Feldman, Casey Bryan. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 21, 2020

15098010 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 21, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/098,010 04/13/2016 Casey Bryan Feldman 83643773 (FGTL-07600) 8133
130881 7590 05/21/2020
Stevens Law Group - FGTL
1754 Technology Drive, Suite 226
San Jose, CA 95110
EXAMINER
ENGLISH, ALECIA DIANE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/21/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspto@stevenslawgroup.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CASEY BRYAN FELDMAN and DORON M. ELLIOTT
____________

Appeal 2019-000259
Application 15/098,010
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ROBERT E. NAPPI, and
STEPHEN E. BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1–13 and 15–19. Appeal Br. 1. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies the
real party in interest as Ford Global Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Claimed Invention
Appellant’s invention relates generally to “systems and methods that
determine currently available applications in a mobile device,” as shown, for
example, in Figure 1, reproduced below. Spec. ¶ 1; Fig. 1.

Figure 1 shows a block diagram of example environment 100
capable of implementing Appellant’s invention.
Spec. ¶¶ 4, 17; Fig. 1.
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According to Appellant, vehicle 102 includes entertainment
system 104 that provides various entertainment, navigation information, and
other data to occupants of vehicle 102 via a vehicle user interface.
Spec. ¶¶ 17, 19. Entertainment system 104 communicates with mobile
device 106 carried by user 108. Spec. ¶ 18. Mobile device 106 is capable of
wireless communication with entertainment system 104 when mobile
device 106 is within a communication range of entertainment system 104.
Spec. ¶ 18. Entertainment system 104 allows a driver or passenger of
vehicle 102 to control certain features and/or applications currently available
on mobile device 106. Spec. ¶ 19. According to Appellant, “[s]ince
applications may be deleted from a mobile device by a user, the same mobile
device may have different available applications at different times,” and so
Appellant’s invention receives such information from mobile device 106
related to currently available applications and accordingly updates
entertainment system 104. Spec. ¶¶ 24, 27.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal:
1. A method comprising:
a vehicle entertainment system establishing a
communication link with a mobile device proximate the vehicle;
(a) the vehicle entertainment system receiving, from the mobile
device, an identification of currently available applications on
the mobile device;
(b) the vehicle entertainment system updating an in-
vehicle user interface to display the currently available
applications on the mobile device to at least one occupant of the
vehicle;
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(c) subsequent to performing (a) and (b), transmitting a
query to the mobile device regarding availability of a first
application of the currently available applications;
(d) receiving a response to the query indicating that the
first application is not available; and
(e) in response to (d), updating the in-vehicle user
interface to remove reference to the first application.
Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.).

The Applied References
The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence of
unpatentability of the claims on appeal:
Gerlach US 2016/0034238 A1 Feb. 4, 2016
Langlois US 2017/0115828 A1 Apr. 27, 2017

The Examiner’s Rejections
The Examiner made the following rejections of the claims on appeal:
Claims 1–4, 7–13, 15, and 17–19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Gerlach. Final Act. 2–8.
Claims 5, 6, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Gerlach and Langlois. Final Act. 9–10.

ANALYSIS2
Appellant disputes, inter alia, the Examiner’s findings that Gerlach
anticipates the pending independent claims, namely claims 1, 11, and 19.
Appeal Br. 7–11; Reply Br. 1–8.

2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered Appellant’s Appeal Brief
filed April 5, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); Appellant’s Reply Brief filed October 9,
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Gerlach relates generally to:
An in-vehicle system for providing a driver with access to
functionality of a mobile device that includes a head unit with an
in-vehicle display for providing infotainment to the driver,
software that configures the user interface with a graphical
scheme native to the head unit, and a software interface by which
the head unit can receive deep links from the mobile device.
Id., Abstract. In an exemplary embodiment, “after a user selects a graphical
icon having an associated deep link, the head unit 201 invokes software to
determine whether the user should be permitted to follow the deep link or
whether access to the deep link should be blocked.” Id. ¶ 90 (emphasis
added). Gerlach explains that this software may be implemented within
mirroring client software 314, which may make this determination before
initiating a mirroring protocol connection with mobile device 202. Id.
Gerlach also explains that, alternatively, the determination may be made by
mirroring server software 364 “or one of the mobile applications 362 that is
the target of the deep link.” Id. (emphasis added). For example, if certain
deep links would result in application contexts that would distract a driver,
mirroring client software 314 “may block access to the deep link” if the
vehicle is moving, or if the vehicle speed exceeds a threshold. Id. ¶ 91
(emphasis added); see id. ¶¶ 89–92, Fig. 4.
To serve as an anticipatory reference, “the reference must disclose
each and every element of the claimed invention, whether it does so
explicitly or inherently.” In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). The Examiner finds Gerlach anticipates claim 1, and as

2018 (“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed August 9, 2018
(“Ans.”); the Final Office Action mailed October 5, 2017 (“Final Act.”); and
Appellant’s Specification filed April 13, 2016 (“Spec.”).
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relevant here, the limitation of “(e) in response to [receiving a response to
the query indicating that the first application is not available], updating the
in-vehicle user interface to remove reference to the first application”
(emphasis added). Ans. 11–13. In particular, the Examiner finds:
[T]he limitation remove reference to the first application is [sic]
does not limit the claim to deletion of the application from the
head unit, only to remove reference to the first application. The
[E]xaminer finds that the disclose[d] blocking the usage of
certain applications as explained by Gerlach as removing
reference to the first application.
Ans. 12; see Final Act. 2–3. We note that the Examiner’s above statement
involves the limitation feature of “remove reference to the first application,”
but not the whole limitation of “in response to [receiving a response to the
query indicating that the first application is not available], updating the in-
vehicle user interface to remove reference to the first application,” as recited
in claim 1 (emphasis added).
Appellant argues “Gerlach does not disclose removing any reference
to a mobile application or performing any action similar thereto when a deep
link is blocked because its context is not met.” Reply Br. 6; see Appeal
Br. 9–11. Appellant argues, “[f]or example, the deep link is a reference to a
mobile application but Gerlach does not disclose deleting the deep link if it
is blocked due to its context not being satisfied.” Reply Br. 6–7. Appellant
argues the Examiner “has further cited no evidence to indicate any reference
to a mobile application being removed when a deep link is blocked,” and
therefore, the Examiner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that Gerlach discloses “in response to (d), updating the in-vehicle user
interface to remove reference to the first application.” Reply Br. 7; see
Appeal Br. 11 (In Gerlach, “the vehicle makes the application unavailable
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based on its evaluation of the driver’s state. There is no reference to . . .
updating of a display [to remove reference to the first application].”).
We find Appellant’s argument persuasive, and agree that the Examiner has
not provided sufficient evidence or technical reasoning to show how Gerlach
explicitly or inherently discloses the limitation at issue (recited above).
For example, the Examiner neither construes “updating the in-vehicle user
interface to remove reference to the first application,” nor sufficiently
explains how or why Gerlach’s “block[ing] access” to a deep link to an
application explicitly or inherently discloses “updating the in-vehicle user
interface to remove reference to the first application” in response to
receiving a response to a query indicating that the first application is not
available. See Ans. 12; Final Act. 3; compare Gerlach ¶¶ 89–92,
with Spec. ¶¶ 24, 29.
At best, the Examiner leaves us to speculate as to how or why Gerlach
explicitly or inherently discloses the limitation of “in response to [receiving
a response to the query indicating that the first application is not available],
updating the in-vehicle user interface to remove reference to the first
application,” as recited in claim 1; and to how or why the skilled artisan
would at once envisage Appellant’s claimed arrangement or combination
from Gerlach’s disclosure. See Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc.,
815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We will not resort to speculation or
assumptions to cure the deficiencies in the Examiner’s fact finding and
reasoning. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967); Ex parte
Braeken, 54 USPQ2d 1110, 1112 (BPAI 1999) (unpublished) (“The review
authorized by 35 U.S.C. [§] 134 is not a process whereby the [E]xaminer . . .
invite[s] the [B]oard to examine the application and resolve patentability in
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the first instance.”). Because we find this issue dispositive here, we do not
address Appellant’s other arguments.
Accordingly, constrained by the present record, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) of independent claim 1.
For similar reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) of independent claims 11 and 19, which recite
commensurate limitations. We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) of claims 2–4, 7–10, 12, 13, 15, 17, and 18,
which depend therefrom.
In addition, because the Examiner has not persuasively shown how
the other cited art, namely Langlois, remedies the deficiency in the rejection
based upon Gerlach (see Ans. 11–13), we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 5, 6, and 16, which variously
depend from independent claims 1 and 11.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 7–13,
15, 17–19
102 Gerlach 1–4, 7–13,
15, 17–19
5, 6, 16 103 Gerlach, Langlois 5, 6, 16
Overall
Outcome
1–13, 15–19

REVERSED