Filippo Balestrieri et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardOct 9, 201913357850 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 9, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/357,850 01/25/2012 Filippo Balestrieri 82892257 6523 146568 7590 10/09/2019 MICRO FOCUS LLC 500 Westover Drive #12603 Sanford, NC 27330 EXAMINER ROTARU, OCTAVIAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3624 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/09/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): software.ip.mail@microfocus.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte FILIPPO BALESTRIERI and JULIE WARD DREW ____________ Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1–19. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP. Br. 1. Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The Appellant’s invention relates generally to “ANALYZING SURVEY RESPONSES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO LAUNCH A PARTICULAR OFFERING” (Spec. Title) and specifically to “a survey- based analysis system . . . to make a determination of whether or not a new type of offering (e.g. a shorter-term flexible offering or smaller-set flexible offering) is to be launched by an enterprise” (id. ¶ 10) (emphasis omitted). Claims 1, 11, and 18 are the independent claims on appeal. Independent claim 1, which we reproduce below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal (with added bracketing for reference): 1. A method, comprising: [(a)] receiving survey responses regarding user interest in offerings of plural different types based on proposed incentives for the offerings of the plural different types; and [(b)] performing, by a computer, an analysis of the survey responses, the analysis comprising: deriving measures based on the survey responses regarding user interest in the offerings of the plural different types, the derived measures including a first measure based on a number of users who expressed interest in purchasing a first of the plural different types of offerings, and a second measure based on a number of users who expressed interest in purchasing a second of the plural different types of offerings; computing, based at least on a relationship between the first and second measures, an indication of profitability regarding the second type of offering; outputting the indication of profitability to allow for a determination of whether to launch the second type of offering; and Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 3 [(c)] controlling setup of an information technology (IT) system based on the determination of whether to launch the second type of offering. Claims App. i. REJECTIONS Claims 1–19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Claims 1–19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. OPINION 35 U.S.C. § 112 The Examiner rejects claims 1–19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 because the Specification does not describe the claimed subject matter “in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed” limitation (c) of “controlling setup of an information technology (IT) system based on the determination of whether to launch the second type of offering.” Final Act. 10 (emphasis omitted). Specifically, the Examiner finds that although paragraph 8 of the Specification describes “[l]aunching a new offering” and that “the enterprise may have to set up an information technology (IT) system to support the new offering” (id.) (emphasis omitted), the Specification as originally filed “provides no clear, deliberate and sufficient disclosure to show that Applicant had possession for a ‘controlling’ of the ‘IT setup’ itself.” Id. Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 4 The Appellant disagrees and contends that paragraph 8 of the Specification “refers to setting up an IT system to support a new offering.” Br. 7. The Appellant also refers to paragraphs 9, 10, and 26 and to Figure 1 as showing support for the limitation. Id. Specifically, the Appellant argues that the Specification provides that it is clear that the survey-based analysis system computes an indication of profitability, which is output to make a determination of whether to launch a new type of offering. If a decision is to launch a new type of offering, then ¶ [0008] states that an IT system is set up to support the new offering. The controlling of the setup of the IT system based on the determination of whether to launch the new type of offering is based on the computed indication of profitability that is output by the survey-based analysis system described in the Specification. Id. at 7–8. We agree with the Examiner that the Specification does not discuss or describe controlling an IT system based on determinations such as to reasonably convey to one of ordinary skill in the art that, at the time the application was filed, the Appellant had possession of that limitation. See Ans. 5. The portions of the Specification relied on by the Appellant provide that launching a new offering, i.e., a product or service (Spec. ¶ 3), “can involve a substantial upfront investment in infrastructure by an enterprise . . . [f]or example, the enterprise may have to set up an information technology (IT) system to support the new offering” (id. ¶ 8). A new offering can possibly not be profitable, leading to financial loss, and demand for the offering can be unpredictable. See id. ¶ 9. “[A] survey-based analysis system . . . make[s] a determination of whether or not a new type of offering (e.g. a shorter-term flexible offering or smaller-set flexible offering) is to be Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 5 launched by an enterprise.” Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis omitted). Figure 1 depicts “a block diagram of an example arrangement that includes a survey system according to some implementations.” Id. ¶ 2. We disagree with the Appellant that “[i]f a decision is to launch a new type of offering, then ¶ [0008] states that an IT system is set up to support the new offering.” Br. 7. At best, the Specification discusses that launching an offering may lead to a need to set up an IT system. However, the Specification does not discuss controlling such a system, much less controlling based on a determination of whether to launch. Thus, we are not persuaded of Examiner error, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112 of claims 1–19. 35 U.S.C. § 101 The Appellant argues claims 1–10 as a group. Br. 8. Although the Appellant separately argues claims 11–19 as a group (id. at 17), the Appellant relies on the arguments presented for claims 1–10 (id.). Thus, we consider the Appellant to argue claims 1–19 as a group, and we select claim 1 as representative of that group with claims 2–19 standing or falling therewith. 35 U.S.C. § 101 Framework An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 6 ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 7 mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. Earlier this year, the PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 8 (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54, 56. Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework, the Examiner determines that the Appellant invented a “method”, “article” and “system” for - “controlling setup of an information technology (IT) system based on the determination of whether to launch the second type of offering” and - “outputting” an “indication of profitability”, previously “comput[ed]” based on “a relationship” “between” “survey- deriv[ed]” “first” and “second” “measures”, “to allow a determination of whether to launch a second type of offering” Final Act. 11 (alterations in original). The Examiner determines that claim 1 sets forth a fundamental economic practice, a certain method of organizing human activity, an idea of itself, and a mathematical relationship/formula, Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 9 and thus, an abstract idea. Id. at 13–16. When viewed through the lens of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Examiner’s analysis depicts the claimed subject matter as a mathematical concept and a “[c]ertain method [] of organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk)” under Prong One of Revised Step 2A. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The Appellant disagrees that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea and contends that “claim 1 of the present application is not related to merely gathering and analyzing information and then displaying the results[, but] . . . is directed to improving the technology or computer functionality of setting up an IT system to support an offering” (Br. 10) and “is directed to controlling setup of an IT system based on the determination of whether to launch a type of offering” (id. at 11). Before determining whether the claims at issue are directed to an abstract idea, we first determine to what the claims are directed. [T]he “directed to” inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether “their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1375, 2016 WL 1393573, at *5 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (inquiring into “the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art”). Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The question is whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology” or are “directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 10 An examination of claim 1 shows that the claim recites “[a] method comprising”: (a) “receiving survey responses regarding user interest in offerings . . . based on proposed incentives”; (b) “performing, by a computer, an analysis of the survey responses”; and (c) “controlling setup of an information technology (IT) system based on the determination” in the analysis. Claims App. i. The analysis performed by the computer comprises “deriving measures based on the survey responses,” computing an indication of profitability based on a relationship between measures of interest, and “outputting the indication of profitability to allow for a determination of whether to launch the second type of offering.” Id. We note that for the method, the receiving and controlling steps (a) and (c) are not recited as being performed by a computer, although independent medium and system claims 11 and 18 provide that a system or processor performs these functions. Id. at iii, v. The computer, system, or processor that performs the functions is a generic, conventional processor or any other computing device. See Spec. ¶¶ 14, 55. The Specification provides for “ANALYZING SURVEY RESPONSES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO LAUNCH A PARTICULAR OFFERING.” Spec., Title. In the “Background” section, the Specification discusses that “[a]n enterprise can offer various types of offerings for purchase, including products or services,” for example, a warranty service with a particular product. Id. ¶ 1. The Specification further discusses how enterprises, i.e., “a business concern, an educational organization, a government agency, and so forth,” increase profitability by selling a base offering, i.e., a primary product or service, and a supplemental offering, i.e., an option to the base offering such as a warranty, support Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 11 services, or add-on features/upgrades. Id. ¶¶ 3, 4. “Launching a new offering . . . can involve a substantial upfront investment in infrastructure by an enterprise” (id. ¶ 8), and “[i]t can be difficult to predict whether any particular new offering would be profitable to an enterprise” (id. ¶ 9). The claimed invention addresses these issues by providing “a survey-based analysis system . . . to make a determination of whether or not a new type of offering . . . is to be launched by an enterprise.” Id. ¶ 10. “In examples where the objective is to maximize profit, the launch of the new type of offering is considered in comparison with alternative strategies (e.g. different price for current offering).” Id. (emphasis omitted). The survey- based system is able to identify the value of features of offering. See id. ¶ 11. “By employing survey analysis techniques or mechanisms . . ., measures of profitability for a new offering can be obtained without having to first incur upfront investment costs. Also, such measures of profitability can be obtained without having to depend on the reliability of survey responses to duration-related questions.” Id. ¶ 53. When considered collectively and under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim’s limitations, the claim recites a method, performed in part by a conventional computing device, for analyzing survey data to output profitability data and control setup of a system.2 Receiving data is an extra-solution activity. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) 2 We note that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Board’s “slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241. Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 12 (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity). The step of performing an analysis is recited as being performed by deriving measures and computing a relationship between the measures without any details as to how the deriving and computing are done, i.e., in what way(s) technologically or by what algorithm. The Specification provides that deriving and computing are accomplished by performing standard mathematical computations such as sums and comparisons (see Spec. ¶¶ 26, 35, 36), which can be done mentally. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing cases) (“we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes”). Outputting the results of the analysis is merely insignificant post-solution activity. See id.; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (“Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.”’) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92). Thus, we are left with the limitation of controlling an IT system based on the determinations, with no meaningful steps outside that scope. The claim does not recite how, technologically or by what algorithm, the controlling is done. And, as discussed above with reference to the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the Specification provides no further details. Based on a plain reading of the claim, controlling the setup of an IT system involves influencing, determining, or executing the infrastructure of the system based on the analysis, i.e., performing some action based on the Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 13 results of the analysis, which can be a mental process and/or a post-solution activity. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 590. Analyzing survey data to output profitability data and control setup of a system is similar to the concepts of “selecting certain information, analyzing it using mathematical techniques, and reporting or displaying the results of the analysis” in SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018), of collecting, analyzing, manipulating, and processing data and displaying the results thereof in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and of calculating alarm limit values for a specific purpose in Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–95. Accordingly, we conclude the claim recites a way of analyzing information, a concept performed in the human mind, which is one of the mental processes identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 52) to output profitability, a fundamental economic principle, which is one of the “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance (id.), and thus, recites an abstract idea. As such, we find unpersuasive the Appellant’s argument that the claim does not recite one of the enumerated categories of abstract ideas. See Br. 10–13. Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Revised Guidance (84 Fed. Reg. at 54), we look to whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception,” i.e., “integrates a judicial exception into a practical application.” Here, the Appellant contends “claim 1 relates to a specific method (a method that is inventive over cited references) that Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 14 improves the relevant technology or computer functionality, which in the case of claim 1 is the technology or computer functionality of setting up an information technology system to support an offering.” Br. 9–10 (citing McRO and Enfish); see also id. at 11–17.3 When viewed through the lens of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Appellant contends that the elements of the claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because “[a]n additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. We disagree. Unlike McRO and Enfish, there is no improvement to technology or a technological process. The claimed computer, system, and processor comprise generic, conventional computer components operating in their ordinary capacities. The Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification to indicate that the invention provides a technical improvement in receiving and analyzing data and controlling setup of a system, similar to the improvement in “the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory” in Enfish (822 F.3d at 1339), or that it incorporates rules to automate a subjective task of humans, as in McRO (837 F.3d at 1315–16). Further, contrary to the Appellant’s contention, “setting up an information technology system to support an offering” (Br. 10) is not a technological field, but rather a manual process related to technology. As discussed above, the claim does not provide details on how controlling the 3 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of Office guidance). Solely for purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of Office guidance). See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 15 setup of an IT system is performed in a technological manner. The “focus” of the claim is not “on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities” (Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336), but rather on using the computer as a tool to implement the abstract idea in the particular field of determining profitable offerings and setting up IT systems. See Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular . . . environment does not render the claims any less abstract”). Controlling the setup of an IT system merely limits the abstract idea to a particular technological environment. See BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1286– 87 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework Under the second step in the Alice framework (corresponding to Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance), we find supported the Examiner’s determination that the claim’s limitations, taken individually or as an ordered combination, do not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, that the “recitation of generic, ubiquitous computer structure recited at a high level of generality . . . that serves to perform the generic computer data processing instructions or functions that, as identified above, are already directed to abstract idea(s)” (Final Act. 16) and that the claim recites “well-understood, routine, and conventional activities (i.e. surveyed customer(s) such as performing repetitive calculations” (id.). Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 16 To the extent the Appellant argues that the steps of the claim “[a]dd[] a specific limitation or combination of limitations that [is] not well- understood, routine, conventional activity in the field” (2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56) because “claim 1 is inventive over the references of record” (Br. 16), an abstract idea does not transform into an inventive concept just because the prior art does not disclose or suggest it. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89–90. “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). Indeed, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89; see also Mayo, 566 U.S. at 91 (rejecting “the Government’s invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better established inquiry under § 101”). Taking the claimed elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. The claimed computer, system and processor comprise a conventional, general purpose computer. See supra. It is clear, from the Specification, including the claim’s language, that the “limitations require no improved computer resources [the Appellant] claims to have invented, just already available computers, with their already available basic functions, to use as tools in executing the claimed process” performed by the claimed system. SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1169–70. We agree with the Examiner that the computer, system, and processor operate in their ordinary and conventional capacities to perform the well-understood, routine, and conventional functions of Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 17 receiving and analyzing data, outputting the results of the analysis, and performing some action based on the analysis. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355 (gathering, sending, monitoring, analyzing, selecting, and presenting information does not transform the abstract process into a patent-eligible invention); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (data gathering and displaying are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities); SAP America, 898 F.3d at 1170 (“[A]n invocation of already-available computers that are not themselves plausibly asserted to be an advance, for use in carrying out improved mathematical calculations, amounts to a recitation of what is ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional.’”) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). Considered as an ordered combination, the components of the Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data communication (receiving), analyzing, and using the analysis to output data and perform some action (controlling) is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354–56 (holding that the sequence of gathering, analyzing, and displaying in real-time was abstract); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that the sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract); SAP America, 898 F.3d at 1170 (holding that the sequence of storing, receiving, analyzing, and generating data was abstract); Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–95 (holding that sequence of determining values and performing action of adjusting was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. Appeal 2018-003010 Application 13/357,850 18 We note that, as discussed above, the claim simply recites the functional results to be achieved by a conventional computer. The claim “provides only a result-oriented solution[] with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it. Our law demands more.” Intellectual Ventures, 850 F.3d at 1342. Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination that the limitations of claim 1 do not transform the claim into significantly more than the abstract idea. For at least the reasons above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of independent claim 1 and claims 2–19, the rejection of which stands with claim 1. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–19 112 Written Description 1–19 1–19 101 Eligibility 1–19 Overall Outcome 1–19 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation