FANNIE MAE

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 11, 2020

2019000714 (P.T.A.B. May. 11, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/095,112 12/03/2013 Kent R. Willard 880417-0134-US00 1863
134795 7590 05/11/2020
MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP (DC)
790 N WATER ST
SUITE 2500
MILWAUKEE, WI 53202
EXAMINER
GLENNIE, DEBRA L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/11/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
DCipdocket@michaelbest.com
nbenjamin@michaelbest.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KENT R. WILLARD, FRANKLIN CARROLL,
KEVIN CHUNG, ZACHARY DAWSON,
ERIC ROSENBLATT, and SAMPAT SARAF

Appeal 2019-000714
Application 14/095,112
Technology Center 3600

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JASON J. CHUNG and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.

CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20, all the claims pending in this
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Oral arguments
were heard on April 24, 2020. A transcript of that hearing will be added to
the record in due time.
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Fannie Mae.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Invention
Appellant’s “invention relates generally to computer analysis of real
estate appraisal data, with special attention paid to identifying and evaluating
data errors” in appraisers’ property appraisals. Spec. ¶ 1.2 “An error
detection operation is performed for . . . corresponding appraisal-data-field
entries by detecting any discrepancies, both between appraisers, and between
different appraisals by the same appraisers, where corresponding appraisal-
data-field entries are for a same property characteristic of a same property.”
Id. at Abstract.
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 is exemplary of the claims on appeal and is
reproduced below with bracketed lettering added and dispositive limitation
at issue italicized for discussion purposes:
1. A method comprising:
[(a)] accessing, with an electronic processor, appraisal-
data-field entries from a plurality of property appraisals, the
appraisal-data-field entries indicating values assigned to
property characteristics of a plurality of properties included in
the plurality of property appraisals, wherein a first portion of
the appraisal-data-field entries that correspond to one another
indicate respective values assigned to a first property
characteristic of a first property from the plurality of properties;

2 We refer to: (1) the originally filed Specification filed December 3, 2013
(“Spec.”); (2) the Non-Final Office Action mailed November 28, 2017
(“Final Act.”); (3) the Appeal Brief filed July 2, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); (4) the
Examiner’s Answer mailed September 6, 2018 (“Ans.”); and (3) the Reply
Brief filed November 5, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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[(b)] performing, with the electronic processor, an error
detection operation for each of the appraisal-data-field entries
as a target entry by detecting a discrepancy between the target
entry and an appraisal-data-field entry of the appraisal-data-
field entries that correspond to the target entry;
[(c)] responsive to performing the error detection
operation for the each of the appraisal-data-field entries as the
target entry, flagging, with the electronic processor, all of the
appraisal-data-field entries determined by the error detection
operation to be erroneous;
[(d)] determining, with the electronic processor, a
discrepancy score for the each of the appraisal data-field entries
that are flagged as erroneous;
[(e)] determining, with the electronic processor, an
appraiser score for each appraiser that has submitted at least
one of the plurality of property appraisals based on two or
more discrepancy scores that have been determined and are
associated with the each appraiser, wherein the appraiser score
indicates a reliability and a likelihood of fraudulent activity of
the each appraiser; and
[(f)] controlling, with the electronic processor, a display
device to display data corresponding to at least some of the
plurality of property appraisals including the appraiser score
associated with the each appraiser that submitted one of the at
least some of the plurality of property appraisals.
Appeal Br. 52.
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4–27.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–20 under U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over the combined teachings of Lamont et al. (US 2003/0046099 A1; pub.
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Mar. 6, 2003) (“Lamont”), Yan et al. (US 2011/0173116 A1; pub. July 14,
2011) (“Yan”), and Frazier et al. (US 2012/0278243 A1; pub. Nov. 1, 2012)
(“Frazier”). Final Act. 27–36.
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).
Appellant appeals the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 as
ineligible subject matter under § 101 and as obvious under § 103. Appeal
Br. 11–49; Reply Br. 2–13. Appellant’s arguments address limitations
recited in claim 1 but do not address any particular limitation recited in any
other claim. As such, we select independent claim 1 as representative of all
rejected claims in this appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

I. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has held that § 101 includes implicit
exceptions—laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas—which
are not patent-eligible. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014). In January 2019, the Office issued the 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”),
which addresses the manner in which § 101 case law is to be applied by the
Office. In October 2019, the Office issued an update to explain further the
manner in which the Guidance should be implemented. See October 2019
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Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (Oct. 18, 2019);
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“October 2019 Update”). The Board is required
to adhere to these guidance documents as a matter of Office policy.
Guidance 51.3 The Guidance sets forth a four-part analysis for determining
whether a claim is eligible subject matter under § 101; the four parts are
labeled Step 1, Step 2A Prong 1, Step 2A Prong 2, and Step 2B. Id. 53–56.

Guidance Step 1
First, under “Step 1,” we consider whether the claimed subject matter
falls within the four statutory categories set forth in § 101, namely
“[p]rocess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Guidance 53–
54; see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appellant’s independent claims 1 and 18 each
recite a method (i.e., a “process”). Independent claim 19 recites a device
and independent claim 20 recites a system (i.e., “machines”). Independent
claim 17 recites a computer readable medium (i.e., a “manufacture”). As
such, the claims are directed to a statutory class of invention within § 101
and we proceed to the next step.

Guidance Step 2A Prong 1 (Alice/Mayo–Step 1) (Judicial Exceptions)
Second, under “Step 2A Prong 1,” we evaluate “whether the claim
recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural

3 Although the Office Action at issue occurred before the 2019 Guidance
was issued, the 2019 Guidance “applies to all applications . . . filed before,
on, or after January 7, 2019.” Guidance 50.
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phenomenon.” Guidance 54; see Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216–17 (2014).
The Examiner determines that claim 1 recites and is “directed to an
abstract idea of managing information collected and reviewing the
information for accuracy, specifically, directed towards reviewing appraisals
and determining if an appraisal has accurate information, which is (i) a
fundamental economic practice, (ii) a method of organizing human activities
[and] (iii) an idea of itself.” Final Act. 5.
Appellant argues “the Examiner failed [to] establish a prima facie
case of patent ineligibility against the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because the Examiner has failed to perform the Alice test, i.e., the first step
of identifying an abstract idea as it is recited in the pending claims.” Reply
Br. 8.
We are not persuaded of Examiner error. Rather, we agree with the
Examiner’s determination that claim 1 recites an abstract idea. Apart from
additional elements discussed separately below, claim 1, under a broadest
reasonable interpretation, recites steps focused on determining errors in
property appraisals, which is a fundamental economic activity and a long-
practiced human activity. Guidance 52 (indicated as abstract “[c]ertain
methods of organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or
practices (including . . . mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions.”
In particular, limitation (a) involves accessing stored appraisal-data-field
entries from property appraisals. Limitation (b) involves detecting a
discrepancy between the appraisal-data-field entries. Limitation (c) involves
flagging all of the appraisal-data-field entries determined to be erroneous.
Limitation (d) involves determining a discrepancy score for each of the
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appraisal data-field entries that are flagged as erroneous. Limitation (e)
involves determining an appraiser score for each appraiser based on two or
more discrepancy scores that are associated with the each appraiser and
limitation (f) displays the appraiser scores. Accessing property appraisal-
related data, reviewing the data for errors, and displaying the results, have
long been common steps in ensuring the quality of property appraisals. See
Spec. ¶ 6 (“An appraisal reviewer attempts to determine the acceptability of
an appraised value, generally by manually verifying that the comparable
selections, adjustments, and reconciliations made by the appraiser meet
standards and are mathematically correct.”). Accordingly, these are all steps
for determining errors in property appraisals, which is a fundamental
economic practice and a certain method of organizing human activities.
In addition, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1
recites an idea of itself, i.e., a mental process. Although the previously
recognized category of an idea of itself is not one of the currently recognized
categories, it is sufficient for the purposes of the present appeal that the
claimed concepts reasonably can be characterized as falling within the still-
recognized category of mental processes. See, e.g., MPEP
§ 2106.04(a)(2)(III):
The courts have used the phrase “an idea ‘of itself’” to describe
an idea standing alone such as an uninstantiated concept, plan or
scheme, as well as a mental process (thinking) that “can be
performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and
paper.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1372 . . . (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Characterizing the abstract idea as a mental process instead of an idea
of itself does not constitute a change in the thrust in the Examiner’s rejection
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because the Examiner asserts that “the claimed invention is similar to the
analysis and decision of Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., where
the CAFC stated that, ‘the claims do not go beyond requiring the collection,
analysis, and display of available information in a particular field, stating
those functions in general terms.’” Final Act. 20 (citing Electric Power, 830
F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The selection, collection, analysis and
display of information were determined by the Federal Circuit in that case to
be equivalent to “ordinary mental processes.” Electric Power, 830 F.3d at
1355.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 includes steps of accessing
certain collected property appraisal-related information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis, all of which can be
performed entirely in the human mind, or with the aid of a pen and paper.
Id. As discussed above, limitations (a) and (b) involve accessing stored
appraisal-data-field entries and performing an error detection operation for
each of the appraisal-data-field entries. Limitation (c) involves flagging all
of the appraisal-data-field entries determined to be erroneous. Limitation (d)
and (e) involve determining a discrepancy score based on the flagged errors
and determining an appraiser score for each appraiser based on the
discrepancy scores. Limitation (f) displays the appraiser scores. Under a
broadest reasonable interpretation, limitations (c), (d), and (e) merely require
performing a simple comparison of fields to detect errors and using the
detected errors to calculate scores. A person could perform such a
comparison and score calculation mentally or with pencil and paper without
analyzing a large amount of data and therefore these limitation can be
practically performed in the mind. See also October 2019 Update 7 (“Under
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the 2019 PEG, the ‘mental processes’ grouping is defined as concepts
performed in the human mind, and examples of mental processes include
observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions.”).
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1
recites a mental process because nothing in the claim elements precludes the
steps from practically being performed in the mind. Final Act. 5 (“collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results based on the analysis
(accessing property appraisals and evaluating appraisals using error
detection operations)” (emphasis omitted)); see October 2019 Update 7
(indicating that “a claim to ‘collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,’ where the data
analysis steps are recited at a high level of generality such that they could
practically be performed in the human mind, recites a mental process,” citing
Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356.
Appellant argues the pending claims are not similar to the claims at
issue in Electric Power Group because the “claims at issue in Electric
Power Group are directed to systems and methods for performing real-time
performance monitoring of an electric power grid by collecting data from
multiple data sources, analyzing the data, and displaying the results, which is
completely different than the pending claims,” which “are directed to
flagging appraisal-data-field entries that are erroneous.” Appeal Br. 46.
We are unpersuaded. Electric Power Group is relevant to the
Appellant’s invention because both involve claims that recite collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis, where the data analysis steps are recited at a high level of
generality.
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The Specification further supports the Examiner’s determination that
claim 1 relates to “reviewing appraisals and determining if an appraisal has
accurate information” and thus includes performance of a certain method of
organizing a human activity or an abstract mental process. Final Act. 5. The
Specification describes that the purpose of the invention is to detect “ent[ry
of] false values into the data fields of the appraisal form” by a property
appraiser. Spec. ¶ 3. Thus, the invention seeks to address “entry of false
data [that] may be an intentional misrepresentation by the appraiser” or
“may alternatively represent an error made by the appraiser, rather than
fraud.” Id. at ¶ 3, 4.
Appellant argues “[t]he Examiner has not identified an abstract idea
from the actual claim limitations of claim 1” because “the Examiner
overgeneralized the actual claim limitations.” Appeal Br. 41.
We are not persuaded of Examiner error. The Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 recites “reviewing appraisals and determining if
an appraisal has accurate information,” even if at a high-level, accurately
characterizes the claimed invention. Final Act. 5. The level of abstraction at
which the Examiner describes the invention does not change the accuracy of
the Examiner’s determination. See Apple v. Ameranth Inc., 842 F.3d 1229,
1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract idea can generally be described at
different levels of abstraction.”). Moreover, as discussed above, it is clear
from Appellant’s Specification that the purpose of the invention is to
determine if an appraisal has accurate information by “identifying and
evaluating data errors.” Spec. ¶ 1. For example, the Specification describes
that “[f]alse data field entries [in property appraisals], whether accidental or
fraudulent, result in the estimated value of the subject property being
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inaccurate-i.e., the property is either over- or undervalued.” Spec. ¶ 5. The
Specification further describes detecting such false entries by comparing
data field entries of similar property characteristics in different appraisals.
Spec. ¶ 54 (“if a data field entry 130 for a given property characteristic 140
of a given property is different in two appraisals, then one of the discrepant
values is likely an error (whether accidental or intentional)”). Accordingly,
we agree the Specification discloses that Appellant’s invention is for
collecting appraisal information and reviewing the information for accuracy.
Consequently, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an
abstract idea in the form of a “certain method of organizing human activity”
and a “mental process,” as provided in the Guidance. We discern no error in
that part of the Examiner’s rejection.

Guidance Step 2A Prong 2 (Practical Application)
Third, having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we
proceed to “Step 2A Prong 2” of the Guidance, which requires that we
evaluate whether “the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial
exception into a practical application of the exception.” Guidance 54. “A
claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will
apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id.; see
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78
(2012). The Guidance specifies that this evaluation is conducted by first
“[i]dentifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s),” and then “evaluating those additional
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elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application” such as by reciting an
improvement to technology. Guidance 54–55.
The Examiner finds claim 1 recites additional elements including a
“computer system with a processor.” Final Act. 13. The Examiner
determines claim 1 “does not include additional elements that are sufficient
to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the
claims imply the methods may be performed on generic computer elements.”
Final Act. 12, 13 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 25, 137).
Appellant argues that claim 1 is integrated into a practical application
and thus eligible under Step 2A, prong two. Appeal Br. 46–49.
Specifically, Appellant argues that the claim goes “beyond the mere
collection, analysis, and display of available information in a particular field
by determining discrepancy scores and determining an appraiser score,”
which is “indicative of both reliability and a likelihood of fraudulent
activity.” Id. at 47.
This argument is unpersuasive because the benefit Appellant asserts,
of detecting fraudulent activity by appraisers, is achieved through an
improvement to the abstract idea identified above by determining an
appraiser score for each appraiser. Such an improvement to the recited
abstract idea does not confer patent-eligibility. See Customedia Techs., LLC
v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1363–65 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (collecting
cases).
Furthermore, the Specification does not provide additional details that
would distinguish the claimed additional elements from a generic
implementation. See Spec. ¶ 137 (“the appraisal evaluation module may be
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implemented as computer-readable instructions (e.g., software) on one or
more computing devices (e.g., servers, personal computers, etc.), stored on
computer readable media associated therewith”).” We agree with the
Examiner that there is no indication that the components used in the
invention are anything other than general purpose computer components.
See Ans. 15 (“The claimed invention is using general computing devices to
perform the claimed invention and of which the specification did not include
and special unconventional arrangement of parts.”). Thus, rather than
improving technology, claim 1 uses the generic computer components as
tools to implement the improved abstract idea. Using generic computer
components as tools to perform an abstract idea does not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application or otherwise confer patent-
eligibility. Guidance 55.
Appellant further argues that claim 1 is similar to the claims at issue
in McRO4 because “like the claims at issue in MCRO, the pending claims are
‘a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology.’”
Appeal Br. 49 (citing McRO).
This argument is unpersuasive. In McRO, our reviewing court
analyzed claims that use “a combined order of specific rules that renders
information into a specific format that is then used and applied to create
desired results: a sequence of synchronized, animated characters.” McRO,
837 F.3d at 1315. The court found that the claims did not “simply use a
computer as a tool to automate conventional activity,” but instead used the
computer to “perform a distinct process” that is carried out in a different way

4 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
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than the prior non-computer method to improve the technology of 3-D
animation techniques. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314–16.
Appellant argues that “the pending claims, like the claims at issue in
MCRO, are ‘a combined order of specific rules that renders information
[e.g., appraisal data- field entries that are flagged as erroneous] into a
specific format [e.g., discrepancy scores] that are then used and applied to
create desired results [e.g., appraiser scores].’” Appeal Br. 49.
In contrast with McRO, Appellant does not identify any specific rules
at all in the claim, let alone specific rules that are used to solve a
technological problem such as the rules enabling the computer in McRO to
generate computer animated characters. Accordingly, Appellant has not
identified a specific rule used to solve a technological problem as in McRO.
We, therefore, find insufficient basis on the record before us to
support Appellant’s argument that claim 1 is similar to the claim in McRO,
where computers were unable to make certain subjective determinations, i.e.,
regarding morph weight and phoneme timings, which could only be made
prior to the McRO invention by human animators. As such, we are not
persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claim improves a computer
technology or other technology, and we do not consider claim 1 to recite a
practical application of the abstract concept in view of McRO.
Appellant further argues the claimed invention provides an
improvement to technology, i.e., “a specific improvement over prior
systems,” because claim 1 is like the claims in Core Wireless5. Reply
Br. 10.

5 Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics Inc., 880 F.3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
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We are unpersuaded. Claim 1 broadly recites “controlling, with the
electronic processor, a display device to display data corresponding to at
least some of the plurality of property appraisals.” Thus, claim 1 recites
displaying property appraisal-related data at a high level of generality and on
a generic display. See Spec. ¶ 146 (describing a generic display device).
The claim’s recitation of displaying data is unlike patent-eligible claims
directed to displaying data in a specific user interface such as in Core
Wireless. In Core Wireless, the Federal Circuit held that claims that recited
an interface were patent eligible because the claims recited specific
limitations of the interface such as: an application summary that can be
reached through a menu, the data being in a list and being selectable to
launch an application, and additional limitations directed to the actual user
interface displayed and how it functions. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1363.
The court found that the claims were directed to an improved user interface
and not the abstract concept of an index as the claim “limitations disclose a
specific manner of displaying a limited set of information to the user, rather
than using conventional user interface methods to display a generic index on
a computer.” Id.; see also Trading Tech v. CQG, Inc., 675 Fed. Appx. 1001
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that a user interface with a prescribed functionality
directly related to the interface’s structure, that is addressed to and resolves a
problem in the art, is patent eligible).
In Appellant’s claim 1, there are no limitations directed to a specific
manner of displaying a limited set of information to the user or to how the
user interacts with the displayed data and, therefore, we find Appellant’s
arguments unpersuasive. As such, claim 1 does not recite a patent-eligible
improvement to computer functionality. See Customedia Techs., 951 F.3d
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1359, 1365 (“[T]o be directed to a patent-eligible improvement to computer
functionality, the claims must be directed to an improvement to the
functionality of the computer or network platform itself.”)
Additionally, none of the remaining indicia of integration identified
by the Guidance are present in the claim. Guidance 55; see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). For example, the claim does not recite a particular
machine and, instead, generically recites processors and other generic
computer components such as a display device. Final Act. 16. Nor does the
claim recite the “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different
state or thing.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010); MPEP § 2106.05(c). The
claimed additional elements do not transform an article, i.e., some type of
tangible or physical object, but instead transform an intangible concept, i.e.,
information, from one form to another. That is, the claim simply collects
manipulates, and displays data, thereby determining an appraiser score. See
MPEP § 2106.05(c); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72
(1972) (holding that a computer based algorithm that merely transforms data
from one form to another is not patent-eligible). As such, claim 1 has no
other meaningful limitations (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)), and merely recites
instructions to execute an abstract idea on generic computer hardware (see
MPEP § 2106.05(f)).
Appellant further argues “even assuming, in arguendo, that the
pending claims involve an abstract idea, the pending claims include a
number of additional features that significantly limit the scope of the claim
such that it covers only a narrow application of the abstract idea that does
not preempt the abstract idea.” Appeal Br. 44.
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We are unpersuaded because questions on preemption are inherent in
and resolved by the Alice/Mayo § 101 analysis, which has been applied here.
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“[W]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent
ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case,
preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.”); Two-Way Media
Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
In summary, the additional elements of claim 1 are not applied in any
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to
a particular technological environment, i.e., generic computer components,
such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception. We, therefore, determine claim 1 is not directed
to a specific asserted improvement in computer-related technology or
otherwise integrated into a practical application and thus is directed to a
judicial exception.

Guidance Step 2B (Alice/Mayo, Step 2) (Inventive Concept)
Having concluded that claim 1 is “directed to” an abstract idea, we
turn to whether the claim provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the
additional elements, individually and as an ordered combination, amount to
“significantly more” than the exceptions themselves. Guidance 56. To
determine whether the claim provides an inventive concept, the additional
elements are considered—individually and in combination—to determine
whether they (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or (2) simply
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append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. Guidance 56.
The Examiner determines that the claimed additional elements do not
amount to significantly more than the above-identified abstract idea. Final
Act. 23 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 25, 137). Specifically, the Examiner notes that in
light of Appellant’s Specification, “it is clear that the invention describes the
computing components/environment as either performing basic computing
functions such as sending and receiving data, or performing functions
‘known’ in the art. In other words, the claimed functions are ‘well-
understood, routine, activit[ies]’ previously known in the industry.” Id. The
Examiner concludes that “the claims fail to recite any element that
individually or as an ordered combination transform the abstract idea of
error detection operations into a patent eligible application of that idea.” Id.
(emphasis omitted).
Appellant argues that claim 1 “satisf[ies] the second prong of the
aforementioned Alice test because . . . claim [1] include[s] a number of
additional features that provide significantly more than the alleged abstract
idea.” Appeal Br. 45.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive. As discussed above, the only
“additional elements” in claim 1 beyond the recited abstract idea are “an
electronic processor” and a “display device” and these elements are merely
used for performing steps of the claimed abstract process for determining
and displaying an appraiser score. Final Act. 13. As the Examiner notes,
claim 1 uses generic computer components for collecting and analyzing data
and displaying data and for implementing the abstract idea. Id. at 20. We
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also agree with the Examiner that, according to Appellant’s Specification,
the additional elements are “generic computer elements” performing typical
functions and thus are “well-understood, routine, and conventional.” Final
Act. 12, 13 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 25, 137); Ans. 17. For these reasons, the recited
hardware adds nothing more than well-understood, routine, conventional
activities, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract mental
process. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)(ii). We, therefore, agree with the
Examiner’s determination that the additional elements do not amount to
significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception.
Appellant argues that “the novelty and non-obviousness” of certain
elements in claim 1 “is evidence of unconventionality in claim 1.” Appeal
Br. 43–44.
We are unpersuaded. Although the second step in the Alice/Mayo
analysis includes a search for an inventive concept, the analysis is not an
evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea
is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89 (rejecting the
suggestion that Sections 102, 103, and 112 might perform the appropriate
screening function and noting that in Mayo such an approach “would make
the ‘law of nature’ exception . . . a dead letter”). Further, “under the
Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature
(or natural phenomenon or abstract idea), [like Appellant’s claim 1], cannot
rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for
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patent eligibility.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That is, whether the additional elements recited in
the claim are well-understood, routine, and conventional is an analysis
conducted apart from the abstract idea recited in the claim.
Appellant next argues the Examiner fails to provide evidence (as
required by Berkheimer6) in the step 2B analysis to support the assertion that
the identified additional elements are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Appeal Br. 42–43.
This argument is unpersuasive. In Berkheimer, the Federal Circuit
held that “[w]hether something [(i.e., additional elements beyond the
abstract idea)] is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled
artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.” See Berkheimer,
881 F.3d at 1369. In response to Berkheimer, the USPTO issued a new
examination procedure (“the Berkheimer Memorandum”7), requiring the
Examiner to support expressly a finding that limitations beyond the abstract
idea are well-understood, routine, and conventional.
The Examiner, although not expressly mentioning Berkheimer, does
comply with the Berkheimer Memorandum’s requirement to support
expressly a finding that an additional limitation beyond the abstract idea is
well-understood, routine, and conventional. See also Berkheimer, 881 F.3d
at 1369. The Examiner identifies claim 1’s additional elements and finds
that, in view of the Specification, the additional elements are “generic

6 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
7 April 19, 2018 Memorandum to the Patent Examining Corps, entitled
“Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility,
Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.).”
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computer elements” performing typical functions and thus are “well-
understood, routine, and conventional.” Final Act. 12, 13 (citing
Spec. ¶¶ 25, 137); Ans. 17. Thus, the Examiner cites to Appellant’s
Specification to find certain additional limitations are well-understood,
routine, and conventional as set forth in the Berkheimer Memorandum.
Berkheimer Memorandum 4 (III. A. 1 “[a] citation to an express statement in
the specification.”). We agree with the Examiner’s finding because the
Specification indicates the claimed invention may be performed by
conventional hardware, i.e., “on one or more computing devices ( e.g.,
servers, personal computers, etc.).” Spec. ¶¶ 137, 146. Also, the
Specification does not describe the particulars of the additional elements,
thereby indicating these elements are sufficiently well-understood in the art.
See Ans. 15 (“The claimed invention is using general computing devices to
perform the claimed invention and of which the specification did not include
and special unconventional arrangement of parts.”). Appellant, in turn, fails
to specifically address the Examiner’s reliance on the Specification or to
persuasively demonstrate which limitations are not well-understood, routine,
or conventional, whether under Berkheimer or any other authority. Appeal
Br. 42–43.
Appellant argues that claim 1 recites significantly more than the
alleged abstract idea because “similar to BASCOM, 8 the pending claims
have an inventive concept that can be found in the ordered combination of
claim limitations that transforms the abstract idea into a particular, practical
application of that abstract idea.” Appeal Br. 49.

