Fair Mercantile Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 22, 1984

271 N.L.R.B. 1159 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

FAIR MERCANTILE CO.
Fair Mercantile Company and Debra Hanks. Case
14-CA-16752
22 August 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
ZIMMERMAN AND HUNTER
On 9 February 1984 Administrative Law Judge
Michael O. Miller issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, l and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Fair Mer-
cantile Company, St. Louis, Missouri, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order.
I The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951).
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL O. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was heard on December 5, 1983, in St. Louis, Mis-
souri, based on an unfair labor practice charge filed by
Debra Hanks, an individual, on June 6, 1983, and a com-
plaint issued by the Regional Director for Region 14 of
the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) on July
12, 1983. The complaint alleges that Fair Mercantile
Company (Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by threat-
ening employees with discharge if they brought their
complaints to Respondent's officers and discharging
Debra Hanks and Marie Stefanoni because of their con-
certed protected activities. Respondent's timely filed
answer denies the commission of any unfair labor prac-
tices.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to appear,
examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue
orally. Briefs, which have been carefully considered,
were filed on behalf of the General Counsel and Re-
spondent.
271 NLRB No. 188
Based on the entire record, including my observation
of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the follow-
ing
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS-PRELIMINARY
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent is a Missouri corporation engaged in the
retail sale of furniture, appliances, and related products
from its place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. Jurisdic-
tion is not in dispute. The complaint alleges, Respondent
in its answer as amended at hearing admits, and I find
and conclude that Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
Respondent's employees are represented by the Inde-
pendent Retail Furniture Employees Organization. How-
ever, that labor organization is not involved in these pro-
ceedings.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Debra Hanks and Marie Stefanoni were employed as
cashiers and officer workers in Respondent's store until
mid-March 1983.1 Hanks had been employed for 6
months as of that time and Stefanoni for more than 3
years. Their immediate supervisor was Rosemarie
Morton, the office manager. Morton reported to Theo-
dore Paull and Melvin Paull, brothers who were the
president and vice president of Respondent, respectively.
The Paull brothers, Theodore and Melvin, had daily
contact with both Hanks and Stefanoni.
While both Hanks and Stefanoni testified, generally, to
the existence of a good relationship between them and
Morton, the record reveals that for some time both em-
ployees had felt, and had discussed between themselves,
the belief that Morton had been treating them unfairly
and rudely. Both expressed the belief that Morton
blamed them for the mistakes of others and was less than
fair in work assignments. In September 1982 Stefanoni
had quit her employment with Respondent because of
her inability to tolerate Morton's complaints about her.
She took some time off at Theodore's suggestion and re-
turned after Melvin made repeated requests for her to do
so.2 Morton testified that, while the work of these two
employees was satisfactory, there was an absence of co-
operation and an exacerbation of tensions between them
and her over the last 4 to 5 months. Other than testifying
I All dates hereinafter are 1983 unless otherwise specified.
2 Notwithstanding this earlier experience, Stefanoni testified that she
liked Morton "as a person," that she likes "everyone, including Rose-
marie Morton." She claimed that her pretrial affidavit, wherein she had
stated that she had never gotten along with Morton, was in error. It was
her testimony that the affidavit should have stated that Morton never got
along with her. Stefanoni's testimony about liking Morton, tangential at
best, is, I find, somewhat of an exaggeration.
1159
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that these employees had left work for the night-shift
employees, Morton offered no specifics. 3
Respondent's cashier cage has two cash drawers, each
of which is assigned to a single cashier. On March 7 (or
March 2 as the incidents are recalled by Respondent's
witnesses) Morton brought a recently hired employee,
Storz, into the cashier's cage to be trained and asked that
either Hanks or Stefanoni volunteer to let Storz use her
cash drawer for the day. Stefanoni volunteered hers and
was assigned to other, noncash-handling, duties for the
day. During the noon hour, however, both Hanks and
Storz went to lunch at the same time, leaving no one
present with access to a cash drawer. During that lunch
period several salesmen brought invoices and cash to
Stefanoni who held the papers and funds until the two
cashiers returned. Storz did not know how to ring up
these funds and Morton instructed Stefanoni to give
them to Hanks to be rung up. Hanks took the money,
about $600, and the invoices and went to Morton.
Morton instructed her to ring up the money and Hanks
refused, stating that she had not signed for the money
and did not want to accept responsibility for it in the
event that a customer subsequently claimed to have been
credited with an incorrect amount.4
Hanks told Morton that she wished to speak to Theo-
dore and objected to Morton's attempts to have her
speak with Melvin instead. Subsequently, Hanks and Ste-
fanoni jointly spoke with Theodore in private. It was
Stefanoni's intention to tell him that she objected to
being given the responsibility of holding cash without
access to a cash drawer. In their meeting with Theodore,
the two cashiers recited their complaints concerning
Morton, including their complaints about the handling of
money. They told Theodore that Morton blamed them
for the mistakes of others, assigned them extra work,
complained about them, and picked on them. Morton,
they said, never had a kind word for them. Hanks lik-
ened her supervision to that of a military drill sergeant
and said that she could not take it any more. She threat-
ened to quit. Stefanoni told Theodore that he could not
let her quit and repeated the same complaints that Hanks
had voiced. Theodore asked Hanks not to quit, promised
her that he would work the problems out, and arranged
for a meeting to be held on March 9. They returned to
work and worked without incident until March 9.
About 3 p.m. on March 9, Hanks and Stefanoni met in
the second floor conference room with Theodore,
Melvin, and Morton. The two employees restated their
I Contrary to the General Counsel's contentions, I find no inconsisten-
cies in Morton's testimony concerning when she began to notice a lack of
cooperation on the part of these employees and when she had last noted
such a problem. It is clear that Morton was contending that the lack of
cooperation was an ongoing problem dating back for several months; her
answer to one question by the General Counsel, which could be under-
stood to be a statement that it had been 4 or 5 months since she had last
noticed a failure of cooperation, was obviously the result of a misunder-
standing of that question and was quickly corrected by the witness with-
out any prompting by Respondent's counsel.
4 At one point in her testimony, Stefanoni testified that there were no
signatures of Respondent's employees on the invoices. She subsequently
testified that she had misunderstood the question on direct examination
and that the salespersons had signed the invoices but had not signed for
the money. She also acknowledged that the invoice was generally signed
by the customer.
complaints concerning the way they were being super-
vised by Morton. They complained that Morton was
rude, demanding of immediate responses from them even
when other work or calls had to be handled, neglected
to greet them, blamed them for the mistakes of other em-
ployees, talked about Stefanoni "badly," failed to give
Hanks and Stefanoni Christmas gifts while purchasing
gifts for other employees under her supervision, and
denied them the opportunity to participate with other
employees in the giving of a birthday gift to Theodore.
Hanks, in particular, complained that Morton required
her to ring up mail payments late in the afternoon at a
time when she had to be checking out the register before
the arrival of the night-shift employees and got mad
when Hanks asked Melvin whether she could leave that
work for those night-shift employees.
According to Hanks' testimony, Morton spoke next
and "denied everything" that Hanks and Stefanoni had
said. She also complained that Hanks and Stefanoni had
gone to Melvin and Theodore Paull, indicating that she
did not like them to do that, and then blamed a third em-
ployee for "starting everything . . . trying to stir things
up."
After Morton spoke, Melvin told the employees that
"he had to go by what Rosemarie said. She was [their]
supervisor . . . [they] had to go by what she said."
