Federal-Mogul Corp.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsSep 28, 1977232 N.L.R.B. 1200 (N.L.R.B. 1977) Copy Citation DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Federal-Mogul Corporation and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). Case 10- CA-12332 September 28, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENNELLO, AND MURPHY On June 14, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Joseph L. Battle issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. The essential facts relating to the issues now before the Board are not in dispute and may be summarized as follows: In a speech given on May 13, 1976, by the Respondent's plant manager, Darrow, the Respon- dent's employees were told that "there had been claims of unfair treatment in administering our merit system and our policy of pay continuation. The alternative as I see it, should the UAW be involved, is to negotiate regulated pay increases for all employees, and to pay no one for absences. This is contrary to our philosophy of trust and recognition of better work performance. Accepting the possibility for errors in all systems, we feel that the opportunity to reward an individual is far superior to the inequities of a forced system of uniform rules such as are typical union approaches." At the time of the speech, the Respondent had a policy of "pay continuation" for absences for some employees. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the allegation of the complaint that the Respondent "threatened its employees that pay to employees during excused absences due to illness would be discontinued if the Union were chosen." Nonetheless, the Administra- tive Law Judge found that the speech given by Plant Manager Darrow was sufficient to establish a violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, on grounds that it was clear from this speech that the policy of pay continuation would be discontinued in the event of union involvement. 232 NLRB No. 88 We disagree. We find that Darrow's speech was in response to employee claims that there had been inequities in the implementation of Respondent's policy with respect to sick leave pay. Our review of the relevant portions of Darrow's speech reveals that he did not threaten employees with loss of a benefit, but merely advised the employees that, under a union contract, merit increases and pay for absences would be regulated pursuant to the terms of the contract. These remarks did not threaten a withdraw- al of benefits within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. I In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt pro forma the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of the allegations that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(aX I) by virtue of Supervisor Morris' statement to employee West. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOSEPH L. BATrLE, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard before me at Anniston, Alabama, on May 4, 1977, upon a complaint issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board and answer filed by Federal-Mogul Corporation, hereinafter called the Re- spondent. The issues raised by the pleadings relate to whether or not the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by (I) threatening its employees with discharge or other reprisals if they engaged in union activities; (2) prohibiting its employees from discussing the Union during the employ- ees' nonworktime by telling its employees that they could talk only company business on company time; and (3) threatening its employees that pay to employees during excused absences due to illness would be discontinued if the Union were chosen as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees. The Union referred to in the pleadings is the Charging Party herein. For the reasons which follow, I find that the General Counsel has met its burden of proof as to the allegation concerning the discontinuance of paid sick leave and has not met its burden of proof as to the remaining allegations. Upon the entire record in this proceeding and having observed the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Respondent is engaged in the sale and distribution of automotive replacement parts; its sales and shipment of 1200 FEDERAL-MOGUL CORPORATION finished products in interstate commerce are sufficient to satisfy the Board's standard for the assertion of jurisdic- tion; the Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the Act; and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), hereinafter called the Union, is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of the Act. As to the allegations concerning the Respondent's threats of reprisal and discharge, employee Matthews testified that in the latter part of April 1976, Supervisor Morris told him that "he had received a complaint that I had been harassing the employees about finding (sic) union cards and that I was headed for trouble." Morris denied that this conversation occurred. Also, according to Mat- thews, he was called to Personnel Manager Garris' office on the same day and was told by Garris that he "had received a complaint that . . . I had been harassing employees about signing union cards, . . . that . . . the Company had a right to protect the employees who were against the Union from the employees who were for the Union, and he was warning me for my own good that I could be terminated for harassing the employees." Mat- thews also testified that Garris told him that "you can't talk about the Union." After Matthews' memory was refreshed, he further testified that Garris, like Morris, told him that he "was headed for trouble." According to Morris, who was present in Garris' office during the foregoing conversation, Garris told Matthews that "there had been some com- plaints by fellow employees that he had been bothering them on their job in regard to signing the union cards ... and . . . not to bother them on their work time or he wasn't to be doing that on his work time, that what he did prior to work or during the breaks or during the noon hours or after work was his business." According to Garris, "I assured him I was not accusing him and not saying that he didn't, but somebody said Matthews was harassing these people . . . on their work centers, asking them to come sign Union cards . . and I asked Mr. Matthews not to do this. I told him he could get cards signed if he liked, as long as he did not harass people." According to Morris and Garris, Matthews was not threatened with disciplinary action. In considering the foregoing, I do not credit Matthews' testimony as to the conversation in which Morris allegedly told him he was "headed for trouble." Matthews seemed unclear as to who made the statement to him, having testified that both Matthews and Garris used exactly the same words on different occasions on the same day. I therefore find no violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as to the foregoing matter. The "harassment" which Garris referred to in his conversation with Matthews appears to have related to Matthews' reported conduct on Matthews' worktime of "bothering" employees on their worktime by soliciting employees' signatures for union authorization cards. If Garris told Matthews that he was "headed for trouble" or that "you can't talk about the Union," it appears that this relates to the complaint Garris received concerning Matthews' solicitation during working time. Thus, the limitations placed upon Matthews were not all- encompassing, but instead allowed Matthews to solicit signatures "prior to work or during the breaks or during the noon hours or after work." In these circumstances, I find no violation of Section 8(aXl) of the Act occurred in Matthews' foregoing conversation with Garris. Concerning the allegation as to the Respondent's prohibition of talk about the Union, employee Plummer testified that 2 or 3 weeks before an NLRB election of May 14, 1976, Respondent's supervisor, Morris, advised him "that we were not to talk about anything but company business on our working hours." Prior to this time, the employees had talked during working time and nonwork- ing time at working areas "about anything under the sun." Before and after this conversation, it was the usual practice of Supervisor Morris to remind employees to "say what we had to say and get back to our work" so that production could be properly maintained. Morris never specifically told employees not to talk about the Union and Plummer didn't stop talking about the Union on his first job after his conversation with Morris. Morris denies that he told Plummer to talk only company business on company time. Another occasion which involves the allegation as to the Respondent's prohibition of talk concerning the Union involved employee West in April 1976. West testified that on this occasion, Supervisor Morris told him that "he didn't want to catch me talking to anyone for any length of time, that he would hate to see me hurt." It was a common occurrence for Morris to tell employees two or three times a week to keep their talking to a minimum, but West testified that the possibility of getting hurt had never before been suggested to West by Morris. According to West, Morris "put me over there fon another job] to protect me." Morris testified that he spoke to West several times as an individual about talking on the job. In Morris' words, "you can't talk and do this type of work and keep your mind on what you're doing." Morris denied that he ever told any employee under his supervision that he could be fired or terminated or disciplined in any manner if the employee didn't stop talking about the Union. In considering the foregoing, I note that West was merely told not to talk with anyone for any length of time so that he wouldn't get hurt. I find that this evidence is too vague to support either of the allegations of the complaint, that the Respondent allegedly threatened its employees with reprisals because of their union activity, or that the Respondent prohibited its employees from discussing the Union during nonworktime by telling its employees that they could talk only company business on company time. The latter allegation is specifically supported by the testimony of employee Plummer. Morris specifically denied making such a statement. In considering the testimony of the two, I note that Morris never told the Respondent's employees not to talk about the Union and that Plummer was not, as alleged, actually "prohibited" from discussing the Union. Indeed, Plummer continued to talk about the Union after his conversation with Morris. In any event, I credit Morris' denial that the statement in question was made. I find it unbelievable that Morris would attempt to limit the content of employees' conversa- tions. Enforcing such a policy would be not only illegal under the Act, but also impossible as a practical matter. In these circumstances, I find no violation of Section 8(a)(I) 1201 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the Act occurred in Morris' conversations with Plummer or West. As to the allegation which relates to a threatened loss of paid sick leave, it is undisputed that in a speech given on May 13, 1976, by the Respondent's plant manager, Darrow, the Respondent's employees were told that "there had been claims of unfair treatment in administering our merit system and our policy of pay continuation. The alternative as I see it, should the UAW be involved, is to negotiate regulated pay increases for all employees, and to pay no one for absences." From the foregoing, it is clear that at the time of the speech, the Respondent had a policy of "pay continuation" for absences of some employees and that this policy would be discontinued "should the UAW be involved." This evidence does not meet the allegation of the complaint, that the Respondent "threatened its em- ployees that pay to employees during excused absences due to illness would be discontinued if the Union were chosen as the collective bargaining representative of the employ- ees." However, the speech in question was introduced as a joint exhibit by agreement of the parties and is sufficient to establish a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act based upon the fact that the parties litigated the Respondent's threat to discontinue its policy of pay continuation for some employees in the event of involvement by the UAW. Accordingly, I find that in making this particular an- nouncement, the Respondent's plant manager violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of the Act and it will effecutate the purposes of the Act for jurisdiction to be exercised herein. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 3. By threatening its employees with a discontinuance of its pay continuation policy in the event of involvement by the Union, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, thereby violating Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce within the meaning of the Act. THE REMEDY As to remedy, I recommend that the Respondent cease and desist from the Section 8(a)(1) violation which I have found and take affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] * U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1978 0-Z61-294 1202 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation