FAINOR, Judith A. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 4, 2020

2018008054 (P.T.A.B. May. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/036,716 09/25/2013 Judith A. FAINOR 16-30095-US 6866
98804 7590 05/04/2020
Reed Smith LLP
P.O. Box 488
Pittsburgh, PA 15230
EXAMINER
SCHEUNEMANN, RICHARD N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
gdonovan@reedsmith.com
ptoipinbox@reedsmith.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JUDITH A. FAINOR, DINA LARESCH, and
DAVID J. HARTMANN
____________

Appeal 2018-008054
Application 14/036,7161
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 21–34. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Sparta
Systems, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
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THE INVENTION
Appellant states the claims relate to “methods, systems, and
computer-readable media storing instructions for bi-directional quality
management systems.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A computer-implemented method for electronic networkbased
quality management, the method comprising:
receiving, over an electronic network, a first electronic
communication from a first party computer system, the first
electronic communication including an indication of a current
state or current activity of a custom quality management
workflow executing on the first party computer system, wherein
the custom quality management workflow includes a plurality
of custom states and a plurality of custom activities;
advancing a standard quality management workflow
executing on a second party computer system from a first state
or activity to a second state or activity based at least in part on
the first electronic communication, wherein the standard quality
management workflow includes a plurality of standard states
and a plurality of standard activities which are incompatible
with the custom quality management workflow;
determining a state or activity of the custom quality
management workflow corresponding to the current state or
current activity of the standard quality management workflow
based on a map between the standard quality management
workflow and the custom quality management workflow,
wherein the map comprises mapping data representing a
correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of
the standard quality management workflow and a custom state
or custom activity of the custom quality management
workflow;
advancing the custom quality management workflow to the
determined state or activity; and
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sending, over the electronic network, a second electronic
communication to the first party computer system, the second
electronic communication including information associated
with the determined state or activity of the custom quality
management workflow.

Appeal Br. 40 (Claims App.).
THE REJECTION
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Waldorf US 2002/0038228 A1 Mar. 28, 2002
Saran US 2003/0055668 A1 Mar. 20, 2003
Greenstein US 2009/0012832 A1 Jan. 8, 2009
Guller US 2009/0299784 A1 Dec. 3, 2009
Sears US 2013/0013454 A1 Jan. 10, 2013
The following rejections are before us for review.2
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 21–34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claims 1, 2, 4, 22–25, and 30, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Greenstein in view of Waldolf.
Claims 5 and 26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Greenstein in view of Sears and Guller.
Claims 6 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Greenstein in view of Sears and Saran.

2 The following rejections have been withdrawn by the Examiner (Answer
4–5): Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 21–24 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or
35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph. Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 21–34
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second
paragraph. Claims 31 and 34 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) for being
anticipated by Greenstein. Claim 32 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for
being unpatentable over Greenstein in view of Waldorf.
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Claims 7, 21, 28, and 29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Greenstein in view of Sears.

FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 5–6 in the
Final Office Action3 and on pages 5–8 in the Examiner’s Answer,
concerning only the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will affirm the rejection of claims 1–2, 4–7, and 21–34 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Appellant argues independent claims 1 and 21 as a group.
(Appeal Br. 19). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this
group, and so the remaining claims including the dependent claims stand or
fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo

3 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action
mailed on July 3, 2017.
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and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
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protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Guidance”).4 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency

4 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
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management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October
2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter
to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their
character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v.

5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–
55.
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Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement
in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract
idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1335–36.
In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong
test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the
claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
The Specification states:
A medical device producer can use an on-premises EQMS
[(Enterprise Quality Management Systems)] to keep track of the
manufacture of a particular medical device. Each step of a
process of creating that device may be accompanied by the
storage or manipulation of data in the EQMS. This enables
auditing, record-keeping, compliance with Federal
requirements, storage of relevant documents or data, and the
like.
Spec. ¶ 2.
Separate systems are used to manage the quality of a
manufacturer’s suppliers. For example, a supplier may want to
inform the manufacturer about a potential defect or problem
with an item provided to the manufacturer. This may include
sending the manufacturer a document, images, test results, a
proposed action plan, or other data. The manufacturer may
receive the information about the defect or problem from a
variety of different sources - such as email, faxes, or telephone
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calls - and store the information in the appropriate supplier
system. These supplier systems also enable the manufacturer to
keep track of issue resolution using a different workflow, but at
the expense of reconciling information between the EQMS
systems and the supplier systems. Properly tracking issue
resolution requires manual exchange of information between
EQMS systems and supplier systems. This is time-consuming,
cumbersome, and hinders audit processes.
Spec. ¶ 4.
The preamble states claim 1 is for network–based quality
management. Claim 1 recites in pertinent part,
. . . receiving, . . . a first . . . communication from a first party
. . . , the first . . . communication including an indication of a
current state or current activity of a custom quality management
workflow . . . , wherein the custom quality management
workflow includes a plurality of custom states and a plurality of
custom activities; advancing a standard quality management
workflow . . . from a first state or activity to a second state or
activity based at least in part on the first . . . communication,
wherein the standard quality management workflow includes a
plurality of standard states and a plurality of standard activities
which are incompatible with the custom quality management
workflow; determining a state or activity of the custom quality
management workflow corresponding to the current state or
current activity of the standard quality management workflow
based on a map between the standard quality management
workflow and the custom quality management workflow,
wherein the map comprises mapping data representing a
correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of
the standard quality management workflow and a custom state
or custom activity of the custom quality management
workflow; advancing the custom quality management workflow
to the determined state or activity; and sending, . . . a second
. . . communication to the first party . . . , the second electronic
communication including information associated with the
determined state or activity of the custom quality management
workflow.
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The Examiner found that claim 1 is directed to “determining a state or
activity of a workflow based on a map,” and, as such, “an idea of itself.”
(Final Act. 5).
All this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites a state or activity
of a custom quality management workflow corresponding to the current state
or current activity of a standard quality management workflow based on a
map between the standard quality management workflow and the custom
quality management workflow which is an idea itself. This is consistent
with the Examiner’s determination. Claim terms such as, “mapping data
representing a correspondence between a standard state or standard activity
of the standard quality management workflow and a custom state or custom
activity of the custom quality management workflow,” “the custom quality
management workflow includes a plurality of custom states and a plurality
of custom activities,” and “the standard quality management workflow
includes a plurality of standard states and a plurality of standard activities
which are incompatible with the custom quality management workflow,” are
ideas as such. That is, the data defining standard/custom states and
standard/custom activity is information, and as such, is an intangible. See
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 451 n.12 (2007);
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Also, the step of mapping data is a thought process involving
determinations. See e.g., Spec. ¶ 70. Collecting information, analyzing it,
and displaying results from certain results of the collection and analysis are
abstract ideas. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC, 830 F.3d 1350. Concepts
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performed in the human mind are mental processes because the steps of
receiving, transmitting, storing, and analyzing data mimic human thought
processes of observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion, perhaps with
paper and pencil, where the data interpretation is perceptible only in the
human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611
(Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only
generically requires “an electronic network,” “a first party computer
system,” and “a second party computer system.” These components are
described in the specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 26,
31, 45, 46 and Figs. 1, 2. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these
most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the
judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial
exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. We find
no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any
indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 1 invoke any
assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
Thus, we find that claim 1 recites the judicial exception of an idea as
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such that is not integrated into a practical application.
That the claim does not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be
limited to quality management workflow, does not make it any less abstract.
See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or
may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make
them any less abstract.”).
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claim must
include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must
be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at
72–73).
Concerning this step the Examiner found the following:
The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient
to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception
because the claims do not recite an improvement to another
technology or technical field, nor do they recite an
improvement to the functioning of the computer itself. The
claims require no more than a generic computer (a computer
implemented method using a data processing system in claim 1)
to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood,
routine and conventional activities previously known to the
industry. The use of a computer to manipulate data and report
the result is well-understood, routine, and conventional.
Final Act. 6. We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is
whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to
implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 225. They do not.
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Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to receive, execute, determine, advance, send, and apply decision
criteria to data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—
one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer
functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC., 830 F.3d 1354; see also
In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming”). In short,
each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the
functioning of the computer itself. In addition, as we stated above, the claim
does not affect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.
The Specification spells out different generic equipment and parameters that
might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such
conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information
access under different scenarios (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 26, 31, 45, 46, and Figs.
1, 2). Thus, claim 1 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than
instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic
computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–226.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claim 1 add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (receive,
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execute, determine, advance, send, and apply decision criteria to data) and
storing is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract.
See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing
access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings,
LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation,
display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast
Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding
sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract).
The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant have submitted
concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Appeal Br. 14–23, Reply Br. 1–7). We find that
our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments,
which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address
various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues: “As shown above, the Examiner points to a single
limitation in independent claim 1 when analyzing whether the claim is
directed to an abstract idea. This is clearly improper and abdicates the
Examiner's responsibility to consider the claim ‘as a whole.’” (Appeal
Br. 16).
We disagree with Appellant because first, an abstract idea can
generally be described at different levels of abstraction. See Apple, Inc. v.
Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Second, although we
agree with Appellant that the claims must be read, as a whole (Appeal
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Br. 16–18), we nevertheless find, on balance, that claim 1 is directed to the
idea of a state or activity of a custom quality management workflow
corresponding to the current state or current activity of a standard quality
management workflow based on a map between the standard quality
management workflow and the custom quality management workflow for
the reasons specified above with respect to our “directed to” findings. As
found supra, claim 1 only includes the following generically recited device
limitations: “an electronic network,” “a first party computer system,” and “a
second party computer system.” What remains in the claim after
disregarding these device limitations are abstractions, i.e., “mapping data
representing a correspondence between a standard state or standard activity
of the standard quality management workflow and a custom state or custom
activity of the custom quality management workflow,” “the custom quality
management workflow includes a plurality of custom states and a plurality
of custom activities,” and “the standard quality management workflow
includes a plurality of standard states and a plurality of standard activities
which are incompatible with the custom quality management workflow.”
“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo,
566 U.S. at 90).
Appellant next argues,
the problem with prior art systems is that a response
communication transmitted over a network from a second party
computer system to a first party computer system that is
executing a different workflow than the second party computer
system will not interpretable by the workflow executing on the
first party computer system. See, e.g., Application, ¶¶ 3–4.
The claims of the present application solve this problem by
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essentially . . . executing on the first party computer system and
then sending a response to the first party that is based on the
determined state of that emulated workflow. This is
accomplished by maintaining a copy of both the standard and
custom workflows. See, e.g., Application, ¶ 41 (‘Workflow
module 205A may also maintain a customer workflow in
addition to the standard workflow explained above’).

(Appeal Br. 20).

We disagree with Appellant. The concept of “emulating” is an
abstraction because it is a form of imitation which is mental perception, and
practice of maintaining a copy is a form of remembering which itself is a
mental process. In other words, the asserted improvement is, at best, an
improvement to the abstract idea. But “[n]o matter how much of an advance
in the . . . field the claims recite, the advance lies entirely in the realm of
abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract
application realm.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168
(Fed. Cir. 2018). Even taking the copy as a hard copy, it is well settled that
storing data mimics human thought processes, perhaps with paper and
pencil, where the data interpretation is perceptible only in the human mind.
See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 611.
Also, in light of the breadth of the claim, the Appellant’s argument is
not persuasive as to error in the rejection. Nowhere in claim 1 is the word
“emulating” recited. Appellant’s claim 1 simply recites, “determining a
state or activity of the custom quality management workflow corresponding
to the current state or current activity of the standard quality management
workflow based on a map between the standard quality management
workflow and the custom quality management workflow.” (Appeal Br. 40).
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It is not apparent and Appellant does not show how mapping between the
standard quality management workflow and the custom quality management
workflow equates to “emulating.”
Likewise unpersuasive are Appellant’s analogies of the appealed
claims to those in Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom Inc., 841 F.3d
1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Appeal Br. 21, 23). In Amdocs, the court adopted
the district court’s interpretation of the claim term “enhance,” stating, it
approved “reading the ‘in a distributed fashion’ and the ‘close to the source’
of network information requirements into the term ‘enhance.’” Id. at 1300.
The court then went on to find the claim’s “enhancing” limitation
necessarily required that the generic components operate in an
unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer
functionality. Id. at 1300–1301.
In this way, the claims of Amdocs are inconsistent with those before
us on appeal here in that in the latter, there are no specific technologic
modifications required to solve a problem or improve the functioning of a
known system generally to produce patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g.,
DDR Holdings., 773 F.3d 1245 ; McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellant contends its
use of “a map between a standard workflow and the custom workflow and a
current state of the standard workflow,” constitutes “an unconventional
technological solution,” (Appeal Br. 21), but fails to show how mapping
data is unconventional in the technincal field.
We further fail to see the similarities asserted by Appellant (Appeal
Br. 23–25) between the claims on appeal here and those adjudicated in DDR
Holdings. (Appeal Br. 21–22). In DDR Holdings, the court evaluated the
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eligibility of claims “address[ing] the problem of retaining website
visitors that, if adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of
Internet hyperlink protocol, would be instantly transported away from a
host’s website after ‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a
hyperlink.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d. at 1257. There, the court found that
the claims were patent eligible because they transformed the manner in
which a hyperlink typically functions to resolve a problem that had no
“pre-Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. In contrast, Appellant seeks
equivalents between a generically recited “mapping data structure” and the
transformative hyperlink in DDR Holdings. (App. Br. 21–22). Unlike the
hyperlink claimed in DDR, which performed a system function in the claim,
“mapping data” does not cause a system function to occur in a particular
way in the claim. Moreover, here, the limitations do not recite
implementation details. Instead, they recite functional results to be
achieved. In other words, claim 1 does not recite “a particular way of
programming or designing the software . . . , but instead merely the abstract
concept of “determin[e] a state or activity of the custom quality management
workflow.” Accordingly, we disagree with Appellant that the generically
recited claim term “mapping data structure” is the equivalent of the
transformative hyperlink in DDR Holdings accordingly.
Appellant argues,

the claims recite features which reconcile the execution of
incompatible workflows executing on disparate computing
systems that must communicate with each other over a network
in order to advance each of their respective workflows. These
features constitute an improvement to computer technology and
are ‘significantly more’ than merely determining a state or
activity of a workflow based on a map.
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(Appeal Br. 23).
We disagree with Appellant because as found above, reconciling the
execution of incompatible workflows is an abstraction and “[i]t has been
clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the
invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech. LLC
v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive
of error. (See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-
related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”))).
Accordingly, we will sustain the rejection of claim 1, and thus also of
claims 2, 4–7, and 21–34, under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION
Each of independent claims 1 and 23 recites in pertinent part,
determining a state or activity of the custom quality
management workflow corresponding to the current state or
current activity of the standard quality management workflow
based on a map between the standard quality management
workflow and the custom quality management workflow,
wherein the map comprises mapping data representing a
correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of
the standard quality management workflow and a custom state
or custom activity of the custom quality management workflow.
The Examiner found concerning this limitation, that Greenstein at
paragraph 472 discloses this limitation reasoning, “service element
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localization assumes that for each component used in one geography, its
equivalents in all other geographies are known. A component translation
table can be built for composition and replacement of components using the
translation tablet.” (Final Act. 13).
Appellant argues,
the Examiner’s mapping appears to equate the recited ‘map’
with the disclosure of a component mapping table in
Greenstein. However, Greenstein discloses that the component
mapping table maps components between different geographies,
whereas the claim recites that ‘the map comprises mapping data
representing a correspondence between a standard state or
standard activity of the standard quality management workflow
and a custom state or custom activity of the custom quality
managementworkflow.’ See Greenstein at ¶ 472. There is no
disclosure in this or any other section of Green[stein] of a map
between states and activities of incompatible workflows.

(Appeal Br. 34).
We agree with Appellant. Our review of Greenstein indicates that the
disclosed translation table holds raw data which comprises: “projected sales
volumes, sales time period, required minimum profit margin, target
maximum price, and/or target relative availability date.” Greenstein ¶ 454.
The claimed subject matter on the other hand requires state or activity of the
custom quality management workflow data. As such, the content of the
mapping data in the claims on appeal is functional in that it must function to
show “correspondence between a standard state or standard activity of the
standard quality management workflow and a custom state or custom
activity of the custom quality management workflow.” In contrast,
Greenstein at paragraph 472 discloses in its geographic equivalents table,
raw data set forth above, which is not functional in the sense that the data
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itself does not reflect correspondence between two difference states, i.e., a
standard state and a custom state. Thus, the differnce in data charaterisitics
between that found in the Greenstein table and that of the claimed map is
determinative. The Examiner does not explain and it is not apparent how
this difference is taught under 35 U.S.C. § 103 analysis. Accordingly, we
will not sustain the rejection of in claims 1 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The rejection of the dependent claims based on references in addition
to Greenstein and Waldorf does not remedy the noted sortfalls of Greenstein.
Since claims 2, 4–7, 21, 22, and 24–30 depend from one of claims 1 and 23,
and since we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 23, the rejection of
the dependent claims likewise cannot be sustained.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–2, 4–7,
and 21–30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We conclude the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 21–
30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–2, 4–7,
21–30
101 Eligibility 1–2, 4–7,
21–34

1, 2, 4–7,
21–30
103 Waldorf,
Greenstein, Guller,
Sears, Saran
1, 2, 4–7,
21–30
Overall
Outcome
1–2, 4–7,
21–34

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DECISION
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED