Firestone Textiles Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 13, 1979

244 N.L.R.B. 168 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Firestone Textiles Company, Division of the Firestone
Tire & Rubber Company and International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, UAW. Case 9 CA
9378
August 13, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND PENEI.L.O
On March 14, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
John C. Miller issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed
an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Firestone Textiles
Company, Division of the Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company, Bowling Green, Kentucky, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order, except that
the attached notice is substituted for that of the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF TlHE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE Wll.L NOT refuse to bargain in good faith
with the International Union, United Automo-
bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended.
WE WILL, upon request, meet and bargain in
good faith with the Union mentioned above and,
if an agreement is reached, reduce such agree-
ment to writing and sign it.
FIRESTONE TEXHTLES COMPANY, DIVISION
OF THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COM-
PANY
DECISION
STAIEMEN1 ()F It1 C(ASI
JOllN C. Ml.I.eIR. Administrative Law Judge: By Order
rdated March 15, 1978. the Board directed that a hearing be
held to resolve the issues raised by Respondent's objections
lo an election held on September 25 26. 1974. The Board's
Order, in turn, was prompted by a remand order of the
LJnited States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit direct-
ing that such a hearing be held.'
Thereafter. on July 10 14, 1978. a hearing was held in
Bowling Green. Kentucky, at which Respondent-Employer
was offered the opportunity to adduce evidence in support
of its 10 objections and the Petitioner. the United Automo-
>bile Workers, offered evidence in rebuttal. Inasmuch as the
allegations that Respondent-Employer refused to bargain in
9-CA 9378 are dependent on the validity of the Union's
certification as the bargaining representative, which in turn
-ests on the underlying merits of the Employer's objections
n the representation case. 9 RC 10686, those objections
will be considered first.
Upon consideration of the entire record, including briefs
of the parties, and based on the demeanor of the witnesses.
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
In view of the Board's original assertion of jurisdiction
aver the Employer,' I find that Respondent is an Employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
The International Union, United Automobile. Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
I In his Supplemental Decision and Certification of Representative in Case
) RC 10686. the Regional Director had overruled Respondent's objections
to the election and the Board had denied the Respondent's request for re-
view. Thereafter. the Board issued a decision. 222 N.RB 1254 (1976). find-
ing that Respondent's refusal to bargain was a violation of Sec. 8a)(5} and
Il) of the Act. In a decision issued December 28. 1977. the Sixth Circuit
declined enforcement and remanded the case for a hearing on Respondent's
objections. Firestone Teriles Corpani v. L. R B. 568 F2d 499.
1222 NLRB 1254 (upra).
244 NLRB No. 32
168
FIRESTONE TEXTILES COMPANY
II. lite ()BJF( IIONS OF I El tI( llON IN 9 RC(- 10686
A. The Ten Objeclions
Although the Employer filed 10 objections to the Elec-
tion, at the hearing no evidence was adduced with respect
to Objections 4, 5, and 10.1 Accordingly. those objections
are overruled. The seven remaining objections will be dis-
cussed and ruled on hereafter.
B. Contentions of the Parties
1. In its brief, the Employer emphasized three major
points, namely:
(a) Did the Union conduct mass picketing, directed at
employees entering the plant at voting times to destroy the
laboratory conditions required by the Board for a fair elec-
tion.
(b) Did noise, confusion, and electioneering and adver-
tising by union partisans in the voting area destroy the re-
quired laboratory conditions.
(c) Would the misconduct of the Union and its partisans.
in its cumulative effect under the conditions shown, reason-
ably tend to sway the votes of at least two of the 347 votes
cast for the Petitioner.
2. The Petitioner's brief reviews the evidence as to each
objection and contends that, whether considered separately
as individual objections or cumulatively, the objections are
without merit.
C. Seven Remaining Objections
I. Objection I alleged that on September 26. 1974, while
voting was in progress, a "vote yes" UAW campaign sticker
was placed in an ashtray on the voting registration table
located in the voting area.
With respect to this objection, Pat Rossner and Leroy
Miller, the Board agents conducting the election, both testi-
fied credibly that they saw no campaign material in the
voting area and that no one brought any campaign material
to their attention. J. D. Logsdon, a runner-observer for the
Company who is no longer employed by Firestone. credibly
testified that during the last 20 minutes at the 4-6 p.m.
session on September 26, he replaced Mike Lawrence as a
company observer and noticed a UAW sticker on the bot-
tom of an ashtray on the observers' table. He did not re-
move it, but when Mike Lawrence returned he noticed and
wadded up the sticker and threw it away. Lawrence con-
firmed that he noticed the UAW sticker in the ashtray and
when he discovered it he removed it. He stated the sticker
would have been observable by the voters coming in and
estimated the sticker may have been there for 15 minutes.
Lawrence was the company observer at all three voting ses-
sions covering 2 days. He stated that that was the only
campaign material he saw within the voting area. The
Company presented six other employees who testified they
saw a UAW sticker in the cafeteria. the place used for the
voting, although the testimony was not altogether consis-
tent. Luther Reddnarch. Jr.. testified he saw a sticker stat-
' In its brief. Respondent-Employer acknowledged that it as not pursu-
ing Objections 4. 5. and 10.
ing "Vote Yes" on an ashtray on a table against the far wall
of the cafeteria, some 12 15 feet away. Employees Jerry
Landrum. Sarah Crisp, Doug Mastin, and Zettie Wingfield
testified they also saw a UAW sticker. Both Crisp and
Wingfield testified similarly that they saw a vote yes or
UAW sticker on the ashtray at the observers' table. Ap-
proximately 690 people voted at the election. None of the
union witnesses observed any campaign material in the vot-
ing area.
I find sufficient credible testimony to establish that a
UAW sticker was displayed at or near the observers' table
in the cafeteria, the established voting area, for a short pe-
riod of time. In view of the fact that Lawrence was present
at all voting sessions, I find that his testimony and that of
Logsdon established that a UAW sticker was displayed in
the voting area for a period of 15-20 minutes and that when
it was noticed by Lawrence. he removed it.
The question remaining, however, is whether the display
of such a UAW sticker had such an effect as to warrant
setting aside the election. The rule against campaign signs
and material in the immediate voting area was established
primarily to permit the voter to cast his secret ballot in an
atmosphere free of last minute campaigning and is similar
to that established in other elections throughout the coun-
try. One witness, Mastin. when asked if the sticker display
had any effect on the way he voted, responded "No, not
really." While I find it unnecessary to rely on subjective
testimony as to what effect certain conduct had, it is illus-
trative. Moreover. similar stickers were displayed through-
out the plant and on auto bumpers during the campaign.
The election was run for 6 hours at three different time
periods over a 2-day period.4 I note, moreover, that voters
were permitted to wear campaign buttons on their persons
in the voting area.
Finally. I note and credit the testimony of agent Rossner,
the Board agent, that very few voters voted the last 30-45
minutes of the afternoon voting session. This is logical be-
cause Logsdon. the company observer-runner became
available to relieve Lawrence, the other company observer,
only after the last group of employees had been notified
about voting. Under all the circumstances, I am not per-
suaded that the mere display of a union sticker on an ash-
tray in the voting area for such a short period of time had
any impact on the few voters that did vote in that time
period to warrant setting the election aside. I find, there-
fore, that such a minor infraction of the rules, with respect
to campaigning in the voting area, had little or no impact
on the voters and is an insufficient basis to set aside the
election.
Before deciding on the merits of this objection, it is neces-
sary to decide a corollary issue. In his Supplemental Deci-
sion and certification, the Regional Director noted that
postelection investigations are not limited to the specific
issues raised by the parties and considered evidence involv-
ing employee campaigning and talking in and about the
voting area. Consequently, when the issue arose at the hear-
ing I permitted testimony on such matter.
It was stipulated that the voting occurred in the phase three lunchroom
September 25. 1974. from 2 to 6 p.m. and on September 26. 1974. from 6 to
8 a.m. and from 4 to 6 p.m
169
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As employees were released to vote, they waited in line to
get their names checked off the voter eligibility list and to
receive a ballot. As noted previously, the voting took place
in the third phase lunchroom or cafeteria. The line of em-
ployees extended from inside the cafeteria doors which
were opened and the number of employees varied from 0 to
15 depending on the numbers of employees released and
the speed with which the balloting process took place. As
the number of employees grew, more employees were in
line outside the cafeteria doors. On the outside of one of the
cafeteria doors an official sign was posted indicating it was
the place of voting.5
Several employee witnesses stated there was more talking
while waiting in line than in prior elections. Employee
Wingfield credibly testified that one employee, after voting,
turned and yelled to employees in line, "I voted yes."
Board Agents Rossner and Miller credibly testified that
no events of an untoward nature occurred during the elec-
tion, although once or twice employees were told to hold
down the noise.
Employees cannot be foreclosed from engaging in con-
versation while waiting in line to vote, and obviously the
union election is bound to be a topic of conversation for
some of the employees. Although several employees may
have voiced their support for the Union in more than con-
versational tones, I find that the election in general, involv-
ing over 600 voters, comported with normal election stan-
dards, and to the extent there were minor exceptions, I do
not find that the conduct was so flagrant or widespread as
to affect other employees or deprive them of their free
choice in the election. Accordingly. I find that neither the
temporary display of a UAW sticker on the observers' table
nor the expression of voting preference by several employ-
ees before or after voting had any impact on other employ-
ees or their voting intentions. 6 Objection I and the corollary
issue involving campaigning in the voting area are over-
ruled.
2. Objection 2 alleged that Board Agent Pat Rossner ad-
vised the Petitioner's observers that they were permitted to
wear UAW campaign stickers on their persons in view of
other employees if they choose. In contrast, Board Agent
Leroy Miller, immediately prior to the September 26 voting
session, allegedly required the Employer's observer, J. D.
Logsdon, to remove a pocket saver and an identification
tag, both of which contained the name Firestone but which
did not contain any campaign propaganda or were in any
other way directed toward the voting.
Board Agent Rossner credibly testified that Board Agent
Miller told company observers to remove Firestone pocket
savers and that she later instructed all observers that she
could not require them to remove campaign insignia. She
also stated that the UAW representative told union observ-
ers to remove pro-union insignia and they all did so. Logs-
don, the individual specifically named in this objection, re-
called that he was asked to remove a section supervisor's
badge after a union representative pointed out the badge to
I find no credible evidence that any prounion sign was posted on the
cafeteria doors or inside he cafeteria to warrant any discussion thereon.
s See Southeastern Mills, Inc., 227 NLRB 57 (1976); Glacier Packing Co..
Inc., 210 NLRB 571 (1974).
one of the Board's agents. He did not recall being asked to
remove a pocket saver with the Firestone name on it or
recall actually removing it. Union observer Dennis Bunch
testified similarly that Logsdon was asked and did remove
his section supervisor's badge but that he continued to wear
his pocket saver along with the official NLRB observer
badge.
While there may have been isolated instances of observ-
ers wearing campaign buttons or insignia, I find that in
general both company and union observers wore only their
official NLRB observer badges. Nor do I find that the
Board agents' instructions were inconsistent or evidence of
bias to have an impact on employees voting. There is a
distinction between wearing either a prounion or procom-
pany insignia and the wearing of a badge which includes
the term supervisor. The Board does not usually permit
statutory supervisors to serve as election observers because
the presence of a supervisor may have an impact on an
employee's free choice. Consequently, even though the sec-
tion supervisors in this case were not statutory supervisors
who were excluded from voting, the precautionary measure
of requesting that such a badge be removed was proper.
Moreover, to the extent that several union observers may
have exhibited campaign insignia, the Board has held that
the wearing of insignia by company or union observers does
not, of itself, constitute interference with an election.' Ac-
cordingly, I find this objection to be without merit and it is
overruled.
3. Objections 3, 6, 7, and 9 deal with mass picketing,
name-calling and a general allegation that Petitioner's
agents made threats and acted in a coercive manner toward
employees in the voting unit. These objections shall be con-
sidered separately and collectively as they all involve coer-
cive statements or similar conduct that allegedly interfered
with employees' freedom of choice in the election.
(a) Objection 3 alleges that on Wednesday, September
25, 1974, as employees were coming to work on the first of
2 days of the election, UAW partisans, paid organizers, and
members of the organizing committee, including Thomas
Puckett, the union organizer, appeared at the highway en-
trance to the plant in large numbers, parked their cars
along the highway, and by such mass picketing and congre-
gating, intimidated and coerced employees to vote in favor
of the Petitioner.
While it is undisputed that a fairly large group of em-
ployees gathered at the plant entrance on the 2 days of the
election and distributed handbills to employees and cam-
paigned for the Union, the testimony varies as to estimates
of the number of employees present and what remarks were
exchanged between employees handbilling and employees
going to work on those voting days. There is sufficient
credible testimony to establish that the number of employ-
ees present at the plant entrance varied from 15 to 35. All
the employees that testified agreed. however, that none of
the employee-drivers were blocked from entering or exiting
the plant, although several employees testified that if a car
in front of them stopped to take union literature they were
automatically required to stop. Three company witnesses
'Larkwood Farmrs. A Division of The Pillsbury Company. 178 NLRB 226
(1969).
170
FIRESTONE TEXTILES COMPANY
testified they were subjected to derogatory remarks, and
their testimony is worthy of further review.
J. D. Logsdon stated he encountered no difficulty in get-
ting into the plant, but after leaving his car in the parking
lot he was standing at the main entrance to the plant with
Mike Lawrence, another company observer. and heard em-
ployees call his name and ell, inter alia, such expletives at
him as "company suckass, and son of a bitch." He stated he
was standing about 150 yards from the handbillers at the
time and did not recognize them. He did not report the
incident and thereafter served as a company observer-run-
ner in the voting session that day which began at 4 p.m. on
September 26.
Another company witness, Betty Short, testified that she
entered the plant between I I and 11:30 p.m. on September
25 and heard someone yell "you'll be sorry, bitch" when
she pulled through the plant entrance and did not stop to
take literature. She affirmed, however, that no handbiller
blocked her entrance and she entered the plant at about 15
m.p.h. She could not identify the person who yelled and
acknowledged that no one used her name or uttered any
threats about the election.
A third employee, Richard Todd, testified credibly that
when the car in front of him stopped to take literature,
someone stepped in front of his car after he stopped, came
to his car window to give him literature, and someone
stated, "son of a bitch, you'd better stop next time." Todd
did not try to identify the speaker and did not report the
incident because the term s.o.b. is a pretty common term
. . and was as he described it "just an expression to let off
heat." Three other employees testified of some nervousness
as they were driving through the entrance but testified they
had no trouble getting into the plant. Two of the three
employees, Sexton and Majors, who were questioned about
it, testified that the presence of the persons at the entrance
did not affect their vote.
Union witnesses testified that they were instructed not to
hold up the flow of traffic and to be courteous to employees
entering the plant. None of the union witnesses heard or
recalled any derogatory comments.
Even accepting the testimony of the Company's wit-
nesses,' I do not find that the relatively few derogatory re-
marks uttered at the plant entrance were likely to or did
have any impact on employees and their voting intentions.
All witnesses agreed that they had no difficulty in getting
into or out of the plant. None of the witnesses testified that
any threats were directed at them with the explicit purpose
of getting them to vote in a particular fashion. Except for
the comments directed towards Logsdon, the derogatory re-
marks were prompted by their failure to stop at the plant
entrance and accept union literature. There was no testi-
mony that employees were threatened with respect to how
they were going to vote.
I do not find that the presence of fairly large numbers of
union adherents at the plant entrance, by itself, constituted
a threat that would deprive employees of their freedom of
I Obviously. Logsden's vote was unaffected by the incident, since Dennis
Bunch's undisputed testimony is that all the observers voted at the opening
of the polls on September 25, 1974. Lawrence confirmed that the name-
calling incident occurred the final day of the voting. September 26. 1979.
choice in a secret-ballot election. Union adherents are enti-
tled to handbill and to urge employees to vote for the
Union as long as it is done peacefully and without threats.'
While the derogatory comments are regretable, I do not
find them coercive in these circumstances. I find that the
overall conduct of the handbillers was generally peaceful
and within lawful bounds. Accordingly. I find Objection 3
to be without merit.
(b) Objection 6 alleged that on September 26, 1974. im-
mediately prior to the voting period, Thomas Puckett, a
union representative, said to one of the Union's observers
that "we'll take care of those company suck-asses" and that
said statement was made in a loud tone in the presence of
employees waiting to vote and was, therefore, coercive and
intimidating.
James Lyles was the only witness to testify for the Com-
pany regarding this objection. He testified that he acted as a
company observer-runner and that while waiting in the
lunchroom at 5:30 a.m. on September 26, 1974, prior to the
voting scheduled for 6 to 8 a.m., organizer Thomas Puckett
asked Paul Dunning, an employee active on behalf of the
Union, what his name was. Dunning told Puckett his last
name was Lyles and that he "was one of the Company's
worst suck-asses." ° Lyles stated it was said in a normal
conversational tone and that he did not tell any employee
about it before or while the polls were open. Dunning did
not recall seeing Lyles at the election and stated he never
used such language. He also stated he never heard Puckett
say, "we'll take care of him." Puckett denied the entire inci-
dent, stating he never asked the identity of a company ob-
server or heard Dunning refer to a company observer.
Dunning testified in a forthright manner, and I credit his
testimony. In addition to corroborative testimony by Puck-
ett, a company representative, Richard Weber, did not tes-
tify to such incident and presumably did not hear any such
conversation. Secondly, even assuming that such incident
occurred as stated by Lyles. the facts of such incident were
not communicated to any other voting employees. Contrary
to the allegation, the comment, if made, was not said in the
presence of employees waiting to vote nor was it said in a
loud voice. Inasmuch as Lyles testified he had participated
in previous elections as a company observer-runner, it is
unlikely that such statement had an effect on his voting
intentions.
In any event, I conclude that the incident did not occur
as alleged and therefore recommend dismissing this objec-
tion.
(c) Objection 7 alleges that Petitioner's organizer, Buddy
Leonard. called employees he believed opposed to the
Union by opprobious, insulting, and offensive names. A re-
view of the record discloses no testimony in support of this
allegation. Accordingly, this objection is overruled.
(d) Objection 9 alleges that Petitioner's agents and repre-
sentatives made additional threats and coercive statements
and acted in a threatening and coercive manner toward
employees in the voting unit.
Michael Lawrence testified that employee Larry McDan-
iel told him he should join up with the Union before Sep-
9 Sewanee Coal Operators Association. Inc.. 146 NLRB 1145 (1964).
'o Lyles further testified that Puckett stated. "We'll take care of him."
171
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tember or he might be "mowing the grass." Lawrence fur-
ther testified that he and McDaniel had been on friendly
terms and that he "probably" made a friendly $5 bet on the
election outcome with McDaniel. Lawrence did act as a
company observer during all three sessions of voting. We
begin with the fact that McDaniel was not an authorized
agent or representative of the Union, but was a fellow em-
ployee who was in no position to affect Lawrence's job sta-
tus, and that both Lawrence and McDaniel were aware of
such fact. In this context, where the parties had a bet on the
outcome of the election and McDaniel was not an autho-
rized union representative and had no supervisory status or
authority over Lawrence, the comment was more in the
nature of a jest or good-humored banter and not a threat.
Under all the circumstances, I find the remark did not con-
stitute a threat.
Employee Davis credibly testified that fellow employees
in his carpool, Ray and Houchins, told him that he would
vote for the Union if he knew what was good for him. He
conceded that he remained in the carpool despite the com-
ment. While the employees in question may have stated
positive views in support of the Union, the exchange of
views, pro and con, about the election was a normal event in
view of the pending election. In the context presented, I do
not find that this remark amounted to anything more than
campaign rhetoric and an attempt to persuade Davis to
vote for the Union." Accordingly, I recommend Objection
9 be overruled.
(e) Consideration of the cumulative effect of Objections
3, 6, 7, and 9 and the evidence and findings thereon.
I dismissed Objections 6 and 7, respectively, on credibil-
ity grounds and lack of evidence. Considering Objections 3
and 9 together as part of the total conduct, I am unable to
find that the evidence adduced amounted to threats or coer-
cive conduct that had any measurable impact on the em-
ployees concerned nor that it had any effect on their voting
intentions.
4. Objection 8 alleges that various organizers and repre-
sentatives of the Petitioner, including Thomas Puckett, told
employees that those who signed up ahead [for the Union]
would not have to pay initiation fees or dues while those
who came in later would have to pay dues and initiation
fees. It further alleged that other benefits were promised to
employees who supported the Union which would be de-
nied to those who joined later.
Two employees, Zettie Wingfield and Ruth Major, cred-
ibly testified that employee Freda Martin told them that to
avoid payment of a $50 fee, they should sign a union card
before the election. Specifically, Wingfield testified that
Martin told her she should sign a card before the election
and if she did she would not have to pay a $50 initiation
fee. She further stated that other employees asked her if
such statement were true. She told them no. Major testified
similarly that Martin told her that if she did not sign a
union card before the election it would cost her a $50 initi-
ation fee.
H1 While Davis testified that the tone of voice of Houchins was threatening,
he noted that there were 6 employees in the carpool, that there were pro and
con discussion about the election, that he was not sure whether Randall Bray
in the carpool was for or against the Union. Lastly, Davis testified that the
remarks did not affect the way he voted.
Pursley testified that employee Paul Dunning ap-
proached him 2 or 3 weeks before the election and told him
that if he signed a UAW card, he would not have any fees
to pay but that if he did not he would have to pay $25 or
$50 later.
Employee Lee testified that employee Ragland stated he
[Lee] needed to sign a union card and that it would cost him
more to join if he did not. Lee also stated that employee
Harrell told him it would cost him more in union dues if he
did not sign a card.
May Johnson testified that employee Buddy Leonard
told her union dues would be higher if she waited until after
the election to sign a union card. She stated that Leonard
was an officer of the Union at the time of the discussion.
In rebuttal to the testimony of the previous company wit-
nesses, Dunning recalled no conversation with Pursley and
stated he took no breaks in the area of the weaving depart-
ment in which Pursley worked. Dunning further stated that
most of the authorization cards he obtained were secured
before the Union petitioned for an election. He did ask
persons to sign yellow membership cards after the election.
He also stated that he carried a document introduced as
Charging Party's Exhibit 13, entitled "What you should
know about-UAW" so that he could show it to employees
if the subject of initiation fees came up. This document was
similar in text to Charging Party's Exhibit 18 which is noted
in detail hereafter, and which advises employees that they
can join the Union without paying an initiation fee after the
election.
Puckett testified that he discussed with employees the
waiver of initiation fees and told them that after the elec-
tion Firestone employees would have the opportunity to
join the Union without paying an initiation fee. After the
Union selected its officers, the Union would thereafter set a
cutoff date after which initiation fees would be paid.
Leonard testified that he was aware of the UAW's policy
with respect to initiation fees because of discussions with
Puckett and from the union literature that was passed out
during the campaign. The union literature that was passed
out during the campaign included Charging Party's Exhib-
its 13, 17, and 18.
Exhibit 18 was a letter dated July 8, 1974, addressed to
all Firestone employees and passed out shortly after that
date which stated in part:
Q. Will the Firestone workers have to pay an initi-
ation fee?
A. No... in new plants being organized, the Inter-
national Union does not charge an initiation fee until
after giving the employees a certain period of time to
join the Union after a labor board election. Those who
join during that period will not be required to pay any
initiation fee. [Emphasis supplied.]
Charging Party's Exhibit 17, a handbill passed out on
September 23, 1974, just prior to the election, advised em-
ployees that those working in the plant at the time of the
election would have the opportunity to join the UAW with-
out paying any initiation fees.
In part, because of Charging Party's Exhibits 13, 17, and
18, 1 find the testimony of Puckett, Leonard, and Dunning,
credible. It would be inconsistent of union supporters to tell
employees contrary to what had been circulated in union
172
FIRESTONE TEXTILES COMPANY
literature as early as July 8, 1974, or shortly thereafter,
about any requirements as to payment of union initiation
fees. Nor would it be logical for Puckett, the principal orga-
nizer for the union campaign, to issue oral advice contrary
to circulated union material which he helped to prepare or
circulate.
In N.L.R.B. v. Savair Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 270
(1973). the Supreme Court concluded that promises by
union officials and employees soliciting union cards to
waive initiation fees if employees signed a union authoriza-
tion card before the election constituted an improper in-
ducement. The Court further concluded that such a waiver
of initiation fees would be proper if it were extended to
employees who join the Union after the election as well as
before.
The factual situation which I found existed here contains
a little of both elements. I credited the testimony of Puckett,
Dunning, and Leonard that they properly set forth that
employees could join the Union after the election and still
not be required to pay any initiation fee and I relied in part
on three separate union distributions of literature which set
forth the Union's policy with respect to waiver of initiation
fees. However. I also credited the undisputed testimony of
Wingfield and Major that they were informed by Freda
Martin, a fellow employee, that if they signed a union card
before the election they would save a $50 initiation fee.
I find that Martin's misrepresentation as to payment of
initiation fees was effectively repudiated by the correct ver-
sion as set forth in the credited testimony of Puckett, Dun-
ning, and Leonard in their discussions with employees and
by the Union's circulation of literature on three occasions
during the preelection period. Moreover, this conclusions is
corroborated by the fact that Wingfield informed other em-
ployees that Martin's representation was not true and by
the fact that neither Wingfield or Major did in fact sign a
union card. Accordingly, I find that Martin's misrepresen-
tation was effectively repudiated and that employees voting
intentions were not affected thereby. Objection 8 is over-
ruled.
D. Summary of Objections
Of the seven litigated objections, I concluded that Objec-
tion I and 2, dealing with a UAW campaign sticker and
campaigning in the voting area and instructions regarding
wearing of campaign insignia, were insufficient to affect em-
ployees voting intentions. I also concluded that Objection 3,
group handbilling at the plant entrance and calling several
employees uncomplimentary names, had no or minimal im-
pact on employees' voting. I overruled Objection 6 on credi-
bility grounds and Objection 7 for lack of evidence. As to
Objection 8. based on Savair, supra, I found that union
literature circulated to employees established and corrobo-
rated the credited testimony of Puckett. Dunning. and
Leonard that the UAW policy of waiving of union initi-
ation fees was properly set forth to the employees. To the
extent several employees were informed otherwise by em-
ployee Martin, I concluded such misrepresentation was ef-
fectively repudiated. With respect to Objection 9. 1 con-
cluded that alleged threats made to employees Lawrence
and Davis did not in fact constitute threats in the context
presented.
Respondent's brief urges that if the mass picketing at the
plant entrance and the electioneering by union partisans in
the voting area could reasonably tend to swaN the votes of
at least two of the 347 votes cast." the objections should he
deemed meritorious. The term "mass picketing" is a misno-
mer since it infers that ingress and egress from the plant
were blocked off. In fact, a large group of employees hand-
billed at the plant entrance in a controlled fashion. Nor was
the electioneering so uncontrolled in the voting area that
employees were affected thereby. Elections are not con-
ducted in a vacuum, and while the conduct of employees
can be monitored to some extent, emploNees cannot he ex-
pected to remain silent and act like robots throughout the
voting procedure. In my view, Respondent's contention is
mathematically implausible and an unacceptable oversim-
plification.
I have reviewed the election and its factual context and
have concluded that the employees who participated were
afforded the opportunity to express their free choice as to
their selection of a bargaining representative. HIaving over-
ruled all objections, I find that the Union was properl, cer-
tified as the collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees of Firestone in the appropriate unit set forth herein.
Ill. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRA(CII( ES
In his Supplemental Decision and Certification of Repre-
sentative in Case 9-RC-10686, the Regional Director had
overruled Respondent's objections to the election and the
Board denied Respondent's request for review. Having now
reviewed said objections after a hearing pursuant to the
remand of the court and the Board, and finding them to be
without merit. I find that the original certification was valid
and the Employer's refusal to bargain thereafter is violative
of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act.
CON( SIONS OF LAW
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record.
I make the following conclusions of law:
I. Firestone Textiles Company. a division of Firestone
Tire & Rubber Company, is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The International Union. United Automobile. Aero-
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America. is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section (2)(5) of
the Act.
3. The Employer's objections to the election are without
merit and are overruled.
4. By refusing to bargain collectively with the Interna-
tional Union. United Automobile. Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America, the validly certified
collective-bargaining representative, about wages, hours.
and conditions of work. Respondent-Employer has violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
2 This contention is misleading as the tally of hballots n he election esab-
tished that 347 votes were cast for the Petitioner and 329 votes cast against
the Union with 14 challenged ballot,s Reslprdent's contentin apparentl 5
assumes that all 14 challenged ballots would have been upheld
173
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. The aforesaid are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Employer has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
The Employer shall be ordered to bargain in good faith
with the duly certified bargaining representative about
wages, hours, and working conditions and, if an agreement
is reached, sign a written agreement upon request.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record. and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended
Order:
ORDER'3
The Respondent, Firestone Textiles Company. Division
of the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, Bowling Green,
Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings.
conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived
for all purposes.
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with the Interna-
tional Union. United Automobile. Aerospace and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America.
(b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them under the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, meet and bargain in good faith with
the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, and if an
agreement is reached, incorporate such agreement, upon re-
quest, into a written contract.
(b) Post at its place of business in Bowling Green, Ken-
tucky, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."l"
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director of Region 9. after being duly signed by its autho-
rized representative, shall be posted by Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9. in writing.
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.
14 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board."
174