Fannie Mae

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 28, 2021

2020005374 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/139,167 12/23/2013 Megan C. Berry 880417-0132-US00 5685
134795 7590 01/28/2021
MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP (DC)
790 N WATER ST
SUITE 2500
MILWAUKEE, WI 53202
EXAMINER
CRANDALL, RICHARD W.
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/28/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
DCipdocket@michaelbest.com
nbenjamin@michaelbest.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MEGAN C. BERRY, FELIX G. MEALE,
ERIC ROSENBLATT, JESSE STAAL, and
ANGELA TSENG

Appeal 2020-005374
Application 14/139,167
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before DONALD E. ADAMS, RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, and
ULRIKE W. JENKS, Administrative Patent Judges.

LEBOVITZ, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
The Examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
and 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of patent-eligibility. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject the
claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Fannie Mae.
Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 83–91 stand rejected by Examiner in the Non-final Office
Action (“Office Act.”) as follows:
Claims 83–91 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of Stinson
(US 2009/0006185 A1, published Jan. 1, 2009), Graboske (US
2008/0004893 A1, published Jan. 3, 2008) (“Graboske”), and Hendry (US
2004/0030565 A1, Feb. 12, 2004) (“Hendry”). Office Act. 9.
Claims 83–91 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “the claimed invention
is directed to a judicial exception in the form of a mental process-an
observation, evaluation, or opinion-without a practical application or
significantly more.” Office Act. 2.
Claim 83, the only independent claim on appeal, is reproduced below
(annotations added to number the limitations (steps) in the claims):
83. A non-transitory data storage device having computer code
embodied thereon, the computer code when executed by a
processor of a system device causes the system device to
perform operations comprising:
[1] receiving, by the system device from a computing
device over a communication network when the computing
device is in electronic communication with the system device
via the communication network, a request that causes the
system device to acquire electronic appraisals of a subject
property;
[2] extracting, by the system device after the system
device acquires the electronic appraisals, characteristics data
from the electronic appraisals in a manner that permits the
system device to detect whether or not faulty data exists in the
electronic appraisals; and
[3] outputting, from the system device to the computing
device over the communication network when the system
device detects an existence of the faulty data in the electronic
appraisals, a notification that commands the computing device
to visually display data entry fields on an electronic display in a
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manner that causes the computing device to populate the data
entry fields with the characteristics data while highlighting any
of the data entry fields that displays the faulty data.

REJECTION BASED ON SECTION 103
Examiner found that Stinson describes acquiring electronic appraisal
reports of a subject property as in step 1 of claim 83. Office Act. 9–10.
Examiner also found that Stinson describes step 3 of outputting a
notification that commands the computing device to populate data entry
fields of the appraisal form. Id. at 10. Examiner acknowledged that Stinson
does not disclose step 2 of extracting data to detect faulty data and
highlighting the faulty data as also required by step 3 of the claim. Id. at 11.
However, Examiner made findings that Graboske extracts appraisal data into
a formatted file and describes an appraisal guidelines module to verify that
the appraisal data meets appraisal guidelines and detect discrepancies, which
Examiner determined met the “faulty data” steps 2 and 3 of claim 83. Id. at
11–13. Examiner also found that Graboske also sets a fail flag if a validation
rule is not met (id. at 13), which is analogous to the highlighting of step 3 of
claim 83.
Examiner determined it would have been obvious to apply Graboske’s
method of validating appraisal data and determining discrepancies to Stinson
“to electronically rather than manually analyze the information in Stinson.”
Office Act. 14. Examiner explained:
[The] improved speed and accuracy of the computer-
implemented validation approach of Graboske is advantageous
over the manual approach of Stinson alone because the number
of real estate transactions and inquires is rapidly growing
(Stinson ¶¶ 0046-47), standardization is improved through
USPAP compliant appraisals (Stinson ¶¶ 0052, 56), and the
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system can assess whether human appraisers are providing
accurate information to the system as well (Graboske ¶ 0038).
Office Act. 15.
With respect to the limitation in step 3 of highlighting faulty data,
Examiner further cited Hendry. Id.

Limitation [3] outputting a notification that commands the computing device
Appellant states that Stinson does not “disclose, teach, or suggest”
outputting a notification that commands the customers in Stinson to visually
display data entry fields on an electronic display as required by step 3 of
clam 83. Appeal Br. 41. Appellant states that the “customers (107)” in
Stinson is not a “computing device” and it does not visually display the
appraisal data. Id. at 43. Appellant also states there is no device in Graboske
similar to the claimed “computing device.” Id. at 45.
This argument does not persuade us that the Examiner erred.
Stinson describes an electronic appraisal system as in rejected claim
83. Stinson discloses:
An appraisal system includes: a collector system configured to
gather at least one of data and files associated with a property;
and a scoring system coupled to the collector system and
configured to analyze at least one of the data and files in order
to calculate a score associated with the property, where the
score is calculated using at least one of a zone and a market
group associated with the property.
Stinson ¶ 7; see also ¶ 46.2

2 “A property appraisal system 100 of FIG. 1 includes a collector system
101, an accounting system 103 (e.g., an accounting database), an appraisal
database 105, and a scoring system 201 (in FIG. 2) in accordance with an
exemplary embodiment of the present invention.”
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Stinson discloses that “Customer(s) 107 such as individuals, banks,
insurance, companies, and other entities can order residential and
commercial real estate appraisals over the internet using appraisal system
100.” Stinson ¶ 46. Stinson discloses that the customers “interact with the
system via any input device such as a computing unit, keyboard, mouse,
smart card reader, biometric system, kiosk, personal digital assistant,
handheld computer (Palm Pilot®), cellular phone and/or the like.” Stinson
¶ 75; see also ¶¶ 78, 82. Any of the input device described by Stinson could
serve as the claimed “computing device.” Figures 9–14 of Stinson show a
“graphical user interface” which would be displayed on the customer’s
computing device. Stinson expressly teaches that the graphical user interface
shown in Figures 9–14 is “running on a portable communication device
1501.” Stinson ¶ 41. Furthermore, Stinson discloses that a customer can
request an appraisal report and that the report can be prepared using “a forms
generation web server assembles data from collector system 101 and
appraisal database 105 to generate appraisal report 206 instantly.” Id. at 57.
Stinson also discloses that the appraisal report “can be delivered
electronically to customer 107 via the Internet or any network.” Id. The
delivered report would be populated characteristics data from the electronic
appraisals. These disclosure fully support by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Examiner’s finding that step 3 of displaying and populating
the electronic appraisal on the customer or user’s computing device is
described by Stinson.
With respect to the requirement in step 3 of “a notification that
commands the computing device to visually display data entry fields on an
electronic display,” the Specification does not disclose how the
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“notification” is implemented. The Specification merely describes the
notification as “prompt[ing] the generation of a user interface 216 by the
interface module 215 of the computing device 101.1.” Spec. ¶ 69. Stinson
discloses, as found by the Examiner, that “Appraisal system 100 includes a
process whereby data from collector database 121 can be exported to a
portable communication device 1501” Stinson ¶ 71. Therefore, the
instruction by the property appraisal system 100 of Stinson to export the data
to the device, thereby populating data fields with the exported data, meets
the disputed limitation. Stinson also describes using browsers and computer
code to process requests (Stinson ¶¶ 78–80), further showing that the display
and populating of data fields is accomplished by Stinson. Appellant has not
identified any persuasive defect in the Examiner’s findings set forth in the
Office Action and explained above.
The Examiner found that Graboske also teaches step 3 of the claim,
comprising outputting a notification to a computing device when faulty data
is detected and then populating data entry fields with data. For example,
Figs. 11A and 11B of Graboske show “exemplary discrepancy reports using
exemplary appraisal data and exemplary property data.” Graboske ¶ 46. The
report is provided to a client. Id. ¶ 40. The report “can be provided in Word,
HTML or batch file format.” Id. ¶ 43. Because these formats are electronic,
it is evident that they are provided in electronic form and displayed and
populated on a computing device as commanded (“a notification that
commands” as recited in claim 83) by the appraisal validation system (id.
¶ 24). Appellant’s argument that Graboske does not teach a computing
device as required by claim 83 is therefore not persuasive.
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Because the “notification” recited in claim 83 is merely an instruction
to display the report on the device, this aspect of the claim is also described
by Graboske as discussed above when the report is provided to a client and
displayed on their device.
In sum, Examiner did not err in finding that both Stinson and
Graboske describe the claim limitation of [3] “a notification that commands
the computing device to visually display data entry fields on an electronic
display in a manner that causes the computing device to populate the data
entry fields with the characteristics data” and therefore this step was well-
known and conventional at the time of filing. Appellant did not adequately
address, nor distinguish, the specific disclosures in Stinson and Graboske
where this claim limitation is described.

Limitation [3] highlighting data fields
Examiner cited Hendry for describing “highlighting any of the data
entry fields that displays the faulty data” as recited in step 3 of the claim.
Appellant states that “Hendry fails to disclose, teach or suggest that the
appraisal quality flag is displayable on a display.” Appeal Br. 48.
This argument is not persuasive. Hendry discloses, as found by the
Examiner, “in a computer implemented version of the invention an empty
data field could be highlighted.” Hendry ¶ 23. It is unclear what “highlight”
means other than producing a visible mark on an empty field. Hendry also
describes “yellow” and “green” flags. Hendry ¶ 28. Again, it is unclear how
flags would be described as colored and not be visible to the eye. Also, as
discussed above, Graboske shows a report display on a computer monitor
with visible flags (Graboske, Fig. 9), where the “scoring module 150 is
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shown using flags.” Graboske ¶ 44. Thus, both Hendry and Graboske
provide evidence that it was known and conventional at the time of the
invention to visibly mark (e.g., by “highlighting”) an appraisal report to
identify discrepancies.
For the foregoing reasons, the rejection of claim 83 as obvious in view
of Stinson, Graboske, and Hendry is affirmed. Claims 84–81 were not
argued separately and therefore fall with claim 83. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
REJECTION BASED ON SECTION 101

Principles of Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
However, not every discovery is eligible for patent protection. Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). “Excluded from such patent protection are
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Id. The Supreme
Court articulated a two-step analysis to determine whether a claim falls
within an excluded category of invention. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012).
In the first step, it is determined “whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If
it is determined that the claims are directed to an ineligible concept, then the
second step of the two-part analysis is applied in which it is asked “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us?” Id. (alteration in original). The Court
explained that this step involves
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a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (citing from Mayo, 566
U.S. at 75–77).
Alice, relying on the analysis in Mayo of a claim directed to a law of
nature, stated that in the second part of the analysis, “the elements of each
claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” must be
considered “to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
217.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Eligibility Guidance”). This guidance provides additional direction
on how to implement the two-part analysis of Mayo and Alice.
Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Eligibility Guidance, looks at the
specific limitations in the claim to determine whether the claim recites a
judicial exception to patent eligibility. In Step 2A, Prong Two, the claims are
examined to identify whether there are additional elements in the claims that
integrate the exception in a practical application, namely, is there a
“meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 2019
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54 (Prong Two).
If the claim recites a judicial exception that is not integrated into a
practical application, then as in the Mayo/Alice framework, Step 2B of the
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2019 Eligibility Guidance instructs us to determine whether there is a
claimed “inventive concept” to ensure that the claims define an invention
that is significantly more than the ineligible concept itself. 2019 Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these guiding principles in mind, we proceed to determine
whether the claimed subject matter in this appeal is eligible for patent
protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Discussion
Claim 83 is directed to a “non-transitory data storage device.” A
storage device is a “manufacture” and therefore falls into one of the broad
statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Following the first step of the Mayo/Alice analysis, we find that the claim is
directed to a statutory class of invention. We thus proceed to Step 2A, Prong
One, of the Eligibility Guidance.

Step 2A, Prong One
In Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Eligibility Guidance, the specific
limitations in the claim are examined to determine whether the claim recites
a judicial exception to patent eligibility, namely, whether the claim recites an
abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon. The 2019 Eligibility
Guidance directs examiners to search each limitation in the claim to
determine whether it recites abstract an abstract idea. 2019 Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Examiner found that the steps in claim 83 could be performed
mentally, and therefore the steps fall into the grouping of “Mental
processes,” listed in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance as one of the broad
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categories of abstract ideas. Office Act. 3–4; 2019 Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.
Appellant contends that Examiner fails to provide “objective
evidence” that the following steps in the claims “could be performed by
hand” (emphasis added) (Appeal Br. 12):
“outputting, from the system device to the computing device over the
communication network when the system device detects an existence of the
faulty data in the electronic appraisals, a notification”;
“commands the computing device to visually display data entry fields
on an electronic display”; and
“causes the computing device to populate the data entry fields with
the characteristics data while highlighting any of the data entry fields that
displays the faulty data.”
The principal question is whether the claimed process that is
accomplished on a computer and communication network is automating a
process that could also be performed in the human mind without using the
technology recited in the claim. “Courts have examined claims that required
the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible
invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”
Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., 793 F.3d 1306,
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Examiner’s position, which we agree with, is that
while claim 82 recites steps accomplished using a computing device,
communication network, electronic displays, etc., the computer-
implementation does not confer patent-eligibility because the steps could
still be performed by a human (Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec
Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed Cir. 2016) (“Furthermore, with the
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exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the
claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human,
mentally or with pen and paper.”).
As explained by the Examiner, a human could perform the steps in the
claim of acquiring an appraisal of a subject property (step 1) and of detecting
“faulty data” in the appraisal report, such as inconsistent or missing data
(step 2; see Spec. ¶¶ 3, 4 describing “faulty data”). A human could also fill
the information into the appraisal form (“in a manner that causes the
computing device to populate the data entry fields with the characteristics
data”) and highlight, with a marker, pen, etc., the faulty data (“while
highlighting any of the data entry fields that displays the faulty data”). The
added step of “outputting . . . a notification that commands the computing
device to visually display data entry fields on an electronic display” is a part
of the computer-implementation, and as discussed in Intellectual Ventures I,
does not “foreclose” the claim from reciting mental steps that could be
performed by a human.
With respect to the Examiner’s alleged failure to provide objective
evidence that such steps could be performed by “hand,” we are in agreement
with the Examiner that obtaining data for an appraisal report and populating
a form with it could be accomplished mentally with the aid of paper and pen.
Stinson’s teaching that “appraisal report 105 may be manually completed by
an appraiser using the appraisal form shown in FIG. 2 or electronically
completed by an appraiser using the graphical user interfaces” (Stinson ¶ 25)
provides direct evidence that steps could be performed mentally using pen
and paper as was the convention before computer technology. Graboske also
describes performing appraisals by writing data into a form (Graboske ¶ 6),
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providing additional evidence that the Examiner correctly found that steps of
the claim could be performed by a mental process with paper and pen.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
determining that claim 83 recites mental processes.
Because we find that the Examiner correctly found that claim 83
recites an abstract idea, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two, of the analysis.

Step 2A, Prong Two
Prong Two of Step 2A under the 2019 Eligibility Guidance asks
whether there are additional elements that integrate the exception into a
practical application. As discussed in the 2019 Eligibility Guidance, “[a]
claim that integrates a judicial exception in a practical application will apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that places a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Integration into a practical application is evaluated by identifying whether
there are additional elements individually, and in combination, which go
beyond the judicial exception. Id. at 54–55.
The Examiner found that the steps in the claim are “merely
instructions” to perform the abstract idea recited in the claims on a
computer. Office Act. 5. The Examiner found that the additional element in
the claim, such as the communication network, is being used as a tool “to
apply the abstract idea to a computer” and therefore does not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application. Id. at 5–6.
Appellant contends that claims “having a graphical user interface”
were found to be patent-eligible and not to be directed to an abstract idea.
Appeal Br. 17. To support this position, Appellant cites Aatrix Software v.
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Green Shades Software, 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018), Data Engine
Technologies LLC V Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018), Core
Wireless Licensing SARL v. LG Electronics, 880 F. 3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2018), Trading Techs. International, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001,
1004 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Appeal Br. 16, 17, 23, 25
The circuit court in Aatrix did not make a patent-eligibility decision
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on the disputed claims in that case, but rather found
that the district court, in the case involving patent-eligibility of a patent
claim, improperly granted the motion to dismiss the case and improperly
denied the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint because the
circuit court found that allegations made in the second amended complaint
may be sufficient to “directly affect the district court’s patent eligibility
analysis.” Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1126. As the circuit court concluded: “There
are factual allegations in the second amended complaint, which when
accepted as true, prevent dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. as 1129.
For this, we do not consider the circuit court’s statements in Aatrix
concerning patent-eligibility to be a precedential holding. We therefore turn
to the remaining cases discussed by Appellant.
In Data Engine, the claim was “directed to a specific method for
navigating through three-dimensional electronic spreadsheets.” Data Engine,
906 F.3d at 1007–1008. The court found that the claim solved the
“technological problem” of navigating through three-dimensional
spreadsheets on a computer “by providing a highly intuitive, user-friendly
interface with familiar notebook tabs for navigating the three-dimensional
worksheet environment.” Id. at 1008. Representative claim 12 of Data
Engine recited, for example:
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[W]hile displaying said first spreadsheet page, displaying a row
of spreadsheet page identifiers along one side of said first
spreadsheet page, each said spreadsheet page identifier being
displayed as an image of a notebook tab on said screen display
and indicating a single respective spreadsheet page . . . in
response to said receiving user input step, displaying said
second spreadsheet page on said screen display in a manner so
as to obscure said first spreadsheet page from display while
continuing to display at least a portion of said row of
spreadsheet page identifiers[.]
The graphical interface in Data Engine comprised a “spreadsheet page
identifier being displayed as an image of a notebook tab on said screen
display” which continued to be displayed to a user when a second
spreadsheet was displayed. This configuration was considered to be an
improvement because it allowed the user to navigate “through the various
spreadsheet pages through selection of the notebook tabs.” Data Engine, 906
F.3d at 1008. The graphical interface therefore was not merely the
presentation of spreadsheets on a display screen, but also provided a
functionality that enabled a user to navigate through multiple spreadsheet
pages.
Claim 1 of the ’476 patent in Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1359, recites:
[T]he computing device being configured to display on the
screen a menu listing one or more applications, and additionally
being configured to display on the screen an application
summary that can be reached directly from the menu.
The claim in Core Wireless was not simply summarizing and
presenting information, but rather required “‘an application summary that
can be reached directly from the menu,’ [while] specifying a particular
manner by which the summary window must be accessed.” Core Wireless,
880 F.3d. at 1362. The court further explained that “[t]he disclosed invention
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improves the efficiency of using the electronic device by bringing together
‘a limited list of common functions and commonly accessed stored data,’
which can be accessed directly from the main menu.” Id. at 1363. The
provision of a graphical interface with defined functions therefore was a
significant factor in the court finding the claims to be patent-eligible in Core
Wireless.
In another case cited by Appellant, Trading Technologies
International, Inc., the court adopted the district court’s determination that
the disputed claims were patent-eligible because they “require a specific,
structured graphical user interface paired with a prescribed functionality
directly related to the graphical user interface’s structure that is addressed to
and resolves a specifically identified problem in the prior state of the art.”
Specifically, the claim recited displaying bid and ask regions along an axis,
“displaying an order entry region comprising a plurality of locations for
receiving commands to send trade orders, each location corresponding to a
price level along the common static price axis,” and “in response to a
selection of a particular location of the order entry region . . . , and sending
the trade order to the electronic exchange.” Trading Technologies, 675 Fed.
Appx. at 1003. As explained by the district court:
If the claims simply provided for “setting, displaying, and
selecting” data or information, CQG would be correct in its
assessment that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. . . .
Neither the claims of the '304 patent nor the claims of the ’132
patent are directed to solely ‘setting, displaying, and selecting’
data or information that is visible on the GUI device. Rather,
the claims are directed to solving a problem that existed with
prior art GUIs, namely, that the best bid and best ask prices
would change based on updates received from the market.
There was a risk with the prior art GUIs that a trader would
miss her intended price as a result of prices changing from
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under her pointer at the time she clicked on the price cell on the
GUI. The patents-in-suit provide a system and method whereby
traders may place orders at a particular, identified price level,
not necessarily the highest bid or the lowest ask price because
the invention keeps the prices static in position, and allows the
quantities at each price to change.
Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., Case No. 05-cv-4811 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
24, 2015) 6.
The hallmark of the patent-eligible claims in Data Engine, Core
Wireless, and Trading Technologies, as explained above, is a specific
element in the graphical user interface with a defined functionality. Such
hallmark is missing from the claims here. The notification in step 3 of the
claim “causes the computing device to populate the data entry fields with the
characteristics data while highlighting any of the data entry fields that
displays the faulty data.” There is no functionality associated with the user
interface; the data is entered into the fields and faulty data is highlighted. As
explained by the district court in Trading Technologies, “the claims simply
provided for ‘setting, displaying, and selecting’ data or information, CQG
would be correct in its assessment that the claims are directed to an abstract
idea.”
Date Engine’s claims had tabs to navigate through spreadsheets, Core
Wireless’s claims had a menu to reach an application summary, and Trading
Technology had an order entry region, which along with other features of the
interface, provided a system to place orders. The entered data and
highlighted data in claim 83 is static and provides no added function and no
added specific way in which these results are achieved. As clarified in Data
Engine, 906 F.3d at 1013, “mere automation” of a “process does not negate
its abstraction.”
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Appellant also cites Example 23 of the July 2015 Subject Matter
Eligibility Update.3 In claim of Example 23, claim 1, the claim was directed
to:
method relates to addressing a problem with overlapping
windows within a graphical user interface. In particular, the
claim recites dynamically relocating textual information within
a window displayed in a graphical user interface based upon a
detected overlap condition. When the windows overlap, textual
information is reformatted and relocated to an unobscured
portion of the underlying window; when the windows no longer
overlap, the textual information is returned to its original
format and location.
In claim 1 of Example 23, a dynamic process is recited in which
textual information on a display is automatically relocated to a second
format in response to an overlap condition and then returned to a first format
when the overlap no longer exists. In claim 83, there is no dynamic change
to the interface. Instead, in claim 83, information is entered into a field and
highlighted.
Appellant also cites claim 4 of Example 23 of the July 2015 Subject
Matter Eligibility Update, but provides no analysis on how this claim is
similar to claim 83. In the analysis of claim 4, it was stated that “[t]he
recitation of the computer screen for displaying and the processor for
moving data is not enough by itself to transform the exception into a
patentable invention, because these limitations are generic computer
components performing generic computer functions at a high level of
generality,” which is the same reasoning relied on here for lack of patent-
eligibility. Claim 4, however, was determined to be eligible, because, like

3 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-
app1.pdf
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claim 1, the claim recited steps in which the textual information was
dynamically changed in response to an overlap condition. This dynamic
change is missing from claim 83.
We further note that claims, like the ones at issue here, were found to
be patent ineligible when they were directed to an online loan origination
service “in which data is received in one format, automatically extracted,
compared to a set criteria, populated into a second document, and then
stored for and retrieved by a user” were found to be patent-ineligible.
Mortgage Application Tech. v. MeridianLink Inc., 2021 WL 97347 (Fed.
Circ., nonprecedential, Jan. 21, 2021).
In sum, Appellant did not establish that the claim recites an additional
element in the claim which integrates the abstract idea in to a practical
application.
Step 2B
Because we determined that the judicial exception is not integrated
into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B of the Eligibility
Guidelines, which asks whether there is an inventive concept. In making
this Step 2B determination, we must consider whether there are specific
limitations or elements recited in the claim “that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present” or whether the claim “simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception,
indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.” 2019 Eligibility
Guidelines, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (footnote omitted). We must also consider
whether the combination of steps perform “in an unconventional way and
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therefore include an ‘inventive step,’ rendering the claim eligible at Step
2B.” Id.
Examiner found that the use of a computer to transmit and receive
data and organize and highlight faulty information is using a computer as a
tool in a well-understood, routine, and conventional way. Office Act. 6.
Appellant’s argument under step 2B is the same as in the obviousness
rejection. Specifically, Appellant argues that for the reasons discussed in the
Appeal Brief in which the obviousness rejection was argued (Section
(IV(D)) the claims are not well-understood, routine or conventional in the
art. Appeal Br. 34. The only step identified by Appellant is providing an
inventive concept is step 3 of the claim.
As discussed in the obviousness rejection, all the steps recited in the
claim are found in Stinson, Graboske, and Hendry, including all the
limitations in step 3. The step of “a notification that commands the
computing device to visually display data entry fields on an electronic
display in a manner that causes the computing device to populate the data
entry fields with the characteristics data while highlighting any of the data
entry fields that displays the faulty data,” as discussed in the obviousness
rejection, involves well-understood, routine or conventional implementation.
Appellant has not explained how the notification, populating the data entry
fields, and highlighting the faulty data provides an inventive concept.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the rejection of claim
83 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed. Claims 84–81 were not argued
separately and therefore fall with claim 83. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
83–91 103 Stinson, Graboske,
Hendry
83–91
83–91 101 Eligibility 83–91
Overall
Outcome
83–91

TIME PERIOD
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED