Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 30, 1999

330 N.L.R.B. 287 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

FLAMINGO HILTON-LAUGHLIN 287
Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin and Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees Local 86, Hotel Employ-
ees International Union, AFL–CIO. Case 32–
CA–15627
November 30, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND BRAME
On December 11, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Jay
R. Pollack issued the attached decision. The Respondent,
the General Counsel, and the Union each filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the Union filed a brief in op-
position to the Respondent’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions as
modified and to adopt the recommended Order as modi-
fied1 and set forth in full below.
The complaint alleged that various rules in the Re-
spondent’s employee handbook violated the Act. The
judge found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by maintaining:
1. “Code of conduct” and “disclosure” rules that could
be interpreted as limiting its employees’ right to discuss
wages and working conditions.
2. A rule prohibiting employees from wearing
unauthorized pins and decals.

3. A rule prohibiting off-duty employees from engag-
ing in solicitation or distribution in public areas of its
facility other than gaming areas.

1 In the last paragraph of sec. II,F of his decision, the judge found
that two of the Respondent’s rules concerning abusive or insulting
language violate the Act, but he failed to include these violations in
either his conclusions of law or his recommended Order. In the last
paragraph of sec. II,C of his decision, the judge dismissed an allegation
that the Respondent’s rule prohibiting the wearing of hotel uniforms off
the Respondent’s premises violated the Act. Nevertheless, the judge’s
Conclusion of Law 3(b) inadvertently states that this rule violates the
Act, and par. 1(b) of his recommended Order requires the Respondent
to cease maintaining this rule. Our amended conclusions of law and our
Order, below, correct these inadvertent errors. We also substitute a new
notice containing language consistent with these changes.
Additionally, without setting forth any supporting rationale, the
judge, in his recommended Order, provided “broad” cease-and-desist
language requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from “in any
other manner” interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Sec. 7 of the Act. We find that
broad cease-and-desist language is not warranted in this case. See
Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). Instead, we have provided in
our Order customary narrow language requiring the Respondent to
cease and desist from “in any like or related manner” interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
them in Sec. 7 of the Act. Our new notice also contains narrow cease-
and-desist language.
4. A rule prohibiting making “false, vicious, profane,
or malicious statements regarding another employee,
guest, patron, or the Hotel itself.”
5. Rules prohibiting “using loud, abusive or foul lan-
guage” and prohibiting “disorderly conduct in the Hotel,
including fighting, horseplay, threatening, insulting,
abusing, intimidating, coercing or interfering with any
guests, patrons, or employees.”
6. A rule restricting off-duty employees’ patronizing
of the hotel.
7. A rule prohibiting “off-duty misconduct that mate-
rially and adversely affects job performance or tends to
bring discredit to the hotel.”
8. A rule prohibiting “insubordination, derogatory be-
havior towards management personnel, refusal of job
assignments, or harassment of another employee or
guest.”
The judge dismissed allegations that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining:
1. A rule prohibiting employees from wearing hotel
uniforms off hotel premises without management per-
mission.
2. A policy requiring prior management approval be-
fore any employee posts a written notice on the hotel’s
premises.
3. A rule prohibiting nonemployees from soliciting
off-duty employees in certain areas of the hotel open to
the public.
4. A rule prohibiting “failure to have or maintain in
management’s sole judgment, satisfactory attitude . . .
and/or relationships with other guests, employees, in-
cluding supervisors.”
We agree with the judge’s dismissals,2 reverse his
findings that maintenance of the rules described in items
7 and 8 above violated Section 8(a)(1), and adopt his
2 Contrary to her colleagues and the judge, Member Liebman finds
that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a
rule prohibiting employees from:
Fail[ing] to have or maintain in management’s sole judgment, satis-
factory attitude . . . and/or relationships with other guests, employees,
including supervisors.
In Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 830 (1998), Members Fox
and Liebman, in dissent, found that the employer violated Sec. 8(a)(1)
by maintaining a rule, similar to the rule in question here, which pro-
hibited:
Unlawful or improper conduct off the hotel’s premises or during
non-working hours which affects the employee’s relationship with the
job, fellow employees, supervisors, or the hotel’s reputation or good
will in the community.
Members Fox and Liebman found that this rule was overly broad
and ambiguous, that it failed to define the area of permissible conduct
in a manner clear to employees, and that, consequently, it had a reason-
able tendency to cause employees to refrain from engaging in protected
activities, rather than risk being disciplined for violating the rule. Id. at
830. Likewise in the instant case, and for the same reasons, Member
Liebman finds that the Respondent’s maintenance of the rule in ques-
tion here violates Sec. 8(a)(1).
330 NLRB No. 34
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 288
other findings of violations,3 with certain qualifications
set forth below. 4 In evaluating the rules at issue here, we

3 In agreeing with the finding in sec. II,B of the judge’s decision that
the Respondent’s code of conduct and disclosure rules violate Sec.
8(a)(1) of the Act, Chairman Truesdale notes that the code of conduct
prohibits employees from revealing confidential information about
customers, hotel business, or “fellow employees.” The prohibition on
revealing information about fellow employees, in Chairman Trues-
dale’s view, makes these rules distinguishable from Lafayette Park
Hotel, supra. In that case, the Board found lawful the employer’s stan-
dard of conduct 17, which prohibited employees from “[d]ivulging
Hotel-private information” but contained no provision concerning
disclosure of information about fellow employees.
In Lafayette Park Hotel, supra at 830, Members Fox and Liebman,
in dissent, found that the employer violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining
the rule (standard of conduct 17), referred to above by the Chairman,
prohibiting employees from “[d]ivulging Hotel-private information to
employees or other individuals or entities that are not authorized to
receive that information.” Member Liebman agrees with the Chairman
that the prohibition against revealing information about employees in
the rule in question here makes the rule unlawful. In finding this rule to
be unlawful, she also relies on the rationale she applied in finding the
similar rule unlawful in her joint dissent in Lafayette Park Hotel. See
also Super K-Mart, 330 NLRB 263 (1999) (dissenting opinion).
Member Brame, contrary to his colleagues, would not adopt the
judge’s finding that the Respondent’s code of conduct and disclosure
rules violate the Act. In Member Brame’s view, these rules are not
meaningfully distinguishable from the rule prohibiting disclosure of
“Hotel-private information” found lawful in Lafayette Park Hotel. Like
that rule, Member Brame would find that employees here would not
reasonably read the Respondent’s code of conduct and disclosure rules
as prohibiting discussion of terms and conditions of employment.
Rather, in Member Brame’s view, employees would reasonably under-
stand the rules as designed to protect the Respondent’s interest in main-
taining the confidentiality of proprietary and other information that is
properly kept private.
Additionally, unlike his colleagues, Member Brame would not adopt
the finding, in sec. II,F of the judge’s decision, that Sec. 8(a)(1) was
violated by the Respondent’s rule prohibiting employees from
“[m]aking false, vicious, profane, or malicious statements regarding
another employee, guest, patron, or the Hotel itself.” In Lafayette Park
Hotel, supra, the Board addressed the employer’s standard of conduct
18, which contained virtually identical language. As in Lafayette Park
Hotel, supra at 828 fn. 15, Member Brame would find that the Respon-
dent’s mere maintenance of this rule does not reasonably tend to chill
employees’ Sec. 7 activity, because “employees would reasonably
recognize that the rule . . . is directed at a legitimate employer inter-
est and not Sec. 7 activity.”
Further, unlike his colleagues, Member Brame would not adopt the
finding, in sec. II,F of the judge’s decision, that Sec. 8(a)(1) was vio-
lated by the Respondent’s rules that prohibited “[u]sing loud, abusive
or foul language” and prohibited “[d]isorderly conduct in the Hotel,
including fighting, horseplay, threatening, insulting, abusing, intimidat-
ing, coercing or interfering with any guests, patrons, or employees.”
Member Brame would likewise find that employees reasonably would
recognize that these rules are directed at legitimate employer interests
and not Sec. 7 activity.
Finally, while joining his colleagues in the remaining violations that
they find, Member Brame notes that these violations are highly theo-
retical in nature. Indeed, it is conceded that the rules at issue in this case
were not initiated in response to any union or protected, concerted
activity, and there is no evidence that the Respondent disciplined any
employee under the rules for engaging in union or protected, concerted
activity. As the Fourth Circuit warned in a slightly different context,
“[s]omewhere, in the vast human experience, there must be an incon-
venience so minimally damaging, so utterly trivial, so profoundly petty,
that it should not give rise to a [Sec. 8(a)(1) violation]. If so this is it.”
Eastern Omni Constructors v. NLRB, 170 F.3d 418, 426 (1998), quot-
apply, where relevant, the Board’s decision in Lafayette
Park Hotel, supra, which issued subsequent to the
judge’s decision in this case.
1. The judge found, in section II,E of his decision, that
the Respondent’s no-solicitation policy was unlawful in
that it prohibited off-duty employees from soliciting
other off-duty employees in all public areas of the hotel.
He found that, subject only to certain narrow exceptions,
employers may not prohibit off-duty employee solicita-
tion or distribution if the employees are permissibly pre-
sent while off-duty. In his analysis, however, the judge
did not specify the particular language in the Respon-
dent’s no-solicitation policy to which this finding per-
tained. In adopting the judge’s finding of a violation, we
specify that the language found unlawful is the provision
stating: “No employee may solicit other employees at
any time in gaming, meeting, convention, exhibit, or rec-
reational areas open to guest and/or the public.” We
agree that this provision is overbroad to the extent that it
bars off-duty employees from soliciting other off-duty
employees in public areas of the Respondent’s facility
other than gaming areas. See Barney’s Club, 227 NLRB
414, 417 (1976).
2. The judge, in section II,G of his decision, found that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
maintaining in its employee handbook a rule prohibiting
“off-duty misconduct that materially and adversely af-
fects job performance or tends to bring discredit to the
Hotel.” The judge found that the rule failed to define
areas of permissible and impermissible conduct and that,
therefore, employees might reasonably refrain from Sec-
tion 7 activity in order to comply with the rule. We dis-
agree.
In Lafayette Park Hotel, supra at 824, the Board re-
cently found a similar rule not to violate the Act. In that
case, the employer’s standard of conduct 31 prohibited
the following:
Unlawful or improper conduct off the hotel’s premises
or during non-working hours which affects the em-
ployee’s relationship with the job, fellow employees,

ing Beraho v. S .C. State College, 394 S.E.2d 28, 29 (1990) (Sanders,
C. J., concurring). In Member Brame’s view, prosecution of trivial
violations such as these is not a wise use of the Board’s resources.
4 In the first paragraph of sec. II,F of his decision, the judge set forth
two rules that he stated were at issue. The first rule, according to the
judge, prohibited “[i]nsubordination, derogatory behavior towards
management personnel, refusal of job assignments, or harassment of
another employee or guest.” This rule, however, does not, in fact,
appear in the Respondent’s employee handbook (Jt. Exh. 1), which was
made part of the record. Accordingly, we reverse the judge’s finding
that the Respondent violated the Act by maintaining such a rule.
We adopt the judge’s finding that maintenance of the second rule,
which prohibited “[m]aking false, vicious, profane, or malicious state-
ments regarding another employee, guest, patron, or the Hotel itself”
violates Sec. 8(a)(1). See Lafayette Park Hotel, supra (standard of
conduct 18). As indicated above, Member Brame does not join in
adopting this violation.
FLAMINGO HILTON-LAUGHLIN 289
supervisors, or the hotel’s reputation or good will in the
community.

The Respondent’s rule at issue here is nearly identical
to standard of conduct 31 in Lafayette Park Hotel. The
Respondent’s rule concerns “off-duty misconduct,” while
standard of conduct 31 concerned “[u]nlawful or im-
proper conduct off the hotel’s premises or during non-
working hours.”5 The Respondent’s rule is further lim-
ited to two types of misconduct. One, misconduct that
“materially and adversely affects job performance,” is
quite similar to standard of conduct 31’s limitation to
improper conduct “which affects the employee’s rela-
tionship with the job, fellow employees, [or] supervi-
sors.” The second type of misconduct addressed by the
Respondent’s rule, misconduct that “tends to bring dis-
credit to the Hotel,” is quite similar to the second prong
of standard of conduct 31, which addressed improper
conduct “which affects . . . . the hotel’s reputation or
good will in the community.”
In finding standard of conduct 31 not to violate the
Act, the Board majority in Lafayette Park Hotel stated:

[W]e do not believe that this rule can reasonably be
read as encompassing Section 7 activity. In our view,
employees would not reasonably fear that the Respon-
dent would use this rule to punish them for engaging in
protected activity that the Respondent may deem to be
“improper.” To ascribe such a meaning to these words
is, quite simply, far-fetched. Employees reasonably
would believe that this rule was intended to reach seri-
ous misconduct, not conduct protected by the Act.6

Examination of the language of the Respondent’s rule leads
us to find, as the Board did in Lafayette Park Hotel, that the
Respondent’s rule cannot reasonably be read as encompass-
ing Section 7 activity and that employees would not rea-
sonably fear that the Respondent would use this rule to pun-
ish them for engaging in protected activity. Accordingly,
contrary to the judge’s recommendation, we dismiss the
complaint allegation that the Respondent’s maintenance of
its rule concerning off-duty misconduct violates Section
8(a)(1).7
3. The judge, in section II,H of his decision, found that
the Respondent’s rule proscribing “patronizing the public

5 Standard of conduct 31 is, in fact, broader than the Respondent’s
rule, in that standard of conduct 31 concerned not only off-duty mis-
conduct (conduct “during non-working hours”) but also conduct “off
the hotel’s premises,” which apparently could be conduct occurring
while either on duty or off duty.
6 Id. at 827.
7 Contrary to her colleagues, Member Liebman finds that the judge
correctly found that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintain-
ing the “off-duty misconduct” rule in question. She agrees with her
colleagues that the Respondent’s rule is largely identical to standard of
conduct 31 in Lafayette Park Hotel, and in finding a violation here she
relies on the reasons for finding standard of conduct 31 unlawful set
forth in her joint dissenting opinion in that case.
dining rooms, bars, cocktail lounges, guest rooms, shops,
or other guest facilities without prior permission of the
employees’ department manager” violated Section
8(a)(1) under the Board’s decision in Tri-County Medical
Center, 222 NLRB 1089 (1976). The Respondent does
not, however, have a rule containing the particular re-
strictions recited by the judge.8 Rather, the portion of the
Respondent’s “Employee Patronage” rule that the com-
plaint alleged as unlawful and that the parties litigated is
a provision stating, “Employees are not permitted to pa-
tronize the property during the eight hours immediately
before a scheduled shift.” The General Counsel contends
that this provision runs afoul of the principle set forth in
Tri-County Medical Center. There, the Board held that,
“except where justified by business reasons, a rule which
denies off-duty employees entry to parking lots, gates,
and other outside nonworking areas will be found inva-
lid.” 222 NLRB at 1089. The Board further stated that a
no-access rule concerning off-duty employees is valid
only if it:

(1) limits access solely with respect to the interior of
the plant and other working areas; (2) is clearly dis-
seminated to all employees; and (3) applies to off-duty
employees seeking access to the plant for any purpose
and not just to those employees engaging in union ac-
tivity.9

The Respondent contends that its rule prohibiting employ-
ees from patronizing the property during the 8 hours imme-
diately before a scheduled shift meets these criteria and is
therefore lawful. In particular, the Respondent contends that
the rule limits access only to the interior of its facilities,
because the Respondent’s hotel offers no restaurants or
gaming operations which one might “patronize” on the out-
side portions of its property.
We find that the Respondent’s rule prohibiting em-
ployees from “patroniz[ing] the property” during the 8
hours immediately before a scheduled shift is unlawful
under Tri-County Medical Center. The rule on its face is
not limited to the interior of the Respondent’s facilities
but, rather, by its terms, restricts employee access to the
Respondent’s entire “property.” While the Respondent
contends that it has no outside restaurants or other exte-
rior facilities that customers could “patronize,” this as-
serted fact is not established by the record. Moreover,
implicit in the Respondent’s argument is the assumption
that the term “patronize” can mean only “be a customer
of.” Another common definition of the term “patronize,”
however, is “use.”10 Thus, the Respondent’s rule that
8 This case was tried in tandem with a similar case in which the Fla-
mingo Hilton-Reno was the Respondent (Case 32–CA–15626). It ap-
pears that the judge inadvertently quoted the rule on employee patron-
age that appeared in the Flamingo Hilton-Reno case.
9 222 NLRB at 1089.
10 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 1656
(1981).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 290
“[e]mployees are not permitted to patronize the property
during the eight hours immediately before a scheduled
shift” can as readily apply to outside portions of the Re-
spondent’s property as to interior portions and to use by
noncustomers. Moreover, the Respondent has not estab-
lished a business reason for this rule. Accordingly, we
find that the Respondent’s maintenance of its rule that
“[e]mployees are not permitted to patronize the property
during the eight hours immediately before a scheduled
shift” violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 3(b)
of the judge’s decision.
“(b) Prohibit abusive or insulting language without
making clear that such rules are not intended to bar law-
ful union organizing propaganda.”
2. Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 3(e).
“(e) Prohibit ‘false, vicious, or profane’ statements
without clearly indicating to employees the boundaries of
permissible and impermissible conduct.”
3. Delete Conclusion of Law 3(f).
4. Revise Conclusion of Law 3(g) to read as follows
and redesignate it as Conclusion of Law 3(f).
“(f) Prohibit employees from patronizing the Respon-
dent’s property during the 8 hours before a scheduled
shift.”
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and set forth in full below and orders that the
Respondent, Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, Laughlin, Ne-
vada, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining rules limiting its employees’ right to
discuss wages and working conditions.
(b) Maintaining rules prohibiting abusive or insulting
language without making clear that such rules are not
intended to bar lawful union organizing propaganda.
(c) Maintaining rules prohibiting the wearing of union
insignia.
(d) Maintaining rules prohibiting off-duty employees
from engaging in solicitation or distribution in public
areas of its facility other than gaming areas.
(e) Maintaining rules prohibiting “false, vicious, or
profane” statements without clearly indicating to em-
ployees the boundaries of permissible and impermissible
conduct.
(f) Maintaining rules prohibiting employees from pa-
tronizing the Respondent’s property during the 8 hours
before a scheduled shift.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the Act.
(a) Rescind the rules indicated in 1(a) through (g)
above, remove them from its employee handbook, and
advise the employees in writing that the rules are no
longer being maintained.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Laughlin, Nevada facility copies, in English and
Spanish, of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”11
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 32, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days
in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since February 19, 1996.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT maintain rules limiting our employees’
right to discuss wages and working conditions.
WE WILL NOT maintain rules prohibiting abusive or in-
sulting language without making clear that such rules are
not intended to bar lawful union organizing propaganda.
WE WILL NOT maintain rules prohibiting the wearing of
union insignia.
WE WILL NOT maintain rules prohibiting off-duty em-
ployees from engaging in solicitation or distribution in
public areas of our facility other than gaming areas.

11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
FLAMINGO HILTON-LAUGHLIN 291
WE WILL NOT maintain rules prohibiting “false, vicious,
or profane” statements without clearly indicating to you
the boundaries of permissible and impermissible con-
duct.
WE WILL NOT maintain rules prohibiting you from pa-
tronizing our property during the 8 hours before a sched-
uled shift.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind the rules indicated above, remove
them from our employee handbook, and advise the em-
ployees in writing that the rules are no longer being
maintained.

FLAMINGO HILTON-LAUGHLIN

Gary M. Connaughton, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Joseph E. Herman, Esq. (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius), of Los
Angeles, California, for the Respondent.
Michael T. Anderson, Esq. (Davis, Cowell & Bowe), of San
Francisco, California, for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case
in trial at Sparks, Nevada, on December 17, 1996. On August
19, 1996, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Local 86,
Hotel Employees International Union, AFL–CIO (the Union)
filed the charge alleging that Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin (Re-
spondent or the Hotel) committed certain violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), as
amended. On October 24, 1996, the Regional Director for Re-
gion 32 of the National Labor Relations Board issued a com-
plaint and notice of hearing against Respondent. Respondent
filed a timely answer to the complaint, denying all wrongdoing.
On January 9, 1997, the General Counsel amended the complaint
to conform the complaint to the proof. Respondent did not op-
pose the amendment.
All parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to in-
troduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to file briefs. Upon the entire record, and having
considered the posthearing briefs of the parties, I make the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Nevada corporation with offices and a princi-
pal place of business located in Laughlin, Nevada, where it is
engaged in the operation of a hotel-restaurant-casino complex.
During the 12 months prior to issuance of the complaint, Re-
spondent derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000. During
the 12 months prior to the complaint, Respondent purchased and
received goods and products valued in excess of $5000 directly
from sellers or suppliers located outside the State of Nevada.
Accordingly, Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
Respondent admits and I find that the Union is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Issues
The complaint alleges that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining rules that prohibit employees
from engaging in certain behavior, including: (1) discussing con-
fidential information regarding customers, fellow employees, or
hotel business; (2) wearing sunglasses or hats that are not part of
the uniform, or unauthorized pins or decals; (3) posting of notices
on hotel property without management permission; (4) engaging
in solicitation in the gaming, meeting, convention, exhibit or
recreational areas open to guests and/or the public, or distributing
literature in work areas during worktime: (5) engaging in “de-
rogatory behavior toward management personnel” or insubordi-
nation; (6) failing to maintain a satisfactory attitude, satisfactory
job performance or relationship with guests, employees and su-
pervisors; using “abusive” or “profane” language; (7) making
“false, vicious, profane or malicious statements” regarding an-
other employee, guest patron or the Hotel; (8) engaging in disor-
derly conduct in the Hotel, including fighting, horseplay, threat-
ening, insulting or abusing guests, patrons or employees and; (9)
engaging in off-duty misconduct that materially and adversely
affects job performance or would bring discredit to the Hotel.
The complaint also alleges that Respondent violated the Act by
maintaining an invalid no solicitation/no distribution policy.
The parties stipulated that the rules at issue herein have been
included in Respondent’s employee handbook. In addition to
stipulating to the rules at issue, the parties stipulated that the rules
in question were not initiated in response to any union and/or
protected concerted activity. Further, there is no evidence that
Respondent has disciplined any employees under the rules for
engaging in any union and/or protected concerted activity. The
General Counsel’s theory is limited to the contention that Re-
spondent has violated, and continues to violate, the Act by main-
taining the rules in question. The General Counsel contends that
the rules having a chilling effect on union and protected con-
certed activities.
B. Code of Conduct and Disclosure
The rules entitled “Code of Conduct and Disclosure” alleged
to be unlawful read as follows:
Code of Conduct
Employees will not reveal confidential information re-
garding our customers, fellow employees, or Hotel busi-
ness.
Disclosure
Much of the Hotel business is confidential and must
not be discussed with any party not associated with the
Hotel. You should use discretion at all times when talking
about your work. The Hotel considers all information not
previously disclosed to outside parties by official Hotel
channels to be proprietary information. Questions or calls
from news media should be immediately transferred and
responded to by the Marketing Department or the Presi-
dent of the Hotel. At no time should you talk to the media
about Hotel operations.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 292
If you should discuss or disclose proprietary informa-
tion, you may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and
including termination.

The General Counsel contends that the handbook provisions
listed above are unlawfully vague in their description of “confi-
dential” information which may not be disseminated. According
to the General Counsel, a reasonable employee could read the
handbook as a broad prohibition against discussing wages or
other terms and conditions of employment. Respondent contends
it had substantial and legitimate business reasons for restricting
discussion of confidential and proprietary information. It con-
tends that its rules do not prohibit its employees from discussing
terms and conditions of employment with other employees or
with third parties.
Generally, a rule prohibiting employees from discussing their
wages violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See, e.g., Waco, Inc.,
273 NLRB 746, 748 (1984). In Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital,
284 NLRB 442, 466 (1987), the hospital expressly forbade its
employees from discussing “hospital affairs . . . and employee
problems.” The Board held that such a rule could be construed
by employees to preclude discussing terms and conditions of
employment, including wages, which could fall under the broad
categories of hospital affairs and employee problems. The Board
further found that the respondent-hospital had not established a
substantial and legitimate business justification for its policy.
Accordingly, the Board found that the rule prohibiting discussing
hospital affairs and employee problems violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
In Aroostook County Regional Opthamology Center, 317
NLRB 218 (1995), the employer’s manual contained a provision
which read, “No office business is a matter for discussion with
spouses, families or friends.” The Board held “office business”
could reasonably be interpreted to include employees’ terms and
conditions of employment. The Board noted that the provision
followed a heading entitled “confidentiality,” not “patient confi-
dentiality.” As a result, the Board found that the manual provi-
sion was ambiguous. The Board then held that where ambigui-
ties appear in employee work rules promulgated by an employer,
the ambiguity must be resolved against the promulgator. Thus,
the Board found that the rule violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Applying the rationale of Aroostook County Opthomology to
the instant case, the handbook provision is ambiguous and could
be interpreted as limiting employee discussion of wages and
other terms and conditions of employment. Under Aroostook
County Opthomology, the ambiguity must be resolved against the
employer. Therefore, I am constrained to find that this provision
of the employee handbook violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
C. Apparel and Personal Appearance
The General Counsel contends that Respondent violated the
Act by maintaining rules which prohibit uniformed and non-
uniformed employees from wearing unauthorized pins and de-
cals. Further the rules provide:

Management may discipline any employee for failure
to comply with the dress code, which may include sending
the employee home with loss of pay, or disciplinary action
up to and including termination . . . .
Uniformed employees may not wear their uniforms off
the Hotel premises, without prior permission of manage-
ment.

The General Counsel citing Reno Hilton, 319 NLRB 1154 fn.
3, 1171, 1172 (1995), contends that absent special circumstances,
union pins, buttons, or other insignia cannot be banned by an
employer. Respondent contends that there is no evidence that
Respondent actually prevented any employee from wearing un-
ion insignia. Thus, Respondent argues that absent evidence of
interfere with a protected right of employees, its rules should fit
the special circumstances exception because it has a history of
presenting an image of neatly uniformed and well groomed em-
ployees to the general public.
It is well settled that absent some special circumstance, such as
maintenance of production and discipline, safety, or preventing
alienation of customers, employees have the protected right to
wear union buttons at work. See Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801–803 (1945). However, this employee
right is balanced against an employer’s right to operate its busi-
ness, and an employer may limit or even prohibit the wearing of
union pins or buttons at work if “special circumstances exist.”
Albertson’s, Inc., 272 NLRB 865, 866 (1984); Albertson’s, Inc.,
319 NLRB 93 (1995). One such special circumstance is where
the display of union insignia may “unreasonably interfere with a
public image which the employer has established as part of its
business plan, through appearance rules for its employees.”
Meijer, Inc., 318 NLRB 50 (1995). The Board has consistently
held, however, that customer exposure to union insignia alone is
not a special circumstance allowing an employer to prohibit dis-
play of union insignia by employees.
In Burger King v. NLRB, 725 F. 2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1984), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that
special circumstances existed to justify the prohibition of union
buttons where an employer enforces a policy in a consistent and
nondiscriminatory manner. The court found that the employer’s
ban on unauthorized pins was consistently enforced prior to the
employees’ union activities, and the policy was not created in
response to union activities. In United Parcel Service v. NLRB,
41 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 1994), cited by Respondent, the Sixth
Circuit found special circumstances where the employer had a
longstanding policy regarding appearance rules for its employees
having contact with the public. The employees involved in
United Parcel were covered by a collective-bargaining agree-
ment which permitted the employer to enforce appearance and
uniform rules for the employees.
Here, the policy existed prior to the recent controversy and
was not created in response to union activities. However, Re-
spondent offered no evidence of a longstanding policy regarding
appearance rules. Moreover, there is no evidence regarding im-
plementation of Respondent’s rules in a consistent and nondis-
criminatory manner. Respondent knew that the Board had held
this rule to be a violation at its sister hotel in Reno Hilton, 319
NLRB 1154 (1995). The rules do not appear to be limited to
employees having contact with the public and are not limited to
uniformed employees. Accordingly, I find that Respondent has
violated the Act by prohibiting the display of union buttons and
insignia.
The General Counsel contends that the rule against wearing
hotel uniforms off the Hotel premises, without hotel permission
is an excessive impediment to employee union activity. See
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 301 NLRB 1008, 1019–1020 (1991).
However, the rule found unlawful in Pepsi-Cola was promul-
gated in response to a union organization drive and specifically
stated that employees could not engage in union activities while
wearing company uniforms. In the instant case the rule was not
FLAMINGO HILTON-LAUGHLIN 293
promulgated in response to union activities and the rule applied
to all off-duty activities. Accordingly, in the absence of any
evidence of discriminatory application of the rule, I find no viola-
tion of the Act.
D. The Posting of Written Notices
Separate and apart from its no-solicitation/no-distribution rule,
which will be discussed infra, Respondent maintains a policy
requiring prior approval by Respondent’s management before
any employee may post a written notice on the Hotel’s premises.
The General Counsel contends, because prior approval is re-
quired, this rule chills employee protected activities. Respondent
contends that it has no obligation to permit employees to post
notices on company bulletin boards and that there is no evidence
of interference with employee rights.
In Honeywell, Inc., 262 NLRB 1402 (1982), enfd. 722 F.2d
405 (8th Cir. 1983), the Board stated:

In general there is no statutory right of employees or a
union to use an employer’s bulletin board. However,
where an employer permits its employees to utilize its bul-
letin boards for the posting of notices relating to personal
items such as social or religious affairs, sales of personal
property, cards, thank you notes, articles, and cartoons,
commercial notices and advertisements, or, in general, any
non-work related matters, it may not validly discriminate
against [union messages] which employees also posted.
[262 NLRB at 1402.]

In Guardian Industries Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317 (7th Cir.
1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed a Board finding that an employer was required to allow
posting of union notices because it had allowed notices advertis-
ing items for sale. The court held that since the employer had
only permitted limited postings on its bulletin boards about sale
items, and had not allowed the posting of general announcements
about meetings, it did not violate the Act when it refused to per-
mit the posting of notices for union meetings.
In the instant case there is no evidence that Respondent
permitted the posting of any nonwork related items. Further,
there is no evidence that Respondent refused employees
permission to post any notices relating to union or protected
concerted activity. Thus, it appears that the General Counsel’s
case is based on speculation that Respondent would discriminate
against union or similar notices. I find absent evidence of
discriminatory enforcement, Respondent’s posting policy has not
been shown to be unlawful.
E. The No-Solicitation/No-Distribution Policy
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent maintained a
discriminatory no solicitation and distribution policy. The Ho-
tel’s no-solicitation rule, published in the employee handbook
and posted in employee areas, reads:

NO SOLICITATION AND DISTRIBUTION POLICYFOR
EMPLOYEES AND NON-EMPLOYEES

Persons who are not employees of Flamingo Hilton-
Laughlin are not permitted to solicit employees or distrib-
ute written material on our property at any time, except as
provided below.
No employee may distribute literature in work areas at
any time or solicit another employee in any area of the Ho-
tel during his or her working time or during the other em-
ployee’s working time. No employee may solicit other
employees at any time in gaming, meeting convention, ex-
hibit, or recreational areas open to guests and/or the pub-
lic.
Working time includes all time during which an em-
ployee is assigned or engaged in the performance of job
duties, but does not include breaks, lunch periods during
which time the employee is not assigned to or expected to
perform any job duties.
Non-employees who are patrons of restaurants or bars
open to the public and off-duty employees may engage in
such activities with off-duty employees, provided they act
in a non-disruptive manner consistent with the customary
use of those areas.
The purpose of these rules is to prevent interference
with and disruption of the work of our employees and is to
maintain our operation at peak efficiency at all times for
the convenience and benefit of our employees, our guests,
and the public.

The General Counsel contends that Respondent’s rule is overly
broad insofar as it bars nonemployees from soliciting off-duty
employees in certain areas of the Hotel open to the public. Re-
spondent contends that its rule is a lawful restriction on nonem-
ployees’ access to its private property. Further, Respondent ar-
gues that there is no evidence that Respondent permitted more
access to any other nonemployees or groups.
The United States Supreme Court has held that union organiz-
ers may come onto an employer’s property under two limited
circumstances to communicate with employees: first, if there are
no other reasonably available channels of communication; and
second, “if the employer’s notice or order . . . discriminates
against the union by allowing other distribution.” NLRB v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992). In Lechmere, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the inaccessibility rule was a narrow one,
applicable only when “the location of a plant and the living quar-
ters of the employees place the employees beyond the reasonable
efforts to communicate with them.” 502 U.S. at 539.
In this case, there is no evidence that Respondent’s employees
lived on the premises of the Hotel or that the employees were
otherwise inaccessible. Further, there is no evidence that Re-
spondent had allowed distribution or solicitation by any other
nonemployees or group. Accordingly, I find that the rule did not
unlawfully prohibit nonemployees from organizing in public
areas.
Secondly, the General Counsel contends that no solicitation/no
distribution rules are overly broad insofar as they bar off-duty
employees from soliciting other off-duty employees in certain
areas of the hotel open to the public which do not constitute “sell-
ing areas” within the meaning of Marshall Field & Co., 98
NLRB 88 (1951), and its progeny, including but not limited to
rest rooms, waiting rooms and exterior areas of the hotel.
In Marshall Field, the employer prohibited off-duty employees
from soliciting in any areas except “nonselling closed areas”
from which the public was excluded. The Board held that this
prohibition was overbroad. The Board distinguished between
areas of the store open to the public and the narrower category of
the sales floor. 98 NLRB at 89–92. “We do not believe, how-
ever, that solicitation in areas not used for selling purposes
amounts to an undue interference with store business even
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 294
though customers may be present in such places.” 98 NLRB at
92.
The Board has long held that gambling casino and hotel facili-
ties, such as those operated by Respondent, are analogous to
retail stores for purposes of considering the validity of enforce-
ment of no-solicitation/no-distribution rules in asserted working
areas. Dunes Hotel, 284 NLRB 871, 875 (1987); Barney’s Club,
227 NLRB 414 (1976). From this, it is clear that the working
areas of a gaming establishment, such as operated by Respon-
dent, encompass the gambling areas of the casino and adjacent
aisles and corridors, areas which the Board equates to the selling
area of a retail store, but exclude the public bars and restaurants.
Harolds Club, 267 NLRB 1167 (1983); Barney’s Club, supra at
417. Further, just as in a retail store where there are other areas,
including the public restrooms, in which distributions of literature
have no affect upon the business of the store and may be under-
taken, there are areas of a gambling establishment in which off-
duty employee distributions of literature clearly have no adverse
effect upon the main business of the facility—the operation of
games of chance. I do not believe that Respondent may legiti-
mately interfere with distribution and solicitation in the public
nonselling areas of the gaming complex. On this point, specifi-
cally analogous to the Marshall Field & Co. case, an outside
private street, which was open to the public for pedestrian use
and as to which the Board could discern “no cogent reason for
denying employees the right to solicit . . . for union member-
ship,” are the outside areas, including the parking lots of Respon-
dent’s facility, as to which there is no record evidence that off-
duty employee distributions of literature in these areas had any
detrimental effect upon Respondent’s gaming operations or the
passage of patrons through the affected entrances. Moreover,
while counsel for Respondent argues that the parking lots are
working areas given that work tasks are performed there by secu-
rity personnel, valet parkers, courtesy bus drivers, maintenance
personnel, gardeners, and housekeeping employees, a similar
contention was summarily rejected by the Board as one “ that can
be asserted by every company, thus effectively destroying the
right of employees to distribute literature. Some work tasks . . .
are performed at some time in almost every area of every com-
pany.” United States Steel Corp., 223 NLRB 1246, 1248 (1976).
In Harold’s Club, the Board permitted solicitation in a public
bar, despite the fact that it was a “working area” for cocktail em-
ployees and a public area open to guests. In this case, off-duty
employees are permitted to socialize with nonemployees as pa-
trons. The Board has held that employers may not prohibit off-
duty employee solicitation and distribution if the employees are
permissibly present at the Hotel while off-duty. See Harvey’s
Wagon Wheel, 271 NLRB 306, 316 (1984); Mandarin, 221
NLRB 264, 264 (1975). The ban on solicitation in all public
areas, including nonselling areas, is therefore unlawful. See
Dunes Hotel, 284 NLRB at 876–878.
F. Rules Against Derogatory and Disruptive Behavior
The General Counsel further challenges disciplinary rules
which prohibit disruptive conduct such as insubordination, de-
rogatory behavior, harassment, profanity, threats, fighting, and
horseplay. Respondent argues that there is no evidence that the
rules were discriminatorily enforced or that the rules were prom-
ulgated in response to union activity. Respondent argues that the
General Counsel is alleging a violation on speculation that Re-
spondent might interfere with employee rights. The rules at issue
prohibit:

Insubordination, derogatory behavior towards man-
agement personnel, refusal of job assignments, or harass-
ment of another employee or guest . . . .
Making false, vicious, profane, or malicious statements
regarding another employee, guest, patron, or the Hotel it-
self.

In Southern Maryland Hospital Center, 293 NLRB 1209
(1989), the hospital maintained a rule which prohibited “mali-
cious gossip or derogatory attacks on fellow employees, patients,
physicians or hospital representatives.” The Board held that a
prohibition on malicious gossip was lawful. However, the Board
held that the prohibition of derogatory attacks on hospital repre-
sentatives was a violation of Section 8(a)(1). The Board rea-
soned that the term “derogatory” meant “expressive of low esti-
mation or reproach . . . disparaging, detracting, degrading, depre-
catory.” Thus, the Board held that an assertion that an employer
overworks or underpays its employees, which would constitute
the most elementary kind of union propaganda, could reasonably
be regarded as “derogatory” toward the employer. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit enforced the Board
decision explaining that “by permitting the punishment of em-
ployees for speaking badly about hospital personnel, the em-
ployer failed to determine the area of permissible conduct in a
manner clear to employees and thus caused employees to refrain
from engaging in protected activities.” Further, the court stated
that “the values of free speech and union expression outweigh
employer tranquility in this instance. NLRB v. Southern Mary-
land Hospital Center, 916 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1990).
In Cincinnati Suburban Press, 289 NLRB 966 (1988), the
Board held that employers may proscribe “maliciously false”
statements, but may not proscribe and punish for publication of
false statements. Punishing employees for distributing merely
“false” statements fails to define the area of permissible conduct
in a manner clear to employees and thus causes employees to
refrain from engaging in protected activities.
Thus, in the instant case, to the extent that the Hotel’s rule
against derogatory behavior prohibits permissible union propa-
ganda, that is “merely false” or inhibits truthful propaganda, the
rule violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Further, Respondent’s
rules to the extent that they that prohibit false statements in addi-
tion to vicious, profane, and malicious statements violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent’s rules further provide:

Failure to have or maintain in management’s sole
judgment, satisfactory attitude . . . and/or relationships
with other guests, employees, including supervisors.

The General Counsel contends that a requirement that em-
ployees maintain a “satisfactory attitude” is unlawful as that term
could reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting permissible union
propaganda. However, there is no evidence that the rule was ever
enforced in such a manner. There can be no doubt that an em-
ployer in a service industry may require that employees maintain
a satisfactory attitude. There is no basis to presume or speculate
that the term satisfactory attitude would be used to discriminate
against pro-union employees.
Simplex Wire & Cable Co., 313 NLRB 1311 (1994), cited by
the General Counsel is inapposite. In Simplex, an acting supervi-
sor maintained a list of employees perceived to have negative
attitudes. There were rumors in the plant that the list contained
the names of union supporters and that one of the employees had
FLAMINGO HILTON-LAUGHLIN 295
been terminated because he was on the list. The Board found that
the employer could not lawfully prohibit employees from dis-
cussing that list. The case did not deal with a rule requiring a
satisfactory attitude or a rule prohibiting a bad attitude.
The General Counsel contests Respondent’s rules against abu-
sive or foul language and disorderly conduct such as fighting,
horseplay etc.

Using loud, abusive or foul language.
Disorderly conduct in the Hotel, including fighting,
horseplay, threatening, insulting, abusing, intimidating,
coercing or interfering with any guests, patrons, or em-
ployees.

In Linn v. United Plant Guards, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), the
United States Supreme Court held that propaganda during a un-
ion campaign is protected and does not lose the protection of the
Act even when it includes “intemperate, abusive and inaccurate
statements” during attempts to organize employees. In Great
Lakes Steel, 236 NLRB 1033, 1036–1037 (1978), the Board held
that a rule prohibiting distribution of literature which was “libel-
ous, defamatory, scurrilous, abusive or insulting or any literature
which would tend to disrupt order, discipline or production
within the plant” was unlawful. The rule was held to unlawfully
inhibit Section 7 activity. In the instant case, because the rules do
not define abusive or insulting language or conduct, under Great
Lakes Steel, the rules could reasonably be interpreted as barring
lawful union organizing propaganda.
G. Off-Duty Misconduct
The General Counsel contends that the rule proscribing off-
duty misconduct is ambiguous and broad enough to include em-
ployees’ protected concerted activity which may be critical of the
Hotel. The handbook prohibits “off-duty misconduct that mate-
rially and adversely affects job performance or tends to bring
discredit to the Hotel.”
In Cincinnati Suburban Press, 289 NLRB 966 fn. 2 (1988), an
employee was discharged for publishing an article critical of his
employer. The article was written and published during ongoing
union organizing efforts. The Board held that even though the
employee may be acting alone, an employee attempting to form,
join, or assist a labor organization is nevertheless protected by the
Act. The Board held a rule prohibiting improper or unseemly
conduct unlawful because it could well have caused employees to
refrain from engaging in protected activities. The Board stated,
“Respondent may adopt rules in which the content of the rules is
necessary to the credibility of the institution and/or the quality of
its product, and the rules themselves are narrowly tailored, un-
ambiguous, and designate the category of employees to whom
the rules are applicable; provided, however, that such rules do not
improperly impinge on the relevant rights of the affected em-
ployees.” Id. at fn. 2.
In the instant case, the rule fails to define the areas of permis-
sible and impermissible conduct. Thus, employees could rea-
sonably refrain from Section 7 activity in order to comply with
the rule. Accordingly, I find that this rule violates Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
H. Patronizing the Hotel
The General Counsel contends that the rule proscribing patron-
izing the public dining rooms, bars, cocktail lounges, guest
rooms, shops, or other guest facilities without prior permission of
the employees’ department manager violates the Act.
In a companion case, Reno Hilton, Cases 32–CA–15310 and
32–CA–15512 the evidence showed that notwithstanding this
rule, Respondent’s employees were invited and encouraged to
use the Hotel’s public facilities. However, in the instant case no
evidence was produced to show the enforcement or application of
this rule.
In Westinghouse Electric Corp., 204 NLRB 78 (1975), off-
duty employees ignored a rule requiring the employer’s permis-
sion to be on the premises outside working hours. The Board
held the assertion that employees do not require their employer’s
permission to exercise their rights under Section 7 demonstrates a
misconception of the right involved. The right at issue is not
employee access to an employer’s premises for organizational
purposes, but rather the right of an employee to nondiscrimina-
tory treatment. The nondiscriminatory enforcement of an unam-
biguous rule against union adherents is not an unfair labor prac-
tice unless the rule itself is unlawful.
In Tri-County Medical Center, 222 NLRB 1089 (1976), the
Board held that a no-access rule concerning off-duty employees
will be deemed valid if it: (1) limits access solely with respect to
the interior of the plant and other working areas; (2) is clearly
disseminated to all employees; and (3) applies to off-duty em-
ployees seeking access to the plant for any purpose and not just to
those employees engaging in union activities. Finally, except
where justified by business reasons, a rule which denies off-duty
employees entry to parking lots, gates, and other outside non-
working areas will be found invalid.
Respondent’s rule does not comply with the guidelines of Tri-
County Medical Center. The policy is included in the employee
handbook which is given to all employees. However, the rule
applies to public bars and restaurants, and guest rooms located
inside the facility in addition to the gaming areas. There is no
evidence as to how the rule was enforced. However, the other
rules imply that employees are invited and encouraged to patron-
ize the Hotel’s restaurants, bars and showrooms. I find that the
requirement of prior permission could well have the effect of
inhibiting employee protected concerted activities. I further find
that Respondent has not established a business justification for its
rule. See Harolds Club, 267 NLRB 1167 (1983); Harvey’s
Wagon Wheel, 271 NLRB 306, 316 (1984); The Mandarin, 221
NLRB 264 (1975).
REMEDY
Having found Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintain-
ing rules which: (a) limit its employees’ right to discuss wages
and working conditions; (b) limiting its employees’ rights to wear
uniforms or curtailing their union activity; (c) prohibit the wear-
ing of union insignia; (d) prohibit off-duty employees from so-
licitations and distributions in public areas of its facility other
than gaming areas; (e) prohibit “false, vicious, or profane” state-
ments and “derogatory” conduct without clearly indicating to
employees the parameters of permissible and impermissible con-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 296
duct; (f) prohibit conduct which tends to bring discredit to the
Hotel without clearly indicating to employees the parameters of
permissible and impermissible conduct; and (g) require off-duty
employees, encouraged to patronize the Hotel’s restaurants and
entertainment areas, other than gaming areas, to obtain permis-
sion before patronizing such nongaming areas.
4. Respondent did not otherwise violate Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act as alleged in the complaint.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]