Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 23, 1973

203 N.L.R.B. 89 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

FIRESTONE TEXTILE COMPANY
Firestone Textile Company, a Division of Firestone
Tire & Rubber Company and United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO.
Cases 9-CA-6804 and 9-CA-7008
April 23, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On October 25, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Joseph I. Nachman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings,' findings,2 and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, Firestone Textile Company,
a Division of Firestone Tire & Rubber Company,
Bowling Green, Kentucky, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in said
recommended Order except that the attached notice
is substituted for the Administrative Law Judge's no-
tice.
' The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board 's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions were incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, inc, 91 NLRB 544,
enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and find
no basis for reversing his findings.
2 In agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, we find that Respon-
dent violated Sec. 8 (aX3) when it discharged Hooten for soliciting another
employee , Vincent, to sign an authorization card In this connection , we note
that the credited evidence demonstrates that Hooten was on his break period
in an area regularly used for breaks both by Hooten and by other employees,
and that while engaged in such break , and only during such break and in the
break area , did Hooten solicit Vincent. Moreover , even assuming that the
solicitation be viewed as worktime solicitation because Vincent was not
taking a break and was passing through the area from one work station to
another, we find that the discharge of Hooten violated Sec . 8(aX3) in view
of the invalidity of the no -solicitation rule and the fact that the record
demonstrates that the solicitation did not interfere in any way with the work
of either Vincent or Hooten.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
89
After a full trial in which both sides had the opportu-
nity to present their evidence, the National Labor
Relations Board has found that we, Firestone Textile
Company, a Division of Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company, violated the National Labor Relations Act,
and ordered us to post this notice. We will carry out
the order of the Board or the judgment of any court
enforcing the same, and we will comply with the fol-
lowing:
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or help unions
To act together for collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection
To refuse to do any or all these things.
WE WILL NOT do anything to interfere with you
in the exercise of the aforementioned rights, and
all our employees are free to become or remain
a member of United Rubber Workers or not be-
come or remain a member of that or any other
union.
WE WILL NOT question you about your sympa-
thies for or activities on behalf of Rubber Work-
ers or any other union.
The rule appearing at page 16 of the current employee
handbook, entitled "Solicitations," is now revoked to
the extent that it prohibits solicitation for a union
anywhere in our plant on your nonworking time.
All employees are free to solicit for Rubber Workers,
or any other union, anywhere in our plant provided
it is on nonworking time.
As the National Labor Relations Board found that we
violated the law when we fired Zolen R. Hotten and
Celia Holder, WE WILL offer each of them their old jobs
back if the same exists, and if not a substantially equal
job, without any loss in their seniority or other rights
and privileges, and make up to them the pay they lost
with 6-percent interest.
FIRESTONE TEXTILE COMPANY, A
DIVISION OF FIRESTONE TIRE &
RUBBER COMPANY
(Employer)
203 NLRB No. 19
90
Dated By
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(Representative ) (Title)
We will notify immediately the above-named individ-
uals, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon
application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Federal Building, Room 2407, 550
Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, Telephone 513-
684-3686.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOSEPH I . NACHMAN, Administrative Law Judge: This pro-
ceeding tried before me at Bowling Green , Kentucky, on
July 18-19,' with all parties duly represented, involves two
complaints 2 pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National La-
bor Relations Act, as amended (herein the Act), which were
consolidated for trial. As amended at the trial ,3 these com-
plaints allege that Firestone Textile Company, a Division of
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company (herein Respondent or
Company), in the course of an organizational campaign at
its Bowling Green, Kentucky, plant, by United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America (herein
Union), interrogated its employees concerning their union
activities and the union activities of fellow employees; cre-
ating the impression that the union activities of employees
was under its surveillance ; promulgated , published, main-
tained , and enforced an unduly broad rule prohibiting solic-
itation in the plant; and discharged two employees because
of their assistance to and support of the Union, thereby
violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Respondent
admitted certain allegations of the complaints , but denied
the commission of any unfair labor practice . For reasons
This and all dates herein are 1972, unless otherwise noted.
2 In Case 9-CA--6804, the complaint issued April 5, on a charge filed
February 14 and amended March I . In Case 9-CA-7008, the complaint
issued June 9, on a charge filed May 2.
3 The amendments consisted of (1) deleting par. 5(c), and so much of par
6 of the complaint in Case 9-CA-6804, as alleges Jeanette Cowlis was dis-
criminatonly discharged ; and (2) by adding a new paragraph to the com-
plaint in Case 9-CA-7008 to be designated as par. 6(c), alleging that, at all
times since 6 months after the filing and service of the charge in that case,
Respondent has maintained , published , and distributed to its employees a
handbook which contains an unlawful rule dealing with solicitation by em-
ployees . Leave to so amend was granted over Respondent 's objection.
hereafter more fully stated , I find the material allegations of
the complaints sustained by the evidence and recommend
a remedial order.
At the trial all parties were afforded full opportunity to
introduce relevant and material evidence , to examine and
cross-examine witnesses , to argue orally on the record, and
to submit briefs . Briefs submitted by the General Counsel
and Respondent , respectively, have been duly considered.
Upon the pleadings , stipulations of counsel , the evidence
including my observation of their demeanor while testify-
ing, and the entire record , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT 4
The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
Respondent's Bowling Green , Kentucky , plant is en-
gaged in the manufacture of tire cord . For several years the
Union has been trying to organize the employees at said
plant, with at least two prior Board elections conducted
which the Union lost . That Respondent is opposed to the
unionization of its employees is evident not only from the
prior case , but also from the statement of its counsel on the
record in the instant case that the Company regards the
Union as "bad for the plant and for each employee in it."
Some of the events occurring during the union campaign
commencing in January 1968 and extending into 1969 were
the subject of an unfair labor practice proceeding before the
Board , which culminated in the Board Order heretofore
mentioned , dated October 1, 1970 (185 NLRB 817), and
which was enforced by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit on January 19, 1972, upon consent of
all parties . One holding of the Board in the aforementioned
case was that a rule in a handbook Respondent promulgat-
ed and distributed to its employees was an unlawfully broad
no-solicitation rule. This handbook , as well as one subse-
quently issued ,s contains the following rule under the head-
ing "Solicitations": 6
Our Company sanctions one plant -wide solicitation of
contributions each year and that is for the United Fund
which supports various welfare agencies of our com-
munity and area.
n 11
Collections for sick or injured employees, flowers for
4 No issue of commerce or labor organization is presented The complaints
allege and the answers admit facts which establish these jurisdictional ele-
ments . I find those facts to be as pleaded. Moreover , the Board asserted
jurisdiction over Respondent's Bowling Green plant in its Decision and
Order issued October 1, 1970, and reported at 185 NLRB 817, which is
hereafter more fully considered.
5 There are two handbooks in evidence ; G.C. Exh 3 was given to Celia
Holder when she was initially hired on October 15, 1968 . She testified that
she received no other handbook while employed by Respondent. Marion
Denning , who has been employed by Respondent for about 4 years , testified
that a revised handbook , G.C. Exh . 4, was given him by his foreman about
3 months prior to his testimony G C. Exh. 4 itself bears no date , but Industri-
al Relations Manager Webber testified that it issued on Friday , June 16,
1972, and that every rule in it had been posted on the employee's bulletin
board by March 1
6 The rule referred to appears on page 27 of G C Exh. 3 and on p. 16 of
G.C. Exh 4
FIRESTONE TEXTILE COMPANY 91
the sick or deceased, etc., are permitted provided they
are handled outside of regular working hours. The
Company has found it to be to your advantage to limit
solicitations and collections to those in which you and
your company have a real interest.
Any questions regarding solicitations , fund requests,
membership drivers, etc., should be directed to the In-
dustrial Relations Department.
In addition to the foregoing, the earlier handbook con-
tained the following rule under the heading "Staying On the
Job" (at p. 11):
You are to work at your job until the quitting time for
lunch or shift change.
You are required to be on the job available to perform
assigned work at your scheduled shift start time. You
are to remain on your job during scheduled working
hours. When leaving your machine-or work area for
anything other than personal relief, notify your super-
visor.
In the revised handbook (G.C. Exh. 4), the last-men-
tioned rule does not appear in the precise language above
quoted . It now appears in a revised form under the general
heading "Rules of Conduct" (pp. 32-36), where there are
listed 22 paragraphs detailing prohibited conduct, which,
." ... will subject an employee [to] disciplinary action in-
cluding discharge," Two of these rules read thus:
19. Threatening, intimidating, coercing others or inter-
fering with another employee's work.
22. Leaving work station; being absent from work area
or department without proper permission ; loitering in
work areas or departments including one's own; dis-
tracting or interfering with the work of others; or dis-
tracting employees from their work duties by
distributing material or soliciting during working time.
In the prior case, the Board, on the authority of Stoddard-
Quirk Manufacturing Co., 138 NLRB 615, held that the
effect of the rule in the handbook, under the heading "Solic-
itation," was to bar solicitation by employees in the plant
on employee 's nonwork time , and to that extent infringed
upon the Section 7 rights of employees, in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act, 185 NLRB 817. However, neither the
Board's Order, nor the notice it required Respondent post,
made reference to revocation of the rule to the extent of its
invalidity; both the Order and the notice only mentioned
that Respondent would cease and desist from "prohibiting
employee solicitation of other employees on behalf, of the
Union in the plant on employee's nonwork time."7
In connection with the aforementioned rule concerning
solicitation, the evidence shows that supervisors directed
employees to solicit fellow employees, during their working
time, for contributions to a flower fund and a hardship
fund, as well as to the United Givers Fund. Solicitation for
r The evidence shows that the notice required by the Board 's Order was
posted by Respondent but the time thereof is not clear . As the court's en-
forcement decree was entered January 19, 1972, I assume that the notice was
posted shortly thereafter, and that it was removed upon expiration of the
required 60-day posting period , which would appear to be by late March or
early April. However , as noted above the identical rule dealing with "solicita-
tion" was republished by Respondent on June 16.
the United Givers Fund presumably, as the rule indicates,
was once a year, but solicitation for the flower and hardship
funds were made whenever money was needed for such
purposes.8
The Discharge of Celia Holder
Holder was initially employed by Respondent in October
1968, and worked continuously until her discharge on Feb-
ruary 2. Both Industrial Relations Manager Webber as well
as Supervisor Sweeney conceded that Holder was a satisfac-
tory employee, and Webber admitted that were it not for the
incident on February 2, hereafter detailed, Holder would
probably still be employed by Respondent. Holder's job
was that of a beam tier in the twisting department, which
requires that all the beams be tied in before the machine is
started, with all the cords untangled. Lowering the beam
into position and starting the machine requires the service
of from two to four employees, and she could ask other
employees in her department for assistance when required.
According to Holder's uncontradicted and credited testimo-
ny, the Union's current campaign which began in January
1972 is the third at Respondent's Bowling Green plant, and
she participated in all of them. She signed a union card in
the current campaign on January 10, and thereafter ob-
tained the signature of a number of other employees to
union cards. That Respondant was aware of Holder's
prounion sympathies is evident from the fact, as the Board
found in the prior case, that Holder and fellow employee
Becker were prevented on one occasion by Webber from
distributing union literature in nonwork areas of the plant,
as well as from her conversation with Sweeney and Plant
Manager King on February 2, hereafter related.
On February 2, Holder was working the midnight to 8
a.m. shift. Shortly after her lunchbreak about 5 a.m., she
returned to her machine, which apparently had been shut
down, to tie in some beams, and on her way asked fellow
employee Jerry Thomas to assist her in that task. As they
proceeded with the work, Holder became concerned that
some of the lines might become entangled and suggested to
Thomas that before proceeding further they await the re-
turn of their foreman, James Sweeney, who was then in the
lunchroom for his meal break. While waiting, Holder re-
marked to Thomas that her husband was interested in buy-
ing a truck, and that she understood Thomas had one for
sale. When Thomas responded affirmatively Holder handed
Thomas a slip of paper upon which he, at Holder's request,
wrote the name of his father-in-law, with whom he lived,
and a telephone number where he might be reached to
discuss the possible purchase of the truck. Holder testified
that the piece of paper she handed Thomas, which was
received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 2, was the
voucher or explanatory portion of a paycheck she had re-
ceived, and that it was folded over once. On the back of the
paper appears the legend "Marvin Pedigo-678-4967,"
which, according to Holder, she saw Thomas write.
8 Based on the credited testimony of Celia Holder and Marion Denning.
Although Foreman Sweeney testified that solicitation for such funds was
made by employees only during their nonwork time , Foreman Lykins testi-
fied that employees under his supervision may well have engaged in solicita-
tion for such funds during their working time.
92 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In this setting Supervisor Sweeney came into the area and
saw Thomas in a half kneeling position writing on some-
thing on his leg , which , Sweeney testified , was folded four
different ways . As Sweeney came within 6 to 8 feet of Hold-
er and Thomas , he observed , according to his testimony,
Thomas hand , "this note or card or whatever-I assumed
it was a union card"-to Holder, who put it in her apron
pocket . After assisting Holder and Thomas with tying in the
beams and getting the machine started up, Sweeney told
Holder that he wanted to talk with her in his office. There
Sweeney opened the conversation by stating , "I guess you
know what I caught you doing." When Holder commented
in the negative , Sweeney stated that he caught her signing
Taylor to a union card . Holder denied the accusation and
told Sweeney that he did not see what he thought he saw.
Sweeney replied that he knew it was a union card , because
he had handled quite a few of them . Sweeney then told
Holder that just a few days before he discussed Holder with
a company official , and that the latter had stated that he had
been watching her and that she had shown no sign of being
for the Union , and that he hoped Holder had finally decided
to come over to the Company's side . Holder replied that she
had always been for the Union and always would be. Swee-
ney asked why she was for the Union , and Holder replied
that one of her sons was not working for the Company
because she was for the Union , and another had been fired
for the same reason .9 Sweeney then stated that he was going
to telephone Industrial Relations Manager Webber . Holder
asked Sweeney if Webber would really get up at that hour
of the morning, to which Sweeney replied , in substance, for
you he will . Holder then stated that if Sweeney had no
objection she would rather talk with Plant Manager King
out of the presence of Webber. After making a telephone
call which Holder did not hear, Sweeney told her that she
would not be permitted to talk to King alone , but would
have to talk to King and Webber together. Sweeney then
made another telephone call-Holder was unable to say to
whom-but she did hear Sweeney say that he had Holder
for signing an employee to a union card . 10 After these tele-
phone conversations Sweeney took Holder to the main con-
ference room to await the arrival of King and Webber."
9 Holder testified that at this point Sweeney asked her to empty the con-
tents of her apron pockets on the table so that he could see whether she had
in her possession a card signed by Thomas , adding that the information he
thus obtained would just be between the two of them , but that she refused,
telling Sweeney that she would not "rat on anyone ." Sweeney denied that he
asked Holder to empty her apron pockets so he could see the cards and
claimed that he asked to see only the card signed by Thomas . In the view
I take of the case it is unnecessary to resolve this conflict.
10 The exact time of these calls is not entirely clear . Sweeney gave no
testimony on the subject . King testified that he received Sweeney's call while
at breakfast , but did not fix a time . Webber testified that Sweeney's call
awakened him, that he thereupon got dressed and went to his office, where
he arrived about 7 . 15 a.m., and found King in his office . From this it would
appear that Sweeney 's calls to King and Webber must have been made
between 6 and 6 : 30 a.m.
11 The findings in this section are based on a composite of the testimony
of Holder and Sweeney which is not in dispute . Holder additionally testified
that, while waiting in the conference room for the arrival of King and Web-
ber, Sweeney again asked her why she was for the Union and stated that she
could help herself by showing him the signed union cards she admittedly had
in her possession , but that she refused . Sweeney denied that the Union was
discussed or that he asked to see the cards. As heretofore indicated I find it
unnecessary to resolve this credibility issue.
King and Webber arrived in the conference room about
7:30 a .m. What occurred there is substantially undisputed.
In response to King's question as to the nature of the prob-
lem, Sweeney stated that he had caught Holder signing
Thomas to a union card while both were at work , and asked
Holder if it was not correct that she had passed a folded
card to Thomas . Holder replied that it was true that she had
been working for the Union ; she had some signed cards in
her possession ; and she had passed a piece of paper to
Thomas, but that it was not a union card . King then told
Holder that he was not interested in other cards she may
have obtained , but just wanted to know if what she had
given Thomas that morning was a union card . Holder re-
plied that it was not; that it had nothing to do with the
Union . King then told Holder that, if she had nothing fur-
ther to say , she could go . Holder asked if she was fired. King
replied that she was not fired at that time , but that she
should call Webber after 4 that afternoon and the latter
would advise her what decision had been reached. When
Holder called later that day, Webber told her that it had
been decided to dismiss her. About 2 weeks later , Holder
telephoned Webber again and asked for her job back. Web-
ber refused.12
Holder admits that during her conversations with Swee-
ney, Webber , and King she did not show or offer to show
any of them the paper on which she claimed Thomas wrote
the name and telephone number. She gave as the reason for
not doing so that she knew she was going to be fired regard-
less of what she said or did , because she felt Webber would
not believe her. She made no claim that she informed them
that her conversation with Thomas concerned only the pos-
sible purchase of a truck or that she had only obtained a
telephone number for that purpose.
Although Webber at one point claimed that whenever an
employee ceases the performance of his job for other than
company business , he is in violation of the rule requiring full
time and attention to the job, he admitted that the rule was
not so strictly interpreted or applied . To use Webber's
words, "we have never objected to passing of time of day,"
employees are "not little soldiers ," nor are they "in a con-
centration camp"; people will "make small talk," and they
are going to "interrupt momentarily for whatever people
talk about," and while we would prefer not to have this, "we
have to be realistic and recognize you can 't run a factory
that way ." Both Webber and Sweeney admitted that had
Holder demonstrated to them that her conversation with
Thomas involved no more than obtaining a telephone num-
ber where her husband might call concerning the possible
purchase of a truck she would not have been discharged,
and that the incident would have been forgotten . Addition-
ally, Webber and King testified that after talking with Hold-
er they investigated the matter further, but both admitted
that such investigation was limited to discussions with coun-
sel and corporate officials of Respondent . Concedely, nei-
ther of them spoke to Taylor concerning the incident
involved, nor did they direct any other company representa-
tive to do so . They admitted that Respondent took no disci-
12 The findings in this section are based on a composite of the testimony
of Holder, King , and Webber, which is not in conflict . The conflicts which
do exist, I deem unnecessary to resolve to reach a decision
FIRESTONE TEXTILE COMPANY 93
plinary action of any kind against Taylor. Neither the Gen-
eral Counsel nor Respondent called Taylor as a witness.
The Discharge of Zoland R. Hooten
Hooten was employed by Respondent June 29, 1968, as
a sweeper and to clean work areas in the plant, and was so
employed until his discharge on February 1, 1972. Webber
and Supervisor Lykins admitted that Hooten's work perfor-
mance was in all respects satisfactory. In the current cam-
paign Hooten signed a card for the Union during the month
of January and solicited other employees to sign cards. The
extent, if any, to which Hooten participated in the prior
union campaigns is not disclosed by the record.
On February 1, Hooten worked the midnight to 8 a.m.
shift and was entitled to rest breaks both before and after
the meal break, but there were no fixed times for this pur-
pose. During his shift on February 1, according to Hooten.
after sweeping an aisle, he entered a break area, got a cup
of coffee, lit a cigarette, and then took a seat at a small desk
just outside the break area because the break area was
crowded and there was no place to sit down;13 while so
seated, Patricia Vincent, a quality control inspector who
worked in a nearby area, came by and he asked her if she
would sign a card for the Union; Vincent refused; and upon
completion of his break he resumed his duties and complet-
ed his work shift without any further discussion with Vin-
cent .14 When Hooten's shift ended at 8 a.m., and he was
13 According to Hooten he has frequently taken his break at this desk and
has observed others doing so . He was never told by any supervisors that it
was improper for him to do as he did on this occasion.
i4 Vincent testified that when Hooten first asked her to sign the card, he
was not in a break area , but at a point between jobs 16 and 17, where eating,
drinking, and smoking is prohibited ; about a half hour later she saw him in
the break area drinking coffee ; after the discussion in the break area . Hooten
followed her from machine to machine as she performed her duties, dragging
his broom behind him , soliciting her to sign a union card and that her trip
from the first machine to the last of the 32 at which she inspected took about
20 minutes ; and she then reported Hooten's actions to her foreman, Wayne
Elms. According to Vincent , although this was the only time Hooten actually
asked her to sign a card , he had talked to her about the Union on other
occasions and on a number of these she reported the fact to Lykins, Hooten's
foreman , asking that the latter require Hooten to leave her alone. Elms
testified that it was about 2 30 a .m. when Vincent reported to him that
Hooten had solicited her to sign a card and that she did not want it to happen
again ; he immediately contacted Lykins, Hooten 's foreman , and reported
those facts to him ; about 3 p.m he went to Lykins' office to see what the
latter was doing about the matter ; from Lykins ' office for a period of about
5 minutes, he and Lykms observed Hooten following Vincent about the
latter's work area and that , while they were too far from him to hear what
was being said , he could observe that Hooten and Vincent appeared to be
engaged in a heated discussion ; and, while it was Hooten 's duty to sweep up
in the area where he and Vincent were , Hooten was not performing his duties
at the time because he did not have his broom with him. Lykins testified that
Foreman Elms informed him of Vincent 's claim that she was being solicited
by Hooten , but that he did not speak to Hooten or take any immediate action
regarding the matter ; about a half hour later Elms came to his office and the
two of them watched Hooten follow Vincent about her work area while the
latter performed her duties : while they were too far away to hear what was
said , he could observe that the conversation between Hooten and Vincent
appeared to be heated ; while Hooten had his broom with him, he was not
sweeping as would be his duty while in the area where he was talking to
Vincent ; he and Elms observed Hooten talking with Vincent for about 10 or
15 minutes; although he was Hooten 's supervisor , he at no time during this
period of observation said anything to Hooten , nor made any effort to put
an end to the activity he observed, notwithstanding that he was aware of and
under the duty to enforce Respondent's plant rules , and he subsequently
preparing to leave the plant, he was directed to see Industri-
al Relations Manager Webber. In the latter's office, with
Foremen Posey and Lykins present, Webber told Hooten
that he had information that "you've been off the job get-
ting union cards signed...." Hooten denied this, but did
admit that he had talked with Vincent in the break area,
while he was on his break. Webber replied that this was not
in accord with the information that had come to him. Web-
ber then told Hooten that he (Webber) had to talk to the
plant manager again, and that Hooten should go and call
later in the day and he would then tell Hooten what disposi-
tion had been made of the matter. When Hooten called later
that day, Webber stated that no decision had yet been
reached, and that he should call again the following af-
ternoon, but in the meantime not to come to work. Hooten
called Webber the following afternoon and the latter stated
that Hooten was discharged for leaving his job and pester-
ing other employees.)S Webber claims that Hooten's dis-
charge was for breach of the rule requiring him to remain
on the job, not for soliciting.
Independent 8(a)(1) Allegations
1. On or about April 21, Foreman Sweeney and employ-
ees Allen Davis and Frank Richmond were in Sweeney's
office. After some discussion concerning the job, Sweeney
asked Davis to leave and then told Richmond that he (Swee-
ney) had reason to believe that other employees were trying
to get Richmond to sign a union card. Richmond told Swee-
ney that he was not for the Union and that no one was
trying to get him to sign a card. Sweeney then told Rich-
mond that if the efforts to get him to sign a card continued
to let him (Sweeney) know and that he would put a stop to
it.16
2. During the last week in January, employee Overstreet
was walking through the plant and came upon Foremen
Jones and Crisp. As Overstreet approached the two fore-
reported what he had observed to Webber, but was not asked for nor did he
make any recommendation.
I am unable to credit the testimony of Vincent, Elms, and Lykins to the
extent that it conflicts with that of Hooten Vincent, in particular, I find,
literally wore her antiunion bias on her sleeve. So anxious was she to involve
Hooten in a violation of Respondent 's rules that she testified that Hooten had
talked to her on several prior occasions about the Union while she was at
work, claiming that she had reported this to Lykins, Hooten 's foreman, but
the latter does not support her in that claim. Rather, Lykins testified that he
never received any complaint about Hooten's work, nor did he ever have
occasion to give Hooten a written warning . The testimony of Elms and
Lykins that, with knowledge that Vincent was claiming that Hooten, in
violation of Respondent's rule , was soliciting her to sign a union card, they
watched Hooten pursue Vincent for a period estimated at from 5 to 15
minutes and took no action to stop him from continuing with what they
regarded as improper activity, I reject as simply incredible . Accordingly, I
credit Hooten.
15 My findings with respect to the conversations between Hooten and
Webber are based on the testimony of Hooten which in its essential aspects
is not in conflict with that of Webber.
16 Based on the credited testimony of Richmond. Sweeney claimed that he
could not have had this conversation on April 21, because he was on vacation
at the time , but admitted that it might have occurred on some other day in
April According to Sweeney, Richmond complained to him that he (Rich-
mond) was being coerced on the job by other employees; that he told Rich-
mond that if he wanted to tell him who was involved he could do so, but if
he did not and it continued, just to let him know and he would see what he
could do to get it stopped. To the extent that Sweeney's testimony is in
conflict with that of Richmond , I do not credit it.
94 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
men, Jones stated loud enough for all to hear , "Here's a man
who will know." Jones then asked Overstreet how many
employees had signed union cards. Overstreet, who was at
the time unaware of the union 's campaign , replied that he
did not know.l" The following day Overstreet attended a
meeting called and addressed by Plant Manager King, and
which was attended by a number of other employees. King
told the assembled employees, among other things, that
although the Company felt that the Union would not be to
the advantage of the employees this was for the employees
to determine, and that the Company would not pry into
their union activity and would not discuss the Union with
them except at the request of the employees. After the meet-
ing ended, Overstreet approached King and told the latter
that he had been questioned by a supervisor about the
Union. King asked who it was, but Jones replied that he
preferred not to say. King then told Overstreet that what he
reported was contrary to company policy and that he was
going to look into the matter and see that it did not recur.18
A few days following his conversation with Overstreet, King
questioned Jones about the incident. Jones admitted that he
had asked the question attributed to him by Overstreet, but
explained that the two were close friends and he regarded
it simply as a friendly conversation. King told Jones that he
must not discuss the Union with any employee, either on or
off the job. Jones has not thereafter done so.19
Contentions and Conclusions
I find and conclude that Respondent independently vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by:
1. Sweeney's statement to Richmond that he knew the
latter was being solicited to sign a card, and if it continued
to let him (Sweeney) know about it so he could take steps
to stop it. Sweeney's statement obviously had the effect of
requiring Richmond to declare himself with respect to the
Union and his activity in support thereof; conduct which
the Board has uniformly held to be coercive and violative
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Certain-teed Products Corpora-
tion, 153 NLRB 495, 507 ; Beiser Aviation Corporation, 135
NLRB 399, 400, and cases there cited. That Richmond vol-
unteered that he was opposed to the Union is immaterial.
Having found that it was Sweeney, and not Richmond, who
initiated the conversation in which they engaged , and the
complete lack of evidence that would constitute any basis
for Sweeney to believe that Richmond was being harassed
to sign a card, there can be no merit to Respondent's con-
tention that Sweeney merely acted to protect Richmond
from being harassed on the job, assuming arguendo, that
such would , under appropriate facts , be a defense.20
it This finding is based on the testimony of Overstreet . Jones admitted this
conversation with Overstreet , but claimed they had been friends for years
and he regarded this as nothing more than a confidential conversation be-
tween two close friends.
is The findings regarding the conversation between King and Overstreet
are based on a composite of their testimony which is uncontradicted
i9 The findings in this regard are based on composite of the credited
testimony of King and Jones
20 Although Jones' inquiry of Overstreet as to how many employees had
signed union cards was coercive and, under normal circumstances, would
2. In the prior case involving Respondent (185 NLRB
817), the Board held that Respondent's rule concerning so-
licitation then in effect (as it appeared at p. 27 of G.C. Exh.
3), was overly broad and hence violative of Section 8(a)(l)
of the Act, in that its effect was to prohibit union solicitation
in the plant by employees during their nonwork time. Al-
though Respondent posted the notice required by the
Board's prior Order," the rule itself remained in effect, and
indeed was republished verbatim on June 16. See General
Counsel's Exhibit 4, pp. 16-17. As the republished rule like
the prior rule did not inform employees that they were free
to engage in union solicitation in the plant during their
nonwork time , it to that extent infringed upon the exercise
by employees of their Section 7 rights and therefore violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing
Company, 138 NLRB 615; Firestone Synthetic, 185 NLRB
817; WIPO, Inc., 199 NLRB No. 11. That there has been
no showing the republished rule was ever invoked by Re-
spondent to prohibit union solicitation is irrelevant . It is the
existence of the overly broad rule which constitutes the
interference with the organizational rights of employees.
Leece-Nevelle Company, 159 NLRB 293, 298, enfd. 396 F.2d
773 (C.A. 5, 1968). Nor can I agree with Respondent's con-
tention that the notice posted by Respondent in accordance
with the requirements of the Board 's Order in the prior case
removed any confusion in the minds of the employees as to
the meaning and effect of the republished rule. Rather, I
agree with the General Counsel that this is not a case of an
ambiguity in the rule; it is plainly unlawful on its face for
the reason heretofore stated . And even assuming that the
notice to employees which Respondent posted as required
by the Board's Order might properly be regarded, for the
period it was posted , as negating the unlawful effect of the
rule, that notice was removed and thereafter , on June 16, a
new rule , unlawful on its face, was republished . In this
posture, the employees had every right to assume that the
rule, as published in the revised handbook , governed their
activity. As that rule imposed presumptively unlawful re-
strictions upon union activity, and the presumption not
being rebutted by a showing of some business necessity for
the rule, it follows that by publishing and maintaining in
effect its aforementioned rule, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. I so find and conclude.
I further find and conclude that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act when it discharged Hooten
on February 1 and Holder on February 2.
Considering first the discharge of Hooten , having found
that Hooten was on breaktime when he solicited Vincent to
sign a card, it follows that he was engaged in union and
concerted activity, at a time and place he was lawfully enti-
constitute the interference , restraint, and coercion proscribed by Section
8(a)(l) of the Act , I find and conclude that under the facts here Respondent
has sufficiently disavowed Jones' interrogation of Overstreet to effectively
dissipate any coercion initially inherent therein Cosmodyne Manufacturing
Company, 150 NLRB 96, 100 This seems particularly true in the instant case
when there is no showing by the General Counsel that any other employee
was aware that Jones had interrogated Overstreet as indicated The incident
involving Richmond , above referred to, was wholly disconnected from the
incident involving Overstreet and insufficient to establish that Respondent's
repiudiation of Jones' statement was not in good faith
i As heretofore indicated (fn 7), it would appear that the notice had been
removed by early April 1972
FIRESTONE TEXTILE COMPANY
tied to do so, and his discharge for pursuing that activity
plainly violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Respondent's contention that Hooten was discharged not
for soliciting during his breaktime, but for neglecting his
own work and interfering with Vincent in the performance
of her duties, is unsupported by the record, in view of my
finding, based on the credited testimony of Hooten, that he
did not speak to Vincent outside the break area and did not
follow her about her work area or otherwise interfere with
her work.22
Respondent discharged Holder, I find and conclude, to
rid itself of an employee known to it to be active on behalf
of the Union in the prior as well as the then current union
campaign, and that the incident involving Thomas was
siezed upon in an attempt to obscure the true motive of the
discharge. I reach this conclusion on the totality of the
following considerations:
(a) Holder had worked for Respondent for approximate-
ly 3-1/2 years and admittedly was in all respects a satisfacto-
ry employee.
(b) That Respondent was aware of Holder's activity on
behalf of the Union is made clear not only by the fact, as
the Board found in the prior case, that Holder and another
employee were prevented by Webber from distributing
union literature in a nonwork area of the plant, but prior to
her discharge on February 2, she told Sweeney, Webber,
and King that she was an active supporter of the Union,
solicited fellow employees to sign cards, and had signed
cards in her possession.
(c) Respondent's union animus is made clear not only by
its conduct here and in the prior case, but by the statement
of its counsel on this record that Respondent regards the
union as "bad for the plant and for each employee in
it."23
(d) As I have found, the paper which Sweeney saw
Thomas write upon and hand to Holder was not a union
card, but a slip of paper on which Thomas had written a
name and telephone number.24
(e) Although Holder told Sweeney, Webber, and King
that what Thomas signed was not a union card and had
nothing to do with the Union, the so-called investigation
which Webber and King said they made of this incident was
confined to discussions with higher management of the
Company and its counsel, none of whom had any informa-
tion on what in fact occurred between Holder and Thomas.
Admittedly, no attempt was made to interview Thomas, nor
was disciplinary action of any kind taken against him, not-
withstanding the fact that whatever violation of the rules
Holder may in Respondent's view have been guilty of,
Thomas was guilty of the same infraction.25 The Board has
22 The contrary testimony of Vincent, Elms, and Lykins I have discredited
23 Respondent, of course, is lawfully entitled to entertain such views, but
it does demonstrate its union animus.
24 In this connection it is of significance that Sweeney, in describing the
document he saw Thomas write upon and hand to Holder, referred to it as
this note or card or whatever-[ assumed it was a union card, thus indicating
his uncertainty that the document was in fact a union card
25 Respondent's explanation that it refrained from interviewing Thomas
for fear of being charged with interrogating him in violation of Sec 8(a)(1)
of the Act has all the earmarks of speciousness and evidences its purpose to
deal differently as between two employees engaged in the same transaction
Respondent had no hesitancy whatever in questioning Holder about whether
95
consistently held that an employer's failure to conduct a full
and fair investigation of an employee's alleged misconduct
is evidence of discriminatory intent, especially when viewed
in the light of the employer's union hostility. Norfolk Tallow
Co., Inc., 154 NLRB 1052, 1059; Shell Oil Company v. N L.
R.B., 128 F.2d 206, 207 (C.A. 5, 1942); J. W. Mortell Com-
pany, 168 NLRB, 435, 452, enfd. with modifications 440
F.2d 455, 458 (C.A. 7, 1971).
(f) Industrial Relations Manager Webber's admission
that had Holder in fact done no more than obtain a name
and telephone number from Thomas, Respondent would
not have regarded this as a violation of its rules and would
have taken no action against her. A full and fair investiga-
tion of all the facts, I find and conclude, would have dis-
closed precisely that.
(g) A study of the "staying on the job" rule, as it existed
at the time of this incident, shows that Holder in fact en-
gaged in no conduct that could properly be regarded as a
violation of that rule. In substance, the rule required em-
ployees to be in their work area at all times (except lunch-
breaks and for personal relief), available to perform all
tasks that might be assigned, and not to leave the work area
without notifying a supervisor The evidence here shows
that Holder was in her work area. Her machine was shut
down, and she enlisted the assistance of Thomas, as she was
entitled to do, to tie in the booms preparatory to starting up
the machine. Because Holder was fearful that the lines
might become entangled, thus causing serious problems, she
suggested to Thomas that they suspend and await
Sweeney's return from his meal break, so that the latter
could assist them in getting the beams properly tied in and
starting her machine. It was while so waiting that Holder
had her conversation with Thomas about the truck and
Thomas wrote the name and telephone number on the pa-
per, which incident Sweeney observed. From these facts it
is plain that Holder did nothing proscribed by the rule; she
was in her work area available for work, and was simply
waiting for the arrival of her supervisor to assist in the
necessary tasks to properly put the machine in operation.
While so waiting, neither Holder nor Thomas was actually
engaged in performing work.26
(h) What all this adds up to is that an employee with an
admittedly satisfactory work record is discharged at the
inception of a union campaign of which Respondent had
knowledge, allegedly for violating plant rules, without in-
vestigating whether such a violation in fact occurred with
the uncontradicted evidence showing that she had commit-
ted no offense for which Respondent would impose disci-
pline. This is not the customary and normal reaction of an
she procured Thomas' signature on a union card, and even asked her to
produce the alleged card she got from Thomas , but claims great difficulty in
interviewing Thomas for the purpose of preparing for the trial of this case
what he and Holder were discussing or the nature of the document Sweeney
saw him write upon
26 This fact makes suspect Webber's claim that Holder was discharged for
violation of the "staying on the job" rule, and not for " soliciting ." This is
particularly true in view of Sweeney's testimony that he accused Holder of
getting Thomas to sign a union card on the job, and that he did this because
there is a rule prohibiting soliciting signatures to union cards while on the
job Of course, under Stoddard-Quirk, 138 NLRB 615, absent special circum-
stances not present here , an employee must be accorded the right to solicit
anywhere in the plant subject only to the restriction that it be on nonworking
time Id at 621
96 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employer faced with a situation of this kind. And when
there is added to this the fact that Holder, not once but
twice, was a leading force in the effort to organize the plant,
a result which Respondent admittedly opposes, it is reason-
able to conclude, as I do, that Respondent's reliance upon
its rules " ... is more consistent with antipathy for union
activity than concern over plant rules" (N.L.R.B. v. General
Industries Electronics Company, 401 F.2d 297, 301 (C.A. 8,
1968). Or as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated the same principle in Shattuck Denn Mining Corpora-
tion v . N. L. R B, 362 F 2d 466, 470 (C.A. 9, 1966).
If he [the trier of fact] finds that the stated motive for
a discharge is false, he certainly can infer that there is
another motive. More than that, he can infer that the
motive is one that, the employer desires to conceal-an
unlawful motive-at least where, as in this case, the
surrounding facts tend to reinforce that inference.
In substance, upon consideration of the entire record in
the case, I find and conclude that Holder was discharged
because of her union activity, and that the alleged violation
of plant rules was a pretext seized upon in an attempt to
obscure the true motive for her termination, namely,
Respondent's desire to rid itself of an employee that actively
supported the Union.
But there is yet another and independent reason for find-
ing that Holder's discharge was, under the facts of this case,
unlawful. I have found, notwithstanding Respondent's dis-
claimer, that it in fact acted in reliance upon its rule prohib-
iting solicitation as it appeared at the time at page 27 of
General Counsel's Exhibit 3. Assuming arguendo, that what
Holder got Thomas to sign on February 2 was in fact a
union card and that she did so during her working time, her
discharge for that reason would nonetheless violate the Act,
because, as the Board has held, the rule is overly broad in
that it proscribes solicitation anywhere in the plant even on
an employee's nonworking time. The rule being invalid, as
the Board held in The J. L. Hudson Company, 198 NLRB
No. 19, and again in Miller's Discount Department Stores,
198 NLRB No. 40, reaffirming its prior holding in Greentree
Electronics Corporation, 176 NLRB 919, a discharge based
on a violation of an overly broad no-solicitation rule is
unlawful unless "the employer can establish that the solic-
itation interfered with the employees' own work or that of
other employees, and that this rather than the violation of
the rule was the reason for the discharge," Miller's Discount
Department Stores, supra. Explicating this holding more ful-
ly the Board continued:
A no-solicitation rule is presumptively, and only pre-
sumptively, valid if it is limited to prohibiting solicita-
tion during the time an employee is expected to be
working and not during breaktime, lunchtime, or the
like. Such a rule is valid because it is presumed to be
directed toward, and to have the effect of, preventing
interference with production.
But where a no-solicitation rule goes beyond these
limits, as the present one does, it is an unlawful in-
fringement upon the employees' freedom to solicit their
fellow employees for (or against) union representation.
The rule in such case can provide no justification for
the discharge of an employee who violated it. There-
fore, if an employee is discharged for soliciting in viola-
tion of an unlawful rule, the discharge also is unlawful
unless the employer can establish that the solicitation
interfered with the employees' own work or that of
other employees, and that this rather than violation of
the rule was the reason for the discharge. As we noted
above, no such interference is shown here. Thus the
employee has been discharged for engaging in an activ-
ity protected by the Act, and the violation is plain.
Enforcement of an unlawful rule in this manner is, of
course, a separate further interference with employee
rights.
The Chairman's view appears to be that, because the
employer may in a piesumptively valid way limit solic-
itation, there can be no interference with employees'
rights by discharging them for soliciting on worktime.
The correct view, however, is that any prohibition of
solicitation, by rule or discipline, interferes with em-
ployee rights, and that such interference must-in the
absence of a valid rule-be supported by an affirmative
showing of impairment of production. Reliance on an
invalid rule is, of course, no such showing.
In the instant case Respondent's rule concerning solicita-
tion was plainly over broad, and there is no evidence what-
ever that Holder's conversation with Thomas had any effect
on production. Indeed the uncontradicted evidence is that
Holder and Thomas were not engaged in work at all, but
were standing in the work area awaiting the return of Fore-
man Sweeney to give them proper guidance in starting up
Holder's machine. Under such facts, even assuming arguen-
do that Holder did solicit Thomas to sign a card for the
Union, her discharge for that reason, under the facts here,
was violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I so find
and conclude.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and the entire record
in the case, I state the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By Sweeney's interrogation of Richmond, and by pub-
lishing, maintaining, and enforcing an overly broad rule
prohibiting solicitation in its plant, Respondent interfered
with, coerced, and restrained its employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, and
thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By discriminating against Zoland R. Hooten and Celia
Holder, regarding the wages, hours, and terms and condi-
tions of their employment, to discourage membership in the
Union, Respondent engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
FIRESTONE TEXTILE COMPANY 97
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act, it
will be recommended that it be required to cease and desist
therefrom and to take the affirmative action, set forth be-
low, designed and found necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Having found that Respondent interfered with, coerced,
and restrained its employees in the exercise of their guaran-
teed Section 7 rights and discriminatorily discharged Hoo-
ten and Holder, I conclude from the totality of that
unlawful conduct that Respondent should be required to
cease and desist from in any manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees, N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle
Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532 (C.A. 4, 1941); California Lingerie,
Inc., 129 NLRB 912, 915.
To remedy the discharge of Hooten and Holder, it will be
recommended that it be required to offer them immediate,
full, and unconditional reinstatement to their former or sub-
stantially equivalent jobs, without prejudice to their seniori-
ty or other rights, privileges, or working conditions, and
make each of them whole for any loss of earnings suffered,
respectively, by paying to each a sum of money equal to the
amount each would have earned from the date of discharge,
to the date they are severally reinstated, less any amounts
they may have severally earned as wages during said period.
Such backpay shall be computed in accordance with the
formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB
289, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, as
provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. It
will further be recommended that Respondent be required
to preserve and, upon request, make available to authorized
agents of the Board all records necessary or useful in de-
termining compliance with the Board's Order or in comput-
ing the amount of backpay due.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law
and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section
I0(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 27
Respondent, Firestone Textile Company, a Division of
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, Bowling Green, Ken-
tucky, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating any employee concerning
his sympathies for, or activities on behalf of United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
or any other labor organization.
(b) Publishing, maintaining in effect, enforcing or ap-
plying any plant rule or regulation prohibiting its employees
27 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
from soliciting on behalf of the above-mentioned or any
other labor organization in any area of its plant during their
nonworking time.
(c) Discouraging membership in United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization of its employees, by discharging or
otherwise discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment of its
employees.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed and
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Forthwith rescind and vacate its plant rule, as the
same appears in its employee handbook promulgated on or
about June 16, 1972, to the extent that it prohibits employ-
ees from soliciting on behalf of any labor organization in
any area of its plant during their nonworking time.
(b) Offer Zoland R. Hooten and Celia Holder imme-
diate, full, and unconditional reinstatement to their former
jobs or, if such jobs no longer exist, to a substantially equiv-
alent ones , without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of
earnings suffered by reason of the discirimination against
them, in the manner prescribed in the section hereof entitled
"The Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to author-
ized agents of the National Labor Relations Board, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security
payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary or useful in determining
compliance with this order or in computing the amount of
backpay due as above provided.
(d) Post at its plant in Bowling Green, Kentucky, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 28 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 9 (Cincinnati, Ohio), shall, after being signed by an
authorized representative be posted as herein provided im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and be so maintained for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the aforesaid Regional Director, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Decision, what steps it
has taken to comply herewith 29
28 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
29 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after
exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified by deleting the
word "Decision" and substituting the word "Order."