Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 1, 1970

185 N.L.R.B. 817 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

FIRESTONE SYNTHETIC FIBERS & TEXTILE
Firestone Synthetic Fibers and Textile Company,
Division of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Compa-
ny and United Rubber , Cork, Linoleum and Plastic
Workers of America , AFL-CIO. Cases 9-CA-5226
and 9-CA-5272
October 1, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN AND
JENKINS
On March 17, 1970, Trial Examiner Alba B. Martin
issued his Decision in this proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging
in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. He further found that the
Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mended that such allegations be dismissed. Thereafter,
the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examin-
er's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are here-
by affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts
the findings, conclusions,' and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner, as modified herein.
We do not adopt the Trial Examiner 's finding that Respondent
violated Sec 8(a)(1) by its propaganda through use of letters and a
montage concerning strikes, by Foreman Sculley's conversation with
employee Wanda Beckner on June 7, 1969, described in par III, A,
4, d, of his Decision , or by Department Manager Lovinggood's query
to employee Stiles as to when the Union was supposed to have an
election
Member Brown would affirm the Trial Examiner 's findings, respecting
the letters and newspaper montage
Chairman Miller would not find the wage increase on July 7, 1969,
or the announcements relating thereto , to violate Sec 8 (a)(1), in view
of the pattern of wage increases in both the Bowling Green and Gastonia
plants . Nor would he find a violation with respect to the employer's
conversation with Wanda Beckner on June 9, 1969 The Trial Examiner's
finding of an 8(a)( 1) violation on the basis of statements "that the
employees would get no miracles if the Union got in, and that the
Union people would lie to her," in the Chairman 's opinion , ignored
the free speech guaranties of the Constitution and of Sec 8 (c) of the
Act The alleged interrogation occurred in a context where both the
employer and employee were engaging in a free and open exchange
of views and mutual accusations , and where the employee was an articulate
union supporter In the Chairman's view , questions asked and freely
ORDER
817
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board hereby adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and orders
that the Respondent, Firestone Synthetic Fibers and
Textile Company, Division of the Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company, Bowling Green, Kentucky, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order,' as herein modified:
1. Delete paragraph 1(a) and renumber the present
paragraphs 1(b) through 1(i) as 1(a) through 1(h),
respectively.
2. Substitute for paragraph 1(k) the following as
paragraph 1(j):
"(j) Interrogating employees concerning what the
Union could do for or had promised employees, and
concerning how much money they expect to get
through the Union."
3. Renumber present paragraph 1(1) as 1(k).
4. Delete the fifth indented paragraph and the
last indented paragraph of the Notice to Employees.
answered in this context do not constitute the type of interrogation
which can properly be construed as illegal interference with employee
rights
Par 2(a) of the Order is hereby amended by deleting the language
preceding the words "equivalent positions" and substituting therefor,
"Offer to Billy D Smith, Regina Sneed , and Edward Lee Milton immediate
and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions , ", and the first paragraph
of the Appendix is hereby amended to conform with the changed language
of the Order
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDING
ALBA B MARTIN, Trial Examiner This consolidated
proceeding, with all parties represented, was heard before
me in Bowling Green, Kentucky, on October 14, 15, and
16, 1969.' The proceeding involves alleged violations of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, 29 U S.C. Sec. 151, et seq., herein called
the Act After the hearing the General Counsel and
Respondent filed helpful briefs, which have been duly consid-
ered. Upon the entire record and my observation of the
witnesses I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Firestone Synthetic Fibers and Textiles Company, Divi-
sion of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, herein
' The Union filed the charge in Case 9-CA-5226 on June 16, 1969,
and filed the charge in Case 9-CA-5272 on July 30, 1969
185 NLRB No. 118
818 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
called Respondent, is a Delaware corporation engaged at
its plant in Bowling Green, Kentucky, the plant herein
involved, in the manufacture of textiles During the calendar
year prior to the issuance of the complaint on September
10, 1969, a representative period, Respondent had a direct
outflow in interstate commerce of its products valued in
excess of $50,000 which it sold and caused to be shipped
directly from its plant in Bowling Green, Kentucky, to
customers outside the State of Kentucky. I find that
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the
Act to exercise jurisdiction herein.
Ii. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers
of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
1. Threats of strike and loss of jobs
Respondent's operations at the Bowling Green plant com-
menced in January 1968 and began to achieve some volume
in about April 1968. The Union's organizational campaign
began in early 1968 and continued at least until the election
on July 23 and 24, 1969 The Union lost the election
153 to 187. Its objections had not been ruled upon at
the time of the hearing herein (Case 9-RC-8140).
Respondent's consistent position to employees was that
it was opposed to the Union. As early as July 1968 Plant
Manager Galligan told assembled employees, "It is . .
our intention to oppose these unions and by every lawful
and proper means to prevent either of them' from coming
in here."
As the election approached, in July 1969 Respondent
sent employees a montage of newspaper clippings and pic-
tures concerning strikes; five pages consisting of 23 questions
and answers, 9 of which related to the subject of strikes,
and four letters, three of which referred to strikes. This
propaganda was filled with dire consequences of strikes
to employees, including loss of jobs, income, violence, and
many other frightening ideas. One letter said, "Pulling
you out on STRIKE is the only way URW can try to
force Firestone to do anything it is not already willing
to do." Respondent's manager of industrial relations, Rich-
ard Webber, testified that Respondent's position, expressed
to employees, was that Respondent could not grant the
benefits being promised by the Union, that the consequences
of the Union's becoming the bargaining agent would be
strikes and violence.
In a talk to employees 2 days before the election Galligan
said, among other things, that this was a textile plant,
not a rubber plant, and that Respondent would pay only
the wages paid in the textile industry He said, "Unions'
' At that time another union was also trying to sign up employees
mean strikes. As with wars, everybody loses in a strike.
At the very least, strikes can mean the loss of jobs and
paychecks, often including violence, bloodshed, broken
homes, property damage, hatred, bitterness and loss of
friends."
The record contained no suggestion that as the election
approached a possible strike, economic or otherwise, was
being discussed by union organizers, among the employees,
or rumored in the plant Thus it appears beyond a doubt
that in introducing and repeating the thought during the
preelection period that unions mean strikes, and that strikes
result in loss of jobs and other dire consequences, economic
and otherwise, Respondent was intentionally threatening
employees with loss of their jobs rather than merely abstract-
ly instructing them in the consequences of an economic
strike Respondent's propaganda was not in answer to any
real threat of a strike, but was designed to frighten the
employees away from the Union and to defeat the Union
at the election. This activity was a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Cf. Orkin Exterminating Company of
Florida, Inc., 152 NLRB 83, enfd. 379 F.2d 972 (C.A.
5); Hoffman-Taff Inc., 135 NLRB 1319, 1321. Further,
by informing the employees that calling a strike was the
only way the Union could try to force Respondent to
do anything it was not already willing to do was an act
reasonably calculated to create an atmosphere of futility
about the Union in employees' minds and to discourage
support for the Union among employees. By such message
of futility Respondent further interfered with, restrained,
and coerced employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights,
and thereby further violated Section 8(a)(1).
In Galligan's talk to employees 2 days before the election
he told the employees that the union organizers were
there simply because the Union wanted their money, one
of the Union's first demands would be a checkoff, "an
arrangement by which the Union takes a slice of every
member's pay check before he or she ever gets it"; "unions
need money to run organizing campaigns, to call strikes,
to finance elaborate meetings in posh resorts. .."; and
"fines against members also produce union income and
help control members who might dare oppose union dictated
policies." Among many other things Galligan also said,
"Union bosses have to justify their existence to their mem-
bers. Consequently, they thrive on trouble. . . When
there is no trouble, unions will stir up some. When no
grievances exist, they will create some. If grievances are
small, they will magnify them. . . when management
and employees may have enjoyed good relations in the
past, the union strives to come between the two and break
down that relationship "
In his letter to employees of July 11, 1969, Galligan
said, among other things, "Most of the money for dues
goes to the International Union . . . for salaries,
conventions in Miami, Florida, etc. This is why the
International URW spends all this money to keep salaried
paid organizers in Bowling Green for months "
2. Respondent's no-solicitation rule
In its handbook for employees Respondent sets forth
its rule concerning solicitations. It permits and encourages
FIRESTONE SYNTHETIC FIBERS & TEXTILE
one solicitation per year for contributions to the United
Fund. It permits, "outside of regular working hours," collec-
tions for sick or injured employees and for flowers for
"the sick or deceased, etc." The rule then says, "The
Company has found it to be to your advantage to limit
solicitations and collections to those in which you and
your Company have a real interest." The entire record
makes it clear that the Company did not consider this
latter phrase as including solicitation for the Union.
The effect of this rule is to bar union solicitations by
employees in the plant on employees' nonwork time; and
to the extent that it does this the rule infringes upon
the exercise of Section 7 rights, Respondent thereby further
violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act Stoddard-Quirk Manu-
facturing Co., 138 NLRB 615
3 Interrogations and threats by top management
On June 9, 1969, the Monday after the discharge of
Regina Sneed the previous Friday considered below,
Respondent summoned Wanda Beckner, a sister of Sneed,
into Galligan's office, where she remained for 2 hours,
most of which was consumed in a discussion about the
Union.
Respondent summoned Beckner to warn her not to threat-
en other employees. On Saturday, the day after her sister's
discharge, Beckner had threatened to black both the eyes
of Helen Lawrence, an employee, if Lawrence caused Beck-
ner to be fired Beckner told Lawrence she thought Lawrence
"got" her sister fired, and she thought Lawrence was report-
ing to management that Sneed and Beckner were working
for the Union. By Lawrence's behavior Beckner suspected
this
Galligan indicated to Beckner that he knew about her
threat to Lawrence and warned Beckner not to threaten
employees anywhere, in the plant or on a street corner.
Beckner burst into tears. Galligan assured her he had
called her in to reprimand her but not to discharge her.
Beckner challenged their right to control her actions away
from the plant.
Beckner told Galligan and Webber that she thought
they fired her sister because of the Union. They did not
deny this statement, but Galligan said that why Sneed
was fired was none of Beckner's business, that Beckner
should just mind her own business, work, and keep her
mouth shut.
Galligan told Beckner he had looked at her record and
her previous jobs and noted that she had a family to
support including a disabled husband and five or six child-
ren. He pointed out she was earning more here than ever
before and asked her if she wasn't satisfied with her pay
or her job.
According to the credited testimony of Beckner, a credible
witness, Galligan asked her if she had ever worked for
the Union before, and she replied in the negative. He
said that he didn't think the Union would do the employees
any good, and that the employees should not expect any
miracles if the Union came in because they would not
get them. Beckner said she thought the Union would win
by 85 percent. Galligan asked her how she knew the Union
was going to win. She replied, "By the cards we've got
819
signed " Galligan said, "Don't you know people will sign
cards to get you off their back?" Beckner replied, "Don't
you know that people are scared to sign cards but will
vote for the Union?" Galligan asked Beckner how she
knew about the Union. She replied, from employees and
from meetings she had attended, and because Ottis Smith,
the union representative, had told her about it Galligan
replied that Smith and the union people would lie to
her '
During the 2 hours Webber told Beckner that the Union
could do no good, that if the Union came in there would
be strikes, shootings, rock throwings, and people will be
out of jobs and have no money to live on Webber said
that he didn't care if they went on strike, that he could
buy the material for just a little bit more than he could
make it, but that the employees would be out of jobs
and without income.
Beckner was so upset during this 2-hour session with
top management that she was sent to the company doctor,
who gave her a "nerve pill."
Galligan and Webber both admitted that prior to calling
Beckner in they knew she actively supported the Union.
Under all the circumstances of this case and this interview,
Galligan's interrogations concerning the Union-how she
knew about it, how she knew the Union was going to
win, whether she had ever worked for the Union before,
didn't she know employees would sign cards just to get
the Union off their backs-together with Galligan' s state-
ments that the employees would get no miracles if the
Union got in, and that the union people would lie to
her, reasonably tended to interfere with, restrain, and coerce
employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights, Respondent
thereby violating Section 8(a)(1). In addition, Webber's
raising the specter of strikes and violence and loss of
jobs when there was no evidence the employees were consid-
ering striking, amounted, under all the circumstances of
this case, to a threat of discharge because of union activity,
Respondent thereby further violating Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
4. Interrogations and threats by lower management
a. Employee Ronald Stiles, who by his demeanor
impressed me as a credible witness, credibly testified that
on about May 3, 1969, he was called off his job into
the plant office by Foremen Barney Jones and Joe Madison,
and questioned about his union activities Stiles was a
group leader' and a member of the Union's organizing
committee in the plant. Foreman Madison said that if
the Union came in the Company would move the plant,
that all Firestone had invested at the plant "was the beams
in the beam room and a Dodge pickup truck out front."
Madison asked Stiles what he thought the Union could
do for the employees. Foreman Jones asked Stiles how
' Galligan denied saying anything to Beckner about the Union Webber's
testimony confirmed that the Union was discussed Upon the entire
record I credit Beckner's testimony
' Respondent called the classification section supervisor or group leader
No one contended otherwise , and the record showed that this classification
did not have the characteristics of and was not that of a supervisor
within the meaning of the Act
820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
much money Stiles expected to get, and, when Stiles replied
with a figure, offered to bet Stiles a $10 bill that he
would never get that much here.
As a witness Foreman Madison stated it was a well-
known fact that Firestone could move out of Bowling
Green, and that he told Stiles on this occasion not that
the Company would move but that it could move if the
Union came in. Madison added that no one higher in
management than he ever told him the Company would
move if the Union was voted in.
Whether Madison said "would" or "could," his expressed
threat of the plant 's actual or possible closing amounted
to a threat of possible dire economic consequences to
employees because of their union activities, Respondent
thereby further violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Also,
interrogating Stiles as to what he thought the Union could
do for employees and how much money he expected to
get through the Union, under all the circumstances herein,
reasonably tended to interfere with, restrain, and coerce
employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights, Respondent
thereby further violating Section 8(a)(1).
Stiles credibly testified that on May 7, 1969, he was
called into the office of the department manager, Loving-
good, and asked how he liked his job, whether he had
any grievances, and when the Union was supposed to
have an election. Lovinggood admitted the first part of
this conversation but denied asking Stiles when the election
was to be. He admitted knowing Stiles was for the Union.
Under all the circumstances of this proceeding, as well
as on credibility grounds, I credit Stiles' testimony and
hold that by interrogating Stiles as to when the election
would be Respondent further reasonably tended to interfere
with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of
Section 7 rights, Respondent thereby further violating Sec-
tion 8(a)(1).
Stiles further testified, credibly in my judgment, and
without contradiction, that Madison and Jones often called
him off his job and interrogated him concerning his union
activities and the union organization; such interrogations
further reasonably tending to interfere with, restrain, and
coerce employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights,
Respondent thereby further violating Section 8(a)(1).
b. Employee Roger Crowder credibly and without contra-
diction testified that on July 17, 1969, his foreman, Madison,
came over to him while Crowder was working at the
loom and asked him what his opinion was about the Union
Madison did not deny this interrogation. On the entire
record I find that by this interrogation Respondent further
violated Section 8(a)(1).
c. Foreman Larry Moore admitted that he was "strictly
against the Union," that he told his view to everybody
who asked, that he may have brought up the subject of
the Union because discussing the Union was "just a frequent
thing," and that "I knew just about how everyone of
mine was going to vote in the election" He had about
14 to 16 employees under him, about half of whom were
women.
According to the uncontradicted testimony of Linda Aus-
brooks, who worked under Foreman Moore, in October
1968 prior to the 10(b) period, Moore told her he had
learned she was working for the Union and warned her
that she had better be careful because if the Company
found out she would be fired. Also prior to the 10(b)
period, in about November 1968, Moore asked Ausbrooks
why she was for the Union.
Ausbrooks credibly testified and Moore partially admitted
that about February 19, 1969, Moore called Ausbrooks
into the plant office and said to her and another employee,
Janice Ray, that if the Union came in there might be
a strike and we would be out of work and it would
hurt us all He said Firestone didn't owe Bowling Green
anything and it could just move away if it wanted to.
About March 1, Ausbrooks and Ray talked to some
girls in the restroom about signing up for the Union.
Upon their return Foreman Moore called them in, said
he had heard they had been talking about the Union,
and that he didn't want to hear them talking about it
anymore
A few days later another employee, Barbara Crown,
admitted to Ausbrooks that she had informed on them
Crown said Foreman Moore had promised her a daytime
job. Ausbrooks then asked Moore how Crown could have
a daytime job when she had worked at the plant only
2 or 3 weeks. Moore said he didn't know anything about
it. Ausbrooks said Crown had told them about it in the
bathroom Moore replied that he had told them he didn't
want to hear any more about the Union, and if he did
he was going to speak to Mr. Posey (the department manag-
er) or Dick Webber.
About 5 n inutes before Ausbrooks went to vote in the
election on July 23, 1969, Foreman Moore asked her what
the Union had promised it could do for her
Moore's version of these conversations was that he warned
Ausbrooks against absenting herself from the job and inter-
fering with others trying to sign them up during working
hours. In view of Moore's admissions, his antiunion stance,
in view of his pre-10(b) warning to Ausbrooks, and as
he refused to give Ausbrooks satisfaction about his conversa-
tion with Crown, I believe that Moore was not confining
his warning to what Ausbrooks was doing on worktime
but was referring to her prounion talk and solicitation
generally.
Upon the above facts and considerations and the entire
record I hold that Respondent further violated Section
8(a)(1): By Foreman Moore's threats that if the Union
came in there might be a strike and they would be out
of work, that Firestone could move away, that he didn't
want to hear Ausbrooks and Ray talking about the Union
anymore and that if he did he was going to higher manage-
ment; and also by Foreman Moore's interrogation of Aus-
brooks as to what the Union had promised it could do
for her
d While Wanda Beckner was working about June 7,
1969, Foreman Stanley Sculley came up to her machine
and asked her how her job was going. She asked him
if he knew her sister had been fired the day before He
replied in the negative. Somehow the Union came into
the conversation. Sculley asked her what the Union could
do for her that the Company couldn't. She replied, "For
one thing they could give us job security, which we don't
FIRESTONE SYNTHETIC FIBERS & TEXTILE
have now." Beckner testified that her sister had been fired
the day before and that she was nervous, a fact which
scarcely could have escaped the notice of Foreman Sculley.
Under all the circumstances of this proceeding I find that
Sculley's interrogation amounted to a further violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Respondent.
e. In early May 1969, Foreman James Sweeney and
Billy Smith were talking about their work. According to
Smith's credited and uncontradicted testimony, Sweeney
brought up the subject of the Union, saying that Foreman
Barney Jones, under whom Smith had recently worked,
told Sweeney that someone had seen Smith at a union
meeting the other day, and that Jones was surprised and
shocked that Smith was a union member Sweeney asked
if Smith was still a union member and going to meetings
and Smith replied in the affirmative. Sweeney warned Smith
to be careful. In July 1968, before he was promoted to
foreman in January 1969, Sweeney had been influential
in getting Smith to sign a union card, and they were
still friends.
Later in May Sweeney came up to Smith as the latter
was fishing at a reservoir in the county and asked him
if he knew an employee named Blankenship and whether
or not he was a member of the Union Smith replied
that he knew him, but could not say whether or not
he was a member of the Union.
Smith credibly testified that although he and Sweeney
were still friends, he wasn't certain what Sweeney's motive
was in the above conversations, whether Sweeney was talking
to him as a representative of management or as a friend,
and that he thought Sweeney was "talking to me as a
Company man." Under all the circumstances and upon
the entire record, I hold that Sweeney's warning about
Jones' reaction and his interrogations as to whether Smith
and Blankenship were union members amounted to a threat
and interrogations in further violation of Section 8(a)(1)
f. On July 9, 2 weeks before the election, Foreman
Hatcher told employee Carlos Lloyd he wanted to talk
to him about the Union; that he was going to try to
talk to "everyone" before the election. Hatcher said the
Company would appreciate a "NO" vote. Hatcher asked
Lloyd how he liked the job he was then on. Lloyd was
then replacing the group leader who was on vacation.
Hatcher said, "Well, I just want you to know" that the
next opening they had for a leadman's job he would do
his best to get Lloyd in Hatcher told Lloyd, as he had
told him before, that his attendance record would have
to improve if he was to get promoted.
It seems to me, and I conclude, that in this short conversa-
tion Foreman Hatcher was intentionally trying to convey
to Lloyd the idea that if he voted against the Union
he would be more apt to get promoted to group leader,
and that Lloyd reasonably could have so understood Hatch-
er's words. Upon the entire record I conclude that Hatcher's
words amounted to an implied promise of benefit to an
employee in order to defeat the Union at the election,
Respondent thereby further violating Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
g. Respondent appeared to have contended that it was
not responsible for any violative actions of its foremen
because they were inexperienced in industry, some had
821
recently been farmers , and they had been given some precau-
tionary advice by Respondent 's counsel . The Board's test
is whether these threats and interrogations reasonably tended
to interfere with , restrain , and coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act;'
and as has been found above, here they did
5. Barring distributions in breezeway
Respondent prohibits the distribution of union literature
in the "breezeway," a glass-sided passageway between the
plant and the administration building. Entering and exiting
employees pass through the breezeway at shift change,
which is the only time the breezeway is ever crowded.
Webber asserted, as the reason, that the breezeway was
heavily traveled at shift time and that there was substantial
littering around the property and Respondent thought it
was necessary to control it. He did not say there had
been littering in the breezeway Plant Manager Galligan
testified the reason for the prohibition was because of
danger to employees because some employees go through
the breezeway at shift change wearing on their jeans and
belts the knives and scissors they use on their jobs
Wanda Beckner credibly testified that a Burns guard
once stopped her and Celia Holder from making a union
distribution in the breezeway, saying they were littering
in the breezeway. Once Webber stopped Beckner and Hold-
er, saying they were littering when they were not. Webber
told them to get off the company premises and hand
out the union literature where they wouldn't litter.
Despite the prohibition these two employees passed out
leaflets in the breezeway twice when they were not stopped.
Galligan said the breezeway was 4-feet wide, but Beckner
credibly testified the breezeway was wide enough to hold
leaflets out at arm's-length for employees to take as they
passed through. Beckner and Holder left after all the outgo-
ing shift had passed ahead of them and Beckner saw no
leaflets lying around in the breezeway or elsewhere.
When the Union first asked Webber's permission to
pass out literature in early June 1969, Webber prohibited
the distribution of union handbills anywhere on company
property. After the union representative got in touch with
the Union's general counsel in Akron, Ohio, the Company
permitted employee distributions in the cafeteria, locker-
rooms, and other nonworking areas including the parking
lot, but still the local management barred -distributions
in the breezeway and so instructed the guards. Distribution
in the breezeway was not shown to have actually caused
littering, and in any case it caused no littering in production
areas and raised no hazard to production. It caused no
discipline problem. It didn't interfere with the work of
the employees making the distributions or of the exiting
or entering employees who were not then working. Galligan's
asserted reason for the prohibition was unconvincing since
no one was shown ever to have been injured in the breeze-
way. The entire record, including the discharge of Milton
' Kalmar Laboratories, Inc, 159 NLRB 805, 809, and cases cited
in fn 3, enfd. 387 F 2d 833, (C A 7), Russell-Newman Mfg Co,
Inc, 153 NLRB 1312, 1315, Cannon Electric Company, 151 NLRB
1465,1469
822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for trying to pass out leaflets in the breezeway (see below)
and the other discriminatory discharges , proved that
Respondent 's prohibition was not to protect Respondent's
legitimate property interests , but rather to obstruct the
employees ' statutory right of self-organization , and that
Respondent has forfeited any immunity it may otherwise
have had in this regard Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing
Co., 138 NLRB 615 , particularly footnote 8; N.L.R.B.
v. Stowe Spinning Company, et al., 336 US 226, 230-
233; N.L. R.B. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, 351
U.S.105 , 111, footnote 4. Upon the entire record I hold
that the imposition and enforcement of this prohibition
was a further violation by Respondent of Section 8(a)(1).
6. The wage increase and changes in group insurance
After the filing of the petition in Case 9-RC-8140 on
May 1, 1969, Respondent put into effect an improved
group insurance' plan for employees and dependents on
June 1 and a 6-1/2 percent wage increase on June 7
The wage increase was announced to employees in a bulletin
board notice in early June The improved insurance plan
was announced to employees in an employee newsletter
dated June 6, 1969, reading in part as follows:
GROUP INSURANCE
For some time we have been studying revisions
in our employee-family group insurance program. I
am pleased to announce that on Sunday, June 1, 1969
substantial increases were placed into effect in your
group insurance. A complete listing of these benefits
is attached for your comparison of the new and old
plans
Many of you are hearing the sweet song of promises
by a Union. Perhaps some are listening. These increases
give us an over all package superior to that of any
Union Plant in this area. It shows what can be gained
for employees when there is no Union in the plant.
Most importantly, the increases can be put into effect
immediately and this would not be possible if a Union
were in
In his letter dated July 11, 1969, Galligan wrote to employ-
ees:
Substantial wage increases were put into effect in
July last year, and again in July this year.This follows
the pattern in Firestone Textile Plants for a number
of years Firestone expects to pay the highest wages,
compared with the Textile industry generally, and the
Bowling Green area in particular.
In the questions and answers sent employees by the Compa-
ny on July 17, appears the following:
Question: Do I need URW to get wage increases
and fringe benefits?
Answer: No. Firestone-Bowling Green put in gener-
ous wage increases in July 1968 and July this year,
just as is their pattern . . We have the best
' This included life insurance, accidental death and dismemberment,
weekly accident and sickness benefits , hospital expense , surgical expense,
in- hospital doctor calls , and a pension plan
insurance plan in the Bowling Green area Our wages
may not be up to Louisville and the big cities, but they
are sure among the best in the Bowling Green
area. . . We get along okay in the plant without
much trouble, and don't have Union bosses and Union
stewards interfering or "rolling" us off our jobs.
In his letter to employees dated July 21, 1969, Galligan
wrote-
We can all be proud of the wage increases put
into effect in July of last year, and again in July
of this year Your Group Life, Health, and Hospital
benefits are the highest in the Bowling Green area-
Union or non-union. All of this you have without
Union Strikes, Union Dues, and Union seniority for
officers above other employees
Richard Webber testified that the improvements in the
employees' insurance plan were made to keep up with
recent rate changes at the county hospital in Bowling
Green and also to bring the benefits at Bowling Green
up to those at Respondent's affiliated textile plant at Gasto-
nia, North Carolina. As early as November 1968 Webber
drew up a written comparison of the benefits at the two
plants. Respondent offered no explanation for instituting
the changes on June 1, 1969, except that higher corporate
authority approved them and they were then put into
effect without delay. Webber testified the union campaign
and the anticipated election had nothing to do with the
granting of or the timing of the changes
The affiliated Gastonia plant had given employees a
wage increase in August 1955, October 1956, February
1959, 1960, and 1962, November 1963, September 1964,
July 15, 1965, June 6, 1966, and September 4, 1967. Both
the Bowling Green and the Gastonia plants gave raises
on July 15, 1968, and July 7, 1969. Respondent pictured
itself as being in an area where textiles are the predominant
industry and as giving the 1968 and 1969 raises to fall
in line with raises given by other textile plants. It contended
the union movement and anticipated election had nothing
to do with the granting of or timing of the 1969 increase.
Respondent announced the insurance change and the
wage increase a few days after the representation case
hearing, and in its antiunion propaganda between then
and the election Respondent emphasized that only the
Company was responsible for granting the employees these
improvements and that the Union had nothing to do with
it. Rather than delay the announcements until after the
election Respondent made them after the representation
case hearing and when the election was foreseeable and
then made maximum use of the improved benefits to defeat
the Union at the election. The previous year the raise
had been given in July, and some years Gastonia had
given raises in August, September, and October. In view
of these facts and considerations, in view of Respondent's
hostility to the Union, and upon the entire record considered
as a whole, I find and hold that Respondent timed and
used the announcements of the changes for the purpose
of defeating the Union at the election ind that under
all the circumstances the timing and use of these announce-
ments reasonably tended to interfere with, restrain, and
coerce employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights,
FIRESTONE SYNTHETIC FIBERS & TEXTILE
Respondent thereby further violating Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act
7 Galligan not spying
The General Counsel contended, but failed to prove,
that Plant Manager Galligan spied on those attending a
union meeting by parking in the parking lot outside The
testimony of the General Counsel's witness, Roger Crowder,
on this matter showed that Crowder had doubts as to
whether it was really Galligan whom he saw there; and
by his demeanor when he was denying he was there Galligan
impressed me that he was telling the truth.
8. Webber did not create impression of surveillance
Beginning about a week before the election a number
of employees began to wear union T-shirts to work. Roger
Crowder testified that one day shortly after they began
wearing them Webber was standing at the plant door at
change of shift with a pad of paper and a pen "and
as they went in, it looked like he wrote something down."
Webber's office was near the plant entrance and he was
frequently in that area. He credibly testified that he made
no list of employees wearing T-shirts, and that since the
wearing of the T-shirts just before the election was a
"semi-sensational proposition" he made a particular effort
to stay away from the area of the door at shift changes
so as not "to dignify or appear to react in any way to
this thing." Upon this evidence and as I believe Webber
was testifying truthfully on this point, I find that Webber
did not make a list of employees wearing T-shirts and
did not create the impression of engaging in surveillance.
B. The Discharges
1 The discharge of Billy D. Smith
Billy Smith was a satisfactory employee during his 11
months' employment with Respondent. He was hired in
July 1968, and between then and his discharge June 7,
1969, he received six pay raises and was promoted to
a group leader. He was never reprimanded in connection
with his work.
Smith joined the Union in July 1968 at the suggestion
of James Sweeney, who was then his group leader. Smith
persuaded some 20 others to sign union cards. Sweeney
became a foreman in January 1969.
As has been seen above, in early May 1969 Foreman
Sweeney warned Smith to be careful about his union activi-
ties
On May 23 and 24, 1969, on behalf of the employees
Smith spoke up to management about alleged errors in
the paychecks of the three employees for whom he was
the leadman. These men had complained to Smith that
their checks were too low. This grievance ultimately engaged
the attention and the displeasure of all or most of the
top management in the plant Smith grieved to his foreman,
Sweeney, about it three times, to Foreman Barney Jones
twice. As he was talking with Sweeney about it the third
time the department manager, Vernon Lovinggood, came
823
into the plant office where they were and asked him what
his trouble was. Smith told him. Lovinggood replied that if
Smith didn't have anything wrong on his check he should
return to his work section and mind his own business, that
the matter did not concern him Smith obeyed the order
About an hour later, on May 24, Smith was called
to the plant office, where he found himself with Foremen
Jones and Sweeney, Department Manager Lovinggood, the
three employees concerned, and also Claude Smith,
Respondent's production manager The latter explained to
Smith and the three employees that their checks were
correct and the basis upon which their wages had been
calculated The men thanked him and returned to their
work That ended the grievance.
After lunch that day Plant Manager Galligan summoned
Smith to his office to discuss the matter Smith testified
Galligan opened the discussion with the accusatory ques-
tions, "What are you trying to do out there? Divide them
up? . . . Can't they talk for themselves?" Galligan
testified he opened the discussion by asking Smith "why he
was dissatisfied with the job, with his pay, or what was the
situation." Both testified that during the conversation
Smith explained that the men were afraid to talk to
management about the matter. Galligan pointed out that
Smith was being paid at the rate of a group leader and that
what the men in his group were receiving was none of his
business. Smith contended it was his business Galligan said
the men should take the complaint up with their foreman,
who would take it up with higher management. Smith
testified that during the interview Plant Manager Galligan
said that if Smith thought he could "find better pay some
place else why, why don't you just leave" Galligan's
version of this idea was that Galligan said if Smith was
dissatisfied why didn't he go some place else.
On May 27 Sthith attended the representation case hearing
and sat with the Union's representative and the Union's
lawyers. Richard Webber, manager of industrial relations,
was present representing the Company.
For a few minutes during the evening of Thursday,
May 29, Smith engaged the supply room attendant, John
Thomas, in a conversation about the Union, urging him
to vote for the Union if he became eligible to vote. Thomas,
who was the husband of Webber's secretary, went to Webber
the following Monday, June 3, and related this conversation
to Webber and signed a statement Webber wrote up about
it. On June 7 Webber discharged Smith, allegedly for violat-
ing a company rule when he was talking with Thomas
Webber testified that he "got the facts" concerning the
Smith-Thomas incident and "discussed the matter at
length." He said, "We discussed the matter fully internally."
He said the procedure is to fill out a report and have
it approved by Plant Manager Galligan. In the discharge
interview Webber told Smith that he had heard that Smith
had had a little run-in with Galligan and that Smith was
not happy "with the way things are run here." From
these facts I conclude that Galligan was the person, or
one of them, with whom Webber discussed the matter
at length, "the matter" being whether to discharge Smith.
Webber's "investigation" did not include discussing
Smith's alleged rule breaking with Smith. Webber admitted
824 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
on the witness stand that the decision to discharge Smith
had been made before he called Smith into his office for
the terminal interview. Thus the decision was made without
giving Smith a chance to make any explanation concerning
the incident
As it appears in the employee handbook the rule involved,
entitled "Staying on the Job," provides that employees
are to remain on their job during scheduled working hours
and when leaving their "machine or work area for anything
other than personal relief' they are supposed to notify
their supervisor.
In July 1968 Plant Manager Galligan assembled employ-
ees and stated, among other things:
As in all other matters not related to your work,
Union organizing activities will not be allowed on
the job. Anybody who carries on such activities and
thereby neglects his other work, or interferes with
the work of others, will be subject to discharge
Respondent did not give Smith any written statement
as to the reason for the discharge, but it appears from
Respondent's testimony that the discharge was allegedly
because Smith had left his work area but not because
he had allegedly interfered with the work of John Thomas
Webber testified that in the terminal interview he told
Smith he had violated the "staying on the job" rule, but
Webber's testimony includes no statement that Thomas
told Webber or Webber told Smith that Smith interfered
with Thomas' work.
Smith had not in fact interfered with Thomas' work.
Thomas testified that when Smith came up "I presume
I was doing nothing just minding the job." This suggests
that Thomas' only duty that evening, shortly before Thomas
completed his shift at 8 p.m, was to hand out supplies
to employees who came for them. There was no showing
that any employees came and requested supplies while
Thomas was talking with Smith. Further, according to
Smith's uncontradicted testimony, as he was talking to
Thomas about the Union Smith asked Thomas if he was
bothering him and Thomas replied in the negative
Smith's duties as a group leader included going to the
supply room from time to time for supplies. On the occasion
in question Smith asked Thomas for several pieces of a
certain part, which Thomas did not have. Also he frequently
went elsewhere in the plant to bring in material to keep
the men busy. So his work area was not as narrowly
defined as though he operated a machine.
The Coke machine near where Smith went on his break-
time and the restroom he used were near the supply room.
At least twice Smith talked with the supply clerk, Thomas,
when Smith was in that area. At least once Smith noted
that Thomas was studying his lessons when Smith
approached, Thomas being a student at a university in
Bowling Green as well as the supply clerk.
Smith credibly testified that he was on a break when
he talked with Thomas about the Union on the evening
of May 29 and was going for a Coke and to the restroom
Smith tried to take his breaks at irregular times when
all the machines he and his group took care of were
running and none of the machines were down. Each man
was entitled to two breaks a day, one before lunch and
one after. Webber testified he thought Smith was not on
a break when he was talking with Thomas about the
Union on May 29, but Webber never discussed that matter
with Smith, or with Thomas, although the record in no
way suggests that Webber doubted Smith's word Nor did
Webber, insofar as the record showed, ask Smith's foreman
if Smith was on a break.
Thomas testified he didn't know Smith's name, so he
inquired in the plant and learned it. Then Thomas informed
on Smith to his wife's boss, Webber. He bypassed his
immediate supervisor and went directly to Webber.
Webber testified on direct examination that the "staying
on the job" rule applied to both foremen and hourly rated
employees and to both prounion and antiunion activities.
Yet Respondent has never discharged or reprimanded, inso-
far as the record showed, any foreman for calling employees
off their jobs into the office to talk to them against the
Union, although foremen have done this on a number
of occasions as seen above.
The oral and written statement Thomas gave Webber
concerning Smith informed Webber and Galligan, if they
had not known it before, that Smith was strongly prounion
and was soliciting Thomas' vote if he got a chance to
vote. The representation case hearing had been held a
few days before and Smith was assuming there would
be an election. And Galligan knew from his confrontation
with Smith a few days before over the wage misunderstand-
ing that Smith would speak up for what he believed to
be employees' rights.
In view of Respondent's deep hostility to the Union,
its knowledge of and hostility towards Smith's union and
concerted activities, its precipitate decision to discharge
him over an incident without first giving him an opportunity
to give his version of the facts, and as, in fact, Smith
had not broken any rule and was on a break himself
and did not interfere with Thomas' work, I find that
the asserted reason for the discharge was but a pretext,
that Respondent's real concern was not with Smith's negligi-
ble misuse of company time if he overstayed his breaktime
by a few moments, but rather with the nature of the
specific activity in which he was engaged, his effort to
win a union vote; and that the real reason for the discharge
was because of Smith's union and concerted activities, to
discourage further union and concerted activities, and to
defeat the Union at the anticipated election, Respondent
thereby violating Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
2. The discharge of Regina Sneed
Regina Sneed worked for Respondent from July 20,
1968, until her discharge on June 6, 1969 About the
end of December 1968 she was promoted to the job of
inspector. A written description of her duties as inspector
appears among the exhibits (G.C 6) and this shows that
it was an important job. She performed it responsibly
and was never reprimanded. She was given two raises.
When he was discharging her Webber said her work was
good.
Sneed was on the Union's shop committee and she gave
out authorization cards at breaktimes and lunchtimes. On
May 27 she attended the representation hearing with her
sister, Wanda Beckner. Webber was present for the Compa-
ny.
FIRESTONE SYNTHETIC FIBERS & TEXTILE
On June 6, 1969, Webber discharged Sneed allegedly
because she had violated the "staying on the job" rule.
Webber told her, according to Sneed, that he had informa-
tion she was not staying on the job, was talking to others,
and was interfering with their work. Sneed denied this.
Webber asked her why she thought she was being fired
She replied because of her union activities and because
she had talked in favor of the Union to two employees
she knew were for the Company, naming Jesse Williams
and Helen Lawrence
Having heard from the department manager of an "inci-
dent" between Sneed and Williams, on June 6, Webber
sent for Jesse Williams, a loom fixer Williams reported
to Webber two conversations Williams had had with Sneed
about the representation case hearing and the Union. On
the basis of Williams' oral report and the written statement
Webber got from him, Webber discharged Sneed that very
day without first giving Sneed an opportunity to give her
version of the conversations or any explanation concerning
them.
From Williams' report if not before Webber knew that
Sneed was supporting the Union and that Williams was
against the Union, and Webber so admitted on the witness
stand From Williams' oral report and written statement
Webber learned also that Sneed and Williams discussed
the pros and cons of the Union for a number of minutes
at a loom that was down and which Williams was fixing,
and that several days later, on June 3, they had had
another short conversation about the Union. Williams told
Webber that Sneed initiated both conversations Williams
did not tell Webber that these conversations in any way
interfered with his work, and there was no proof that
it did. Nor did Williams say anything, to Webber as to
whether or not Sneed was on a break or working during
these conversations (Sneed testified she was on a break
during the second conversation) On this evidence Webber
told Sneed, as has been seen above, that Sneed was not
staying on her job and was interfering with the work
of others.
In her work Sneed inspected some 25 looms in an area
about two blocks long. Thus her work area covered all
this space During her two conversations with Williams
she was within her work area.
Sneed forcefully testified that during the first conversation
she was performing a duty on the loom that was down
at the same time Williams was trying to fix it. She also
testified forcefully and repeatedly that Williams initiated
this conversation by asking her what had happened at
the representation case hearing after he left that afternoon.
They had both attended and Williams had left early and
this conversation occurred at the beginning of the midnight
shift that night. The circumstance that this was their first
conversation after Williams left the hearing early is convinc-
ing to me that Sneed's version is credible. If the antiunion
Williams had been interested enough to go to the hearing,
presumably he was interested in its ending and its outcome.
Williams' version was that the conversation opened with
Sneed's starting to talk about the hearing. He did not
testify what her first statement was. In any case Webber
didn't give Sneed a chance to tell about it before discharging
her; and in any case both Sneed and Williams were talking
825
about the hearing and the Union on the job and if one
was being interfered with, so was the other, and only
Sneed was discharged.
From the above and preponderance of all the evidence
I conclude that to Webber's knowledge the conversations
between Sneed and Williams caused no disruption of plant
production or discipline; that Webber's real concern was
not with Sneed's negligible misuse of company time but
with the fact that she was talking in favor of the Union
and was clearly a convinced union adherent, that Respond-
ent's real purpose in discharging her was to use her asserted
violation of the "staying on the job" rule as a pretext
to mask its real purpose to discourage and stop union
activity in the plant and to defeat the Union at the anticipat-
ed election; Respondent thereby further violating Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3 The discharge of Edward Lee Milton
At the end of his shift on July 15, 1969, employee
Milton hurried to his locker and got a batch of union
leaflets to pass out to his shift as it left As he was
heading for the timeclock to check out a Burns Detective
Agency guard interrupted him, told him he could not
pass the leaflets out in the "breezeway." Surprised, Milton
handed the batch of leaflets to the guard. Milton then
went immediately to the timeclock and was the third employ-
ee to punch out. His place in line was saved for him
by friends. Then he returned to the breezeway and asked
the guard for the return of the leaflets, saying he would
pass them out on the road. The guard refused to give
them to him.
The following day, July 16, 1 week before the election,
Webber called Milton in and discharged him, telling him
that he had not punched his timecard out the previous
day. Milton replied that he had punched his timecard
out Then Webber said, "You left your job early " Milton
replied, "If this is a fact, you would have to fire 75
more employees because they were on their way out too."
Webber said he was sorry to have to discharge him, he
was a good worker, one of the best, but that it was company
policy.
Webber testified that Milton was discharged because
"it was our belief" that Milton had not "properly" punched
his timecard, and because he had left his job for purposes
other than working. Webber reached his conclusions on
both items without checking with Milton and getting his
version of the facts, and after hearing a secondhand account
from the chief guard and then questioning the guard. He
did not even talk with Milton's foreman or other employees
in Milton's department. As in the case of Sneed and Smith,
the decision to discharge Milton was made before Milton
was called in or given a chance to speak.
The quickness with which Webber abandoned the first
reason when Milton answered him that he had punched
the timeclock indicated the weakness of Webber's conviction
and of Respondent's defense Webber testified that he didn't
argue with Milton about it, that "I still can't see how
it was possible but he stated that he did" (punch his
own timecard). Webber suspected that Milton had arranged
to have someone else punch him out, which employees
826 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sometimes did contrary to the rules-although no one
was shown ever to have been discharged for it. Milton,
and another employee who was in the checkout line near
Milton, credibly testified that Milton did punch his own
card
Webber also suspected and concluded that Milton must
have left his work station earlier than other employees
in order to have gone to the locker room beyond the
timeclock and then returned to the timeclock in time to
punch his own card out. Employee Talley testified Milton
punched out at midnight, the end of the shift Respondent
did not produce Milton's timecard and Webber evidently
never checked it. To accomplish what he said he did,
leave his loom after other weavers in the department left
theirs and yet beat them to the timeclock, required some
fast walking, but Milton credibly testified that he is a
fast walker, and he is thin and looks lithe and speedy.
Milton had a special incentive that night, to get the leaflets
and be set to pass them out when the shift exited. By
his demeanor Milton impressed me as a credible witness,
and he credibly testified that when he got at the head
of the line, in third place, a friend of his, Jackson, and
another employee agreed to save his place in line while
he went and got the leaflets from his locker.
Five employees' testified concerning the practice of
employees just before the end of a shift. This testimony
showed that employees customarily left their work stations
a few minutes ahead of checkout time-varying from 15
minutes to 5 minutes before the hour-in order to wash
up (including the removal of grease) and get to the timeclock
in time to start clocking out on the hour. This must
have been with the express or implied permission of the
foremen, for it occurred every day and there were three
shifts. One witness, Linda Ausbrooks, told of an occasion
when a foreman had cautioned employees that Plant Manag-
er Galligan had seen some employees at the timeclock
about 25 to 20 minutes before the hour, and that they
were not to be there that early. She told of another occasion
"quite a while ago" when, after Galligan had seen some
"too early" people at the timeclock, "they told us not
to quit work until" the hour and to go and wash up
at the hour and then go punch out. "We done it for
a few days and then everybody went back to punching
out at 10 or 15 minutes til."
Of some significance in the consideration of this matter
is the fact that the chief guard handed the batch of union
leaflets over to Webber on July 16 and that Webber never
returned them to the Union. Instead he kept them (he
still had them at the time of the hearing) and discharged
Milton.
Upon the above facts and considerations and upon the
entire record I believe and hold that Respondent permitted
or condoned the leaving of work stations a few minutes
early in order to wash up, and that Respondent discharged
Milton not for leaving work early and not because he
left his loom for some purpose other than working. What
bothered Respondent was that Milton intended to pass
out union literature a week before the election in the
' Milton, Talley, Beckner, Ausbrooks, and Holder.
breezeway when all the shift went through. Upon the
preponderance of the evidence in the entire record consid-
ered as a whole I find that the asserted reasons for the
discharge were but pretexts and that the real reason for
the discharge of Milton was because of his union activity,
because he tried to pass out union literature in the breezeway
a week before the election, and in order to discourage
further union activity and to defeat the Union at the
election, Respondent thereby further violating Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
iV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's operations
described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
I recommend the customary broad cease-and-desist order
and the affirmative relief conventionally ordered in cases
of this nature, where Respondent's unfair labor practices
were of a character which struck at the roots of employee
rights safeguarded by the Act.
To remedy its discriminatory discharges of Billy D. Smith,'
Regina Sneed, and Edward Lee Milton, Respondent will
be required to offer each of them reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make him whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason
of the discrimination by paying to him a sum of money
equivalent to the amount he normally would have earned
as wages from the date of his discharge (June 7, 1969,
in the case of Smith, June 6, 1969, in the case of Sneed,
and July 16, 1969, in the case of Milton) to the date
of the offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during
such period. The backpay shall be computed on a quarterly
basis in the manner prescribed by the Board in F W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon
at 6 percent as ascertained by the formula adopted in
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. As provided
in the Woolworth case, I recommend further that Respondent
make available to the Board, upon request, payroll and
other records in order to facilitate the checking of the
amounts of backpay due.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1 Firestone Synthetic Fibers and Textiles Company,
Division of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, of
Bowling Green , Kentucky , is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
FIRESTONE SYNTHETIC FIBERS & TEXTILE
2. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers
of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has violated and is violating Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by trying to frighten the employees away from
the Union by threatening that unions mean stnkes; by
interrogating employees concerning union organization,
their union knowledge, opinions, memberships, sympathies,
and activities, concerning what the Union could do for
or had promised employees, and concerning how much
money they expected to get through the Union and when
the election would be; by threatening employees with loss
of jobs because of their union activities; by threatening
that Firestone would or could close the plant and leave
Bowling Green if the Union got in, by threatening to
go to higher management if employees talked about the
Union anymore; by warning employees to be careful about
their union activities; by promising a promotion in return
for a vote against the Union; by prohibiting the distribution
of union literature in the breezeway; by prohibiting employee
solicitation of other employees on behalf of the Union
in the plant on employees' nonwork time, and by timing
the announcements of a wage increase and improvements
in Respondent's group insurance plan for employees, and
by using these changes, for the purpose of defeating the
Union at the election.
4. By discriminatorily discharging Billy D Smith, Regina
Sneed, and Edward Lee Milton, to discourage membership
and activity in the Union, Respondent violated and is
violating Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
5. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and upon the preponderance of the
evidence in the entire record considered as a whole, I
recommend that Firestone Synthetic Fibers and Textiles
Company, Division of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Com-
pany, of Bowling Green, Kentucky, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall-
1. Cease and desist from.
(a) Trying to frighten employees away from the Union
by threatening that unions mean strikes.
(b) Threatening employees with loss of jobs because of
their union activities.
(c) Threatening that Firestone would or could close the
plant and leave Bowling Green if the Union got in.
(d) Threatening to go to higher management if employees
talk about the Union anymore.
(e) Warning employees to be careful about their union
activities.
(f) Promising a promotion in return for a vote against
the Union.
(g) Prohibiting the distribution of union literature in
the breezeway.
(h) Prohibiting employee solicitation of other employees
on behalf of the Union in the plant on employees' nonwork
time.
827
(i) Timing the announcements of wage increases and
improvements in the group insurance plan or other employee
benefits, or using these changes, for the purpose of defeating
the Union.
(l) Interrogating employees concerning the union organi-
zation and the employees' union knowledge, opinions, mem-
berships, sympathies, and activities.
(k) Interrogating employees concerning what the Union
could do for or had promised employees, concerning how
much money they expect to get through the Union and
when the election will be.
(1) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights
to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join
or assist United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Work-
ers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization,
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
2 Take the following affirmative action, which I find
will effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer to Billy D Smith, Regina Sneed, and Edward
Lee Milton reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges, and make them whole in
the manner prescribed in the portion of the Trial Examiner's
Decision entitled "The Remedy" for any loss of earnings
suffered by reason of the discrimination against them.
(b) Notify Billy D. Smith, Regina Sneed, and Edward
Lee Milton if presently serving in the Armed Forces of
the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service Act
and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended,•after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary
to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms
of this Recommended Order.
(d) Post at its plant in Bowling Green, Kentucky, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 9 (Cincinnati, Ohio), after being duly signed
by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46
of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board,
the findings , conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order
herein shall , as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations,
be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions and order,
and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes
In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of
a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading
"Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be
changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board "
828 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within
20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
have been taken to comply herewith.'
' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL offer to Billy D. Smith, Regina Sneed,
and Edward Lee Milton immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their seniority and other
rights and privileges previously enjoyed, in accordance
with the recommendations of the Trial Examiner's
Decision.
WE WILL make whole Billy D. Smith, Regina Sneed,
and Edward Lee Milton for any loss of pay suffered
by them by reason of the discrimination practiced
against them, in accordance with the recommendation
of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
WE WILL notify the above-named employees if pres-
ently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States
of their right to full reinstatement upon application
in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amend-
ed, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
WE WILL NOT discharge or in any other way discrim-
inate against any employee because of his union mem-
bership, sympathy, or activity
WE WILL NOT try to frighten employees away from
the Union by threatening that unions mean strikes.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of jobs
because of their union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten that Firestone would or
could close the plant and leave Bowling Green if
the Union got in.
WE WILL NOT threaten to go to higher management
if employees talk about the Union anymore.
WE WILL NOT warn employees to be careful about
their union activities.
WE WILL NOT promise promotions in return for
votes against the Union.
WE WILL NOT prohibit the distribution of union
literature in the breezeway.
WE WILL NOT prohibit employee solicitation of other
employees on behalf of the Union in the plant on
employees' nonwork time.
WE WILL NOT time the announcements of wage
increases or improvements in the group insurance plan
or other employee benefits, or use these changes, to
try to defeat the Union.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning
union organization or concerning their union knowl-
edge, opinions, memberships, sympathies, and activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning
what the Union could do for employees or had promised
employees or concerning how much money they expect
to get through the Union.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees as to when
the election will be.
FIRESTONE SYNTHETIC
FIBERS AND TEXTILES
COMPANY, DIVISION OF THE
FIRESTONE TIRE AND
RUBBER COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative)
(Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Room
2407, Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street, Cincinnati,
Ohio 45202, Telephone 513-684-3686.