First National Maintenance Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 23, 1979

242 N.L.R.B. 462 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
First National Maintenance Corp. and District 1199,
National Union of Hospital and Health Care Em-
ployees, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO. Case 29-CA-5808
May 23, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND TRUESDALE
On November 24, 1978, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
cross-exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified.'
The Administrative Law Judge found, and we
agree, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(I) of the Act when it refused to bargain about its
decision to discontinue its operation at the Greenpark
Care Center and the effects thereof on the unit em-
ployees. To remedy these violations the Administra-
tive Law Judge's recommended Order requires Re-
spondent to bargain with the Union about the
decision and its effects and to provide backpay for the
terminated employees from the date of their termina-
tion until one of the four stated conditions is met. The
General Counsel urges that these provisions be
adopted. However, he contends that certain addi-
tional remedies should be provided to protect the
rights of the employees under the Act. We find merit
in certain of these contentions.
The termination of this operation and the conse-
quent loss of employment by its employees stemmed
from Respondent's failure to bargain over that deci-
sion and its effects at a time when a measure of union
bargaining power existed. As meaningful bargaining
can be assured here only if some economic strength is
I The General Counsel excepts, inter alia, to the failure of the Administra-
tive Law Judge to find additional violations of Sec. 8(a)( 1) and (5) based on
the allegations in the complaint that Respondent failed to bargain with the
Union prior to its termination of its operation at the Greenpark Care Center.
The Administrative Law Judge made all the necessary factual findings with
respect to these allegations but failed to set forth his conclusions. We adopt
his factual findings, and based thereon conclude that Respondent. in viola-
tion of Sec. 8(aX5) and (I), refused to bargain with the Union b) failing to
respond to the Union's letter dated July 12. 1977, demanding such bargain-
ing.
restored to the Union, and a bargaining order alone
cannot serve as an adequate remedy for the unfair
labor practices Respondent has committed, we deem
it necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of the
Act to order the following remedy which provides re-
dress with a view toward restoring the bargaining
conditions, as nearly as possible, to those which
would have existed but for Respondent's illegal con-
duct.
1. We shall order Respondent to bargain, upon re-
quest, with the Union as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of the employees in the appropriate unit
with respect to the decision to terminate its operation
at the Greenpark Care Center and the possible re-
sumption of operation. If Respondent agrees to re-
sume its Greenpark Care Center operation, it shall
offer all those terminated employees in the appropri-
ate unit reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those
jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent posi-
tions, and shall embody any understanding reached
in a signed agreement.
2. If Respondent fails to agree to resume its Green-
park Care Center operation, Respondent shall be re-
quired to bargain, upon request, with the Union with
respect to the effects on the unit employees of the
decision to terminate the Greenpark Care Center op-
eration and shall establish a preferential hiring list of
all employees in the appropriate unit following a non-
discriminatory system such as seniority. Respondent
shall offer the terminated employees who were em-
ployed at the Greenpark Care Center operation rein-
statement to positions at any of their other cleaning
and maintenance operations which become available,
by the discharging, if necessary, of any persons em-
ployed since July 31, 1977. the date the Greenpark
Care Center operation was terminated. Respondent
and the Union shall reduce to writing any agreement
reached as a result of such bargaining.
3. Further, we shall order Respondent to make
whole the employees in the appropriate unit by pay-
ment of backpay from July 31, 1977, the date of their
termination, until the occurrence of the earliest of the
following conditions: (1) the date Respondent bar-
gains to agreement with the Union on the subjects
pertaining to the decision to close its Greenpark Care
Center operation and the effects of the closing upon
the unit employees;2 (2) a bona fide impasse in bar-
gaining occurs; (3) the failure of the Union to request
bargaining within 5 days of this decision or to com-
mence negotiations within 5 days of Respondent's no-
tice of its desire to bargain with the Union; or (4) the
subsequent failure of the Union to bargain in good
faith. Backpay, less earnings during the applicable pe-
2 Mobil Oil Corporation, 219 NLRB 511 (1975); P. B Mutrie Motor Tranv-
port, Inc, 226 NLRB 1325 (1976).
242 NLRB No. 72
462
FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE CORP.
riod, shall be computed on the basis set forth in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with in-
terest computed in the manner prescribed in Florida
Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). See, gener-
ally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716
(1962).
We have found that Respondent refused to bargain
following the certification. In order to insure that the
employees will be accorded the services of their se-
lected bargaining agent for the period provided by
law, the initial year of certification will begin on the
date that Respondent commences to bargain in good
faith with the Union as the bargaining representative
in the appropriate unit. See Mar-Jac Poultry Com-
pany, Inc., 136 NLRB 785 (1962); Commerce Com-
pany d/b/a Lamar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229 (1962),
enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379
U.S. 817; Burnett Construction Company, 149 NLRB
1419, 1421 (1964), enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1965).
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board hereby orders that the Respondent, First
National Maintenance Corp., New York, New York,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively, upon request,
with District 1199, National Union of Hospital and
Health Care Employees, Retail, Wholesale and De-
partment Store Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
bargaining representative of their employees in the
following appropriate unit:
All housekeeping employees employed at Green-
park Care Center, exclusive of all other employ-
ees, technical and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in Section
2(11) of the Act.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain with the above-named
labor organization as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of all employees in the aforesaid appropri-
ate unit, and further bargain with respect to its deci-
sion to terminate its operation at the Greenpark Care
Center and possible resumption of operations and, if
an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement and offer reinstate-
ment to the terminated employees of this operation. If
Respondent fails to resume its operation at Green-
park Care Center, in accord with the section of this
Decision entitled "The Remedy," Respondent shall
bargain with the Union concerning the effects of the
decision to terminate said operation, establish a pref-
erential hiring list of all employees in the appropriate
unit following a nondiscriminatory system, bargain
about its mode of operation, and offer to its termi-
nated employees in the appropriate unit reinstate-
ment to positions for which they are qualified at any
of its other cleaning and maintenance operations, dis-
charging, if necessary, persons employed since July
31, 1977. Any understanding reached shall be embod-
ied in a signed agreement.
(b) Make whole those employees of Respondent
who were discharged from that location on July 31,
1977, by payment of backpay in the manner and for
the period set forth in this Decision.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to
the Board or its agents, for examination and copying,
all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its facilities in New York, New York,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix" 3
and mail copies thereof to all employees of Respon-
dent who were employed at its Greenpark Care Cen-
ter operation at the time of its termination. Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 29, after being duly signed by Respon-
dent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-
ous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
I In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted b Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
Following a hearing at which all parties had an op-
portunity to present evidence and cross-examine wit-
nesses, the National Labor Relations Board has
463
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
found that we violated the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, and has ordered us to post this no-
tice. We intend to abide by the following:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain, upon request,
with District 1199, National Union of Hospital
and Health Care Employees, Retail, Wholesale
and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, as the
exclusive bargaining representative of our em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit:
All housekeeping employees employed at
Greenpark Care Center, exclusive of all other
employees, technical and professional employ-
ees, guards and supervisors as defined in Sec-
tion 2(11) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL, upon a request, bargain with the
above-named labor organization as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees in the
above appropriate unit, and further bargain with
respect to our decision to terminate our opera-
tion at Greenpark Care Center and possible re-
sumption of operations and, if an understanding
is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement and offer reinstatement to the
terminated employees. If we fail to resume our
operation at Greenpark Care Center, in accord
with the Board's Decision and Order, WE WILL
bargain with the Union concerning the effects of
the decision to terminate said operation, estab-
lish a preferential hiring list of all employees in
the appropriate unit following a nondiscrimina-
tory system, bargain about its mode of operation,
and offer to the terminated employees in the ap-
propriate unit reinstatement to positions for
which they are qualified at any of our other
cleaning and maintenance operations, discharg-
ing, if necessary, persons employed since July 31,
1977. Any understanding reached shall be em-
bodied in a signed agreement.
WE WILL make whole all those employees em-
ployed by us at that location by payment of
backpay with interest, from the date of their ter-
mination on July 31, 1977, in the manner and for
the period required by the Decision and Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.
FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE CORP.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. RICCI, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
in this proceeding was held before Administrative Law
Judge Benjamin K. Blackburn on July 5, 1978, in Brooklyn,
New York. The charge was filed on August 3, 1977, by
District 1199, National Union of Hospital and Health Care
Employees, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, against First
National Maintenance Corporation, herein called Respon-
dent or the Company, and the complaint issued on October
7, 1977. The issue presented is whether Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, herein the Act, by refusing to bargain with the
Union as required by law. A brief was filed by Respondent.
Before issuing a Decision Judge Blackburn died. On No-
vember 8, 1978, the Board's Chief Administrative Law
Judge designated me to prepare and issue a Decision on the
existing record.
Upon the entire record I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a New York State corporation, with its prin-
cipal office and place of business in New York City, New
York, is engaged in providing and performing housekeep-
ing, cleaning, and maintenance services and related services
for various commercial customers. During the past year, a
representative period, it purchased and caused to be trans-
ported and delivered to its place of business cleaning prod-
ucts and other goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000, of which goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 were transported and delivered to its place of busi-
ness directly from out-of-state sources. I find that Respon-
dent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
During the spring of 1977 Respondent, by contract and
as a separate employer, was doing the maintenance work
for the Greenpark Care Center, a nursing institution in
Brooklyn, New York, herein called Greenpark. Its employ-
ees at that location totaled about 35. Respondent hires an
unspecified number of workmen to do like maintenance for
other commercial enterprises under separate contract at
other locations. Asked how many other nursing homes his
Company services, Leonard Marsh, an officer of Respon-
dent and one-third owner, answered 'I would venture to
guess between two and four." It was an evasive answer,
unless Respondent's overall operations are so extensive that
the secretary-treasurer cannot keep in mind how many are
of a particular type.
On March 31, 1977, Respondent's employees at this one
location voted in a Board-conducted election and chose the
Union as bargaining agent; on May I I the Regional Direc-
tor certified the Union as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive. I will assume that Respondent was formally advised
soon thereafter in writing by the Board, as is always the
case in Board representation proceedings. By letter dated
464
FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE CORP.
July 12 the Union wrote to the Company, reminded it of
the certification, and asked for a meeting to negotiate a
contract. The Company never answered the letter.
On July 28, 1978, Marsh told all of the employees work-
ing for him at Greenpark that 3 days later, on July 31, all of
them would be discharged. Not one of the employees had
had any prior notice of the intended action. Informed that
same day of what was about to happen, Edward Wecker,
vice president of Local 1199, immediately communicated
with Marsh and with Mr. Pelman, administrator of Green-
park, in a panic attempt to delay matters with the hope of
averting disaster to the employees. All Wecker got from
Marsh on the telephone was that it was a matter of money,
and that it was too late to do anything about it or even
discuss the matter at all. The employees were fired on July
31, and Marsh never met with any representative of the
Union.
The essential allegation of the complaint is that this uni-
lateral change in the conditions of employment of employ-
ees represented by a certified exclusive bargaining agent,
without a semblance of opportunity for the Union to speak
on their behalf, was a direct violation of the statutory obli-
gation to bargain and was therefore an unfair labor practice
under Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. That Respondent
knew-before uttering one word to the Union or to the
employees of its intent-that the employees were regularly
and lawfully represented by an exclusive agent cannot be
questioned. In fact, Marsh had, for over 2 weeks, been
holding and ignoring the Union's written request for bar-
gaining. That the discharge of a man is a change in his
conditions of employment hardly needs comment. In these
obvious facts, the law is clear. When an employer's work
complement is represented by a union and he wishes to
alter the hiring arrangements, be his reason lack of money
or a mere desire to become richer, the law is no less clear
that he must first talk to the union about it. This Respon-
dent did not. When Wecker tried to talk with the owner he
was faced with mere restatement of afait accompli. He may
have tried to stall matters, but Marsh was impervious, for
economic reasons I am sure, but stone deaf nonetheless.
This is a large Company. For all I know, the 35 men at this
particular home were only a small part of its total business
in the New York area. If Wecker had been given an oppor-
tunity to talk, something might have been worked out to
transfer these people to other parts of Respondent's busi-
ness. The cases speak of an employer's duty, when he can-
not avoid reducing his staff, to discuss its "effects" with
their bargaining agent. Entirely apart from whether open
discussion between the parties-with the Union speaking
on behalf of the employees as was its right-might have
persuaded Respondent to find a way of continuing this part
of its operations, there was always the possibility that
Marsh might have persuaded Greenpark to use these same
employees to continue doing its maintenance work, either
as direct employees or as later hires by a replacement con-
tractor. Yet there never was any talking, meeting, or oppor-
tunity for the Union to bargain with Respondent.
On the face of the story, there appears a very clear unfair
labor practice. What really remains for consideration are
the defense arguments made by Respondent.
Its principal defense is the contention that the parties did,
in fact, negotiate this entire matter, and that therefore in no
event can there be a finding of refusal to bargain. Called as
an adverse witness by the General Counsel, owner Marsh
had difficulty remembering anything, including statements
of fact appearing in telegrams that he had written. Repeat-
edly his answers were "It could be." "t is possible," "I
can't recall," "Maybe," etc. These responses were about
what must have been a significant experience for his Com-
pany, what with the financial loss it suffered at this particu-
lar job. These observations are made here because the testi-
mony of Wecker, which stands uncontradicted (Marsh did
not testify in defense about the now asserted bargaining at
all), must be believed. All Marsh could recall about talking
with Wecker was that the union agent spoke uwith him on
the telephone, asked why he was quitting the job, asked if
he would remain I month, and that Marsh's reply was that
he was losing money and "couldn't afford" to remain.
Marsh also admitted that his Company never responded to
the Union's demand letter of July 12 and never offered to
discuss the discharges of the employees with their Union.
It is a fact that Respondent was losing money on this job.
As far back as March 17, 1977, Greenpark gave it 30 days'
notice of cancellation of their contract because of the main-
tenance staffs lack of efficiency. Apparently they straight-
ened things out, and the work continued. On June 30 they
talked, and Respondent asked for a $500 weekly raise in
"profits," meaning, I suppose, a raising of the fee paid for
the services; and on July 6 Marsh informed Greenpark in
writing that unless the increase were granted his Company
would discontinue the work on August 1. By telegram
dated July 25 he gave such final notice. As stated above, the
employees were first informed on July 28 about the in-
tended discharges to come 3 days later.
Wecker testified that that same day, July 28, he spoke
twice with Marsh on the phone: Wecker called Respondent.
Wecker first asked Pelman. of Greenpark, could he keep the
employees on, and Pelman said no because as he read the
contract Greenpark was precluded from even considering
hiring these employees for 90 days. Talking then to Marsh,
Wecker asked what was going to happen to the employees,
but the only answer he got was that Respondent was "pull-
ing out" because it was not receiving enough money.
Wecker then asked "could he [Marsh] hold on a little longer
until we could sit down and discuss the matter and see how
to keep the people working," and again Marsh said "no."
this time on the ground that he would have to stay a full 30
days if he stayed even 1, according to the contract. Marsh
told Wecker if he, Wecker, could persaude Pelman to waive
the 30-day clause, "he might be able to swing it so we could
be able to sit down and discuss it." Still on the phone,
Wecker asked about possible employment at other loca-
tions of Respondent, and he received a simple negative.
Wecker's final statement as a witness was "I asked that we
meet and try to discuss the matter. He said, 'We have noth-
ing to discuss.'"
Respondent calls this brief talk on the telephone that day
full bargaining to impasse over both the decision to dis-
charge and its effects upon all 35 employees. I disagree.
What these facts show in totality is that Respondent, from
the very start, had no intention of considering either the
employees' or the Union's opinion or desire in this mass
discharge. Marsh simply refused to meet with he Union or
to discuss anything, although he was obligated to do so in
465
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
law. His indifference to the statutory obligation was first
manifested by Respondent's failure to even respond to the
demand for bargaining received on July 12. To say no more
than "it is a money problem," or "we cannot afford not to
discharge the people," is a far cry from exchanging views
and thoughts as to how, if possible, the economic hurt could
be avoided or at least reduced. I find that Respondent re-
fused to talk with the Union about an absolutely manda-
tory subject of collective bargaining.
As to law, the defense argues that its decision to cancel
out this particular one of many simultaneous operations
was not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. In
support it cites an occasional case where the Board found
exactly the opposite of Respondent's present view, but
where a court of appeals disagreed. A hearing examiner in
these proceedings is bound to apply Board law unless re-
versed by the United States Supreme Court. See Ozark
Trailers, Incorporated, et al., 161 NLRB 561, 566 (1966).
If ever there was a business in which taking on, finishing,
or discontinuing this or that particular job is no more than
a regular and usual method of running its affairs, it is this
Respondent's overall activity. There was no capital in-
volved when it decided to terminate the Greenpark job. The
closing of this one spot in no sense altered the nature of its
business, nor did it substantially affect its total size. The
Board's language in a recent decision is particularly appli-
cable here "[W]here it has not been shown that Respon-
dent's decision to close involved such a 'significant invest-
ment or withdrawal of capital' as to 'affect the scope and
ultimate direction of the enterprise,' we conclude that by
refusing to bargain with the Union concerning the decision
to close the . . . facility, Respondent has thereby violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act." Brockway Motor Trucks,
Division of Mack Trucks, Inc., 230 NLRB 1002, 1003
(1977). See also Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
N.LR.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
A substantial element in the legal argument by Respon-
dent here is that there was no way of keeping these 35
employees on the job, that talk would have been futile be-
cause the Greenpark location was a losing proposition. But
the theory misconceives the law as established. The legal
obligation to accord recognition to a statutory representa-
tive of its employees, particularly to give it an opportunity
to discuss alternatives where an employer wishes to dis-
charge employees even for economic reasons, does not
mean that the employer must make economic concessions
or agree to any condition to its disadvantage. Of course,
there have been attempts at collective bargaining which
have failed to yield mutually desirable results. As has been
said too many times to warrant repetition, the results of
collective bargaining are not germane to the statutory re-
quirements of the Act. From the Court language in Fibre-
board Paper Products, supra: "[A]lthough it is not possible
to say whether a satisfactory solution could be reached,
national labor policy is founded upon the congressional de-
termination that the chances are good enough to warrant
subjecting such issues to the process of collective negotia-
tion." 379 U.S. at 214.
I find that by ignoring the certified exclusive bargaining
agent of its employees in deciding to discharge all its em-
ployees at the Greenpark Care Center location and by re-
fusing to bargain with the Union on request Respondent
has violated and is violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burden-
ing and obstructing commerce and the free flow of com-
merce.
V. THE REMEDY
In remedy, Respondent must be ordered to bargain in
good faith with the Union now on the subject of its decision
to terminate the Greenpark Care Center operation and its
consequent discharge of the employees, as well as with re-
spect to the effects of such action. To effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act Respondent must be ordered to make
whole all the employees thus fired for monetary losses suf-
fered as a result of the violation, from the date of their
discharges until the occurrence of the earliest of the follow-
ing conditions: (1) the date Respondent bargains to agree-
ment with the Union on these subjects, pertaining to the
decision to close the Greenpark Care Center and the effects
of the closing upon the unit employees; (2) a bona fide
impasse in bargaining; (3) the failure of the Union to re-
quest bargaining within 5 days of this Decision or to com-
mence negotiations within 5 days of Respondent's notice of
its desire to bargain with the Union; or (4) the subsequent
failure of the Union to bargain in good faith.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. First National Maintenance Corporation is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. District 1199, National Union of Hospital and Health
Care Employees, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By unilaterally closing its Greenpark Care Center op-
eration and terminating its employees there without bar-
gaining with the Union about the decision to discontinue
the operation or about its effects upon the employees, Re-
spondent has refused to bargain and has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act.
4. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respondent has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced, and is interfering
with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act and
thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
466