8 BASCOM Global Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 827 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
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We disagree. Appellant provides no evidence from the Specification
to support any assertion that the claimed combination of additional elements
is non-conventional. Nor does Appellant identify any particular
combination of claim limitations that transforms the abstract idea into
something more. Mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements
unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re
Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Thus, there is no evidence in
the record to support the argument that Appellant’s claimed method is
provided with any non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
conventional components similar to BASCOM. Analyzing the additional
elements as an ordered combination, we agree with the Examiner that the
additional elements as an ordered combination do not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. Ans. 18–19.
We, therefore, conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive
concept because the additional elements recited in the claim, considered
individually and as an ordered combination, do not provide significantly
more than the recited judicial exception. Accordingly, we are not persuaded
claim 1 recites patent-eligible subject matter. Further, Appellant has not
proffered sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us that any of the
limitations in the remaining claims provide a meaningful limitation that
transform the claims into a patent-eligible application. Therefore, we sustain
the rejection of claims 1–20 under U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter.

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II. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Independent claim 1 recites, in part, “determining, with the electronic
processor, an appraiser score for each appraiser that has submitted at least
one of the plurality of property appraisals based on two or more discrepancy
scores that have been determined and are associated with the each
appraiser.” Appeal Br. 52. The Examiner primarily relies on Frazier to
teach the limitation at issue. Final Act. 35–36 (citing Frazier ¶¶ 8, 9, 33, 40,
45, 53, Fig. 3E).
Appellant argues Frazier fails to teach or suggest determining “an
appraiser score for each appraiser . . . based on two or more discrepancy
scores that have been determined and are associated with the each
appraiser.” Appeal Br. 15. Specifically, Appellant argues Frazier does not
teach determining an appraiser score, as claimed, because the single colored
indicator of Frazier is not based on discrepancies found in the appraiser’s
appraisal. Appeal Br. 18. Appellant continues “Frazier does not disclose
other discrepancy indicators, or discrepancy scores in general, that form the
basis of ‘an appraiser score.’” Id. at 19.
Appellant’s arguments are persuasive. Frazier’s Fig. 3E and the other
portions of Frazier relied upon by the Examiner describe determining a
number of flags to show an appraiser’s credentials 4. Frazier ¶ 45, Fig. 3E.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that the number of appraiser flags
teaches an appraiser score. Final Act. 35. In Frazier, however, the number
of flags is determined by criteria including “license/certification status, state
of license, months at license/certification level, license expiration date,
distance traveled to subject property, and contract price requirement.”
Frazier ¶ 40. Although determined based on a quantity of flags, in Frazier,
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the “appraiser credentials 4 are indicated by an appraiser icon and a colored
indicator.” Id. Appellant argues, and we agree, that in Frazier none of the
criteria for determining the number of flags (appraiser score) include
discrepancies found in the appraiser’s appraisals. Appeal Br. 19. And,
although we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Yan teaches determining
a risk score based on discrepancies (inconsistencies) in appraiser reports
(Final Act. 33) the Examiner does not include reasoning establishing why it
would have been obvious to modify Frazier’s criteria for determining the
number of flags (appraiser score) to include the inconsistencies described in
Yan. We, therefore, find persuasive Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
fails to demonstrate the cited combination teaches or suggests determining
an appraiser score for each appraiser based on two or more discrepancy
scores, as recited in claim 1.
Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments
advanced by Appellant for claim 1, we need not reach the merits of
Appellant’s other arguments. Accordingly, based on the record before us,
we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of independent
claim 1. We also do not sustain the rejection of independent claims 17, 18,
19, and 20, which recite limitations commensurate with the limitation at
issue here, and of dependent claims 2–16, for similar reasons.

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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101

1–20
1–20 103 Lamont, Yan, Frazier 1–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED