Faro Screen Process, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Mar 27, 2014

07-CA-102899 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 27, 2014)

JD–14–14
Canton, MI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
FARO SCREEN PROCESS, INC.,
and Case No. 07–CA–102899

LOCAL 592, SIGN AND DISPLAY UNION,
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES OF THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA (IUPAT), AFL–CIO/CLC.
Counsel:
Eric S. Cockrell, Esq. (NLRB Region 7)
of Detroit, Michigan, for the General Counsel
Robert E. Day, Esq. (Robert E. Day, P.C.),
of Detroit, Michigan, for the Respondent
DECISION
DAVID I. GOLDMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. This case involves a union-represented
printer that, effective January 1, 2013, while in negotiations for a new labor agreement,
unilaterally gave its employees an early wage increase before the new contract was effective.
Anticipating there would be a 2 percent wage increase in the new collective-bargaining
agreement, the employer implemented a 2 percent raise before the new contract was agreed to in
an effort to offset an increase in federal payroll taxes levied on employees as of January 1. In
subsequent days, as anticipated, a new labor agreement containing an initial wage increase was
agreed to by the union and employer, ratified by the employees January 17, and went into effect
February 1, 2013.
The union’s business agent learned for the first time of the January 1, 2013 unilateral
wage increase at the ratification vote. The business agent contacted the employer’s
representative and told him that he expected the employer to provide the wage increase in the
contract on February 1, 2013, in addition to the January 1, 2013 unilateral increase recently
provided. The employer refused, and wrote the union a letter on January 23 “apologiz[ing] for
implementing the raises early” and stating that “[i]t had been a long time since my employees had
gotten a raise. With the impending federal tax increases I did not want my people to take a cut in
pay.” The employer then rescinded the early raise on January 23, and returned to the old wage
rate for the final week of January. On February 1, 2013, the employer implemented the 2 percent
raise called for by the newly effective labor agreement.
JD–14–14
2
The government alleges that the employer’s unilateral January wage increase, and its
subsequent rescission, constitutes unlawful unilateral changes in derogation of the employer’s
bargaining obligation under the National Labor Relations Act (Act). Of that there can be little
doubt. As discussed herein, the employer’s contention that the matter should be deferred to the
union-employer contractual grievance-arbitration procedure is unavailing.5
Less compelling is the remedy sought by the government. As a remedy for this failure to
bargain, the government contends that the employer owes backpay calculated on the premise
that it was required to pay the January 1st wage increase in addition to and on top of the 2
percent contractually-mandated wage increase implemented February 1, 2013. However, I 10
reject the government’s assertion that, as of February 1, 2013, the 2 percent early raise was
required to be continued in addition to and on top of the newly implemented and contractually-
agreed to wage rates.
This is for two reasons. First, while I agree with the government that the remedy for the 15
unilateral wage increase is to maintain it in effect until a different agreement is reached, the new
labor agreement, effective February 1, is that new agreement. No one claims, with good
reason, that the February 1st agreement was an agreement to raise wages more than 2 percent
beyond what they lawfully were before the unlawful unilateral “early raise.” The claim that the
employer must continue to pay a surcharge beyond what the parties agreed to in the new 20
collective-bargaining agreement is unprecedented and a theory profoundly hostile to collective
bargaining. Second, in this case, the unilateral change was, by design, a change implemented
for just the period until a new agreement was put into effect. That is the change that was
implemented, not an open-ended permanent 2 percent increase. This unilateral change,
unlawful for sure, cannot be transformed into a permanent independent wage increase any 25
more than an unlawfully implemented one time weekly bonus must be provided every week until
the parties bargain otherwise.
Accordingly, while the unilateral change violation alleged is easily found, the
government’s proposed remedy is untenable. Rather, the remedy I recommend provides for 30
backpay in the prescribed amounts for the union-represented employees for the period January
23–31, 2013. No backpay is owed for periods after that time. As of February 1, 2013, the
employees were paid the amounts agreed to by the union and employer through the collective-
bargaining process.
35
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 16, 2013, Local 591, Sign and Display Union, International Union of Painters
and Allied Trades of the United States and Canada (IUPAT), AFL–CIO/CLC (Union) filed an
unfair labor practice charge alleging violations of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) by Faro 40
Screen Process, Inc. (Faro), docketed by Region 7 of the National Labor Relations Board
(Board) as Case 07–CA–102899. The Union amended the charge on June 11, 2013. Based on
an investigation into the charge, on August 26, 2013, the Board’s General Counsel, by the
Regional Director for Region 7 of the Board, issued a complaint alleging violations of the Act by
Faro, a compliance specification alleging schedules of reimbursement owed to employees, an 45
order consolidating the complaint and compliance specification for hearing, and a notice of
hearing. Faro filed an answer to the complaint and compliance specification denying all alleged
violations of the Act and denying all claims for reimbursement.
A trial was conducted in this matter on January 27, 2014, in Detroit, Michigan. Counsel 50
for the General Counsel and counsel for the Respondent filed post-trial briefs in support of their
JD–14–14
3
positions by March 3, 2014. On the entire record, I make the following findings, conclusions of
law, and recommendations.
JURISDICTION
5
Faro is and at all material times has been a corporation with an office and place of
business in Canton, Michigan, engaged in the manufacture and nonretail sale of signs and
displays. In conducting its operations during the calendar year ending December 31, 2012,
Faro sold and shipped from its Canton, Michigan facility goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly to points outside the State of Michigan. At all material times, Faro has been an 10
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. At
all material times, the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act. Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects commerce and that the Board
has jurisdiction of this case, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act.
15
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background
Respondent Faro produces banners, decals, and other graphic products at its Canton, 20
Michigan facility. The Union has represented bargaining unit employees at Faro since at least
1978.1 As of the time of the hearing there were approximately11 employees in the unit.
Faro is a member of a multi-employer collective-bargaining association currently
composed of two employers. The other employer is Sawicki & Sons.25
Effective February 1, 2007, the Union and Faro entered into a labor agreement
scheduled to terminate no earlier than February 1, 2010. This agreement (the 2007 Agreement)
provided by its terms that it would renew from year to year if no party provided a notice to
terminate.30
For reasons not elaborated on in the record there was no successor agreement to the
2007 Agreement until the parties entered into a new agreement, effective February 1, 2013, as
described below. Although the testimonial evidence is less than pellucid, it appears, and I find,
that the 2007 Agreement renewed yearly on February 1, 2010, 2011, and 2012. Most 35
significantly, I find that the 2007 Agreement was in effect throughout January 2013.2

1The current collective-bargaining agreement recognizes the Union as the sole and
exclusive collective-bargaining agent for
those production and maintenance of employees employed by the Employer
as indicated within Agreement and as per Appendix "A" consisting of preparatory
layout by the use of photographic, mechanical and electronic means, screen
printing and work operations pertaining thereto at the company plant, excluding
office clerical employees and salesmen, within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act as amended[.]

2In this regard, as the Respondent notes (R. Br. at 16–17), the complaint alleges and the
Respondent admits that since about 1979 the Respondent’s recognition of the Union “has been
embodied in successive collective bargaining agreements, the most recent of which is effective
from February 1, 2013.” (complaint and answer at ¶8) (Emphasis added.)
JD–14–14
4
The 2007 Agreement contained a broad and typical grievance-arbitration procedure that
applied to “any grievance, dispute or complaint . . . over the interpretation or application of the
contents of this Agreement.” It also contained a wage rate provision (article 20) that established
the work classifications and the minimum hourly wage rates for each classification.
5
Bargaining
The parties met in October 2012, and perhaps again early in December 2012. On
December 20, 2012, the Union met again with Sawicki & Sons and Faro for negotiations. There
is conflicting testimony in the record about whether International Union trustee, Tim Strickler, 10
was present for this meeting. At some point, either in December 2012, or in January 2013, the
Union’s Business Agent/Secretary Treasurer Robert Gonzalez replaced Strickler as the lead
negotiator for the Union and Strickler stopped attending the meetings. In addition Faro
employee and steward Jim Fordham and Sawicki & Sons employee and steward Wayne
Cammon were on the union negotiating team. John Sawicki represented Sawicki & Sons, and 15
Edward Brown, president of Faro, represented Faro.
The December meeting focused on healthcare. For the last few years, Faro enjoyed a
competitive advantage over Sawicki & Sons because Faro employees, unlike Sawicki & Sons
employees, contributed toward the health care insurance premium. Brown, on behalf of Faro 20
offered as a proposal for the new contract that Faro would no longer take out the employee
contributions. Brown estimated this as a 3.5 percent savings for the average Faro employee.
The next meeting was held January 2, 2013.3 At this meeting the parties discussed
wages, insurance, and other proposals, but no agreement was reached. Wages were an 25
intense subject of discussion. At the end of the meeting, the employer proposal was for a three-
year contract effective February 1, 2013, with a 2 percent wage increase in each of the first two
years and an increase of 2.5 percent the final year of the contract.
On January 10, when the parties met again, a tentative agreement was reached, subject 30
to ratification, for a three-year agreement, effective February 1. The tentative agreement
provided for wage increases as offered by the employers on January 2, except the final year
increase was 3 percent instead of 2.5 percent. Thus, the agreement provided for a 2 percent
wage increase the first year, a 2 percent increase the second year, and a 3 percent wage
increase for the final year of the agreement. In addition, the agreement included a one year 35
elimination on employee premium contributions to health care, as Brown had proposed (referred
to as a “1 yr cap” on health and welfare), estimated to save employees an additional 3.5
percent.
40
45

3Union representatives testified that the meeting occurred on January 3, but I credit
Brown’s surer testimony that the meeting was held Wednesday, January 2. The dispute is of no
overall significance to the issues in this case.
JD–14–14
5
The January 1, 2013 unilateral wage increase
and elimination of employee health care contributions
Meanwhile, in the evening after the January 2 bargaining meeting (and over a week
before the parties’ tentative agreement was reached on January 10), Faro President Brown 5
wrote a letter to employees, which he dated for the next day January 3, 2013. He posted this
letter near the time clock in the facility on January 3. The letter unilaterally announced, among
other items, implementation of a 2 percent wage increase, to be made effective January 1,
2013. Brown’s letter stated:
10
Dear employees:
RE: wage increases
Union negotiations are underway. I have proposed a 2 percent wage increase for 15
2013 and resetting all health care employee contributions back to zero for 2013.
In light of the recent federal tax increases, length of time without a contract, and
the cost savings of dropping the section 125 deductions before the start of the
new year, I have implemented the wage increase and discontinued the health
care deduction as [of] January 1st payroll.20
Please understand that this proposal has not been ratified yet. Additional
changes may be needed in the future.
The wage increase was implemented and health care contributions ended effective 25
January 1, 2013. According to Brown he contacted his payroll service on Wednesday January
2, and had the change implemented.
Brown testified that he implemented the raises because he wanted to provide the early
wage increase to offset the elimination of the Social Security tax “holiday” on January 1, 2013, 30
that returned Social Security payroll taxes to 6.2 percent of employee income from the 4.2
percent that had been in effect. More generally, he knew that employees had not received a
wage increase in several years, but based on the employer proposal in bargaining he
anticipated a 2 percent raise was coming. As to the health care premium portion he paid for
legal review of that item on a calendar year basis so January 1 was an appropriate time for him 35
to make the change—a change that he also anticipated from negotiations was likely to be in the
final agreement.
Before posting the letter Brown spoke with Faro employee and Union Steward Jim
Fordham. The two testified to somewhat different accounts of the conversation. According to 40
Fordham, just after 8 a.m., Brown came out onto the floor where Fordham worked, notice in
hand, told Fordham to shut down his press, and stated:
I know you guys haven’t had a raise in over four years and you’ve been paying it
to your insurance and higher deductibles . . . . [W]hat I’m going to do is I’m 45
implementing a two percent raise that has nothing to do [with the] contract, Jim.
Listen to me. Listen—listen me out. It has nothing to do with the contract, and
I’m also implementing a cap on the insurance . . . . [which he explained to mean]
no contributions by the employees for a year.”
50
JD–14–14
6
Fordham testified that Brown “told me what he was going to do, and he went to the
board and posted it.”4
Brown agrees that he did not mention at the bargaining table on January 10 that he had
already implemented a wage increase and a reduction in employee health care premium 5
contribution.
Ratification of the contract and rescission of the unilateral wage increase
The Union’s membership met to discuss and vote on the tentative agreement on 10
January 17, 2013. Union Representative Gonzalez had prepared a short summary of the new
agreement listing the only changes from the old agreement: the wage increases of 2 percent, 2

4Brown’s testimonial version of this conversation was different from Fordham’s in several
respects (but not in any ways that alter the outcome of this case). Brown testified that he
discussed the issue with Fordham at the shop late in the morning of January 2, after they
returned from the bargaining session (which had been held at the union headquarters in
Warren, Michigan). Brown testified that he “wanted to run” the idea of a raise increase by
Fordham “to see if it was appropriate to do.” Brown testified that he “wanted to get his
agreement, and he did agree to it, and I told him I would put a posting on there putting up . . .
what we talked about, which I did the following day.” Brown recalled nothing else said by
Fordham or himself on the matter.
I generally found Brown to be a credible and sympathetic witness. I believe that in
implementing the wage increase he was not acting out of malice or with intent to interfere with
negotiations, but rather, simply in an effort, as he testified, to provide an early benefit to
employees that he anticipated (correctly) would soon be provided through the outcome of the
bargaining process.
Be that as it may, I do not accept and I discredit Brown’s testimony to the extent he
claimed that he sought and obtained Fordham’s agreement for the unilateral change to wages
(and employee health care contributions). For one, it is inconsistent with Fordham’s testimonial
account, and I found Fordham a believable and credible witness. Second, Brown’s claim does
not seem plausible: Brown knew who the union’s chief negotiator was—it was not Fordham—
and Brown had been at bargaining that very day. He knew to contact Gonzalez if he wanted to
bargain a change in terms and conditions of employment—that process was ongoing. Finally,
the record evidence is inconsistent with Brown’s claim. Notably, the letter to employees posted
by Brown does not mention that the wage increase had been agreed to, acquiesced in, or that it
involved the Union in any way. To the contrary, while mentioning that “[u]nion negotiations are
underway,” Brown’s note very plainly takes unilateral credit for the changes and even cautions
that the proposal “has not been ratified yet.” Moreover, even after Brown was on the defensive,
and wrote to Gonzalez on January 23 “apologiz[ing]” for the early raises, he does not claim that
Fordham agreed to the raises. His letter does state that he “explained” his intentions to
Fordham and “posted” an explanation, but the letter manifestly does not claim that Fordham
agreed to Brown’s action, or that the matter in any way turned on Fordham’s approval.
I have gone to some length to state why I am rejecting this testimony of Brown’s.
However, I note that, notwithstanding Brown’s testimony, at no point in trial, or in its posthearing
brief, does the Respondent assert as a defense Fordham’s alleged agreement to the wage
change. Indeed, the Respondent’s brief refers to Brown’s solicitation of “a Union Steward under
these circumstances” as a “mistake.” (R. Br. at 11). Moreover, as discussed below, even if
Fordham had agreed to the wage increase as Brown claims, I would not find it exculpatory
under the circumstances.
JD–14–14
7
percent and finally 3 percent, and the health and welfare cap for the first year of the contract.
These were posted in the employers’ facilities as of approximately January 11.
Gonzalez learned for the first time of Brown’s January 3 wage-increase letter on or about
January 15, when Fordham telephoned to tell him about it and told him the unilateral wage 5
increase had been implemented. Gonzalez saw Brown’s letter for the first time only at the
employee ratification meeting the evening of January 17. The memo and implementation of the
wage rate prompted some questions and confusion at the ratification meeting, which was
attended by approximately six Faro employees and six Sawicki & Sons employees. Employees
wanted to know if the 2 percent increase in the contract would be a 2 percent increase on the 10
new 2 percent unilaterally-increased wage rate just put into effect. According to Fordham,
Gonzalez told employees “I don’t know much about that yet. . . . Jim, I need you to get me that
copy of that letter, and I will talk to Mr. Brown and see what’s going on with that two percent.”
Gonzalez, who testified credibly that he “really had no idea as to what Faro . . . [was] doing,” did
not know the answer to the employees’ question, but testified that he took the position that they 15
would get a 2 percent wage increase “per the contract”:
my answer to them was—well, first, I had no idea that Faro Screen Process had
gave them a two percent wage increase at this time, January 1st, and as far as I
was concerned, the contract that they were voting on if it was ratified, that yes 20
they would be entitled to any increases per the contract effective February 1st,
2013.
The agreement was ratified unanimously. The next day Gonzalez called Sawicki and
Brown to report on the ratification. While speaking to Brown he raised the January wage 25
increase and told Brown that “I wasn’t sure what he was doing . . . or what that was about.”
According to Brown, Gonzalez was upset about it. Brown told Gonzalez that the January
increase “was the increase per the contract that we had tentatively agreed [to] on January 10,
2013.” Gonzalez told Brown that he disagreed, and “that we were never notified or never had
any idea of the increase he had given, and I expected that when the contract went into effect 30
February 1, 2013, that he would abide by the terms of the agreement.” Brown understood that
Gonzalez was contending that Faro should add an additional 2 percent to employee pay on
February 1, in addition to the “early raise” Brown had given employees in January.
Gonzalez wrote to Brown, in a letter dated January 18, pressing his view that the 35
upcoming February 1, 2013 wage increase should add 2 percent to the new higher wage rate
unilaterally implemented by Faro effective January 1. Gonzalez wrote:
I must say I am very disappointed per our discussion this morning. The Union
negotiated in good faith resulting in an agreement that is fair to both sides, which 40
was proven per the unanimous ratification voted conducted last evening
approving the contract.
Your decision to grant a merit raise during negotiations, was done strictly on your
own and outside the current CBA and was never part of the negotiations that 45
culminated in a tentative agreement that was then ratified.
To infer the day after the ratification vote that the merit raise was part of the new
CBA is unacceptable.
50
JD–14–14
8
I hope you will abide by the terms you originally agreed to or the Union will be
forced to seek the legal avenues available to see that the contract is enforced.
On January 23, Brown caused Faro to post another letter to employees in the facility.
This letter stated:5
Dear employees:
The union has informed me that they object to implementing the 2 percent raise
early. I will rescind early implementation. The 2 percent wage increase will be 10
implemented on the first February payroll as per the contract.
Brown also wrote to Gonzalez on January 23. Brown’s letter stated:
15
I apologize for implementing the raises early. It had been a long time since my
employees had gotten a raise. With the impending federal tax increases I did not
want my people to take to a cut in pay.
I gave the raise only after we had negotiated the 2 percent/2 percent/2.5% 20
increases.[5] I thought we were done negotiating except for the ratification vote. I
did not intend to influence the results of the negotiations in anyway. I was just
trying to help my people.
In my defense, I explained to my shop steward [Jim Fordham] that I wanted to 25
eliminate the health care deduction to prevent the legal cost of the Section 125
plan and to help their pay checks. I also told Jim that I would go ahead and
throw in the negotiated raise to cover the tax increase. I posted an explanation
to everyone that I wanted to give the raise early. I stated that the agreement had
not yet been ratified yet and that changes may be needed in the future. I did not 30
get any objections to implementing the raise early. Nor did I get any questions
about the raise being in addition to the bargained increase.
I will cancel the early raise immediately. I will implement the bargained raises of
February 1st payroll as bargained for.35
I am truly sorry for any confusion this action may have had.
Brown then contacted his payroll service and had the 2 percent raise he had made
effective January 1, rescinded for the final week of the month. It was re-implemented effective 40
February 1, when the new labor agreement went into effect. According to Brown, he
understood from Gonzalez that “it was inappropriate to give it early.”
45

5Both Brown and Gonzalez testified that this final 2.5 percent referenced in the letter was
incorrect. At some point after the January 3 meeting the proposal on the table had been 2.5
percent for the final year, but when the parties reached a final tentative agreement on January
10, the agreement was for a 3 percent raise in the third year of the new contract.
JD–14–14
9
Analysis
The General Counsel alleges that the implementation and rescission of the 2 percent
increase in wages, effective January 1, and rescinded January 23, constituted unlawful
unilateral changes in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In addition, the General Counsel 5
alleges that Faro’s January 23 announcement to employees that it was rescinding the early
wage increase independently violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
After consideration of the Respondent’s motion to defer the 8(a)(5) allegations, I will
consider the merits of the General Counsel’s claims.10
The Respondent’s Motion for Deferral of the 8(a)(5) allegations
Before analyzing the General Counsel’s claim, it is necessary to consider the
Respondent’s defense that, in accordance with Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971), 15
the Board should defer resolution of this dispute to the parties’ contractual grievance-arbitration
procedure.6

In Collyer, 197 NLRB at 839, the Board held that where a “dispute in its entirety arises
from the contract between the parties, and from the parties’ relationship under the contract, it 20
ought to be resolved in the manner which that contract prescribes.” As the Board has recently
stated,
[T]he Board finds deferral appropriate when the following conditions are met: the
parties' dispute arises within the confines of a long and productive collective-25
bargaining relationship; there is no claim of animosity to employees' exercise of
Section 7 rights; the parties' agreement provides for arbitration in a broad range
of disputes; the parties' arbitration clause clearly encompasses the dispute at
issue; the party seeking deferral has asserted its willingness to utilize arbitration
to resolve the dispute; and the dispute is well suited to resolution by arbitration.30
Sheet Metal Workers, 359 NLRB No. 121, slip op. at 1–2 (2013).
Applying the factors cited in Collyer, it is clear that the final factor is not met. I will
assume that the first two are. However, deferral is inappropriate because the substantive 35
dispute is not well-suited to resolution by arbitration.
As to whether a dispute is well suited to resolution through arbitration, the Board will
defer where the dispute "aris[es] over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-
bargaining agreement." United Cerebral Palsy, 347 NLRB 603, 606 (2006),quoting Commercial 40
Cartage Co., 273 NLRB 637, 640 (1984), quoting Collyer, 192 NLRB at 840. This does not
mean, however, that deferral is appropriate whenever a labor agreement obviously has been
ignored by the employer’s actions. Rather,

6See Sheet Metal Workers (Everbrite), 359 NLRB No. 121, slip op. at 2 (2013) (“while a
deferral defense and the merits may be addressed in the same hearing and the same decision,
whether deferral is appropriate is a threshold question which must be decided in the negative
before the merits of the unfair labor practice allegations can be considered”) (internal quotation
omitted).
JD–14–14
10
[a] dispute is well suited to arbitration when the meaning of a contract provision is
at the heart of the dispute. Deferral is not appropriate when “no construction of
the contract is relevant for evaluating the reasons advanced by Respondent for
failing to comply with that contract provision.” Moreover, deferral is also not
appropriate if the contract provision at issue is unambiguous.5
San Juan Bautista Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 102, slip op. at 2 (2011), quoting Struthers
Wells Corp., 245 NLRB 1170, 1171 fn. 4 (1979), enfd. mem. 636 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied 452 U.S. 916 (1981); Commercial Cartage Co., 273 NLRB 637, 640 (1984) (“Clearly,
deferral is not warranted where contract language is clear and unambiguous and permits no 10
construction which could legitimize the action taken”).
In this case, there is no question that the Respondent’s increase in wages by 2 percent
across-the-board, effective January 1, 2013, was inconsistent with the explicit wage provisions
of the 2007 Agreement. No matter how welcome a wage increase might have been for the 15
employees, it was at odds with the contract then in effect. Respondent cannot credibly offer,
and does not offer, a contractually-based defense to the January wage increase.
Notably, Brown’s January 3, 2013 letter explaining the wage hike to the employees does
not attempt to justify the wage hike as an interpretation of the 2007 Agreement. To the contrary, 20
Brown forthrightly explained the wage increase as an effort to help employees by offsetting the
federal payroll tax increase with an early implementation of the first year wage hike that Brown
was proposing at the bargaining table for the new agreement. Whatever you call this unusual,
and unusually generous, approach to labor relations, it is not based on an interpretation of the
2007 Agreement. “Deferral is not appropriate when no construction of the contract is relevant 25
for evaluating the reasons advanced by Respondent for failing to comply with that contract
provision.” San Juan Bautista Medical Center, supra, slip op at 2 (internal quotations omitted).
The Respondent’s defense is not based upon a plausible interpretation of the contract and does
not warrant deferral. This is not a case where “the meaning of a contract provision is at the
heart of the dispute.”730
35

7In addition to the 8(a)(5) unilateral change allegations, the complaint also alleges that
the Respondent’s January 23 posting stating that it was rescinding the early wage increase
independently violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by “undermining” support for the Union and
“denigrating” its representative status. There is no claim by the Respondent that this allegation
is appropriate for deferral and indeed, it would be an uphill argument to so claim. The issue
does not appear to be cognizable under the grievance-arbitration procedure, which, by its terms,
applies to disputes that “arise over the implementation or application of the contents of this
Agreement.” 2007 Agreement at article 5. In any event, no such claim is made by the
Respondent and the inappropriateness of deferral of this allegation of the complaint provides
independent grounds for the conclusion that the dispute over the wage increase should not be
deferred, as Board policy disfavors Collyer deferral of one issue that is closely related to another
non-deferrable issue. 15th Avenue, Iron Works, 301 NLRB 878, 879 (1991), enfd. 964 F.2d
1336 (2d Cir 1992).
JD–14–14
11
The Merits
The 8(a)(5) allegations
First, the General Counsel alleges that the implementation of the January 2013 wage
hike was an unlawful unilateral change violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. There can be no 5
doubt that the granting of an across-the-board wage increase constitutes an unfair labor
practice where, as here, it is instituted unilaterally and without advance notice to the Union and
without providing an opportunity to bargain.8
Board precedent has long been settled that, as a general rule, an employer may not 10
make unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining without first bargaining to a valid
impasse. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). Indeed, with regard to such unilateral changes,
motive is not relevant. A unilateral change in a mandatory subject is a per se breach of the
Section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain, without regard to the employer's subjective bad faith. Katz,
supra at 743 ("though the employer has every desire to reach agreement with the union upon 15
an over-all collective agreement and earnestly and in all good faith bargains to that end. . . an
employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation is [ ] a violation of §
8(a)(5)"). "For it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of §
8(a)(5) much as does a flat refusal." NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. at 743. "Unilateral action by an
employer without prior discussion with the union does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the 20
affected conditions of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining,
contrary to the congressional policy." Katz, supra at 747. "'The vice involved in [a unilateral
change] is that the employer has changed the existing conditions of employment. It is this
change which is prohibited and which forms the basis of the unfair labor practice charge." Daily
News of Los Angeles, 315 NLRB 1236, 1237 (1994) (bracketing added) (quoting NLRB v. 25
Dothan Eagle, Inc., 434 F.2d 93, 98 (5th Cir. 1970) (court's emphasis)), enfd. 73 F.3d 406 (D.C.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090 (1997). Wages are, of course, a mandatory subject of
bargaining. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348 (1958).
The fact that the unilateral changes in wages made were beneficial to employees does 30
not excuse the violation. Whether beneficial or harmful to employees, the unilateral changes
offend the employer’s statutory bargaining obligation. Allied Mechanical Services, 332 NLRB
1600, 1609 (2001); Randolph Children’s Home, 309 NLRB 341, 343 fn. 3 (1992).
The fact that the parties were engaged in negotiations adds still another layer to the 35
employer’s obligation: where, as here, negotiations for a collective-bargaining agreement are
ongoing "an employer's obligation to refrain from unilateral changes extends beyond the mere
duty to give notice and an opportunity to bargain; it encompasses a duty to refrain from
implementation at all, unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bargaining for
the agreement as a whole." Bottom Line Enterprises, 302 NLRB 373, 374 (1991) (footnote 40
omitted), enfd. mem. 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994).9

8I note that the General Counsel alleges only a unilateral change allegation. He does
not proceed on a Sec. 8(d) contract modification theory.
9As noted, above, I do not credit Brown’s testimony at trial that he ran the January
increase by Fordham before implementing it, and obtained his approval. As explained, above, I
do not believe it happened. But even if I did, it would not insulate Faro from liability, for a
number of reasons. First, there is no indication in the labor agreement, or otherwise, that as a
shop floor union steward Fordham had the authority to agree—particularly, by himself with no
other union personnel involvement—to changes in the labor agreement, on a subject as central
JD–14–14
12
Accordingly, the unilateral implementation of the 2 percent across-the-board wage
increase, without notice to the Union, without mention of it in collective-bargaining negotiations,
and without bargaining to an overall impasse in negotiations, constitutes a violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.10
5
Second, as alleged by the General Counsel, the January 23 unilateral rescission of the
wage increases also constitutes an unlawful unilateral change, for all the same reasons that the
initial unilateral change was unlawful. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center, 337 NLRB 72, 73
(2001). The initial change was not an inadvertent mistaken change made by the Respondent.
It was purposely undertaken to cover the employees with the wage increase for the period of 10
time before a negotiated wage rate became effective. Having unlawfully made the change, it
cannot be rescinded without providing notice and an opportunity to bargain. Mid-Wilshire,
supra.
The 8(a)(1) allegation15
The complaint also alleges that the January 23 memo rescinding the wage increases, in
which the Respondent (implicitly) announced that it was rescinding the early wage increases
due to the union’s objection, independently was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that the memo “undermined the Unit’s support for Charging 20
Party Union and denigrated its status as the Unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining agent”
(complaint ¶10(h)), conduct, the complaint alleges, interfered with, restrained, and coerced
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (Complaint at ¶11.)
Quite apart from the from the question—unalleged and unadvanced—of whether 25
attributing the rescission of the wage hike to the union constitutes an independent 8(a)(5)
bargaining violation, I do not believe that under the circumstances it violates Sec. 8(a)(1). The
Respondent posted a truthful announcement to employees that the Respondent was rescinding
the (unlawful) unilateral and “early” wage increase, and truthfully referenced the Union’s
objection to that wage increase. The memo would not have a reasonably tendency to interfere 30
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights.

as wages no less. Indeed, Fordham was a member of the union’s bargaining committee, and,
consistent with that, there was a process and place to obtain union approval for changes to the
labor agreement: the collective-bargaining table. Notably, the raises were not mentioned there
by Faro. Consultation with a union steward was not an appropriate method of providing notice
to the Union. See Racetrack Food Services, 353 NLRB 687, 701 (2008), affirmed and adopted,
355 NLRB 1258 (2010); RemGrit Corp., 297 NLRB 803, 809 (1990). In any event, the last
minute nature of the consultation with Fordham—Fordham testified that Brown had the notice in
hand and ready to be posted when Brown approached Fordham—would constitute a classic
“fait accompli” were Fordham authorized to negotiate wages with Brown. Ciba-Geigy
Pharmaceuticals Division, 264 NLRB 1013, 1017 (1982) ("To be timely, the notice must be
given sufficiently in advance of the actual implementation of the change to allow a reasonable
opportunity to bargain. However, if the notice is too short a time before implementation or
because the employer has no intention of changing its mind, then the notice is nothing more
than a fait accompli"), enfd. 722 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1983); Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, 336
NLRB 1021, 1023 (2001); Toma Metals, Inc., 342 NLRB 787, 787 fn. 1 (2004).
10An employer's violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act is also a derivative violation of Sec.
8(a)(1) of the Act. Tennessee Coach Co., 115 NLRB 677, 679 (1956), enfd. 237 F.2d 907 (6th
Cir. 1956). See ABF Freight System, 325 NLRB 546 fn. 3 (1998).
JD–14–14
13
The General Counsel’s theory is that the announcement of the rescission of the wage
increase for a one week period until the new contract went into effect, and its (implicit)
attribution of the rescission to the union’s objection to the wage increase, had a reasonable
tendency to undermine employee support for the Union and denigrated its status the 5
employees’ collective-bargaining agent. While I have no doubt at all that employees would
reasonably have a tendency to dislike returning to their prior pay levels for the week, and might
well wish that that the union had not objected, I do not think this can be equated with the kind of
employer undermining and denigration of a collective-bargaining representative that the Board
finds unlawful. 10

In Turtle Bay Resorts, 353 NLRB 1242, 1278–1279 (2009), affirmed and adopted, 355
NLRB 706 (2010), the Board adopted the administrative law judge’s reasoning that:
It is well settled that the Act countenances a significant degree of vituperative15
speech in the heat of labor relations. Indeed, '[w]ords of disparagement alone
concerning a union or its officials are insufficient for finding a violation of Section
8(a)(1).' Sears, Roebuck & Co., 305 NLRB 193 (1991)." Trailmobile Trailer, LLC,
343 NLRB 95 (2004).
20
Brown’s memo is, indeed, far from anything that can reasonably be called vituperative or
even disparagement. The most that can be made of the January 23 memo is that it alerted
employees in a nonprovocative, noninflammatory manner to the fact that the Union objected to
the unilateral nature of the early increase.
25
By way of comparison, the point is well-illustrated by the extreme nature of the
employer’s conduct found unlawful in the sole case cited by the General Counsel in support of
its claim. In Regency House of Wallingford, Inc., 356 NLRB No. 86 (2011), the Board found that
an employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when, in no less than seven examples of
correspondence and conversations, the employer 30
repeatedly criticized the Union’s rescission demand, impugned the Union’s
representational abilities, and questioned the Union’s good faith toward unit
members. The Respondent also repeatedly conveyed that the union, by
demanding rescission, was ‘harming its members and “casting stones” at them, 35
and that it was actually the Respondent who was trying to protect employees’
interests.
Based on the “totality of these communications” the Board concluded that
40
the Respondent's repeated denigration of the Union conveyed an implicit threat
that employees' representation by the Union would be futile (i.e., that the
Respondent would not fulfill its statutory obligations) and that employees would
have to rely on the Respondent to protect their interests. While paying lip service
to its obligation to rescind the unlawful wage increase, the Respondent 45
repeatedly denigrated the Union's acceptance of the Board-ordered remedy as
contrary to the interests of the employees and blamed the employees' low level
of compensation on their representation by the Union. The Respondent thereby
created an atmosphere of hostility toward the Union and interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by 50
Section 7. Particularly in the context of the Respondent's other unlawful conduct,
JD–14–14
14
we find that its comments were more than a simple statement of its view of the
Union.
None of this can be remotely found in Faro’s single note to employees attempting to
rectify his unilateral change and announcing rescission of the wage increase for the one week 5
until the new contract took effect. I will dismiss the 8(a)(1) allegation.11
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent Faro Screening Process, Inc. is an employer within the meaning of 10
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party Local 591, Sign and Display Union, International Union of Painters
and Allied Trades of the United States and Canada (IUPAT), AFL–CIO/CLC is the
recognized collective-bargaining representative of the following appropriate unit of the 15
Respondent’s employees:
All production and maintenance employees employed in the
classifications described in appendix “A” of the collective
bargaining agreement and as per Appendix “A” of the collective 20
bargaining agreement in effect between Respondent and the
Charging Union as described below in paragraph 8.
a. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, by unilaterally
implementing a change in a mandatory subject of bargaining, specifically, an 25
across-the-board “early” wage increase of 2 percent effective January 1, 2013,
without providing the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain.
b. The Respondent further violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by unilaterally
rescinding the unilateral implemented wage increase, described above, on 30
January 23, 2013, without providing the Union notice and an opportunity to
bargain.

11The General Counsel also cites National Medical Associates, Inc., 318 NLRB 1020,
1030–1031 (1995), enfd. 108 F.3d 342 (11th Cir. 1997), a case where the Board adopted an
administrative law judge’s finding that an employer violated Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act—and only
derivatively 8(a)(1)—by denigrating the union. The fact that the case involved an 8(a)(5)
bargaining violation makes it inapposite, but, in any event, that bargaining violation involved the
employer’s CEO Morrel writing to employees and telling them “that he had offered them a raise”
but stating that “this wage increase was denied by the [Union].” As the ALJ explained,
Not to miss this opportunity to belittle the Union, Morrel states: "I apologize for their
insensitivity." As if this were not enough, Morrel then goes on to tell these "most deserving
employees" that thanks to the Union, Respondent will give the money they might have gotten as
a raise to "all other . . . employees." Morrel cleverly ends with a cheery "Merry Christmas" to
punctuate his slap in the face not only to the Union, but the obvious stupidity of the employees
themselves for having this Union to represent them.”
The key here is the tendency of this kind of vitriol to drive a wedge between the employees
and their bargaining representative, an effort that is inconsistent with the employer’s statutory
bargaining obligation. In the instant matter, nothing of the sort can be gleaned from Brown’s
note to employees.
JD–14–14
15
c. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY5
The Respondent shall be ordered to cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically,
having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act first by unilaterally
implementing the early wage increase effective January 1, 2013, and then by unilaterally 10
rescinding the wage increase on January 23, 2013, prior to the effective date of the new
contract, the Respondent shall be ordered to restore the wage increase for the period January
23 through and including January 31, 2013. This is consistent with the Board’s traditional
remedy for unlawful unilateral changes. Had the Respondent merely made and left in place the
January 1 unilateral change, which was beneficial to employees, the “normal remedy for the 15
unlawful changes” would be to “order the rescission of these changes only at the request of the
Union.” Fresno Bee, 339 NLRB 1214, 1216 fn. 6 (2003); HTH Corp., 356 NLRB No. 182, slip
op. at 7 (2011). However, the January 23 rescission was also an unfair labor practice—this time
adverse to employees—and the remedy must therefore provide for restoration of that new
unlawful unilateral change through January 31, 2013.20
However, this affirmative remedy does not mean, as urged by the General Counsel, that
as of February 1, 2013, when the parties’ newly negotiated and agreed-to wage rates for the
2013 Agreement became effective, the Respondent was required to maintain a 2 percent wage
increase in addition to and on top of the newly bargained and lawfully-implemented 2 percent 25
wage hike. I reject the General Counsel’s contention that the remedy in this case should
include, as of February 1, 2013, what would amount to a surcharge on the parties’ negotiated
contractual wage rate beyond that negotiated by, agreed to, and implemented by the
Respondent and the Union on February 1, 2013.
30
This is for two related, but distinct reasons. There is, as I have found, no question but
that the Respondent violated the Act by failing to bargain before increasing wages effective
January 1, 2013. And so, consistent with longstanding Board precedent, it is stuck with this
unilateral change on the subject of wages, beneficial to the employees—but not forever. It is
stuck with the unilateral wage change until the Union and the Respondent bargain to impasse or 35
reach agreement on something different as to wages—and the 2013 Agreement is that new
agreement. It is the agreed-to-fruit of collective bargaining, to be in effect as of February 1,
2013, and it reflects the parties’ agreement that as of February 1, 2013, and for one year hence,
the wage rates will be 2 percent above the previous negotiated rate. There is no basis for the
Board to add a wage surcharge that the parties did not bargain, as a remedy for the 40
Respondent’s failure to bargain over a unilateral change it made during the term of a
predecessor and now expired and defunct contract.12
The gist of the General Counsel’s argument is that the unilateral wage increase was
“outside” of bargaining for a new contract. Therefore, the logic seems to go, the unilateral wage 45
increase can be remedied only by bargaining that is separate from the bargaining for the wages

12I stress that the General Counsel disavows any claim that the parties’ new agreement—the
2013 Agreement—should be interpreted to require a 2 percent increase above and beyond the
wage rate unilaterally imposed effective January 1, 2013. (See, Tr. at 32.)
JD–14–14
16
in the new contract. This is a specious argument. A new agreement on wages is a new
agreement on wages. Faro violated the Act because it implemented new wages in January
2013 without providing notice and an opportunity to bargain. Its “sin” in the eyes of the Act, was
not raising wages, but failing to bargain. The backpay that began accruing when Faro
rescinded the wage increase on January 23, 2013, stopped accruing on February 1, 2013, when 5
it successfully bargained and lawfully implemented—with the Union’s agreement—a new
agreement on wages.13
Second, on a related note, I agree with the Respondent that the evidence demonstrates,
and I find, that the January 1, 2013 unilateral change was implemented as an “early” wage 10
increase to be effective until the implementation of a wage increase in the new agreement. The
evidence is clear that this was not an open-ended permanent 2 percent increase. Rather,
Brown’s announcement to employees about the wage increase links the 2 percent increase to a
pending proposal in negotiations but cautions that this implemented increase “has not been
ratified yet” and therefore “additional changes may be needed in the future.” In other words, if 15
something other than a 2 percent increase ended up being in the new contract the wage
increase would have to be changed. Thus, this “early” raise, as Brown called it in his January
23 note to employees and to Gonzalez, was change—unlawful for sure—that by its terms was a
bridge to whatever was to be negotiated. While a Respondent is not free to unilaterally rescind
an unlawfully implemented wage increase, the life span of this unilateral increase, by all 20
evidence, was until the parties adopted the new contract, at which time the January 1, 2013
wage increase was superseded. The General Counsel makes much of the (credited) testimony
of both Fordham and Brown that the early raises had “nothing to do with the contract.” But this
is not compelling. Of course, the early raises were not contractual—that’s why they are clearly
unlawful and nondeferable. But that is not to say that they were unrelated to the negotiations. 25
Brown’s notices leave no doubt that the (unlawful) raises were a bridge for employees to the
new contract.
Finally, and tellingly, I note that the General Counsel cites not a single case in which the
Board has required an employer to maintain a unilateral change unlawfully implemented during 30
bargaining even after the parties adopt a new contract with different terms. Such a remedy
would be as antithetical to collective bargaining as was the Respondent’s original violation.
Accordingly, the backpay owed to employees is for the period January 23, 2013, to and
including January 31, 2013, the period of time in which the Respondent—without reaching 35
agreement or even offering to bargain with the Union—unilaterally rescinded its unlawfully
implemented pay raise.14

13It would be one thing for the Union (and the General Counsel) to challenge the existence
of the 2013 Agreement on some theory that the Respondent’s January extra-contractual
unilateral wage changes precluded formation of the contract or queered the ratification process.
In that case, the argument that the January unilaterally implemented wage rate must remain in
place until a later impasse or later agreement was reached would have traction. But that is
decidedly not the theory advanced. Rather, beginning on February 1, the General Counsel and
the Union want the wage changes the Union agreed to in collective bargaining and on top of
that the previous unilateral changes in wages to which it did not agree. The Union cannot have
it both ways. It cannot get its new negotiated bargain on wage rates and in addition and on top
of that a pre-existing wage rate it did not bargain for. The Board cannot give it both.
14The specific net amounts owing are set forth in the Order. The amounts are calculated
based on Schedule A of paragraph 1(b) of the compliance specification in this matter. As
JD–14–14
17
The make-whole remedy shall be computed in accordance with Ogle Protective
Services, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest at the rate
prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as
prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010). In accordance with 5
Latino Express, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 44 (2012), the Respondent shall compensate affected
employees for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving lumpsum backpay awards,
and file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating the backpay awards to the
appropriate calendar quarters for each employee.
10
The Respondent shall post an appropriate informational notice, as described in the
attached appendix. This notice shall be posted at Respondent’s facility wherever the notices to
employees are regularly posted for 60 days without anything covering it up or defacing its
contents. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic 15
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings the Respondent has gone out of business
or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed
by the Respondent at any time since January 3, 2013. When the notice is issued to the 20
Respondent, it shall sign it or otherwise notify Region 7 of the Board what action it will take with
respect to this decision.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended
15
25
ORDER
Respondent Faro Screen Process, Inc., Canton, Michigan, its officers, agents, 30
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
35
(a) Implementing wage increases for unit employees without providing the Union
notice and an opportunity to bargain.
(b) Rescinding wage increases for unit employees without providing the Union with
notice and an opportunity to bargain. 40

stipulated by the parties at the hearing, the Respondent does not question these calculations
beyond its challenge to the underlying theories of liability.
15
If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
JD–14–14
18
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
5
(a) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions
of employment of unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees in the
following bargaining unit:
10
those production and maintenance of employees employed by the
Employer as indicated within [the collective-bargaining] Agreement and
as per Appendix "A" consisting of preparatory layout by the use of
photographic, mechanical and electronic means, screen printing and
work operations pertaining thereto at the company plant, excluding 15
office clerical employees and salesmen, within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act as amended.
(b) Make employees whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the unilateral rescission of its wage increase on January 23, 2013, by 20
making the following backpay payments in the amounts set forth, plus interest
computed in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision:
Terry Moers $13.20.
25
Michael Chalifour $16.40
Jim Fordham $13.20
Frank Greenhalgh $15.6030
Denise Linton $13.60
Jason Swartz $13.60
35
TOTAL NET BACKPAY $ 85.60
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the
Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable
place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security 40
payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Canton, 45
Michigan, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 16 Copies of the

16If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
JD–14–14
19
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being
signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed 5
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the 10
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by
the Respondent at any time since January 3, 2013.
15
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for
Region 7 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
20
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 27, 2014
___________________25
David I. Goldman
U.S. Administrative Law Judge
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT implement wage increases without providing the Union notice and an
opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT rescind wage increases without providing the Union notice and an opportunity to
bargain.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL notify and on request bargain with the Union before implementing any changes in
your wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL, make unit employees whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the unilateral rescinding of wage increases, in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of this decision.
WE WILL compensate affected employees for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of
receiving lump-sum backpay awards, and WE WILL file a report with the Social Security
Administration allocating the backpay awards to the appropriate calendar quarters for each
employee.
FARO SCREEN PROCESS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to
file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website:
www.nlrb.gov.
477 Michigan Avenue, Room 300, Detroit, MI 48226-2569
(313) 226-3200, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (313) 226-3244.