened to it. When he subsequently inquired about the status
of his complaint, he was told by human resources personnel
that it had “been taken care of.”
During his testimony, Myatt totally denied that he had spo-
ken to Bizzarro in the manager’s office at any time around Sep-
tember 3, and further denied that he had made any threatening
statements to Bizzarro regarding Bizzarro’s concerted conduct.
He did recall a different meeting with Bizzarro in the “coffee
room” in late October or early November about Bizzarro alleg-
edly interrupting preshift meetings with indignant remarks
about the way Myatt was doing his job. Myatt allegedly ex-
plained to Bizzarro that such comments should be made to
Myatt in private and not in front of the other officers. Cedric
Johnson testified that while he could not recall the specific date
of the meeting that he attended with Bizzarro and Myatt, he
denied that during that meeting Myatt had used the word “in-
cite.” He remembered that Myatt had brought Bizzarro into the
manager’s office to talk about “disrupting the briefing.” Ac-
cording to Johnson, Myatt told Bizzarro that, “if he has a prob-

9 During the hearing, the parties stipulated that Larry Myatt, whose
correct job title is field training officer gold (FTO Gold), is a supervisor
as defined in the Act.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

880
lem with something he needs to pull [Myatt] aside and not dis-
rupt the briefing making snide remarks or comments during—
while [Myatt’s] trying to give out information.” Allegedly,
Bizzarro agreed that in the future he would do so.
Preliminarily, I would note that I found Bizzarro to have a
tendency to exaggerate and embellish his testimony, and to
over emphasize certain events so as to place himself and his
actions in the best possible light. Further, it is clear to me that
he has much of his personal self worth invested in trying to
obtain a successful outcome of this case. That having been
said, I do not believe that he totally fabricated events and
statements, and I conclude that, generally, there was an element
of truth in much of his testimony. With that in mind, I believe
that at the September 3 preshift meeting that he did say that
Quaglio’s comments were threatening and harassing toward the
officers, which elicited a response from Myatt that Bizzarro
should be quiet as he was “inciting” the other officers, or words
to that effect. Further, I believe that Myatt also told Bizzarro
that if he did not stop making such comments, there would be
“consequences.” It is not clear to me whether Myatt’s state-
ments were made in the preshift briefing room or immediately
thereafter in the manager’s office, or perhaps in part in both
places. In any event, I am convinced that the words were spo-
ken by Myatt.
I do not credit Myatt’s denials, which seemed to me half
hearted and made with little conviction. His attempt to move
the incident to another time and event did not seem reasonable
or credible. While Johnson’s version of the incident was a little
more believable than Myatt’s version, it still lacked the sort of
detail that Bizzarro supplied. As I have noted above, I find
nothing improper about the Respondent’s use of the phrase
“believe or leave,” or the way in which it was presented to the
security officers. Nevertheless, Bizzarro reacted to it as if a
threat had been made, and expressed his concerns out loud.
Those expressed concerns resulted in Myatt actually making a
threat. Having heard Bizzarro testify, I believe that his version
of the event had the ring of authenticity about it and is credible.
Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees “the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations . . . and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Employees
are engaged in protected concerted activities when they act in
concert with other employees to improve their working condi-
tions. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1987); NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962). An em-
ployer may not retaliate against an employee for exercising the
right to engage in protected concerted activity. Triangle Elec-
tric Co., 335 NLRB 1037, 1038 (2001); Meyers Industries, 268
NLRB 493, 479 (1984). An employer violates Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act when it discharges an employee, or takes some other
adverse employment action against him, for engaging in pro-
tected concerted activity. Rinke Pontiac Co., 216 NLRB 239,
241, 242 (1975). Further, the Board has found that an employ-
er violates the Act when threats of an “unspecified reprisal” are
made because employees engage in union activity. Certainly,
by analogy, the same would apply to protected concerted activi-
ty. Cf. Atlas Logistics Group Retail Services (Phoenix), 357
NLRB 353, 353 fn. 2 (2011); St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare
Centers, 350 NLRB 203, 205 (2007).
The Board, with court approval, has construed the term
“concerted activities” to include “those circumstances where
individual employees seek to initiate or induce or to prepare for
group action, as well as individual employees bringing truly
group complaints to the attention of management.” Meyers
Industries, 281 NLRB 882 (1986), affd. 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988); See also NLRB
v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984) (affirming
the Board’s power to protect certain individual activities and
citing as an example “the lone employee” who “intends to in-
duce group activity”).
Based on the above, I conclude that on about September 3,
2011, Bizzarro was engaged in protected concerted activity
when he challenged the statements that Quaglio had made re-
garding the “believe or leave” policy by saying that such state-
ments were threatening and harassing to the security officers. It
is immaterial whether the statements made by Quaglio were in
fact threatening or harassing. It is sufficient simply that Biz-
zarro said so. Certainly this expressed concern related directly
to the conditions under which Bizzarro and his fellow security
officers worked. Therefore, I also conclude that Myatt’s relat-
ed comments to Bizzarro that he was “inciting” the other secu-
rity officers and that he should keep his “mouth shut,” or there
would be “consequences,” or words to that effect, constituted a
threat of an unspecified reprisal because Bizzarro had engaged
in protected concerted activity.
Accordingly, I find that these comments made by Myatt to
Bizzarro constituted an unlawful threat of an unspecified re-
prisal in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in
paragraph 5(b) of the complaint.
It is alleged in complaint paragraph 5(c) that by making the
statements to Bizzarro on September 3 attributed to Myatt, that
the Respondent had promulgated and enforced an overly-broad
and discriminatory work rule prohibiting its employees from
engaging in concerted activities. I agree. As noted above, I
have concluded that Myatt told Bizzarro he was “inciting” the
other security officers and that he should keep his “mouth
shut,” or there would be “consequences,” or words to that ef-
fect.
In determining whether the existence of specific work rules
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the Board has held that, “the
appropriate inquiry is whether the rules would reasonably tend
to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”
Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998), enfd. 203
F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Further, where the rules are likely to
have a chilling effect on Section 7 rights, “the Board may con-
clude that their maintenance is an unfair labor practice, even
absent evidence of enforcement.” Id. See also Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of Alabama, 225 NLRB 1217, 1220 (1976).
The Board has further refined the above standard in Lutheran
Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646 (2004), by cre-
ating a two-step inquiry for determining whether the mainte-
nance of a rule violates the Act. First, if the rule expressly
restricts Section 7 activity, it is clearly unlawful. If the rule
does not, it will nonetheless violate the Act upon a showing
that: “(1) employees would reasonably construe the language to
prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 881
response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights. Id. at 647; See North-
western Land Services, 352 NLRB 744 (2009) (applying the
Board’s standard in Lutheran Heritage-Village, supra at 647).
Myatt’s statement to Bizzarro was an explicit restriction of
the Section 7 right to engage in concerted activity. Under the
Act, Bizzarro was fully at liberty to complain to his fellow
officers and to management regarding the Respondent’s “be-
lieve or leave” policy. The Respondent has attempted to re-
strict that right through Myatt’s disparaging statement that Biz-
zarro was “inciting” the other security officers, and through
Myatt’s admonition and threat that Bizzarro should keep his
“mouth shut,” or there would be “consequences.” Such con-
duct by the Respondent would reasonably chill employees in
the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Regardless of whether
there was any further attempt to enforce the rule, a violation
had occurred. Clearly, the rule was promulgated in response to
Bizzarro’s concerted activity in criticizing the “believe or
leave” policy, and was intended through the threat of an un-
specified reprisal to put a stop to such protected activity. It is
an obvious violation of the Act. Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, supra. Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in complaint
paragraph 5(c).
2. Quaglio’s alleged surveillance of September 4, 2011
The General Counsel contends in complaint paragraph 5(d)
that the Respondent, through Supervisor Kevin Quaglio, con-
tinued its campaign of harassing Bizzarro by engaging in sur-
veillance of him in an effort to discover the specifics of his
concerted activity with other security officers. According to
the testimony of Bizzarro, on September 4, the day following
the Respondent’s announcement of its “believe or leave” cam-
paign, he noticed Quaglio following him around the casino
floor for approximately an hour while Bizzarro was performing
his shift duties. Bizzarro testified that it was unusual for
Quaglio to be that close to a security officer on the large casino
floor, unless Quaglio was performing a “spotlight check” of
that officer, which was not happening. It was Bizzarro’s con-
tention that the supervisors normally spend most of their time
in the security office, rather than on the casino floor.
Quaglio denied that he was specifically following Bizzarro
on the date in question, or that he ever surveilled or watched
Bizzarro any differently than he did other security officers.
Further, Quaglio testified that his supervisory position requires
him to spend the majority of his work day on the casino floor
and not in his office. He estimated that he spends about 60
percent of his work day on the casino floor and the remaining
40 percent in his office doing paperwork. According to
Quaglio, while on the casino floor he walks around ensuring
that everything is in order, and will normally observe the secu-
rity officers in the performance of their jobs. This testimony
was largely supported by other witnesses.
Security Supervisor Charles Willis testified that in the course
of his work day, he spends approximately 70 percent of his
time on the casino floor. Further, security officer Ty Evans
testified on cross-examination that it is not unusual for him to
see security supervisors on the casino floor, walking around,
perhaps watching him, or perhaps watching other officers. In
my view, this is simply logical. For the security officers and
their supervisors, the “action” is on the casino floor. This is the
place where the officers need to devote their attention, to pre-
vent problems with “undesirables” from developing, and to
quickly ameliorate any such situations that do develop. Super-
visors are needed on the casino floor for the same reason, as
well as to observe their subordinate employees to ensure that
they are doing their jobs properly. The security supervisors,
including Security Director Golebiewski, testified about attend-
ing to issues and problems that developed on the casino floor.
I credit the witnesses who testified that it is common for se-
curity supervisors to be present on the casino floor. I believe
that Bizzarro has exaggerated and embellished the alleged inci-
dent with Supervisor Quaglio, where he allegedly followed
Bizzarro for approximately 1 hour on the casino floor, assum-
ing it happened at all. Quaglio denied any attempt to engage in
surveillance of Bizzarro on the casino floor on September 4, or
any other date. I accept that denial. The evidence to the con-
trary is limited to Bizzarro’s testimony, which when combined
with his claim that supervisors are seldom on the casino floor,
is simply unrealistic. At this early stage in Bizzarro’s protected
conduct, prior to his involvement with the Union, I do not be-
lieve there is credible evidence that his conduct had become of
particular interest to the Respondent. Bizzarro has a habit of
magnifying his importance to the Respondent, which I do not
believe was always the case, especially at this early stage in the
saga.
The evidence offered by counsel for the General Counsel is
insufficient to meet the General Counsel’s burden of proof to
establish that Quaglio engaged in unlawful surveillance of Biz-
zarro on the casino floor on about September 4. Accordingly, I
recommend to the Board that complaint paragraph 5(d) be dis-
missed.
B. The Union Activity
Bizzarro testified that because of the various employment re-
lated complaints that certain security officers expressed follow-
ing the announcement of the Respondent’s “believe or leave”
policy, he took it upon himself to contact various labor unions
to determine whether one might be interested in representing
the Respondent’s security officers. He eventually decided on
representation by the Union (SPFPA). Bizzarro obtained union
authorization cards and began approaching officers in late Sep-
tember with information, fliers, and union authorization cards.
He testified that he ultimately passed out over 100 authorization
cards to security officers working at the Flamingo, O’Sheas,
and Bill’s.
The parties disagree as to the extent of openness with which
Bizzarro initially conducted his union activity. The General
Counsel and the Union contend that although Bizzarro openly
shared his support for the Union with fellow security officers,
he was initially not open to management about his union sup-
port. To the contrary, the Respondent contends that from the
beginning of the process, Bizzarro was open about his union
involvement and that as early as October 7, the Respondent
learned that he was distributing union authorization cards.
I found Bizzarro’s testimony regarding his method of hand-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

882
ing out authorization cards rather confusing, inconsistent, and
somewhat difficult to believe. According to his testimony, he
did not pass out authorization cards in the presence of man-
agement. When he would approach a security officer, he typi-
cally would not give him or her an authorization card, but, ra-
ther, a business card. He testified that he had recently become
a licensed real estate agent and had business cards printed.
Apparently, he would talk to an officer about the process of
union representation, give the officer union literature, and if the
officer expressed interest in the Union, Bizzarro would tell the
officer to call him on the telephone number printed on his busi-
ness card. If subsequently called, he would make arrangements
to get an authorization card to the officer. However, later in his
testimony it seemed as if he was acknowledging that at times he
would pass out authorization cards while at the Respondent’s
facility. Bizzarro did testify that he would pass out his business
cards to supervisors, but would not engage them in conversa-
tions about the Union. He did not wear a union button or cloth-
ing identifying him as organizing on behalf of the Union, and
the Union never provided the Respondent with a letter an-
nouncing the names of its organizers.
Security Director Eric Golebiewski testified that he first
learned that there was a union organizing campaign going on at
the facility on October 7. Supervisor Quaglio testified that
security officer James Diserio brought him an authorization
card in early October and informed him that Bizzarro “was
really pushing this Union thing, and here are the cards that are
being given out to all of the officers.” As noted, the Respond-
ent’s position is that Bizzarro was very open with his union
activity. In any event, it is undisputed that by no later than
October 7 the Respondent was aware that Bizzarro had been
distributing union authorization cards, and the Respondent had
actually been given one of the cards by a security officer.
There is no dispute that Bizzarro was the primary union organ-
izer at the facility. He testified that during the time that the
organizing campaign was being conducted, he posted approxi-
mately 10 union fliers on a bulletin board located in the Fla-
mingo’s security briefing room.
1. The preshift briefing of October 14, 2011
Prior to the start of a security shift, there is customarily a
meeting held by management with the security officers who are
about to begin their shift. Such preshift briefings are usually
about 1530 minutes in length, although they may occasionally
be longer. During such meetings, the security supervisors in-
form the officers about any issues or problems that it is antici-
pated they will encounter on the shift and any new policies
about which they should be made aware. As the security direc-
tor, Eric Golebiewski sometimes attends these briefings and
may even participate in addressing the assembled officers, but
typically such meetings are conducted by less senior supervi-
sors. Often the supervisor conducting the meeting will ask the
assembled officers whether they have any questions to ask, or
problems, or issues that they wish to discuss. Short discussions
may then ensue, ending with the officers being released to
begin their shift.
According to the testimony of Security Supervisor Keith
Berberich, a number of security officers had approached Ber-
berich and complained to him that Golebiewski was too author-
itative with them, and also complained to him about the service
sweeps and spotlight procedure that the officers were required
to perform. Berberich mentioned these complaints to Gole-
biewski and suggested to him that he meet with the officers.
Golebiewski testified that he agreed to do so in an effort to
determine why the officers felt that he “did not care about
them.” Thereafter, he attended the 9 p.m. preshift briefing on
October 14.
Preliminarily, I will note that I do not credit Golebiewski’s
stated reason for holding this meeting. It is clear to me, based
on the timing of the meeting, which occurred as the union or-
ganizing campaign was gaining momentum, that the real pur-
pose for the meeting was so that Golebiewski could address
that campaign. The length of the meeting and the topics dis-
cussed further establish that the union campaign was the true
motivation for Golebiewski’s presence.
The meeting lasted for 4 hours, which was highly unusual,
and it resulted in a significantly diminished security presence
on the casino floor, even delaying the start of the 1 a.m. shift, as
those security officers were delayed in entering the briefing
room. When he first entered the briefing room, Golebiewski
asked the security supervisors to leave the room. He testified
that he started the meeting by telling the officers that he had
heard they were “upset” with him, that they felt he “did not
care” about them, and he was there to talk about that.
The principal witnesses who testified about this October 14
preshift meeting were Bizzarro and Golebiewski. Their respec-
tive versions differed considerably. According to Bizzarro,
Golebiewski removed a prounion flier from the bulletin board
and went point by point through the flier trying to disprove the
statements made in favor of the Union. He then asked if any of
the security officers wanted to comment about the Union and
when he got no response, he pointed to Bizzarro and asked if
Bizzarro had any complaints and why Bizzarro would want a
union. Bizzarro responded that management had been treating
the security officers poorly, with no respect, and was not listen-
ing to the officers. According to Bizzarro, other officers then
began to speak up, raising complaints about shortened breaks
and spotlight checks.
Bizzarro testified that Golebiewski’s response to the com-
plaints being raised by the security officers was to indicate that
management had been responsive to officers’ complaints. Al-
legedly Golebiewski mentioned that he knew there had been a
problem with Security Supervisor Rick Casali, who he had
removed and sent to Harrah’s for retraining, to be replaced by
Supervisor Charles Willis, who he said “the officers would
really like.” Golebiewski went on to mention the ways in
which he had helped officer Brian Meadows with an absentee-
ism problem, helped officer Thomas Willequer with a customer
complaint, and helped officer Steve Fox with an attendance
issue. According to Bizzarro, Golebiewski further commented
that if there had been a union contract in effect at the Flamingo,
that he would have been forced to strictly adhere to the con-
tract, with no flexibility, and, so, would not have had the “lee-
way” to help Meadows, Willequer, or Fox with their respective
problems.
As noted, Golebiewski’s version of this meeting differs sig-
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 883
nificantly from that of Bizzarro. Although it seems to me that
the differences are not so much as to specifically what was said,
but, rather, what was emphasized. Golebiewski testified that he
began the meeting by saying that it was informal and every-
body was “free to talk” about the issues that they had with him.
He claims that Bizzarro immediately spoke up and said, “You
don’t care about us.” Golebiewski denied that was so, and he
proceeded to give examples of how he had helped Bizzarro. He
mentioned an incident on the casino floor when a prostitute had
spit into Bizzarro’s face, and a further issue where Bizzarro had
refused to wear a name badge containing his full last name.
Golebiewski explained that Bizzarro was concerned that with
an officer’s full name exposed on the name badge, an “undesir-
able,” such as a prostitute, would potentially be able to trace an
officer back to his or her home. Golebiewski informed the
officers that after he learned of this concern, he had changed
the nametag policy and was no longer requiring an officer’s
entire last name be listed on the tag. According to Golebiew-
ski, Bizzarro mentioned other problems that he had been having
with management, with Golebiewski responding in each case.
Golebiewski testified specifically that he did not ask em-
ployees about their views of the Union, nor did he ask them
about their attitudes towards the Union. He denied that he did
or said anything that could suggest to employees that their un-
ion activities were under observation. Further, he denied that
he had indicated that the rules would be more strictly enforced
if the facility were organized.
Security Officer Thomas Willequer attended the October 14
meeting, and he testified there were between eight and ten of-
ficers present. He supported Bizzarro’s testimony that Gole-
biewski began the meeting by asking the assembled officers
collectively why they wanted to join the Union. According to
Willequer, Golebiewski then asked each officer the same ques-
tion individually, which resulted in only a few officers respond-
ing. Willequer claims that Golebiewski stated that if the Union
were to successfully organize the facility, there would be “no
way that he could guarantee that we would be able to keep our
jobs.”
Officer Brian Meadows was at the meeting and testified that
Golebiewski started it off by going around the room “to see
where we all stood as far as the Union and our concerns . . . at
the Flamingo and our concerns with our employment.” Gole-
biewski wanted the individual officers to “share” their feelings
with the collective group. According to Meadows, Golebiew-
ski took credit for saving the jobs of several officers and said
that if the Union were present in the Flamingo, he would not
have been able to do so. Golebiewski also took the opportunity
to announce that Supervisor Ricky Casali was going to be
transferred and replaced by Charles Willis. Meadows testified
that there had been many officer complaints about Casali and
some of those were discussed at the meeting. He cannot recall
whether Golebiewski gave a specific reason for Casali’s trans-
fer, just that it was going to occur.
The preshift meeting on October 14 was 4 hours long, many
matters were discussed, and, unfortunately, the witnesses each
recall matters somewhat differently. However, some aspects of
the meeting were uniformly apparent from the testimony of the
witnesses.
It is alleged in paragraph 5(e)(1) of the complaint that Gole-
biewski created an impression among the security officers at
the meeting that their union activities were under surveillance
by the Respondent. I do not believe that this is accurate. It
should have been clear to all the security officers by the Octo-
ber 14 meeting that management was already aware of the un-
ion organizational campaign. As of October 7 management had
a union authorization card, given to it by a security officer, and
had almost immediately posted it on a bulletin board with a
responsive notice cautioning employees regarding the conse-
quences of signing such a card. It is clear to me, and I assume
it was to the gathered security officers, that Golebiewski was
present at the October 14 meeting to further respond to the
union campaign. However, Golebiewski said nothing that
would lead the officers to conclude that the Respondent was
spying on them or watching them in an attempt to determine
what union activity, if any, in which they were engaged. It
should have been obvious to the security officers that what
knowledge the Respondent had of the union campaign as of
October 14 was the result of the rather transparent efforts of
Bizzarro to solicit authorization cards.
Accordingly, I conclude that counsel for the General Counsel
has offered insufficient evidence that as of the preshift briefing
on October 14 that Golebiewski created an impression among
its employees that their union activities were under surveillance
by the Respondent. Therefore, I shall recommend to the Board
that complaint paragraph 5(e)(1) be dismissed.
Paragraph 5(e)(2) of the complaint alleges that at the meeting
on October 14, Golebiewski interrogated the employees about
their union membership, activities, and sympathies. I agree.
Based on the statements that Golebiewski made as he began the
meeting, it should have been obvious that he was present to
respond to the union campaign. I credit the testimony of Biz-
zarro, Willequer, and Meadows that Golebiewski no sooner
requested that the supervisors leave the room then he asked the
security officers both collectively and individually why they
wanted the Union. He was responding to the union flier that he
had just removed from the bulletin board and to the organizing
campaign, which the officers and their supervisors knew was
occurring.
Golebiewski’s denial that he asked the officers about their
union views or sympathies is simply not credible. Further, I do
not credit a self serving email message purporting to summarize
the meeting of October 14, which Golebiewski prepared the
following day and sent to his superior. (GC Exh. 9.) He at-
tempts to minimize his references to the union or his concerns
about the organizing campaign, and, rather, tries to establish
that his principal concern was what complaints the officers had
with him personally. Frankly, this defies credulity. The Octo-
ber 14 meeting was not just another preshift briefing, far from
it. After entering the room, Golebiewski took the highly unu-
sual step of asking the line supervisors to leave the room. He
then “held court” for 4 hours, apparently being willing to sacri-
fice having an appropriate level of security on the casino floor.
I seriously doubt that Golebiewski would have been willing to
do so simply so that he could find out what complaints the of-
ficers had with him personally. Rather, I believe that he would
have gone to such extremes only in an effort to confront the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

884
union campaign, which was at the time gathering momentum.
In determining whether a supervisor’s questions to an em-
ployee about his union activities were coercive under the Act,
the Board looks to the “totality of the circumstances.”
Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), affd. sub nom.
HERE Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). In
Westwood Health Care Center, 330 NLRB 935 (2000), the
Board listed a number of factors considered in determining
whether alleged interrogations under Rossmore House were
coercive. These are referred to as “Bourne factors,” so named
because they were first set forth in Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d
47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964). These factors include the background of
the parties’ relationship, the nature of the information sought,
the identity of the questioner, the place and method of interro-
gation, and the truthfulness of the reply.
In the matter at hand, the questioner was Eric Golebiewski,
the Respondent’s security director and its highest ranking secu-
rity supervisor. He asked the group of security officers how
they felt about the Union, or words to that effect. He initially
asked them collectively, but then when he got few responses,
he repeated his inquiry directly asking for individual responses.
Undoubtedly the officers were concerned about giving truthful,
candid responses, as many of them remained silent. From his
comments regarding the Union, the officers understood where
Golebiewski stood on the issue. Naturally, some of the officers
would be concerned about upsetting him with a prounion re-
sponse. Such questions from Golebiewski would reasonably
tend to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights.
Under such circumstances, I conclude that by Golebiewski’s
statements at the prehearing briefing on October 14, 2011, the
Respondent has unlawfully interrogated its employees regard-
ing their union membership, activities, and sympathies. There-
fore, it has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in
complaint paragraph 5(e)(2).
Other aspects of Golebiewski’s conduct during the meeting
of October 14 are also alleged to be unlawful, as the General
Counsel contends in complaint paragraph 5(e)(3) that he unlaw-
fully solicited employees’ complaints and grievances, and
promised them increased benefits and improved terms and con-
ditions of employment to dissuade those employees from sup-
porting the Union. While his precise words are somewhat un-
clear, it is obvious from the substance and context of the con-
versation that during the meeting Golebiewski discussed with
the assembled security officers concerns that they had with the
Respondent’s management.
The Board has long held that soliciting employee complaints
and grievances during a union organizing campaign contains
therein an implied promise to remedy such complaints. See,
e.g., Associated Mills, Inc., 190 NLRB 113 (1971); Swift Pro-
duce, Inc., 203 NLRB 360 (1973). Further, the fact that an
employer’s representative does not make a commitment to
specifically take corrective action does not diminish the antici-
pation of a remedy for employee complaints. Maple Grove
Health Care Center, 330 NLRB 775 (2000), citing Capitol EMI
Music, 311 NLRB 997 (1993).
In order for the solicitation of grievances to be unlawful, it is
not necessary for a union to have filed a representational peti-
tion, but merely for there to be a union organizing campaign in
progress. See, e.g., Curwood Inc., 339 NLRB 1137, 1147–
1148 (2003), enfd. in pertinent part 397 F.3d 548, 553–554 (7th
Cir. 2005) (holding that a prepetition announcement and prom-
ise to improve pension benefits violated the Act where the em-
ployer was reacting to knowledge of union activity among its
employees). In the matter at hand, as of the meeting of October
14, the Respondent was aware that the Union was attempting to
organize the security officers. As I have already concluded
above, Golebiewski’s reason for conducting this four hour
meeting was to address the security officers’ interest in union
representation.
It is important to note that the meeting of October 14 was not
the typical 15-minute preshift briefing where a line supervisor
would alert the officers as to any developments on the casino
floor, and new policies and procedures, and would routinely
close the meeting by asking whether the officers had any issues
or complaints that they wanted to raise. The meeting in ques-
tion was very unusual, both as to its length, and because it was
conducted by the security director himself. Whether Golebiew-
ski began the meeting by asking what problems the officers had
with him, or, as others have testified, by asking why the offic-
ers wanted a union, the meeting evolved into a session where
complaints were raised, many by Bizzarro, with Golebiewski
responding by indicating what he had done to benefit the offic-
ers. Among other matters, Golebiewski discussed having saved
the jobs of officers Meadows, Willequer, and Fox, which he
indicated would not have been possible had the Union orga-
nized the facility. Officers complained about numerous other
matters including, shortened breaks, spotlight checks, full
names on name tags, and their difficulties with Supervisor Rick
Casali.
I am in agreement with counsel for the General Counsel that
during the October 14 meeting, in the course of giving an anti-
union speech, which included the unlawful interrogation of
employees regarding their union sympathies, Golebiewski also
unlawfully solicited employee complaints and grievances.
Through those solicitations, Golebiewski was implicitly prom-
ising the officers increased benefits and improved terms and
conditions of employment for the purpose of dissuading them
from supporting the Union. Accordingly, the Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in complaint
paragraph 5(e)(3).
Further, in my view, Golebiewski’s statement to the officers
that Supervisor Casali, with whom they had difficulties and had
raised numerous complaint, was being transferred to a different
facility, and was to be replaced by Supervisor Charles Willis,
was an unlawful promise of improved terms and conditions of
employment in order to dissuade them from supporting the
Union, as alleged in complaint paragraph 5(e)(4). Golebiew-
ski’s conduct constituted a transparent promise of benefit, as he
went so far as to tell the assembled officers that they would
“really like” Willis.
I reject the Respondent’s defense that the decision to transfer
Casali had been made some time before the October 14 meet-
ing, and was taken as a routine transfer to another HIFOP prop-
erty where Casali could receive cross-training. Even assuming
such to be true, the real issue is what the security officers were
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 885
told and when they were so told. I have credited the officers
who testified that they first heard on October 14 that Casali was
to be transferred when Golebiewski mentioned it in response to
complaints raised about Casali, and while he told them that
their new supervisor was to be Willis, somebody that they
would “really like.” It was certainly reasonable for the officers
to conclude that Casali was being replaced as a benefit to them
in order to dissuade them from supporting the Union. Such
conduct constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as
alleged in complaint paragraph 5(e)(4).10
Before leaving the matter of the October 14 meeting, it is
necessary to address the claim in complaint paragraph 5(e)(5),
which alleges that Golebiewski threatened the employees with
more strictly enforced work rules and job loss if they selected
the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. As
noted above, I found that at the preshift meeting Golebiewski
mentioned how he had allegedly saved the jobs of officers
Meadows, Willequer, and Fox by his considerate treatment of
their alleged infractions of the Respondent’s rules and policies.
Further, Golebiewski indicated that if there had been a union
contract in effect at the Flamingo that he would have had to
strictly adhere to that contract with no flexibility, and he would
not have had the “leeway” to assist the officers. Obviously, this
comment was meant to suggest to the officers that if the Union
were successful in organizing the facility and subsequently
signing a collective-bargaining agreement with the Respondent,
that work rules would be strictly enforced under the terms of
that contract and employees who ran afoul of the rules could be
terminated. Golebiewski was saying that under such circum-
stances, he would not have the liberty to help them. This was
certainly a reasonable interpretation for the assembled officers
to reach upon hearing Golebiewski’s comments.
Once again, it should be noted that Golebiewski’s comments
at the October 14 preshift briefing were made shortly after the
Respondent learned of the union campaign and just as that
campaign was gathering momentum. It seems to me that those
comments were clearly designed to restrain, coerce, and inter-
fere with the security officers’ right to engage in Section 7 ac-
tivity. Cf. Carter’s, Inc., 339 NLRB 1089, 1089 fn. 2, 1093
(2003); Cf. Mediplex of Wethersfield, 320 NLRB 510, 518
(1995). Those comments constituted threats to more strictly
enforce work rules and with a corresponding potential of job
loss if the security officers selected the Union as their collective
bargaining representative. Accordingly, I find that they consti-
tuted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in
complaint paragraph 5(e)(5).

10 It should be noted that I do not find, as also alleged in complaint
par. 5(e)(4), that on October 14, Golebiewski informed the officers that
they would no longer be required to perform service sweeps. The
record evidence is to the contrary, as employees continued to be re-
quired to perform service sweeps after October 14. Service sweeps are
interactions between security officers and customers, which are critical-
ly important to the Respondent in its efforts to improve its customer
service scores. The only change in the Respondent’s past practice
occurred after the October 14 meeting, and was limited to the officers
no longer having to call in to dispatch and report their service sweeps.
2. The “Bizarre” flier
In an effort to counter prounion fliers, the Respondent pro-
duced a series of antiunion fliers, which were posted on the
Respondent’s bulletin boards and distributed directly to security
officers. One of those fliers was distributed to officers at a pre-
shift meeting held several days after the 4-hour meeting, which
means that the flier would have been distributed on approxi-
mately October 16, 2011. The General Counsel alleges in
complaint paragraph 5(f)(1) that by that printed communication
the Respondent created the impression among its employees
that their union activities were under surveillance. I agree.
As I have already concluded, while Francis Bizzarro was the
primary union organizer and distributor of authorization cards,
such was an “open secret.” Bizzarro did not distribute authori-
zation cards in the presence of supervisors. However, his
method of distributing cards, as discussed in detail earlier in
this decision, was such that it quickly became well known
among both employees and management that he was doing so.
The Respondent’s supervisory witnesses acknowledge knowing
as much by no later than October 7, when informed by a securi-
ty officer.
The antiunion flier distributed on about October 16 was re-
markable for only one reason. In the middle of this flier, which
portrays the Union in a negative way, in the middle of a sen-
tence, the word “BIZARRE” appears in capital letters, where
the other words in the sentence are in normal lower case. (GC
Exh. 6.) The word certainly stands out from the rest of the
sentence, which in whole reads as follows: “We realize it’s a
pretty BIZARRE situation, but it looks like a small group is
trying to convince all of you that you need to sign up (without
asking questions) for a union that has absolutely no track record
for achieving ‘better’ or ‘more’ for its dues-paying members.”
When asked why this one word in the sentence appeared in
capital letters, the Respondent’s security director, Eric Gole-
biewski, indicated that he did not know, as he did not prepare
the flier and was not sure who did. Counsel for the Respondent
states in his posthearing brief that the use of the word
BIZARRE in capital letters was appropriate in its context, was
not intended to draw attention to Francis Bizzarro, and was
nothing more than an innocent coincidence. This contention I
find preposterous.
It defies logic to believe that this “play on words” was simp-
ly a coincidence. Rather, it seems very obvious that the writer
of the flier intended for the readers to understand the connec-
tion that was being made between the word “BIZARRE” in
capital letters and the primary union organizer, Francis Biz-
zarro. It is highly doubtful that any security officer who read
the flier would not have known that the reference was to Fran-
cis Bizzarro. However, the legal question raised by the com-
plaint is whether identifying Bizzarro in this way created an
impression among the Respondent’s employees that their union
activities were under surveillance. I believe that it did.
While it may have been generally known by the security of-
ficers that Bizzarro was the primary union organizer, seeing his
name used and convoluted in this way would have served to
alert those employees that the Respondent was aware of Biz-
zarro’s union activities and was targeting him and publicly
ridiculing him for those activities. It would serve as a warning
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

886
that having the ability to engage in surveillance of Bizzarro’s
union activity, the Respondent was certainly capable of doing
the same to other union supporters.
The test for whether an employer creates an unlawful im-
pression of surveillance is whether, under the circumstances, an
employee could reasonably conclude that his union activities
are being monitored. Mountain Steel, Inc., 326 NLRB 787
(1998), enfd. 8 Fed. Appx. 180 (4th Cir. 2001). It seems to me
that in the case at hand, that was the logical, and certainly rea-
sonable, conclusion that security officers would reach upon
seeing the play on words using Bizzarro’s name in the flier.
The Board has held that under the Act “[e]mployees should not
have to fear that ‘members of management are peering over
their shoulders, taking note of who is involved in union activi-
ties, and in what particular ways.’” Conley Trucking, 349
NLRB 308 (2007), quoting Fred’k Wallace & Sons, Inc., 331
NLRB 914 (2000).
I conclude that the play on words using Bizzarro’s name in
the flier created an impression among the security officers that
their union activities might be under surveillance by the Re-
spondent. This certainly had the potential to interfere with their
exercise of Section 7 rights. Therefore, I conclude that by this
conduct the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
as alleged in paragraph 5(f)(1) of the complaint.
The General Counsel alleges in complaint paragraph 5(f)(2)
that the Respondent concomitantly threatened its employees
with unspecified reprisals for engaging in union activity when it
distributed the flier containing the play on words using Biz-
zarro’s name. Certainly, holding an employee up to ridicule, as
was done to Bizzarro by the reference to his name in the flier,
was a personally demeaning action taken by the Respondent
against a union supporter because of his union activities. While
perhaps this did not constitute a typical threat, it would certain-
ly have the ability to interfere with, coerce or restrain employ-
ees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. An employee
would reasonably think twice before engaging in union activity
when the result might be having the Respondent single out and
hold that employee up to public ridicule. Thus, such an action
by an employer does for all practical purposes result in an in-
fringement of employee rights under the Act. Accordingly, I
conclude that counsel for the General Counsel has met his bur-
den and established a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as
alleged in complaint paragraph 5(f)(2).
3. Conversation between Golebiewski and Rudy
It is alleged in complaint paragraph 5(g)(1) that about De-
cember 2, 2011, Golebiewski threatened an employee with
discipline if the security officers selected the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative. The employee referenced
is security officer Christopher Rudy, and while both Rudy and
Golebiewski recalled the conversation, their versions of the
incident are somewhat different. This conversation occurred
either on the casino floor or in the lobby of the hotel, but the
precise location is not significant.
According to Rudy, in late November, he was in the hotel
lobby talking to guests and “a cigarette girl.” Golebiewski
came up to him, put his hand on Rudy’s shoulder and said, “If
this was a union area, I would have to write you up.” Rudy
responded, “I’m glad I’m not getting written up.” Rudy testi-
fied that there is no rule against talking with other employees,
only that the security officers are not to “pool together.”
Golebiewski placed the incident in December. He testified
that while walking through the lobby of the hotel, he observed
Rudy “talking to his girlfriend, the cigarette girl.” According to
Golebiewski, he knew that she was Rudy’s girlfriend as he had
previously observed them kissing and embracing. As he ap-
proached Rudy, Golebiewski noticed him talking with the ciga-
rette girl and “touching her hair.” He also noticed “a particular
pair of customers that were standing, waiting for [Rudy] to get
done with his conversation with the cigarette girl.” As Rudy
had not seen him approach, Golebiewski tapped him on the
shoulder and said very quietly, “If there was a union contract it
would have language in it about guest service.” According to
Golebiewski, he then “nudged” his eyes towards the customers,
which was when Rudy first noticed customers waiting for him.
Rudy is said to have responded, “Good thing there’s no con-
tract.”
The two versions of the conversation are substantively rather
similar. Rudy was on his security officer rounds, but was talk-
ing with the cigarette girl. Golebiewski observed this and was
concerned that Rudy was distracted from doing his job because
Rudy was talking with the cigarette girl, and/or because he was
not servicing customers waiting to talk with him. Golebiewski
then referenced the union contract and the language it would
contain covering such a situation.
If Golebiewski had merely told Rudy to get back to work, or
words to that effect, there would be no issue here. However,
instead he referred to a potential union contract and what im-
pact contractual language would have on such a situation.
Whether Rudy’s version is more accurate and Golebiewski
mentioned having to “write him up” in such a situation, or
whether Golebiewski said something more generic, such as
mentioning “guest services language,” there was the implicit
notice that under a union contract Golebiewski would have
been required to take some disciplinary action against Rudy. In
fact, that was precisely the way Rudy understood the comment,
as he responded that he was glad that was not going to happen,
or words to that effect. Rudy’s response was certainly reasona-
ble under the circumstances.
There is no mystery here. What Golebiewski was saying to
Rudy was that he would no longer be able to be lenient with
him regarding discipline if the Union were successful in organ-
izing the facility and getting a contract. This was a threat of a
changed condition of employment in which past leniency
would be eliminated by the existence of a union contract, with
Golebiewski making no reference to changes based on the col-
lective-bargaining process.11 Such a statement by Golebiewski
had the effect of interfering with, restraining, and coercing
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Cf. Carter’s
Inc., supra; Cf. Mediplex of Wethersfield, supra. It constitutes a
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in complaint

11 Golebiewski testified about a conversation that he had with Rudy
some 2 weeks earlier where they had discussed the collective-
bargaining process. However, I see no connection between these two
conversations that were so far apart.
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 887
paragraph 5(g)(1).
Concomitantly, the General Counsel alleged in complaint
paragraph 5(g)(2) that the statements Golebiewski made to
Rudy also constituted the promulgation and enforcement of an
overlybroad and discriminatory work rule prohibiting the Re-
spondent’s employees from talking to coworkers because of
their union activities. However, I do not reach such a conclu-
sion.
The most that can be said about Golebiewski trying to limit
the conservation that Rudy was having with the cigarette girl
was that while on duty Rudy should not be conversing with co-
workers, be that person a girlfriend or not, while customers
were waiting to speak with him. There was absolutely no evi-
dence that this was an attempt to promulgate a rule of any kind,
and, even more to the point, no evidence that by his statements
Golebiewski was trying to limit the union or protected concert-
ed activity of the Respondent’s employees. Further, it would
have been unreasonable for either Rudy or the cigarette girl to
have reached such a conclusion.
The Respondent had the right to expect that while on his
work shift Rudy would be performing the security duties of
walking his rounds and interacting with customers. He was not
told that he could not talk with the cigarette girl, but merely
reminded that he was not performing his duties while standing
in the facility talking as customers were waiting to be serviced.
No rule was promulgated or enforced and no restrictions were
being placed on union or protected concerted activity. Accord-
ingly, I shall recommend that the Board dismiss complaint
paragraph 5(g)(2).
4. Confrontation between Bizzarro and Baker
As I mentioned earlier in this decision, Francis Bizzarro and
Paul Baker, the HIFOB and Respondent’s vice president of
operations and assistant general manager, had been friends
before Bizzarro came to work for the Respondent. Baker had
in fact given Bizzarro a reference for the security officer posi-
tion, and it is highly likely that a reference from such a high
ranking official of the Respondent would have been very help-
ful to Bizzarro is securing a position as a security officer. The
men’s wives had been friends and Yoga devotees before the
husbands became friendly. While the degree of friendship
between Bizzarro and Baker is somewhat unclear, there is no
doubt that they were socially acquainted, the two couples hav-
ing spent time together before Bizzarro’s employment.
On a day in mid-January 2012, Bizzarro and Baker had a se-
ries of interactions, more accurately described as confronta-
tions, at the Respondent’s facility. Not surprisingly, the two
men differ as to precisely what was said during these incidents.
Baker testified that while leaving work on that day, he had
occasion to see Bizzarro arriving at work. According to Biz-
zarro, Baker was waiting for him as Bizzarro passed through an
underground hallway from the parking garage on his way to
work.
The men exchanged greetings, and Bizzarro claims that in
response to the question as to how he was doing, Baker re-
sponded, “not so well.” Bizzarro testified that Baker told him
that he was upset and felt “betrayed” as Bizzarro had tried to
bring the Union into the facility. According to Bizzarro, Baker
was screaming at him, and so he walked away and went to the
timeclock to clock in. Baker followed him to the time clock
and continued to yell at Bizzarro, again saying that Bizzarro
had “betrayed” him, and asked why Bizzarro had failed to fol-
low the “chain of command.” Baker is alleged to have said that
his job had been “placed in jeopardy” by what Bizzarro had
done. Further, according to Bizzarro, Baker stated that all Biz-
zarro’s issues had been taken care of by management, ques-
tioned why Bizzarro had not gone to human resources with his
complaints, and asked how Bizzarro could get the Union in-
volved with the security officers.
Bizzarro testified that he told Baker that it wasn’t anything
personal against him, just that the security officers wanted rep-
resentation. He asked why Baker was so upset with him, as this
was just what the security officers wanted. Further, he told
Baker that the security officers had enough of management’s
treatment, and that they had been treated poorly and with no
respect. According to Bizzarro, Baker seemed very frustrated,
was red in the face, very angry, and continued to yell at him,
and was in fact screaming. Bizzarro contends that again he
tried to walk away from Baker, saying that he had to get his
uniform and go to work. Bizzarro described the incident as
“quite the scene.”
However, Baker described the incident somewhat different-
ly. According to Baker, he encountered Bizzarro at about 9
p.m. as Baker was leaving work for the day. The two men
exchanged hellos, after which Baker said, “I just want to tell
you that, you know, I’m just very disappointed that all this has
occurred and you just didn’t come to me if there was a problem,
you know, in the organization.” Baker claims that Bizzarro
then simply walked away. However, after a short while Baker
proceeded on this way towards the parking garage, at which
point, near the timeclock, he again encountered Bizzarro.
Baker testified that he asked Bizzarro why he had walked
away while they were having a conversation. Baker then said,
“I just want to reiterate that I feel personally pretty—just upset
and disappointed that you didn’t come to me. You know, we
have a relationship, you know. I helped facilitate you getting a
job with a referral, especially when you were having the trou-
bling time that you were having, basically an emotional break-
down.” Bizzarro responded by denying that he was having an
emotional breakdown, to which Baker said that Bizzarro’s wife
had given that information to Baker’s wife.
According to Baker, he then said, “You know Francis, I just
feel like there’s better Unions out there if you look at the re-
search.” Bizzarro responded by saying that Baker did not know
anything, as he just sits up in his office all day. Baker replied,
“I’m out on the floor more than you know, more than you are.”
According to Baker, Bizzarro then said, “This customer service
stuff is going to get people fired.” Baker testified that he then
responded as follows: “This customer service stuff hasn’t got-
ten anybody fired. In fact, none of this, even this union activi-
ty, nobody will get fired for wanting to be involved in the or-
ganization effort here. In fact, there will be no retaliation asso-
ciated with any union organization or activity here.” The con-
versation ended when Baker repeated that he “felt really disap-
pointed” that Bizzarro had not “come to [him] first.”
I did not find Baker to be a credible witness. When testify-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

888
ing he seemed rather nervous, more so than would be expected
for a person with his lofty position with the Respondent. Alt-
hough he testified that considering their past friendship, he was
disappointed that Bizzarro had not gone to him first with his
complaints, I got the distinct impression that he was trying not
to show the depth of his emotional feelings. He appeared to
have his emotions just barely controlled, and I believe that he
really felt deeply betrayed by Bizzarro’s union activity. Fur-
ther, I found much of his testimony self serving and unrealistic,
especially his contention that he specifically told Bizzarro that
“nobody will get fired for wanting to be involved in the organi-
zation effort here.”
As I noted earlier in this decision, while I found Bizzarro
generally credible, he did have a tendency to exaggerate and
embellish so as to put himself in the best possible light. In any
event, in comparing the two versions of the conversation in
question, I believe that Bizzarro’s version was inherently more
credible than that told by Baker. Bizzarro’s story had the ring
of authenticity to it, while Baker’s story did not. Accordingly, I
will credit the version of the conversation told by Bizzarro,
including his claim that Baker was red in the face, screaming at
him, and said that Bizzarro’s actions had placed his [Baker’s]
job “in jeopardy,” and that Bizzarro had “betrayed” him.
Complaint paragraph 5(h)(1) alleges that the Respondent, by
Paul Baker, threatened its employees by informing them that
they were disloyal because employees supported the Union and
engaged in union activities. Having found Bizzarro’s version
of the conversation credible, I conclude that during that conver-
sation Baker said that Bizzarro had “betrayed” him and placed
Baker’s job “in jeopardy” by his union activities. It was cer-
tainly reasonable for Bizzarro to conclude that in Baker’s eyes
he was a disloyal employee for having engaged in union activi-
ties. Further, an employee would reasonably assume that dis-
loyal employees get fired. As the Board has long held, “The
test of whether a statement is unlawful is whether the words
could reasonably be construed as coercive, whether or not that
is the only reasonable construction.” Double D Construction
Group, 339 NLRB 303, 303–304 (2003).
An employer has been found to violate the Act with com-
ments about “loyalty.” E.L.C. Electric, Inc., 344 NLRB 1200,
1200 fn. 3 (2005) (affirming the administrative law judge’s
finding of a violation for telling an employee it would try to
keep its “loyal employees”); Hialeah Hospital, 343 NLRB 391
(2004) (finding the employer’s representative violated the Act
“by telling the employees that he felt ‘betrayed’ and ‘stabbed in
the back’ because they had contacted the Union. Those state-
ments conveyed to the employees the message that engaging in
union activity, a protected statutory right, was tantamount to
employee disloyalty, and implicitly threatened them with un-
specified reprisals.”).
Accordingly, I conclude that by his statements to Bizzarro in
mid-January of 2012, Baker had threatened him with termina-
tion because of his union sympathies and activities. By such
conduct, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, as alleged in complaint paragraph 5(h)(1).
It is further alleged in complaint paragraph 5(h)(2) that dur-
ing that same conversation, Baker threatened Bizzarro with loss
of benefits as the Respondent would no longer resolve employ-
ee complaints because the employees had supported the Union
and engaged in union activities. However, even after crediting
Bizzarro’s version of the conversation with Baker, I do not
believe that it would have been reasonable for Bizzarro to have
reached such a conclusion.
I conclude that Baker told Bizzarro that all his problems had
been taken care of through management, and, so, he should
have followed the “chain of command,” rather than having
gone to the Union. Still, counsel for the General Counsel’s
contention that Bizzarro would have reasonably understood this
to mean that because the employees had sought representation
from the Union that the Respondent would no longer resolve
their complaints is a leap of logic too great to reasonably make.
I do not believe that Bizzarro or other security officers would
have reasonably reached such a conclusion. Therefore, I shall
recommend to the Board that complaint paragraph 5(h)(2) be
dismissed.
The General Counsel alleges in complaint paragraph 5(h)(3)
that during the conversation between Baker and Bizzarro,
Baker promulgated and enforced an overlybroad and discrimi-
natory rule that the security officers had to follow the chain of
command to resolve their complaints. As noted, I have con-
cluded that Baker criticized Bizzarro for failing to follow the
chain of command and take his complaints to the human re-
source department, but instead to have sought union representa-
tion. I believe that for all practical purposes Baker was prom-
ulgating a rule requiring employees to bring complaints through
the human resource department and through the chain of com-
mand. Further, he was implicitly threatening Bizzarro with
disciplinary action for failing to do so, but instead for having
contacted the Union.
The promulgation of such a rule would reasonably be con-
strued by employees as prohibiting Section 7 activity. It would,
therefore, chill those employees’ right to organize on behalf of
the Union, go to the Union with their complaints, or engage in
other protected concerted activity. Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646–647 (2004); See Northeastern
Land Services, 352 NLRB 744 (2009) (applying the Board’s
standard in Lutheran Heritage-Village, supra at 647); Lafayette
Park Hotel, supra. Accordingly, I conclude that the statement
attributed to Baker constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, as alleged in complaint paragraph 5(h)(3).
The General Counsel alleges in complaint paragraph 5(h)(4)
that during the conversation in mid-January, Baker threatened
employees with discharge because they supported the Union
and engaged in union activities. In his posthearing brief, coun-
sel for the General Counsel does not distinguish this allegation
from that contained in complaint paragraph 5(h)(1), which
mentions Baker threatening employees with discipline by in-
forming them that they were disloyal because they supported
the Union and engaged in union activity. In examining the
statements made by Baker in his conversation with Bizzarro, I
am not aware of any language threatening Bizzarro beyond that
language that I have already considered and found unlawful.
According, I believe that this allegation is simply a repetition of
that allegation earlier considered. Therefore, I shall recom-
mend to the Board that complaint paragraph 5(h)(4) be dis-
missed.
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 889
5. Willis creates the impression of surveillance
Complaint paragraph 5(i) alleges that on January 15, 2012,
the Respondent through Supervisor Charles Willis, by describ-
ing employees who supported the Union and engaged in union
activities, created an impression among its employees that their
union activities were under surveillance. In his posthearing
brief, counsel for the General Counsel sets forth a number of
incidents that he contends establish that the actions of various
supervisors, including Willis, were intended to leave the securi-
ty officers with the impression that the Respondent was aware
of Bizzarro’s union activity.
Former security officer Brian Meadows testified that in mid-
December 2011, at a preshift briefing an officer asked supervi-
sor Keith Berberich a question, which he answered by saying,
“I don’t know the answer to that question, you’ll have to ask
Francis that question.” According to Meadows, Bizzarro got
very offended and asked Berberich, “Why are you pointing at
me?” Allegedly, Berberich turned bright red, put his hands up
and said, “Well, I thought you were the mister know it all guy
about the Union.”
Security officer Ty Evans testified that in mid-January 2012,
he was with Supervisor Charles Willis outside the briefing
room when Willis began to talk about the matters that he was
going to discuss once the briefing started. According to Evans,
Willis said that he was “tired of being told what he could and
couldn’t say about the union issue.” Allegedly, Willis went on
to say that “the instigator of the union situation had been given
a favor and given the job that he had and, as a result of family
issues, he was having problems at home and he was given a
favor with his job.” It is counsel for the General Counsel’s
contention that this was a reference to Bizzarro by Willis, who
knew from Barker that Barker had given Bizzarro a job referral
because the men were friends and because Bizzarro had been
having problems at home.
Willis testified and while I found his testimony very confus-
ing and difficult to follow, he seemed to deny that he had told
Evans or any security officer that Bizzarro had gotten his job
through his friendship with Baker. Willis apparently only
found out that Bizzarro and Baker had been friends when sev-
eral days earlier he had overheard part of the conversation be-
tween Bizzarro and Baker on January 13. While Wills seems to
recall a conversation with Evans prior to a briefing, he recalls
the Union coming up in the conversation only in regards to the
contract that the Union had to represent security guards at the
Aquarius Casino and Hotel in Laughlin, Nevada. I did not
believe Willis’ denial, and I found his testimony concerning
this incident very disjointed, self serving, and implausible. On
the other hand, I found Evans’ testimony coherent, plausible,
and, overall, credible.
Further, security officer Christopher Rudy testified that in
late January 2012, at a preshift briefing, Willis asked, “Do you
really want a guy who was juiced in12 by upper management to
represent you in this cause,” referring to Bizzarro and the Un-
ion. As noted, Willis denied ever making such a statement, but,
for the reasons given, I do not accept his denial, and, rather,

12 I will take administrative notice that the term “juiced” is a collo-
quial expression meaning having or using influence to get some benefit.
credit Rudy.
Based on the credible testimony of Evans and Rudy, I am of
the view that in January 2012, Willis made several comments to
security officers regarding an unnamed officer that Willis de-
scribed as the “instigator of the union situation” who was given
his job as a “favor” because he had family problems, and also
as somebody trying to represent the employees who got his job
because he was “juiced in.” It would have been obvious to the
security officers who heard the remarks that Willis was refer-
encing Bizzarro.13 While I have found that it was at least an
“open secret” that Bizzarro was the chief union organizer, Biz-
zarro had not directly represented himself to management as
such. Willis’ remarks were designed to single Bizzarro out as
the union organizer and to disparage him. This conduct would
likely leave the security officers with the impression that Biz-
zarro’s union activities were under surveillance by manage-
ment.
As was mentioned earlier, the test for whether an employer
creates an unlawful impression of surveillance is whether, un-
der the circumstances, an employee could reasonably conclude
that his union activities are being monitored. Mountaineer
Steel, Inc., supra. By his comments, Willis was letting the se-
curity officers know that management was aware of Bizzarro’s
union activities, and by those derogatory references, Willis was
also telling the officers that management was none too happy
with Bizzarro’s activities. The security officers should not
have to fear that “members of management are peering over
their shoulders, taking note of who is involved in union activi-
ties and in what particular ways.” Conley Trucking, supra,
quoting Fred’k Wallace & Son, Inc., supra.
Willis’ comments would reasonably chill the Section 7 activ-
ities of the security officers by causing them to be apprehensive
that if they engaged in union activities the Respondent would
be monitoring such activities as it appeared it had been doing
with Bizzarro’s activities. Accordingly, I conclude that Willis’
comments constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
as alleged in complaint paragraph 5(i).
6. Request that security officers take voluntary time off
The General Counsel alleges in complaint paragraph 5(j) that
about January 19, 2012, the Respondent, by Keith Berberich,
threatened its employees with layoffs because they engaged in
union activities. It is undisputed that the Respondent had a past
practice of requiring security officers who desired to take time
off from work to make such a request of management two
weeks in advance. A number of security officers testified that
in December 2011 or January 2012, they were told by supervi-
sors, including Berberich and Willis, that the Respondent was
trying to cut costs, and it would be appreciated if officers who
wanted to take unpaid time off from work would do so, and that
in that event they could take the time off without having to give
2 weeks advance notice. The officers were further told that
such voluntary time off could avert possible layoffs, and that
officers who requested time off would be considered “team

13 It appears that Keith Berberich’s remark in December 2011 also
referenced Bizzarro. However, this incident is not alleged in the com-
plaint to constitute an unlawful impression of surveillance. Therefore, I
will not deal with it further.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

890
players.” While the Respondent does not deny that its supervi-
sors encouraged the security officers to take voluntary time off,
it argues that this was something that was being encouraged
throughout the Respondent’s various departments and was to-
tally unrelated to the organizing campaign in the security de-
partment.
The available evidence strongly suggests that an effort to get
employees to take voluntary time off was instituted company-
wide and was not restricted to just the Respondent’s security
department. Further, there is no credible, probative evidence to
establish that the effort was in any way related to the attempt to
organize the security officers. Security officer Willequer testi-
fied that in the December/January time frame, Berberich asked
at a preshift briefing whether anybody wanted to take time off
without pay. Berberich indicated that “Caesar’s Entertainment
had overspent their profit margin and was trying to make some
of that up by asking the officers to take time off without pay.”
According to Willequer, Berberich added that “the rest of the
departments would be asking their people in about two or three
months later on down the road to do that.” Willequer clearly
testified that Berberich indicated the encouragement to take
time off was related to “budgetary matters” at Caesar’s Enter-
tainment, and that no connection was made to the union organi-
zational campaign.
Berberich’s unrebutted testimony was that in the 19 years
that he had worked in the Flamingo there had been slow periods
when officers had been asked if they would like to take extra
time off, but that they were not forced to do so. During such
slow seasons, all departments are impacted, with Berberich
mentioning the food and beverage and housekeeping depart-
ments. When specifically asked during direct examination by
counsel for the Respondent whether the solicitation to the secu-
rity officers of unpaid leave was in any way connected to their
union activities, Berberich credibly testified, “It happens every
year, no connection sir.”
There is simply no credible evidence connecting a request
that security officers consider taking unpaid leave with their
union activities. No individual security officers were singled
out and none were required to take leave. It appears that the
request under review was companywide and not limited to the
Respondent’s security department. As counsel for the General
Counsel has failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish a
violation of the Act, I shall recommend to the Board that com-
plaint paragraph 5(j) be dismissed.
7. Close supervision of Bizzarro
Complaint paragraph 5(k) alleges that on about January 21,
2012, the Respondent, through Paul Baker, more closely super-
vised Bizzarro because of his support for the Union. According
to the testimony of Francis Bizzarro, on January 21, 2012,
which was approximately a week after the confrontation with
Paul Baker near the time clock, he was working in the Margari-
taville Casino when Baker approached him and asked if he was
“on post.” Bizzarro responded that he was in the Margaritaville
Casino, which was his post, so “yes,” he was on post. He then
observed Baker making a phone call. Apparently at about that
same time, Bizzarro needed to waive supervisor Willis over for
help with an “undesirable.” After the undesirable was removed
from the property, Bizzarro asked Willis why he had been in
the area. Willis allegedly said that he was in the area because
he had received a phone call from Baker and knew that the two
men had just had a conversation. Bizzarro testified that he
explained his recent conversation with Baker to Willis, who
then responded that Bizzarro “shouldn’t piss off the vice presi-
dent of operations.” Willis then left the area.
In his posthearing brief, counsel for the General Counsel
contends that Baker’s questioning of Bizzarro as to whether he
was on his post and the follow up presence of Willis in the area
establishes that management was more closely supervising
Bizzarro because of his union activities. However, Baker and
Willis tell a somewhat different story than Bizzarro.
Baker credibly testified that he spends a significant amount
of time daily doing a “walkabout” around the properties that he
supervises. During such a walk around in January 2012 in the
Margaritaville Casino, he observed Bizzarro and another secu-
rity officer standing together. He asked both officers whether
this was their post. They answered in the affirmative, to which
Baker responded, “Make sure you walk around and interact
with guests out here on the floor.” Baker then walked away.
He testified that he did not call Willis during this walk around,
and he was not intoxicated.
Willis also contradicts Bizzarro, testifying that he was mak-
ing his rounds through the Margaritaville Casino when Bizzarro
waived him over. According to Willis, Bizzarro told him that
Baker had recently approached him and that Baker was “intoxi-
cated and belligerent” and had told him that he shouldn’t be
standing around, but needed to be patrolling his area. Willis
denied telling Bizzarro that he had recently spoken with Baker
and denied that he told Bizzarro that he should not “piss off”
Baker. Willis testified that Bizzarro’s complaints about Baker
were “above my pay grade,” and so he immediately passed the
information on to security director Golebiewski. By his pay
grade remark, Willis was obviously saying that a complaint that
Baker, HIFOB and the Respondent’s vice president of opera-
tions and assistant general manager, was intoxicated was poten-
tially such a sensitive matter that it needed to go up the chain of
command to those in the organization who had more authority
than he had.
I believe this is one of those instances where Bizzarro has
exaggerated and embellished his testimony. Obviously, there
was some conversation between Bizzarro and Baker, and sub-
sequently between Bizzarro and Willis. I believe that Willis’
testimony is more inherently plausible, and, therefore, I credit
specifically his denial that he had a phone conversation with
Baker that precipitated his appearance in the Margaritaville
Casino. Further, both Baker and Willis credibly testified that
they spend considerable time making rounds through the prop-
erties that they supervise. That is only logical. Therefore, re-
gardless of the words spoken between Bizzarro and Baker and
then between Bizzarro and Willis, there is insufficient evidence
that either Baker or Willis were specifically observing Bizzarro,
or that they were more closely supervising him because of his
union or other protected conduct.
Bizzarro is highly suspicious of the Respondent’s actions
towards him. From the findings that I have made, it appears
that there is some good reason for him to be so, specifically
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 891
regarding his union and protected concerted activities. Howev-
er, I do not believe this is one of those instances. Accordingly,
I shall recommend to the Board that complaint paragraph 5(k)
be dismissed.
8. The Respondent’s bulletin boards
It is alleged in complaint paragraph 5(l) that since October
2011, the Respondent has discriminatorily restricted security
officer employees’ access to the Respondent’s bulletin boards
in the preshift briefing room because they were engaged in
union and other protected concerted activities.14 However, I
found the evidence offered by the General Counsel’s witnesses
to be very confusing regarding the number of bulletin boards,
the location of those bulletin boards, and the general availabil-
ity of those bulletin boards.
All witnesses seem to agree that there are three bulletin
boards in the immediate vicinity of the preshift briefing room
used by the security officers. It appears that one bulletin board
is within the room, a second just outside the room near the time
clock, and a third some small distance away. According to the
testimony of security officer Rudy, the board in the briefing
room is on the “back wall,” the second board is outside the
room “to your right,” and the third is outside the room, “to your
left.” He testified that a locked “glass case” was placed around
the second board in December 2011, “just before New Year’s.”
Rudy claims that since that time he has seen anti-union fliers
posted on the locked bulletin board, but no pro-union fliers.
The third bulletin board, which is also outside the room remains
unlocked and contains no postings regarding the Union, in fa-
vor of or against. Only work-related matters are posted on this
board.
It appears from counsel for the General Counsel’s posthear-
ing brief that the General Counsel is complaining that while the
board in the briefing room remained available for the posting of
prounion materials, such materials were frequently subject to
being summarily removed and/or defaced. Further, he com-
plains that the second board, which was placed under a locked
glass case, is no longer available for the posting of pro-union
materials.
It is undisputed that nonwork related information has tradi-
tionally been posted on the bulletin board inside the briefing
room, including fantasy football, birthday fliers, and personal
items for sale. A number of security officers, including Biz-
zarro, testified that prounion fliers were placed on this board.
However, they complain that in short order the fliers were ei-
ther removed or altered with negative writings. It is important
to note that neither Bizzarro nor any other witness was able to
testify as to who was tampering with the prounion fliers, and no
evidence was offered to establish that the Respondent was be-

14 At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the General
Counsel moved to amend the complaint by filing a notice of intent to
amend consolidated complaint. That motion sought to add paragraphs
5(l), (m), and (n) to the complaint. (GC Exh. 1(q).) I permitted the
proposed amendment over counsel for the Respondent’s objection
because the allegations in the proposed amendment were closely related
by substance and time to the other allegations in the complaint, and
because I determined that allowing the amendment would not prejudice
the Respondent in the presentation of its case.
hind such tampering. Bizzarro testified that over the course of
time, he posted about ten union fliers on this board. Although
he did not specifically say so, the implication was that all were
tampered with at some time after posting. Bizzarro does
acknowledge that in one instance where a flier was removed, he
went to a security supervisor, Janice Miller, and asked for per-
mission to make a copy, presumably on the Respondent’s
equipment, and to repost the flier. He was given that permis-
sion.
In my view, counsel for the General Counsel has failed to es-
tablish that the Respondent was somehow responsible for tam-
pering with the prounion fliers posted on the bulletin board in
the briefing room. There is no evidence that management re-
moved union materials or authorized their removal. Holly
Farms Corp., 311 NLRB 273, 274 (1993) (“There is no evi-
dence that the Respondents knew about the union notices, re-
moved them, or authorized their removal. Under the circum-
stances, we reverse the judge and find that the Respondents did
not unlawfully remove union literature from the bulletin
boards.”).
It is unclear to me whether the bulletin board outside the
briefing room was available for the posting of union materials
prior to the time that the glass cover was placed over it. After
that time, it was apparently not available for the posting of
union materials, as it was locked and the security officers did
not have a key. Bizzarro testified that after the cover went on,
postings on that board were limited to business matters and to
antiunion materials. Further, he testified that after the glass
cover was placed on the board, he requested permission several
times from Supervisor Cedric Johnson to post prounion materi-
als on this board. However, he never received permission.
Counsel for the General Counsel contends that: because the
Union’s materials were tampered with when posted on the bul-
letin board in the briefing room; and because the Union’s mate-
rials could not be posted on the board with the locked glass
case; and because the Respondent was able to post antiunion
materials, which were not tampered with, on both the bulletin
board in the briefing room and the one under glass, that this
constitutes an unlawful discriminatory restriction based on
union activity. I disagree.
The bulletin board in the briefing room, where the security
guards regularly congregated, was available for the posting of
prounion materials. Such materials were in fact frequently
posted there. As I have already concluded, there is no evidence
that the Respondent was responsible for the tampering with
such materials. There is also no evidence that Bizzarro or other
officers were in any way limited in the number of materials that
they could post on this board, and they were able to replace
materials that were either removed or defaced. By making this
board available for the posting of prounion materials, the Re-
spondent was satisfying its obligation under the act not to dis-
criminate on the basis of union activity. See Central Vermont
Hospital, 288 NLRB 514 fn. 2 (1988).
In my view, the Respondent was not obligated to make a se-
cond bulletin board, which was under a locked glass case, also
available for the posting of union materials. The evidence does
not establish that this board was used for the posting of proun-
ion materials even prior to the placement on the board of that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

892
locked case.15 Therefore, counsel the General Counsel has
failed to offer sufficient evidence that the Respondent’s actions
discriminatorily restricted security officer access to posting
information on its bulletin boards because those officers were
engaged in union and other concerted activity. Accordingly, I
shall recommend to the Board that complaint paragraph 5(l) be
dismissed.
9. Creating the impression of surveillance on October 7, 2011
Complaint paragraph 5(m) alleges that on about October 7,
2011, the Respondent, by its agents, in its preshift briefing
room, created an impression among its employees that their
union and concerted activities were under surveillance by the
Respondent. The facts surrounding this allegation are not in
dispute. Within the first week that Bizzarro was distributing
union authorization cards, a security officer gave management a
blank card and identified Bizzarro as the chief union organizer.
Immediately thereafter, the Respondent prepared an antiunion
flier containing a copy of the union authorization card, with a
circle drawn around the place for an employee to sign, and an
admonition regarding signing. This antiunion flier was distrib-
uted at the preshift briefing on October 7. Various security
officers testified that the flier was unaccompanied by any ex-
planation from management as to how the card was obtained.
Counsel for the General Counsel argues in his posthearing
brief that as the organizational campaign was in its infancy,
where it was most vulnerable to threats and the impression of
surveillance, the distribution of copies of blank authorization
cards, without explanation of how they were obtained by man-
agement, would reasonably give employees the impression that
the Respondent was watching their union activity. Cf. Camaco
Lorain Mfg. Plant, 356 NLRB 1182, 1183–1184 (2011). I
agree.
As I have said a number of times, Bizzarro’s involvement in
the campaign became an “open secret.” Still, there is nothing
in the record evidence to suggest that individual authorization
card signers did so openly, or that they wanted the Respondent
to be aware of their involvement in the campaign. As man-
agement gave no explanation as how it came to possess a blank
union card, security officers might reasonably have feared that
the Respondent was spying on their union activity. Moun-
taineer Steel, Inc., supra. Employees have the right to be free
of the concern that management is peering over their shoulders
to watch their protected activity. Conley Trucking, supra, quot-
ing Fred’k Wallace & Son, Inc., supra. Such conduct by the
Respondent could certainly chill the willingness of employees
to engage in Section 7 activity.
Based on the above, I conclude that the Respondent’s con-
duct in distributing fliers containing a copy of a blank union
authorization card constituted the unlawful impression of sur-
veillance as it interfered with, restrained, and coerced employ-
ees in the exercise of their union activity. Accordingly, the
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged
in complaint paragraph 5(m).

15 It should be noted that while the complaint allegation in par. 5(l)
states that the unfair labor practice has been occurring since about
October 2011, the locked case was not placed on the bulletin board
outside the briefing room until late December 2011.
10. The beer pong incident
It is alleged in complaint paragraph 5(n) that about mid-
November 2011, the Respondent, by Eric Golebiewski, in the
O’Sheas Casino, near the beer pong area, interrogated its em-
ployee about the employee’s union sympathies. This allegation
involves a brief conversation between Eric Golebiewski and
security officer Ty Evans. Not especially surprising, the two
men disagree over what was said.
According to Evans, in mid-November he was on duty at the
O’Sheas Casino near the beer bong area when Golebiewski
approached him and asked what his “opinion was about the
Union, of the union issue.” According to Evans, he replied
that, “I haven’t made up my mind.” He testified that at that time
he had not decided whether he supported the Union or not.
Upon hearing Evan’s response, Golebiewski simply walked
away, and that ended the conversation.
Golebiewski testified that in mid-November he ran into Ev-
ans in O’Sheas near the beer bong area. As was his practice
when walking through the casinos, Golebiewski asked some
routine questions such as, “How are you doing?” and “How is
the “beer pong going?” He denies that they had any conversa-
tion about the Union. Counsel for the Respondent argues in his
posthearing brief that Evans’ testimony is not credible, and that
he is simply embellishing the conversation that the two men
had.
Earlier in this decision I explained at length why I found
Golebiewski’s testimony incredible. This is another such in-
stance. When I consider the record as a whole, it is clear to me
that Golebiewski took very personally the security officer’s
campaign to organize on behalf of the Union. He apparently
felt that their action was a reflection upon him as the security
director. His statements and conduct at the highly unusual four
hour preshift meeting on October 14, 2011, show the depth of
his feelings regarding the union campaign. In his own mind, as
reflected by this testimony, he turned the employees’ desire for
union representation into a campaign they were waging against
him, asking them what problems they had with him.
Under such circumstances, I find it very plausible that Gole-
biewski took the opportunity in the beer pong area of O’Sheas
to ask Evans what his opinion was of the Union. In his own
mind, Golebiewski needed to know who was with him and who
against. I have no reason to discredit Evans. To the contrary,
as a current employee of the Flamingo who testified against the
interest of his employer, there is every reason to assume that he
was being truthful. The Board has frequently held that an em-
ployee who testifies against the interest of his current employer
does so at his peril, and so may be entitled to the benefit of the
doubt concerning the credibility of such testimony. See Gold
Standard Enterprises, 234 NLRB 618, 619 (1978); Federal
Stainless Sink, 197 NLRB 489, 491 (1972); Flexsteel Indus-
tries, 316 NLRB 745 (1995), enfd. 83 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1996).
Having concluded that Golebiewski asked Evans his opinion
of the Union, I must determine whether such a question consti-
tuted unlawful interrogation. In determining whether a supervi-
sor’s questions to an employee about his union activities or
sympathies were coercive under the Act, the Board looks to the
“totality of the circumstances.” Rossmore House, 269 NLRB
1176 (1984), affd. sub nom. Hotel & Restaurant Employees
FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING CO. 893
Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). In Westwood
Health Care Center, 330 NLRB 935 (2000), the Board listed a
number of factors considered in determining whether alleged
interrogations under Rossmore House were coercive. These are
referred to as “Bourne factors,” so named because they were
first set forth in Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir.
1964). These factors include the background of the parties’
relationship, the nature of the information sought, the identity
of the questioner, the place and method of interrogation, and
the truthfulness of the reply.
In the matter at hand, Evans was merely a rank and file secu-
rity officer, while Golebiewski was the Respondent’s security
director, and Evan’s ultimate supervisor. Therefore, he likely
would have been intimidated by a question from Golebiewski
on his opinion of the Union, which question seemed to come
“out of the blue.” Evans was working at the time, making his
rounds, which was not the type of environment where he would
normally expect to have to field such a question. Further, Ev-
ans’ answer to the question was ambivalent, not surprising
considering the discomfort that Evans must have felt in this one
on one exchange with his boss.
Based on the “totality of the circumstances,” I am of the
view that Golebiewski’s question to Evans regarding his opin-
ion of the Union constituted unlawful interrogation. It would
tend to reasonably interfere with, restrain, and coerce employ-
ees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Accordingly, I
conclude that by its actions through Golebiewski, the Respond-
ent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in com-
plaint paragraph 5(n).
11. Summary of findings
As is set forth above in this decision, I have found that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in
complaint paragraphs 5(b), (c), (e)(2), (3), (4), (5), (f)(1), (2),
(g)(1), (h)(1), (3), (i), (m), and (n). Further, I have recom-
mended that the Board dismiss complaint paragraphs 5(a), (d),
(e)(1), (g)(2), (h)(2), (4), (j), (k), and (l).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Flamingo Las Vegas Operating Compa-
ny, LLC, is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, International Union, Security, Police and Fire
Professionals of America (SPFPA), is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By the following acts and conduct the Respondent has vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(a) Threatening its employees with unspecified reprisals be-
cause the employees engaged in concerted activities.
(b) Threatening its employees with more strictly enforced
work rules and job loss if they selected the Union as their col-
lective bargaining representative.
(c)Threatening its employees with unspecified reprisals be-
cause the employees engaged in union activities.
(d) Threatening its employees with discipline or discharge if
they selected the Union as their collective bargaining repre-
sentative.
(e) Threatening its employees by informing them that they
were disloyal because they supported the Union and engaged in
union activities.
(f) Promulgating and enforcing an overly-broad and discrim-
inatory work rule prohibiting its employees from engaging in
concerted activities.
(g) Promulgating and enforcing an overly broad and discrim-
inatory work rule that its employees had to follow the chain of
command to resolve the employees’ complaints.
(h) Interrogating its employees about their union member-
ship, activities, and sympathies.
(i) Soliciting its employees’ complaints and grievances, and
promising them improved terms and conditions of employment
to dissuade them from supporting the Union.
(j) Promising its employees improved terms and conditions
of employment by informing them that an objectionable super-
visor had been transferred from its facility to dissuade them
from supporting the Union.
(k) Creating an impression among its employees by printed
communication that their union activities were under surveil-
lance.
(l) Creating an impression among its employees that their un-
ion activities were under surveillance by describing employees
who supported the Union.
(m) Creating an impression among its employees that their
union activities were under surveillance by displaying a blank
union authorization card.
(4) The above-unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
(5) The Respondent has not violated the Act except as set
forth above.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designated to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent shall be required to post a notice that as-
sures its employees that it will respect their rights under the
Act. In addition to physically posting of paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the
Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
In his posthearing brief, counsel for the General Counsel re-
quests that appropriate notices be posted not only at the Fla-
mingo property, but at all five HIFOB properties, including
Harrah’s, Imperial Palace, Flamingo, O’Sheas, and Bills. As
was mentioned earlier in this decision, approximately 120 secu-
rity officers regularly rotate through three of those properties,
Flamingo, Bill’s and O’Sheas, pursuant to a written posted
schedule. While 50 to 70 of those officers are assigned to the
Flamingo, they are part of the overall rotation through the three
properties. Further, although it is not controlling, in the Deci-
sion and Direction of Election issued by the Regional Director
for Region 28 in Case 28–RC–069491 (CP Exh. 1), the Re-
gional Director found there to be a significant community of
interest between the security officers working at the Flamingo,
O’Sheas, and Bill’s properties, and directed an election among
the officers working at those three properties.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

894
It is clear to me from the record evidence that the security of-
ficers exposed to the Respondent’s numerous unfair labor prac-
tices were the security officers working at the Flamingo,
O’Sheas, and Bill’s properties, but not the officers working at
Harrah’s or the Imperial Palace. Despite the fact that all five
properties are considered one “pod” under Caesars Entertain-
ment and are referred to collectively as HIFOB, there is appar-
ently no regular transfer or interchange of security officers
working at Harrah’s and the Imperial Palace, with the officers
working at the other three properties. As only the security of-
ficers working at the Flamingo, O’Sheas, and Bill’s were ex-
posed to the Respondent’s unfair labor practices, I will direct
that notices be posted only at those three properties. Posting at
those three properties will effectuate the purposes of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]