Hanks and Stefanoni asked whether they could not come
to Melvin if something was wrong and he repeated that
he had to go by what she said, her rules. Hanks conclud-
ed the meeting at about 4:15 by noting that nothing had
been accomplished and they had work to complete
before leaving. Hanks and Stefanoni returned to the first
floor to check out their registers. 5
According to the testimony of both Hanks and Stefan-
oni, they left the second floor conference room at the
same time as Theodore and had a brief conversation with
him on their way downstairs. At that time, Hanks was
noticeably upset and Theodore suggested, "Why don't
you . . . two . . . take a couple of days off . .. let
things cool down . .. I'll straighten things out." Re-
spondent, he said, would get back to them. They then re-
turned to their office and completed their work. Before
they left that afternoon, however, they spoke again with
Melvin, who similarly reassured them that everything
would work out. Hanks told Melvin of his brother's sug-
gestion that they take a couple of days off to give Re-
spondent the opportunity to work things out and let mat-
ters cool off. Melvin replied this was a good idea; he said
that he would call the employees on Monday morning.
The two employees, who would normally be paid on the
following day, Thursday, asked Melvin whether they
could have their paychecks so as to avoid an extra trip.
' Hanks' testimony, to the effect that Morton objected to their taking
problems or complaints to Melvin or Theodore, was corroborated by
Stefanoni and was not contradicted by either of the Paulls or Morton.
Noting that corroboration and the absence of contradiction, and further
noting the absence of any demeanor indicia warranting that their testimo-
ny be discredited, I specifically credit the testimony of Hanks and Stefan-
oni concerning the March 9 meeting. In reaching this conclusion, I have
also rejected Respondent's contentions that there existed any meaningful
contradictions between their testimony and statements which were alleg-
edly contained in their pretrial affidavits.
1160
FAIR MERCANTILE CO.
Their request was rejected because Morton, who was re-
sponsible for the paychecks, was not present. The two
employees worked until their evening replacements came
in and then left. 6
On Thursday, March 10, Hanks and Stefanoni did not
report for work. They did go to the store, in midmorn-
ing, to pick up their paychecks. According to their mu-
tually corroborative testimonies, Melvin told them they
would have to wait inasmuch as Morton was at lunch.
They waited approximately I hour, received their pay-
checks when Morton came back, and left with nothing
having been said to them about returning to work on
either that day or the next. Melvin repeated that he
would get in touch with them on Monday. They ob-
served that the cashier work was being performed by
Theodore's daughter and by Morton. 7
6 I cannot credit the testimony of Respondent's witnesses disputing the
foregoing testimony. Thus, Morton's testimony that such a conversation
could not have taken place because the three management representatives
remained in the conference room for 15 minutes after Hanks and Stefan-
oni left is not corroborated by either of the Paull brothers and is some-
what inconsistent with Theodore's description of a second conversation
with the two employees. According to Theodore, he returned to the con-
ference room with Hanks and Stefanoni following the first meeting, and
was confronted with a demand by them to the effect that unless he re-
moved Morton as their supervisor they would not come to work the fol-
lowing morning. He claimed that he told them, in response to that ulti-
matum, that he could not make a decision that rapidly and asked them to
"give [himl a couple of days" to see what he could do for them. They
allegedly reiterated their insistence upon an immediate answer and
walked out. Theodore's testimony, while tending to corroborate Hanks
and Stefanoni's testimony concerning being given "a couple of days" to
allow matters to cool off, is inconsistent with the undisputed fact that
Hanks and Stefanoni completed their work and awaited the arrival of the
evening shift cashiers before leaving. I note, in this regard, that Melvin
did not deny that the employees asked him for their paychecks. (Theo-
dore denied that he was asked for the paychecks, but there was no testi-
mony that the request was ever made to Theodore.) Melvin's testimony
to the effect that he told these employees to call in if they were coming
back is inconsistent with his inability to recall whether they told him they
would not be coming back to work under Morton or whether, in fact, he
saw them at all on March 9 following the conference room meeting. Fi-
nally, the employees' testimony about being told by Theodore to take a
couple days off to allow matters to cool off is consistent with the recom-
mendation Theodore had previously made to Stefanoni in September
1982 on the occasion of the earlier problem in her working for Morton.
He had made such a suggestion before, and it had temporarily succeeded
in resolving the problem. It is probable that he would have made a simi-
lar recommendation when the problem arose again.
I In response to my question after both direct and cross-examination,
Melvin claimed that he had spent 4 to 5 hours talking with Hanks and
Stefanoni on Thursday, trying to convince them to return to work. He
further claimed that it was probably in this conversation that he asked
them to call him on the following day, i.e., Friday. He made no mention
of this extensive conversation on either his direct or cross-examination.
However, this testimony was corroborated, to some extent, by Morton
and by Jim Farrar, a sales employee and officer of the Independent Retail
Furniture Employees Organization. Thus, Morton testified that Hanks
and Stefanoni were told to get back to work. Morton allegedly also told
them that "the only thing I wanted from them was their cooperation."
Farrar testified that he observed Morton and Melvin talking with Hanks
and Stefanoni throughout the middle of the day and overheard Melvin
say something to the effect that the Company would work something
out. He also testified that he asked Stefanoni and Hanks whether they
were going to quit or come back, was told that they were supposed to
call in on the following day, and, when he asked whether they would
call, was told by Stefanoni, "No, we're not going to call them . . . they
need us more than we need them." Hanks denied that any such conversa-
tion took place between Melvin, Morton, Stefanoni, and herself on
March 10. Neither she nor Stefanoni offered any testimony to contradict
the testimony of Farrar except to deny that they were told to call in on
Friday.
Hanks and Stefanoni did not work on Friday, March
11; neither did they call Respondent on that day.
From March 11 through March 13, Respondent ran
classified advertisements seeking to hire cashiers. 8
On Monday, March 14, when they did not receive any
call from Respondent, Hanks and Stefanoni went to the
store, There they observed that new employees had been
hired to replace them and they asked Theodore what
had happened. He said he did not want to talk about it,
that he was upset, and that he was being blamed for
trying to help them.
Hanks and Stefanoni then spoke with Melvin. They
asked him why he had not called them and why new
people were working in their places. He told them that
he was sorry to terminate them but that he had a busi-
ness to run and had to go along with the supervisor,
Morton. He also told them that if their replacements did
not work out he might be able to call them back in a
couple of weeks. °
On the evening of March 14, Hanks and Stefanoni re-
alized that they had vacation pay coming to them. They
returned to the store on Tuesday morning, March 15.
They spoke again with Melvin; he reiterated his regret
that he had to discharge them. They asked for their va-
cation pay and were referred to Morton. Morton told
them that it was up to her whether they came back or
Hanks and Stefanoni were at the store for an hour or more on March
10; it is highly likely that some conversation passed between them and
both Melvin Paull and Rosemarie Morton. In view of Melvin's total fail-
ure to allude to this conversation on either direct or cross-examination, a
fact which tends to indicate that there was nothing said of any signifi-
cance in that conversation, and for the reasons previously stated with re-
spect to the various witnesses' credibility, I cannot find that the conversa-
tion occurred as described by Morton and Melvin. I do not believe that
they were asked or directed to return to work or that they were told at
that time to call in on the following day. As there was some evidence
indicating that Farrar was more disposed to accept management's version
of the events, without independent investigation, than that of the two em-
ployees, and may have been ill-disposed toward those employees because
of their subsequently filed charge against the Union, I cannot find that his
testimony warrants a contrary conclusion. They may well have told him
that they would await management's call, and they may even had said
that Respondent needed them more than they needed Respondent, but I
cannot find that they admitted to Farrar that they had been directed to
call in on the following day.
* Contrary to the contention of the General Counsel, I do not find that
the newspaper invoices evidence that any such classified advertisements
ran on March 10. The invoice entry for March 10 merely reads
"3/10/83-Cash." Unlike the invoice entries billing Respondent for clas-
sified advertisements, the March 10 entry contains no indication of the
classification of advertisement, the number of times it was to run, the
dates on which it was to run, or any price. It appears to reflect a pay-
ment rather than the placement of any advertising material.
I Theodore admitted that he saw the two employees in the store on
Monday, March 14, but denied that he did more than greet them. I credit
the employees and note that their presence in the store on Monday lends
further support to their version of the facts. Had they voluntarily termi-
nated their employment by rejecting a directive to report for work or
call in by Friday, March II, there would have been no reason for them
to go to the store on Monday, March 14 Their presence on that day
lends credence to their statement that Theodore had told them to take
Thursday and Friday off while matters cooled down.
'° Melvin denied that he ever discharged these two employees but ac-
knowledged that he told them (in some conversation) that he had to go
along with Morton, Similarly, he admitted that at some point he may
have told them that there was a possibility that they could subsequently
return to work. I credit the detailed and mutually corroborative testimo-
nies of Hanks and Stefanoni.
1161
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not and that if they did come back it would be under the
condition that they never again complain to Melvin or
Theodore Paull about her. If they did so complain, she
said, they would be fired. Hanks and Stefanoni rejected
her condition and Morton left to get their vacation
checks." Those checks were brought to the employees
and on the back of them was written the words, "volun-
tarily quit, own free will." They objected to the attempt
to have them endorse such statements and struck the
statements out before cashing the checks.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
The General Counsel contends, Respondent does not
in its brief dispute, and I find that in bringing their com-
plaints about Office Manager Morton to Melvin and
Theodore Paull, Hanks and Stefanoni were engaged in
activities which were both concerted and protected
under Sections 7 and 8(a)(l) of the Act. Thus the evi-
dence reflects that the two employees discussed the
problems they felt they were having with Morton among
themselves and went together, on each occasion, to dis-
cuss those problems with higher management. Their ac-
tions were openly concerted. See Myers Industries, 268
NLRB 493 (1984).
Moreover, although the complaints of these employees
may not have been earth shattering, they were protected
by the Act. Their complaints included such matters as
being blamed for the mistakes of others, hostility or
rudeness in the way job assignments were made, and
other actions by Morton indicating hostility toward them
and possible favoritism of other employees. As was pre-
viously stated by the Board in Pacific Coast International
Co., 248 NLRB 1376 (1980), which involved protests of
alleged favoritism by a supervisor in the allocation of job
tasks, at 1380:
The law is well settled that the quality of super-
vision which has a direct impact on employees' job
interests and ability to perform are legitimate em-
ployee concerns and that group action in bringing
these concerns to the attention of management is
protected concerted activities. Dries & Krump Man-
ufacturing, 221 NLRB 309 (1975) [enfd. 544 F.2d
320 (7th Cir. 1976)].
There remain the questions of whether Hanks and Ste-
fanoni were discharged and/or denied reinstatement be-
cause of these protected concerted activities and whether
they were threatened with. a denial of reemployment
unless they agreed to forgo any such protected concert-
ed activities in the future. These questions rest entirely
on the resolution of sharply drawn key credibility dis-
putes. As discussed in detail above, I have, in most major
regards, credited the testimony of Hanks and Stefanoni
I I do not credit Morton's denial concerning these statements. Her
professed lack of concern over their complaining about her directly to
the Paull brothers is inconsistent with the uncontradicted testimony of
Hanks and Stefanoni about Morton's complaint, during the March 9
meeting, concerning Hanks going to Melvin. It is also inconsistent with
Melvin's admission that he told these employees that he and they had to
go along with Morton. He would not likely have said that had there not
been some objection by Morton to the actions of these employees in "ap-
pealing" Morton's orders or conduct to his brother and him.
and found that they were told to take March 10 and II11
off to permit the dispute between themselves and Morton
to cool down, they took those days off without intending
to or otherwise indicating that they were terminating
their employment, and Respondent replaced them during
this period and informed them, upon their return, that
they had been discharged. I have further found that
Morton told them that they would not be reinstated
unless they agreed to forgo their statutorily protected
right to concertedly complain to higher management
about her in the future. 12
Based on all of the foregoing, I find, as alleged in the
complaint, that Respondent terminated Hanks and Ste-
fanoni because of their protected concerted activities in
complaining about the quality of supervision which im-
pacted on their job performance and refused to reinstate
them unless they agreed to refrain from engaging in such
protected concerted activities in the future, all in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, it will be recommended that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Re-
spondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced Debra
Hanks and Marie Stefanoni in the exercise of their Sec-
tion 7 rights by discharging them on or about March 14,
1983, and thereafter failing and refusing to consider them
for reinstatement, I shall recommend that Respondent be
required to offer said Debra Hanks and Marie Stefanoni
immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions
or, if those positions no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and
to make them whole for any loss of earnings they may
have suffered as a result of their unlawful discharges,
with backpay to be computed in the manner set forth in
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and with in-
terest to be computed in the manner set forth in Florida
Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).13
I shall also recommend that Respondent be required to
expunge from its records any references to the unlawful
discharges of Debra Hanks and Marie Stefanoni. Re-
i" Respondent points to the decisions at the Deputy and Appeals Tri-
bunal levels of the State of Missouri Division of Employment Security on
the unemployment compensation claims of Hanks and Stefanoni to estab-
lish that these employees were not discharged but quit. Whatever weight
such decisions might be entitled to before the Board is lessened in this
case by findings of the Appeals Tribunal which appear to support neither
the Employer's view of the facts nor that of the Charging Parties. Thus,
the Appeals Tribunal found, as I did, that Theodore "suggested that the
claimants take a few days off to cool off" and that "the two returned a
few days later." That tribunal also found, contrary to the testimony of
either the Charging Parties or Respondent's witnesses and contrary to my
conclusions here, that when they returned "a few days later," i.e., on
Monday, the two employees conditioned their return to work upon the
discharge of Morton. In such circumstances, I cannot find that the find-
ings and conclusions of either the Deputy or the Appeals Tribunal of the
Division of Employment Security of the State of Missouri support Re-
spondent's factual contentions.
Is See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
1162
FAIR MERCANTILE CO.
spondent, additionally, shall be required to provide them
with written notice of such expunction and to inform
them that Respondent's unlawful conduct will not be
used as a basis for future personnel actions concerning
them. See Sterling Sugars, 261 NLRB 472 (1982).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By threatening Debra Hanks and Marie Stefanoni
with discharge or the denial of reinstatement if they con-
certedly complained to higher management about wages,
hours, or other terms and conditions of employment, and
by discharging and failing and refusing to reinstate
Debra Hanks and Marie Stefanoni because of their pro-
tected concerted activities and their refusal to agree to
forgo their rights to engage in such protected concerted
activities, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed1 4
ORDER
The Respondent, Fair Mercantile Company, St. Louis,
Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with discharge or the
denial of reinstatement unless they agree not to engage in
protected concerted activities.
(b) Discharging employees because of their protected
concerted activities.
(c) Refusing to reinstate employees because they will
not agree to refrain from engaging in protected concert-
ed activities.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative active which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer Debra Hanks and Marie Stefanoni immediate
and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those
jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
withoutprejudice to their seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against them, in the manner
set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(b) Remove from its files any reference to the unlawful
discharges and notify the employees in writing that this
has been done and that the discharges will not be used
against them in any way.
14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its St. Louis, Missouri facility copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix. " 15 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 14, after being signed by the Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
I' If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these protect-
ed concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discharge or
the denial of reinstatement unless they agree not to
engage in protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or refuse to reinstate employ-
ees because of their protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Debra Hanks and Marie Stefanoni im-
mediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent po-
sitions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and WE WILL
1163
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
make them whole for any loss of earnings and other ben-
efits resulting from their discharges, less any net interim
earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL notify Debra Hankis and Marie Stefanoni
that we have removed from our files any reference to
their discharges and that the discharges will not be used
against them in any way.
FAIR MERCANTILE COMPANY
1164