Federated American Insurance Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 17, 1975

219 N.L.R.B. 200 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Federated American Insurance Company , Federated
American Life Insurance Company , Federated
Agencies, Inc., and Federated Incorporated and Of-
fice and Professional Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, Local Union No. 8. Case
19-CA-7170
July 17, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
PENELLO
On March 31, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Al-
len Sinsheimer, Jr., issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondents filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and General Counsel
filed a brief in answer to Respondents' exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs I
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act. as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondents, Federated American
Insurance Company, Federated American Life In-
surance Company, Federated Agencies, Inc., and
Federated Incorporated, Seattle, Washington, their
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended Order.
i Respondents ' request for oral argument is hereby denied, inasmuch as
the record , the exceptions , and the briefs adequately present the issues and
the positions of the parties.
2 The Respondents have excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibili-
ty unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces
us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ALLEN SINSHEIMER , JR., Administrative Law Judge: The
above proceeding was heard on October 9, 10, and 11,
1974, at Seattle, Washington. The complaint I and notice
of hearing issued August 27, 1974.2 The Respondents filed
an answer denying the basic allegations of the complaint.
The issues involve (1) whether the above-named Respon-
dents constitute a joint enterprise or single employer unit;
(2) whether as such or otherwise they are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Board; (3) whether as a joint enterprise
or single employer unit, they were, although not all named
therein, parties to a contract with the Union. Further issues
are whether the Respondents, or any of them, failed to
bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and
whether they or any of them engaged in violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1).
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses and after due consideration of the briefs of the
General Counsel and the Respondents, I make the follow-
ing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESSES OF THE RESPONDENTS
This subject of the businesses of the Respondents will be
set forth under the above heading as supplemented by
other evidence related hereafter in connection with the al-
leged violations. The General Counsel contends that the
aforenamed Employers constitute a single employer or en-
terprise for the purpose of the Act.
The parties agree that the principal factors which the
Board weighs or considers are interrelationship of opera-
tions, common ownership or financial control, common
management, and centralized control of labor relations.
None of these by itself is deemed controlling, nor must all
four be present to find a single employer. The parties differ
as to the extent of existence of these factors in the instant
case . The General Counsel asserts that all four are present.
Respondents assert that there is no interrelationship of op-
erations, no showing of any centralized control of labor
relations, and no showing of any common ownership. Re-
spondent does admit some overlapping of management
personnel among three of the companies.
Federated American Insurance Company and Federated
Incorporated have both been in existence since prior to
1964; Federated Agencies, Inc., since about 1969; and
Federated American Life Insurance Company, according
to McCauley's testimony, since about August 1972.3 Feder-
ated American Insurance Company sells insurance policies
i An original charge filed June 28, 1974, and an amended charge filed
August 5, 1974.
=The complaint was amended by motion granted at the hearing.
3In a letter to the Union on May 6, 1974, McCauley stated that it re-
ceived its certificate of authority from the State of Washington May 5, 1971.
Perhaps the August 1972 approximation referred to commencement of busi-
ness.
219 NLRB No. 38
FEDERATED AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
to individual customers . Federated American Life Insur-
ance Company sells insurance policies to individual cus-
tomers . Federated Agencies , Inc., is a holding company
that sells insurance policies to individual customers
through agencies but not through any employees employed
directly by Federated Agencies since it has no employees.
Federated Incorporated receives a fee for managing certain
aspects of the business of Federated American Insurance
Company and Federated American Life Insurance Com-
pany.
Pertinent facts with respect to ownership and financial
control of the named Respondents are as follows : Federat-
ed Incorporated is totally owned by Mr. and Mrs. Wayne
Murray and Mr. and Mrs . W. T. McCauley. Federated
Incorporated owns 23 percent of the stock of Federated
American while Federated American 's second largest
shareholder owns only 2 percent of the stock of Federated
American . Federated American wholly owns Federated
Agencies and also Federated American Life Insurance
Company. The foregoing reflects a large degree of financial
control in the McCauleys and the Murrays.
With respect to management , the corporate officers of
Federated Incorporated are Mr. and Mrs. McCauley, Mr.
and Mrs . Murray, and Zora Tapping , who is also assistant
secretary of Federated American Insurance Comany and
Federated Incorporated , and has served in a supervisory
position in both companies . The officers of Federated
Agencies are McCauley and Tapping. The corporate offi-
cers of Federated American Insurance Company are
Wayne Murray (president), W. T. McCauley (executive
vice president and secretary), Jack McDonald (chairman
of the Board), Zora Tapping (assistant secretary), and Joe
Davis (vice president in charge of claims). The officers of
Federated American Life are identical to the officers of
Federated American Insurance Company. McCauley is the
chief executive officer of all four named Respondents.
There is similarly a duplication of directors . The board
of directors of Federated Incorporated consists of the Mc-
Cauleys and the Murrays . The board of directors of Feder-
ated Agencies consists of McCauley, Murray, and Tap-
ping . The executive board of directors, as well as the board
of directors of Federated American has consisted of Mc-
Cauley, Murray, Tapping, and Alice Dobson . The board of
directors and executive board of directors of Federated
Life are the same as those of Federated American.
The foregoing reflects a sharing of common manage-
ment . As for the labor relations policies, it appears from
the record that the same policies are applied to the office
clerical employees of all the Respondents except Agencies,
which has no employees . A labor agreement entered into in
1971 which names as the parties Federated American In-
surance Company and the Union has been applied to all of
the office clerical employees of the three companies that
have such employees : Federated Incorporated , Federated
American , and Federated Life. The General Counsel con-
tends that this agreement was applicable to Federated In-
corporated from its inception and subsequently also to
Federated Life, and hence supports the majority status of
the Union as representative of the employees of those com-
panies . For reasons set forth hereafter , I am finding that
such was and is the case . As to matters not covered by said
201
agreement , the same personnel policies are also applied to
all of the office clerical employees of the aforesaid compa-
nies.
McCauley testified that he was ultimately in control of
the labor relations for all of the Respondents , although in a
letter of April 19 in reply to the Union's request for negoti-
ation , McCauley stated that Joe Davis would head up the
negotiating team, but was then ill. It appears that McCau-
ley has, in fact , negotiated with the Union on behalf of the
Respondents and in the past has signed the collective-bar-
gaining agreements . Moreover, McCauley was the only of-
ficer of the Respondents to communicate with the Union
in response to their communications during the period here
involved . He was also the person who dealt with the NLRB
Regional Office concerning the case . McCauley frequently
formulates and distributes personnel policies to the em-
ployees ; persons resigning inform McCauley; he has met
with the Union over grievances involving employees of the
Respondent companies ; McCauley directly supervises all
of the employees of the three Respondent companies which
have employees . McCauley also reviews recommendations
for raises and authorizes such . As set forth, the labor rela-
tions policies of these companies are identical and further,
the working conditions are also identical.
As for the interrelationship of operations , the manage-
ment and ownership, as set forth , overlap. Each company
is located in the same office at the same address in Seattle;
they use a common telephone ; they appear to the public to
be a single integrated insurance operation ; they use one
phone number listed under the name of Federated Ameri-
can Insurance ; they have one receptionist who serves them
all, and uses the name Federated American in responding;
Federated American and Federated Life use the same let-
terhead which refers to "Federated American Insurance
Companies." McCauley testified that two office clerical
persons, Beeman and Weyman, were the only office cleri-
cal employees at Federated American , with one exception,
a stenographer at Federated Life, and the others were em-
ployed at Federated Incorporated . However, the witnesses
for the General Counsel testified they thought they were
employed by Federated American. Both management offi-
cials and employees , who testified , referred numerous
times to "the Company" or "our Company." When a meet-
ing was held to announce a policy to employees , all of the
employees of the companies were assembled together.
Federated Incorporated 's stated purpose is that of man-
agement of the insurance companies pursuant to a man-
agement agreement entered into between Federated Incor-
porated and Federated American Insurance Company. In
fact, the employees appear to work interchangeably among
the several companies . When an employee transfers from
one company to another, his seniority dates from the origi-
nal hire at any one of the companies , so that this tenure
(seniority), vacation rights, etc., are determined according-
ly. There is substantial overlap in supervisory personnel.
Davis is office manager for all companies and gives assign-
ment to all the company employees . Hudgins is a supervi-
sor and manager for both Federated American Insurance
Company and Federated Incorporated . All the employees,
as stated , respond to the supervision of McCauley. Tap-
ping is apparently employed by Federated Incorporated
202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Federated American Insurance Company but is re-
sponsible for the payroll of all the companies and has au-
thority to reprimand employees of all companies . Further,
she interviews and hires employees for all of the compa-
nies . Mallonee is comptroller for all companies and pre-
pares financial statements for all.
Further, Federated Incorporated directly manages all
the affairs of Federated Life ; it directly manages all the
affairs of Federated American and indirectly manages
Federated Agencies , a wholly owned subsidiary of Feder-
ated American . The employees of Federated Incorporated
are involved accordingly in practically every business as-
pect of Federated American , Federated Life , and Federat-
ed Agencies . There is a central accounting office for the
companies and bills of all companies are paid by checks
drawn on Federated Incorporated . There is additional evi-
dence relating and establishing the interrelationship of the
companies , some of which will be indicated hereafter.
As for the jurisdictional standards of the Board , Federat-
ed American itself , which is a property and casualty insur-
ance company , during 1973 wrote and earned over $5 mil-
lion worth of insurance premiums , of which it wrote over
$426,000 in the State of Oregon . During that same time, it
paid over $250,000 for the benefit of the companies' in-
sured customers in Oregon . The total volume of business of
Federated American outside of Washington in 1973 was
$463,000 ; in the 12 months preceding the hearing,
$435,000 . Federated American Life Insurance Company
had no gross volume of business outside the State of Wash-
ington . Federated Incorporated had a total gross volume
outside Washington , in the year 1973, of $33,740 ; in the 12
months preceding the hearing , $25,964 . Federated Agen-
cies, through Federated 's insurance services , had $49,171
of business outside the State of Washington in the year
1973; $39,196 in the 12-month period prior to the hearing.
Federated American Insurance Company is licensed to do
business in seven States outside Washington and does busi-
ness in Oregon , Nevada , Arizona , and possibly Idaho.
Were these viewed as separate companies , there might
be some question as to the Board's jurisdiction . However,
since I am finding the basis of the facts set forth and also
additional ones , post , that these companies may and
should be treated as an overall enterprise or employer,
both as to function of their operations and that of jurisdic-
tion , I find and conclude that they meet the jurisdictional
standards of the Board for a retail business , since the total
business exceeds $5 million of which a substantial amount,
as set forth, is written outside the State . I accordingly find
and conclude that the Respondents are engaged in and
affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7)
of the Act 4
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Office and Professional Employees International Union,
AFL-CIO-CLC. Local Union No. 8, herein called the
4 Playtime Kiddie Wear, Inc Deer Park Mfg Co, Inc, 184 NLRB 373
( 1970), citing Radio and Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v.
Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 ( 1965), Sakrete of Northern
California, Inc., 332 F.2d 902 (C.A. 9, 1964).
Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of the
Act.
Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Prior to the last labor agreement involved herein which
was entered into July 1, 1971, with expiration date June 30,
1974, which specifically named the Union and Federated
American Insurance Company, there was a prior agree-
ment dated May 1, 1968 , terminating April 30, 1971, be-
tween Federated American Insurance Company and the
Union. The Union, by letter of September 11, 1967, had
written Mr . McCauley stating that some employees who
were members of Local 8 were in the employment of Fed-
erated Incorporated, and requesting that Federated Incor-
porated be incorporated into the bargaining sessions. By
letter of September 13, 1967 , Federated Incorporated, by
McCauley, replied that to their knowledge the Union had
not been chosen or designated as representative by a ma-
jority of the employees of Federated Incorporated, and un-
til that time was accomplished , the demand for recognition
must be held in abeyance . The contract was thereafter en-
tered into between Federated American and the Union.
Following that agreement , negotiations commenced for an-
other agreement , as set forth hereafter.
Thereafter, in 1971 , the following occurred: It appears
that the Union submitted proposed changes to the existing
contract between Federated American Insurance Compa-
ny and the Union which bears the date February 19, 1971,
with the first change set forth as follows : Change "1968" to
read "1971" and add after the work "Company" the fol-
lowing: "and Federated Incorporated." Other changes
were proposed but the first is the significant one herein. In
a letter of March 31, 1971, McCauley wrote to Olson, "En-
closed please find our reply to the union proposed changes
to the existing contract dated 2 / 19/71." The following are
enclosed: Reply to proposed changes and then lists certain
other enclosures , and concludes , "We trust this will enable
you to continue your negotiations." Attached to this letter
is a document entitled "Reply to proposed changes to the
existing contract between Federated American Insurance
Company and Office and Professional Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local No. 8," with 2/19/71 in parenthesis at
the top.
This document reads: "Name change accepted." The
document contained opposite this and some other 17 items
on the page , some pencil notations and opposite the one,
"name change accepted," is the word "yes." Olson testified
that he received the letter with the above attachment. Ol-
son also stated that the pencil notations were in his hand-
writing and testified that McCauley never retracted his ap-
proval of the proposed name change to include the
employees of Federated Incorporated. McCauley testified
that he did not recall ever seeing such an attachment and
that he did not agree to any such name change. However, a
carbon copy of the letter and attachment in his file reflects
that it is identical to the attachment to the letter received
by Olson, which was received in evidence. McCauley de-
nies any such reference and testified that he asked Olson at
FEDERATED AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY 203
all times to produce proof of Federated Incorporated's ma-
jority status before he would recognize the Union. Howev-
er, in an affidavit, McCauley gave to the Board, he said,
"When I signed this agreement in 1971, I questioned if it
only covered the employees of Federated American Insur-
ance Company. However, I believed at the time that the
Union thought the contract covered the employees of Fed-
erated Incorporated, as well. The Union seemed satisfied
that everything would be OK if I would sign it . It soon
became obvious that the Union did feel that the contract
governed the office and clerical employees of both compa-
nies because they collected the dues and initiation fees we
sent them on employees working for both companies." Mc-
Cauley admittedly applied its terms to the employees of
Federated Incorporated. In 1974, McCauley wrote, "In the
past we have allowed the contract negotiated on behalf of
Federated American Insurance Company to apply to the
employees of Federated Incorporated." McCauley also
told employee Linda Seelbach (see, post), on May 16 that
everybody was covered by the contract until it ran out in
June. I find and conclude that the Respondent, in fact, did
send the letter and attachment thereto to Olson on or
about the date of March 31, 1971.5
Subsequently, the most recent contract here involved
was presented to the Respondent by the Union and execu-
ted by the parties effective as of July 1, 1971, through June
30, 1974. It names as the parties thereto the Union and
Federated American Insurance Company, but does not
name Federated Incorporated. General Counsel contends
that it was clearly intended to so name Federated Incorpo-
rated and as set forth hereafter was fully applied to the
employees of Federated Incorporated. The Respondent
contends that it named Federated American Insurance
Company only, and was intended only to apply to those
employees. The Respondent admits that its terms may
have been applied to employees of Federated Incorporated
and Federated American Life but that this does not imply
or mean that the contract itself was considered applicable
to them. General Counsel and the Union asserts that the
contract was intended to apply to these companies and
was, in fact, applied to the employees of Federated Incor-
porated and Federated American Life Insurance Company
as well as Federated American. Respondent points out that
5 Olson explained the method he followed in drafting the 1971 contract
was as follows:
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) With that admonition , Mr. Olson, will you an-
swer my question? Why, then, does only this name of Federated Ameri-
can appear in this contract?
A. To the best of my knowledge , what I know , was that I prepared
this contract , the last one , in my office; and how I go about preparing
a contract is that I will take the prior contract-
Q. (Interrupting) Tell us what you did do.
A. What I did do is I took the prior contract, incorporated changes
we had agreed upon , and I insert them sometimes in writing on a
yellow legal page . Sometimes I cut sections of the old contract out, and
I put it-in that type of situation , I give it to one of our clericals who
would [put] it into contracts , and then they are normally proofread,
forwarded on to the employer; and if the employer agrees, they sign
these contracts, and this is what happened in this instance.
Q. When did you first notice that the collective bargaining agree-
ment identified as General Counsel's 16 had only the name of Federat-
ed American on it?
A. On or about probably May 6 of this year, 1974.
Federated American Life Insurance Company was not
even in existence until 1972.
It appears from the correspondence relating to the con-
tract referred to that it was intended to also apply to Feder-
ated Incorporated. As set forth, Respondent denies this
and asserts that parole evidence may not be used to either
reform or modify the agreement and that if there were a
mistake then it should be established by proper proceed-
ings for reformation of a mistake which would not be ap-
plicable to this situation. As far as parole evidence is con-
cerned, in cases before the Board, it appears from both
Board and Court cases that such may be admissible
whether or not generally applicable .6 However, in order to
properly and fully evaluate what actually occurred and
what the contract actually related to, there should be con-
sidered both (1) those matters that have previously been set
forth, and (2) additional evidence as to what the contract
by its terms covered and how the agreement was, in fact,
applied.
First, it appears from some evidence adduced that, as of
May/June 1974, there were 12 employees involved of
whom 9 were employed by Federated Incorporated, 2 by
Federated American, and 1 by Federated Life. However,
according to McCauley, at the time the 1971-74 contract
was signed, two or three at most employees of Federated
American were in classifications set forth therein, namely,
claim clerk, claims clerk senior, and possibly "underwrit-
ing" clerk, a broad term which may include a rate clerk in
the direct mail activity. McCauley said the situation was
presently about the same . Further, according to McCauley,
there would be currently about 13 employees in Federated
Incorporated that would fit classifications of what the bar-
gaining unit consisted of under the wording in the contract.
McCauley testified Federated Life had no employees that
would fit that.'
The contract of 1971 lists the following job classifica-
tions as an appendix thereto: messenger, mail, supply
clerk; file clerk, underwriting clerk, claims clerk, switch-
board operator-receptionists, typist, or policy writer; tran-
scribing machine operator, secretary, stenographer/secre-
tary, secretary-executive, accounting clerk, payroll clerk,
accountant, claims clerk-senior (13 categories ). It also in
the recognition clause, Article I, Section 2, excludes certain
secretaries.
At the time, at Federated American there were apparent-
ly employed two persons in two categories. Most other
categories as set forth were among employees of Federated
Incorporated. Respondent contends that the reason for
listing all the categories in this agreement was that in the
event Federated Incorporated and Federated American
terminated the management agreement with Federated In-
corporated, Federated American would then have to oper-
ate on its own. It would then need the additional categories
and that was why they were provided for in the agreement.
6 See Printing Industries of Northern California, 204 NLRB 329 (1973),
and Communications Workers of America v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone
Company, 337 F.2d 455 (C.A. 9, 1964).
7 Although it appears that one employee Bean is shown as employed by
Federated Life and paying dues, apparently McCauley's position is that the
Federated Life employee is one of the excluded secretaries under the con-
tract.
204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Although , the contract exclusions of certain secretaries was
not referred to, presumably the same contention would be
applicable.
As set forth , the working conditions stated in the con-
tract with respect to various matters were applied to em-
ployees of all the companies including workweek , paydays,
holidays, sick leave , termination, vacations , seniority, disa-
bility benefits , etc. Also, as set forth , employees who trans-
ferred from one company to another retained seniority
commencing with employment with the first company.
Employees of all companies were employed by the same
person and were subject to the overall supervision of Mc-
Cauley and also of other supervisors , in the case of certain
companies , including particularly personnel by Tapping.
Also meetings and notices were addressed to the employees
of all the companies with regard to matters of dress, park-
ing lot utilization , etc. Grievances were conducted involv-
ing employees of all the companies , including one in par-
ticular, discussed in detail in the record . These were taken
up by the Union for employees of various companies. The
location of the facilities and the common operation and
property have been previously described.
Further, significantly, the union-security provision of the
contract was applied to the employees of all of the three
companies which had employees . It provides that all regu-
lar employees shall , as a condition of employment , become
and remain members in good standing of the Union within
31 days following completion of what amounted to a pro-
bationary period of 60 days.
All employees at such appropriate time following the re-
quisite period were given by a representative of Respon-
dents application for membership cards and dues authori-
zation cards to be signed by them . These were generally
and regularly signed except in one or two instances near
the end of the agreement-where either the employee had
not completed the 60 days or, in one instance , special cir-
cumstances were involved . In any case, the Respondents
were requiring the employees to conform to the contract
provisions as to union security and to apply for member-
ship and sign checkoff dues authorization . In fact, all had
apparently signed checkoff dues authorizations, although
two had not paid initiation fees as of the period here in-
volved.
Respondents contended that they were concerned about
requiring employees to become members and pay dues if
they were not legally required to do so . However, it ap-
pears that, as to the 1971 -74 contract, the first time Re-
spondents manifested such concern was in May 1974. Prior
to that time , Respondents had been regularly requiring em-
ployees to apply for membership and sign dues authoriza-
tion without any expressed concern . This would indicate
either ( 1) that the Respondents apparently were uncon-
cerned about violating the law if the employees were not
legally required to join the Union or pay dues, or (2) that
Respondents considered that the contract did properly ap-
ply to all the employees and they could legally be required
to join the Union and pay dues . While this issue need not
be resolved herein, it does bear on the resolution to be
reached as to application of the contract . If it is resolved
that the contract was applicable throughout this period to
all employees , Respondents would not have been illegally
requiring them to apply for membership and authorize
payment of dues. If the contract were not applicable to all
employees, then the Respondents may have been commit-
ting illegal acts (subject, of course, to Sec. 10(b), et al.).
Normally, it would not be inferred that an illegal act is
being performed when a legal act can be inferred.
On April 15, 1974, the Union, through Olson, wrote Mc-
Cauley, vice president of Federated American Insurance
Company, that the Union desired to reopen the present
labor agreement and that he wanted to take the opportuni-
ty to offer to meet and confer for the purpose of negotiat-
ing a new agreement . On April 19, the Federated American
Insurance Company by McCauley wrote to Olson as repre-
sentative of the Union stating that they had his letter re-
questing negotiations ; that Joe Davis would head up the
negotiating team , but was sick ; and that McCauley would
keep him posted and arrange a meeting at the earliest date
possible.
On May 6, McCauley wrote to Olson stating "in the past
we have allowed the contract negotiated on behalf of Federat-
ed American Insurance Company to apply to the employees of
Federated Incorporated. [Emphasis supplied .] In the ab-
sence of any credential certifying Office and Professional
Employees International Union, Local 8 as bargaining
agent, this condition can no longer prevail . Perhaps you
may wish to organize them ." This letter was signed by Mc-
Cauley on behalf of Federated Incorporated.
On May 6, McCauley also wrote to Olson with reference
to American Life and said, "This is a new company that
received its certificate of authority from the State of Wash-
ington on March 5, 1971. The entire staff consists of a
manager and his secretary. We cannot see any employee of
this company to be eligible for membership in Office and
Professional Employees International Union Local 8.
However, it is our desire to follow fair labor relations prac-
tices and upon proper presentation to the Federated Amer-
ican Life Insurance Company of the proper credentials
electing Office and Professional Employees International
Union Local 8 as bargaining agent , we will arrange a meet-
ing with you." This was signed Federated American Life
Insurance Company by McCauley. (G.C. Exh. 5A).
On May 6, McCauley also wrote to Olson:
Dear Mr . Olson:
In reply to your letter of April 15, 1974 we must
respectfully submit the fact we do not have evidence
of Office and Professional Employees International
Union Local 8 authority from the employees to be
recognized by Federated American Insurance Compa-
ny as bargaining agent . In the spirit of fair labor bar-
gaining practices , we will arrange a meeting if and
when this authority is presented to us. Currently, there
are two employees in this unit that would seem to be
eligible members.
Thank you.
Yours truly,
FEDERATED AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
On May 8, Olson responded to McCauley that he was
surprised to receive his three letters dated May 6, regarding
Federated American Insurance Company, Federated
FEDERATED AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
American Life Insurance Company and Federated Incor-
porated , and asked "Why did you write them?"
Olson then goes on:
In your letter regarding Federated American Insur-
ance Company , you indicate you will meet with us
when Local 8 presents authority that we represent the
employees. You have that authority in the form of the
labor agreement and it is in effect until July 1, 1974.
Furthermore, you suggest we only represent two (2)
eligible employees . Our membership records indicate
that we represent fifteen (15) employees of Federated
American Insurance Company.
I want to take this opportunity to offer to meet and
confer with you or your designee for the purpose of
renegotiating this contract at your convenience.
Please notify me, in writing , when you want to be-
gin negotiations.
McCauley responded to Olson on May 15:
Your letter to me of May 8 , 1974 does not seem to
require a reply as my last correspondence with you is
very clear and concise.
The labor agreement in force with Federated Amer-
ican Insurance Company is terminated on July 1,
1974.
On May 16, Olson replied:
In reference to the second paragraph , you men-
tioned the contract is terminated on July 1, 1974. I
realize this . It is my understanding that Federated
American Insurance Company does not plan on re-
newing the contract with Local 8 , or does not plan to
begin negotiations soon . What is the Company's posi-
tion?
Please apprise me of the Company 's position by re-
turn mail.
I want to take this opportunity to offer to meet and
confer with you or your designee , Mr. Davis , at your
convenience , for the purpose of renegotiating this
Agreement.
On May 17, McCauley replied to Olson, and told him to
please refer to the letters from Federated Incorporated,
Federated Life Insurance Company and Federated Ameri-
can Insurance Company all dated May 6, 1974.
On June 6 or 7, 1974 , Olson wrote to McCauley:
As of this date , I have received no word from you
with regard to when we will begin negotiations on
terms for a new contract.
Is Federated American Insurance Company going
to negotiate a new Agreement with Local 8? A plain
"yes" or "no" answer will suffice.
Please inform me by return mail of the Company's
position.
On June 19, McCauley replied:
We have received your letter of June 7, 1974.
Please refer to my letter of May 17 and the letters
from Federated American Insurance Company, Fed-
erated Life Insurance Company and Federated Inc.,
all dated May 6, 1974.
205
No bargaining or meetings occurred thereafter , and it is
evident that the Respondents were refusing to meet with
the Union. Certain events occurred after May 6 which the
Respondent contends further supports its position not to
bargain with the Union which will be considered but which
I do not believe to be material.
It appears that on June 28 , 1974, eight employees signed
a document stating:
"We the undersigned Federated American Insurance
Company and/or Federated American Life Insurance
Company and/or Federated Inc. wish to withdraw and dis-
miss any and all relations with Office and Professional Em-
ployees International Union Local No. 8, AFL-CIO, as of
July 1, 1974."
The circumstances under which this was signed as well
as allegations relating to alleged unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) will be considered , post. How-
ever, this petition and circumstances of its signing , even if
proper and even if there were no independent violations of
Section 8(a)(1) could not affect (or nullify) a prior failure
to bargain commencing in May.
Under all the circumstances set forth herein, I have
found:
1. The Respondent Employers Federated American In-
surance Company, Federated American Life Insurance
Company , and Federated Incorporated constitute an en-
terprise or single employer.
2. I find and conclude that the contract entered into in
1971 was intended to cover the employees of both Federat-
ed American and Federated Incorporated and that such is
manifest both from the correspondence that preceded the
contract , and is further shown , as set forth , by the matters
covered by the contract including the various classifica-
tions (and exclusions), and the application of the contract
to the employees of Federated Incorporated , Federated
American , and Federated Life , as well as the interchange
of employees and the common overall operation of the
companies ; and finally as part thereof and a significant
item , the enforcement of the union -security clause as to all
the regular employees which should only have been done if
the contract, in fact , covered these employees . I recognize
the contention that Federated Life was not in effect until
about August 1972 , according to McCauley's testimony,
although organized as of March 1971, according to a letter
from McCauley. Whether operational in March 1971 or
prior to August 1972, it appears clear that the contract was
applied to the one employee of Federated American, who
was listed as a dues-paying member of the Union. The
mere fact that the agreement did not contain the name of
Federated Incorporated is accordingly , under the circum-
stances , not conclusive . I find that the contract was origi-
nally intended to apply to Federated American and Federat-
ed Incorporated and was , in fact, applied to them and also
Federated Life.
3. Such being the case with all but two employees hav-
ing become members of the Union, and all evidently pay-
ing dues to the Union from the time they were required to
do so, I find that the Respondents Federated Incorporated,
Federated American Insurance Company, and Federated
206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
American Life Insurance Company were obligated to con-
tinue to negotiate with the Union , upon request, for these
companies during the life of the contract. Accordingly, by
refusing to bargain with the Union on May 6, 1974, said
Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act .8
I further find the appropriate unit is:
All full time and regular part time office and clerical
employees employed by Federated American Insur-
ance Company; Federated American Life Insurance
Company; and Federated Incorporated, in Seattle,
Washington; but excluding, secretaries to the General
Manager, Sales Manager , Claims Manager , Under-
writing Manager, and Personnel Manager , and guards
and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended.
B. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
The complaint as amended sets forth numerous instanc-
es of alleged violations of Section 8(axl). As set forth here-
after , while I consider that certain of these instances consti-
tuted violations, I believe that in context some others did
not and will so indicate. Employee Mary Lee Woessner
testified that in mid-March , Supervisor and Assistant Sec-
retary Zora Tapping stopped at her desk and asked her
what happened at the meeting that had been held at Joan
Beeman's house . Woessner said she didn't know because
she did not go. She testified also that, in the first part of
May, Tapping asked her what percentage they were asking
for and she told her she didn't know because she didn't go
to a union meeting at that time . Woessner further testified
that about a week later, while she was on the switchboard,
Zora Tapping brought up the subject of the Union and
asked her what they were asking, and that a proposed mat-
ter involving seniority , following absence because of preg-
nancy, was discussed. Woessner told Tapping she didn't
know because she hadn't heard anything about it. Woess-
ner at first said that she didn't remember whether Tapping
used the term "outlandish" with respect to the amount of
increases sought by the Union. After having her memory
refreshed, Woessner testified that Tapping said that they
were "outlandish." Woessner further testified that, at the
end of June, when Zora Tapping, Judy Bean , and herself
were present, Tapping asked in a joking manner if they
were on strike. She told Tapping they were not, there had
been some confusion at the meeting the night before, and
they were going to petition to get rid of the Union. Woess-
ner testified she considered the comment about a strike to
be a joke.
Tapping testified that she didn't recall talking to Woess-
ner at her desk but she did recall walking into the coffee-
room and saying to the girls , "How did your meeting go,
girls?" as a casual conversation . Tapping was asked about
the matter of percentage in a discussion with Woessner in
May, and responded , "I recall doing some calculating of
8 A contract raises a presumption of continuing majority during its life
which may ordinarily not be questioned during that time . The presumption
continues after its expiration whereupon it may be rebutted by demonstrat-
ed objective evidence . See Barrington Plaza and Tragniew Inc., 185 NLRB
962 (1970).
figures with her, but I don't recall the full conversation of
it. It was after the figures came in from Mr. Olson." She sat
with Woessner and discussed it. Tapping was asked wheth-
er she made comments about the agreement and said she
did say something to the effect that some of the demands
were excessive and that it seemed an awful lot, or some-
thing like that. According to Tapping, it was a general dis-
cussion , not a supervisory officer to an employee. She said
she talked with Woessner about problems on many occa-
sions . Tapping said she couldn't remember about whether
she talked to Woessner about the so-called pregnancy-
seniority matter. Tapping did admit that she might have
asked Woessner with respect to particular proposals why
something was in there. Tapping admitted she might have
used the word "outlandish" as to figures, although she nor-
mally didn't use the term. From the foregoing, I find and
conclude that Tapping illegally questioned Woessner about
attending a union meeting in March in violation of Section
8(a)(1). Respondents also violated the Act by Tapping at-
tempting to discuss and bargain with Woessner individu-
ally regarding the Union's proposals, as set forth, by her
requests concerning the bargaining demands, the discus-
sion with Woessner about the cost of proposals and the
efforts to discourage her directly by referring to them as
"outlandish." The essence of this violation being that nego-
tiations and discussions should have been between Re-
spondent Companies and the Union, not between supervi-
sors and individuals. I accordingly find that, by this
conduct, Respondents did violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5).
With respect to the question by Tapping as to whether the
employees were on strike, from Woessner's testimony, it
appears that this comment was a jocular one and I accord-
ingly do not find a violation therefrom.
Vivianne Briley, an employee, testified that she discussed
the Union with McCracken, Tapping, Linda, and "ev-
erybody." She said she spoke to McCracken once and Tap-
ping twice . Briley testified that on May 16 she went to
McCracken and started a conversation, asking about a
note on the bulletin board that the Union was going to be
terminated. Since she had not paid an initiation fee, Briley
asked McCracken whether she should. According to Bri-
ley, McCracken said it was up to her whether she wanted
to join the Union and it was up to McCauley whether or
not they would be represented by the Union. Briley then
testified that she first spoke to Tapping the first part of
June. Tapping asked her to step into a vacant office and
brought up the subject of the Union. Tapping asked her
what she thought about it. Briley told Tapping she didn't
know. Tapping said something concerning the complaints
the girls were making about the benefits, sick leave, and so
on; that McCauley couldn't do anything about these as
long as they were in the Union and "that he would like to
make us the highest paid insurance company in town but
he couldn't because of the Union." Briley said the reason
she was taken into the office to begin with was to be repri-
manded and that it was in the same conversation in which
she was reprimanded that Tapping commented about the
Union. Tapping gave her a warning about another month
trial period and Briley said she would straighten up.
Briley testified that on June 27 she had another conver-
sation with Tapping about the Union, that Tapping asked
FEDERATED AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY 207
if she was going to the meeting and that she said yes. Briley
further testified, "She said if she was us girls, she wouldn't
even pay her dues." Tapping denied that she said that "if I
were you girls, I would not pay the dues." Tapping admit-
ted that she told Briley that if she hadn't been initiated she
should put it off for a few days, and the reason was that the
employee (Briley) was to be terminated because of poor
work. Tapping said that she didn't make the statement
about dues because Briley paid the dues. Tapping does not
appear to deny the statement by Briley about interrogating
her concerning the Union, the statement that McCauley
couldn't do anything about certain matters as long as they
were in the Union, etc. By the foregoing conduct, I find
that Respondent through Tapping, by interrogation con-
cerning the Union and threats and/or promises dependent
upon union membership, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
As for the statement attributed to McCracken by Briley
which McCracken did not deny, that it was up to Mc-
Cauley whether or not the employees would be represented
by the Union, the General Counsel asserts this meant it
was McCauley's decision and not the employees as to who
would represent them. The statement can be so interpreted
or construed . It can also be interpreted , in the light of all
the circumstances herein, that what was meant was Mc-
Cauley would decide what the employer's position would
be as to recognition of the Union. Since McCracken could
have clarified this but did not, I am finding that a reason-
able construction that might be reached by the employee
would be that the resolution of union representation would
be up to McCauley and accordingly find the statement to
be coercive and in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Janet Schmidt testified without contradiction that in
April after she had worked 60 days, Mr. Lumberg, then
head of the accounting department, called her into his of-
fice, told her that she had completed her 60-day trial period
and that he was satisfied with her work and hoped she'd
stay . He asked if she had paid her initiation fee and she
said no she had not. Lumberg told her he was not at liberty
to tell her why but something was going on in the Compa-
ny and that it would be just throwing her money away if
she paid the initiation fee, so she didn't pay it. After talking
to Lumberg, she talked to other employees and did not pay
the fee. She also told other employees what Lumberg had
said. I find that Respondent thereby further violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by improperly interfering with the
Union and its activities. Schmidt also spoke once with
Respondent's representative, Comptroller Mallonee, about
the end of June or first part of July. He asked her to step in
the office while McCracken was also there . According to
Schmidt, Mallonee said that now that the union matter had
been settled he was going to review everyone 's file to see
who was entitled to a raise . General Counsel argues that,
since Schmidt had failed to sign the petition withdrawing
from the Union, that this was a clear attempt to estrange
Schmidt from further supporting the Union. I consider this
argument to be speculative and not supported by probative
evidence. Accordingly on such basis, I do not find the
statement by Mallonee to be a violation of the Act. How-
ever, Respondent may have violated Section 8(a)(1) from
the implication that it was not and would not have to bar-
gain with the Union as to wages.
About the end of June, Tapping told employee Linda
Seelbach that McCauley would like to give raises but could
not do so until the "mess" with the Union was settled.
Tapping does not appear to have denied this statement,
and I find that Respondent thereby further violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. Employee Stephanie Weyman testi-
fied that she was involved in the preparation and drafting
of the petition previously referred to, which in essence was
to withdraw from the Union. She said it was initiated on a
Thursday night by three of the women employees after get-
ting knowledge of how to do it from Olson, the union rep-
resentative, namely, to get a petition by 30 percent of the
employees, to have it signed and take it to the NLRB.
Weyman testified the three decided to go down to the
NLRB office during the lunch hour the next day, that she
told employer Vice President Davis what their plans were.
Davis said they wouldn't have the time to do it during the
lunch hour because they would only have 45 minutes and
suggested they take an hour off. Weyman went back to the
office. Another employee had called to find out the word-
ing and content, etc. Weyman testified: they were typing it
up to get the proper wording; they decided to put all the
companies in. Davis, who was in his office, agreed and
mentioned Federated American, Federated Life, and Fed-
erated Incorporated. It was also agreed that John
Rickard's name would be on the return for a reply. Wey-
man thought Davis suggested that. She was asked about
whether there was any discussion about where the docu-
ment should be sent and answered that Olson had stated
that it should go to the NLRB but Mr. Davis was there
when they were discussing this. Davis left and came back,
and said that there was a lawyer in McCauley's office and
he had discussed it with him and he said to send it to Don
Olson's office . The foregoing indicates that the employees
were seeking to prepare a petition with respect to their rep-
resentation by the Union, that they had initiated it by
themselves , and that they had taken it up with manage-
ment, through a management representative, Vice Presi-
dent Davis, who apparently was trying to be helpful. The
granting of an extra 15 minutes , standing by itself, would
appear to be of minimal assistance . However, while it may
not appear that Respondent's actual intent was improper,
it does appear that Davis, after being consulted by the em-
ployees, injected himself into the matter more -than he
should have, and that accordingly Respondent did give as-
sistance with respect to the aforesaid petition in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I accordingly find -that it
hereby additionally violated Section 8(a)(1). -
A number of incidents of alleged violation involving Mc-
Cauley wer4 testified to by various . witnesses as, follows:
Employee Linda Seelbach testified that on May 16 she had
submitted a written resignation the day before, and-Mc-
Cauley called her into his office to discuss it. On May 15,
Seelbach had written to McCauley advising that she had
enjoyed working there, that "the bitter situation between
employees and management had become too much for her
to take," and "when I started working for Federated Amer-
ican I was told that I- had to join the Union. I have just
recently heard that I am employed by Federated Incorpo-
rated, so as far as management is concerned, I am not
208 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
legally covered by the union contract after paying union
dues for six years . This is just one of many rumors that are
going around the office that have upset me a great deal."
She then added that she knew she was considered by man-
agement as "mediocre help" and that she saw no future for
herself at the Company . According to Seelbach , when Mc-
Cauley called her into the office.
A. He said I had the wrong idea about this union
thing, that everybody was covered under the contract
until it ran out at the end of June.
MR. MURRAY : I can't hear you, I 'm sorry.
THE WITNESS : That everybody was covered under
the contract until the end of June , at which time there
was to be another contract drawn up , but that it would
have to be negotiated between Federated American,
Federated Incorporated and Federated Life.
According to her , McCauley said , "He said, myself, I'd
rather see the company run without the Union , but that's
up to you girls." McCauley denied making this statement.
Seelbach said McCauley was asked as to how long it
would take to negotiate a contract if Local 8 had to negoti-
ate a contract with each of the companies. According to
Seelbach , he replied , "Who knows how long that would
take." Seelbach said she discussed this conversation with
other employees.
The General Counsel asserts that this was a violation of
the Act by emphasizing the futility of Respondents' em-
ployees relying on the Union 's bargaining efforts and im-
plying it was useless for the employees to exercise their
Section 7 rights . Seelbach was called in to discuss her letter
of resignation which the employer certainly had a right to
do. The discussion with her as to other matters was largely
in the light of the legal position that the Respondent was
taking . A legal position was being taken , albeit incorrectly.
I do not find that the inference drawn by the General
Counsel necessarily follows from the conversation between
McCauley and Seelbach and accordingly do not find a vio-
lation therefrom.
Subsequently , McCauley called Woessner alone into his
office . She had also submitted a letter of resignation dated
May 16 . In her letter , she stated that it had come to her
attention that "I am no longer considered covered under
local O .P.E.I.U . Local 8 working agreement with Federat-
ed American , even though I was required by management
to reinstate myself as a member ." She concluded "in view
of present conditions, I see no other alternative but to ter-
minate my employment here ." According to Woessner,
McCauley asked why she was leaving because he couldn't
find her resignation . She told him it was because of the
Union , that she found out she wasn 't a member . She testi-
fied , "I told him I couldn't understand that I wasn't a
member of the Union , and I wondered why, and I ques-
tioned him on that . He told me that it wasn 't a matter that
I wasn't covered by the contract, but that there were only
two members of the working staff that were members cov-
ered under the contract . We discussed the time clock." She
was then asked whether there was any discussion about
employee benefits and responded that McCauley told her,
and the example that he gave me , at that time, was that "in
case someone 's grandfather had died in California, that
they could have more timeoff if there wasn 't a union con-
tract prohibiting him from giving more time ." According to
Woessner , McCauley brought this up because her mother
had passed away in January . In essence , the contention is
that McCauley at this time brought up the matter of more
flexibility without the Union and related one incident. It
appears that McCauley thereby technically referred to
something that he should not have directly with the em-
ployee and violated the Act.
About mid-May, McCracken because a supervisor and,
as set forth previously, made the statement attributed to
him by Briley . At the time , Judy Bean, McCracken, and
she were in the accounting department and someone asked
to see the union contract . McCracken had been the shop
steward and McCracken replied he had the proposed con-
tract home and would bring it and see they all got a copy.
According to Schmidt , McCracken said he shouldn't be
talking to us along those lines since he was now a supervi-
sor, but he felt that the Union had gone too far . McCrack-
en said it was much too strong a contract , particularly con-
cerning the medical plan and the retirement plan which
union members had asked for. McCracken felt that what
the Union had suggested was much stronger . According to
Schmidt, McCracken said that as a matter of fact, his
Company would not sign such a contract and he was sure
McCauley would not either . According to Schmidt, Mc-
Cracken was not asked but volunteered these opinions.
McCracken did obtain copies of the contracts for the wom-
en and they were distributed to them . About a week later,
there was another conversation with McCracken in which
he had the contract on which he made notations of yes or
no. Schmidt said she had still another conversation with
McCracken at which time the matter of wages was dis-
cussed and that "he said that as soon as the union situation
was settled then we could expect raises or that we could not
expect raises until after this union situation was settled."
Schmidt asked , "Did he say anything about what union
situation he was talking about? " She testified , "He said
that as soon as the union was out , we could expect raises."
By McCracken 's volunteered comments above, Respon-
dent further violated Section 8 (a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the
Respondent described in section I, above, have a close,
initmate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
V THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Because of the nature and extent of the unfair labor
FEDERATED AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
practices engaged in by Respondent , as found above , it will
further be recommended that Respondent be ordered to
cease and desist from in any other manner infringing upon
the rights of the employees guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondents , Federated American Insurance Com-
pany , Federated American Life Insurance Company, and
Federated Incorporated , constitute and function as an en-
terprise or single employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Office and Professional Employees International
Union , AFL-CIO CLC, Local Union No. 8, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
and has at all times material herein been the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of the Respondents ' employees in
the appropriate unit.
3. The appropriate unit consists of all full time and regu-
lar part time office and clerical employees employed by
Federated American Insurance Company ; Federated
American Life Insurance Company ; and Federated Incor-
porated , in Seattle , Washington ; but excluding , secretaries
to the General Manager, Sales Manager, Claims Manager,
Underwriting Manager, and Personnel Manager, and
guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
4. Respondent , Federated Incorporated, was intended
to be a named party-employer to the contract effective July
1, 1971, bearing the names of Federated American Insur-
ance Company and the Union. Said contract was, in fact,
applied to the employees of Federated Incorporated and
also those of Federated American Life Insurance Compa-
ny.
5. By telling employees either not to join or to withdraw
from or support the Union (while a union-security clause
was in effect), and assisting them in so doing, by threaten-
ing employees that benefits would not be granted while the
Union continued or until the Union was out, by advising
or promising that such benefits would be considered when
the Union was out, by attempting to and dealing directly
with employees while the Union was their collective-bar-
gaining representative , and by interrogating employees
concerning union activities , Respondent has interfered
with , restrained , and coerced employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby
has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(axl) of the
Act.
6. As found above, by failing and refusing to recognize,
meet, and bargain since May 6, 1974, with the Union as
exclusive representative of the employees in the appropri-
ate unit, Respondents Federated American Insurance
Company, Federated American Life Insurance Company,
and Federated Incorporated have violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
209
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDERS
Respondents, Federated American Insurance Company,
Federated American Life Insurance Company, and Feder-
ated Incorporated, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees that benefits would not be
forthcoming until the Union was eliminated.
(b) Promising that benefits would be considered when
the Union was eliminated.
(c) Interrogating employees concerning union activities.
(d) Telling employees either not to join or withdraw
from or support the Union and assisting them in so doing.
(e) Attempting to, and dealing directly with, employees
while the Union is their collective-bargaining representa-
tive.
(f) Failing and refusing to meet and bargain collectively
with the Union as exclusive representative of the employ-
ees in the appropriate unit.
(g) In any other manner interfering with the right of em-
ployees to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to
join or assist the above-named or any other labor organiza-
tion, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective-bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection or to refrain from any or all such activi-
ties, except to the extent such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment, as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as
the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit set
forth hereafter. The appropriate unit is: All full time and
regular part time office and clerical employees employed
by Federated American Insurance Company; Federated
American Life Insurance Company; and Federated Incor-
porated, in Seattle, Washington; but excluding, secretaries
to the General Manager , Sales Manager, Claims Manager,
Underwriting Manager, and Personnel Manager, and
guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
(b) Post at its premises in Seattle , Washington, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said
9In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
10 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Continued
210 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 19, after being duly signed by an authorized repre-
sentative of the Respondents , shall be posted by them im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by them
for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondents have taken to comply herewith.
It is further recommended that the complaint be dis-
missed in all other respects.
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT threaten employees that benefits will
not be forthcoming until the Union is eliminated.
WE WILL NOT promise that benefits will be consid-
ered when the Union is eliminated.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning
union activities.
WE WILL NOT tell employees either not to join or
withdraw from or support the Union and assist them
in so doing.
WE WILL NOT attempt to and deal directly with em-
ployees while the Union is their collective-bargaining
representative.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to meet and bargain
collectively with the Union as exclusive representative
of the employees in the appropriate unit.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with the
right of employees to self-organization , to form labor
organization , to join or assist the abovenamed or any
other labor organization to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective-bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
or to refrain from any or all such activities , except to
the extent such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment , as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the unit set forth hereafter . The appropriate unit is:
All full time and regular part time office and clerical
employees employed by Federated American Insur-
ance Company; Federated American Life Insurance
Company , and Federated Incorporated , in Seattle,
Washington ; but excluding , secretaries to the General
Manager , Sales Manager , Claims Manager , Under-
writing Manager, and Personnel Manager, and guards
and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended.
FEDERATED AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
FEDERATED AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
FEDERATED INCORPORATED