Fadi Micaelian

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 1, 2021

2020004764 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 1, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/179,996 02/13/2014 Fadi Victor Micaelian 400-6 3939
109008 7590 03/01/2021
Appleton Luff
221 Main Street
#496
Los Altos, CA 94023
EXAMINER
WONG, ALBERT KANG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/01/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
ip-admin1@appletonluff.com
prasad@appletonluff.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte FADI VICTOR MICAELIAN
____________

Appeal 2020-004764
Application 14/179,996
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOHN C. KERINS, STEFAN STAICOVICI, and
WILLIAM A. CAPP, Administrative Patent Judges.

STAICOVICI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision in the Final Office Action (dated July 1, 2019, hereinafter “Final
Act.”) rejecting claims 2–4, 6, 9, 10, 13–19, and 21–27 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Laves2 and Muller.3 We have
jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Mr. Fadi Victor Micaelian, the sole inventor, is identified
as the real party in interest. See Appellant’s Appeal Brief (filed Jan. 6, 2020,
hereinafter “Appeal Br.”) 1.
2 Laves et al., US 2007/0279315 Al, published Dec. 6, 2007.
3 Muller, US 2002/0135535 Al, published Sept. 26, 2002.
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SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

INVENTION
Appellant’s invention relates to “portable electronic devices.” Spec.
para. 2.
Claims 14, 21, and 25 are independent. Claim 14 is illustrative of the
claimed invention and reads as follows:
14. An electronic device comprising:
a first, second, third and fourth panel, each of said panels
having the same dimensions and having a display on at least
one side, and at least one of the panels containing computing
means for the device;
a first hinge positioned to connect the third panel to the
fourth panel and to permit the third and the fourth panel to
rotate about the first hinge, the first hinge permitting the device
to be in a folded mode where the first panel and the second
panel are in a stacked configuration in a first dimension and a
partially unfolded configuration where the first panel is adjacent
to the second panel in a second dimension, perpendicular to the
first dimension, the panels being of a size such that the device is
handheld in size in the folded mode;
a second hinge positioned to connect the first panel to the
third panel and to permit the first and the third panel to rotate
about the second hinge;
a third hinge positioned to connect the second panel to
the fourth panel and to permit the second and the fourth panel
to rotate about the third hinge, the second and third hinges
permitting the device to be extended in a third dimension,
perpendicular to the first and second dimensions, from
the partially unfolded configuration to a fully open mode where
the first panel is adjacent to the third panel and the second panel
is adjacent to the fourth panel;
wherein the device is operable in the folded, partially
unfolded and fully open modes.
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ANALYSIS4
Claims 14, 21, and 25
The Examiner finds Laves discloses an electronic device having four
display panels and a computing means coupled to the panels, but does not
disclose:
(1) that the four display panels are the same size;
(2) the computing means is in at least one of the four display panels;
and
(3) the recited folding sequence of the four display panels.
Final Act. 5–6 (citing Laves, paras. 33, 38, 39, Fig. 1A, 1B, 1C).
With respect to the first missing limitation, the Examiner further finds
that “one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that making the panels
have the same thickness would allow the display to lie flat upon a table.” Id.
at 5. Thus, the Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to a
person of ordinary skill in the art to “produce panels with the same thickness
since one may make a panel of any thickness and [because] the reference
teaches the use of the device on a table.” Id.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reasoning to modify Laves’s
display panels to have the same size “is pure conjecture as it is not apparent
from the art of record that a desire to have a device lay flat on a table would
cause the skilled artisan to generate a four-panel device with each of the
panels of the same thickness.” Appeal Br. 10. According to Appellant,

4 The rejection of claims 2 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph,
as being indefinite, has been withdrawn. Examiner’s Answer (dated Apr. 6,
2020, hereinafter “Ans.”) 3.
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“Muller achieves the ability for a device to lie flat on a table by employing a
separate main part 10, not by having all panels to be the same size.” Id.
In response, the Examiner shifts position and finds that Laves’s
drawings illustrate display panels that have the same size. Ans. 4 (citing
Laves, Figs. 1A–1D, 17B). The Examiner further finds that Laves discloses
in the Abstract and paragraph 70 that “any two adjacent display panels,
when arranged so as to be in the same plane, are substantially flush along
their adjacent edges to emulate the appearance of a continuous display
across the adjacent edges.” Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
Appellant responds that “[t]wo panels when in the same plane and
substantially flush along an adjacent edge can certainly be of different
thicknesses.” Reply Brief (filed June 8, 2020, hereinafter “Reply Br.”) 2.
For a better understanding, Appellant provides an illustration, as shown
below:

Appellant’s drawing illustrates two of Laves’s adjacent panels having
different thicknesses. Id. at 3.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments for the following
reasons. First, a drawing teaches all that it reasonably discloses and suggests
to a person of ordinary skill in the art. In re Aslanian, 590 F.2d 911, 914
(CCPA 1979). Here, we agree with the Examiner that Laves’s drawings
suggest that the four panels have the same size. See e.g., Laves, Figs. 1A,
16A–16C. Second, we agree with the Examiner that, in order for Laves’s
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display panels to be in the same plane, to have flush edges, and form a
continuous display, Laves’s display panels would have to have the same size
(dimensions). Ans. 5; see also Laves, para. 69 (“all four display panels . . .
are substantially in the same plane to form a combined large-format
display.”). We are not in agreement with Appellant’s position illustrated
above because Laves discloses that that the display panels themselves, that
is, both top and bottom surfaces, are in the same plane, not just the top
surface, as Appellant has illustrated. Finally, Laves discloses using its
electronic device seated at a table (see Laves, para. 32), which would
suggest to a skilled artisan that the bottom surface of the four panels would
also have to be in the same plane in order for the device to lie flat on the
table’s surface. See In re Jacoby, 309 F.2d 513, 516 (CCPA 1962) (An
artisan must be presumed to know something about the art apart from what
the references disclose.).
In regards to the second missing limitation, the Examiner finds that
“one of ordinary skill in the art would be familiar with computational
devices and be aware that display panels have integrated computing means.”
Final Act. 5. Therefore, the Examiner concludes that it would have been
obvious for a skilled artisan to modify Laves’s electronic device to have at
least one of the display panels include integrated computing because it “is
conventionally done in table[t]s and smart phones,” and moreover, because
“the courts have held that it is obvious to make integral what is separate.”
Id.; see also In re Larson, 340 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1965) (“[T]he use of a
one piece construction instead of the structure disclosed in [the prior art]
would be merely a matter of obvious engineering choice.”).
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Appellant argues that “[t]here is no question that Laves only discloses
that the computing means for the device is external to each of the display
panels.” Appeal Br. 11 (citing Laves, Fig. 2). In particular, Appellant notes
that in Laves’s Figures 3 and 4 “the CPU [304] is shown to be separate from
the display panels [201, 401].” Id. at 12. Appellant further asserts “that
Muller discloses the same in this regard,” and, thus, it is “illogical to
surmise that the skilled artisan when viewing Laves and Muller would be
motivated to place computing means inside a panel, without the benefits of
applicant’s disclosure.” Id.
In response, the Examiner notes that because Laves discloses
communication interfaces 308 employing bus 306 via short-range wireless
links and a touch-screen display 410, a skilled artisan would reasonably
“conclude [that] known computing means exists within the panel display” of
Laves. Ans. 6. The Examiner explains that Laves’s touch screen 410
includes a grid of electronic circuits and a processor to process the signals
from a user touching the screen, which is similar to “tablets and smart
phones where the display and computational means are integrated.” Id. at 6–
7 (citing Laves, paras. 34, 49). Furthermore, the Examiner takes the position
that having computing means inside a display panel is known, as described
in Appellant’s Specification. Id. at 6 (citing Spec. para. 42 (“device 100
provides computing, communication and Input/Output (I/O) capability via
known hardware and software.”)).
We are not persuaded by the Examiner’s determination that because
Laves discloses communication interfaces 308, bus 306, and touch
screen 410, a skilled artisan would understand that CPU 304 (computing
means) is located within display 401. See Laves, Fig. 4. Laves explicitly
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discloses control module 201, which includes CPU 304 and communication
interfaces 308, as being located at the top edge of display panel 102, that is,
external to the display unit. See Laves, para. 62, Fig. 2. Furthermore, Laves
discloses touch screen 410 as “electrically connected” to CPU 304, which as
noted above, is located external to the display unit, i.e., touch screen 410.
Hence, we appreciate Appellant’s position that “[t]he computing capability
of the Laves device is . . . not contained in and indeed is clearly separate
from the composite display 201.” Reply Br. 4 (citing Laves, Figs. 3, 4)
(emphasis added).
Nonetheless, the Examiner’s rejection does not rely only on the
disclosure of Laves, but rather also on the well-known feature of tablets and
smart phones of having display panels with integrated computing means.
See Final Act. 5; Ans. 7. As Appellant does not adequately challenge the
truth of the finding, we adopt this finding. See Reply Br. 4; see also In re
Fox, 471 F.2d 1405, 1406-07 (CCPA 1973) (affirming rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 103 without citation of any prior art based on facts that were
unchallenged by the appellant).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Laves’ s device to make
computing means, i.e, CPU 304, and display panel 102 “integral or [to]
relocate the parts in a known matter,” as exemplified “by the known
examples of tablets and smart phones.” Ans. 7. The Examiner’s
modification to make computing means, i.e, CPU 304, and display panel 102
“integral” is nothing more than a predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions, which, here, we find to have been
obvious. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
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Appellant has not persuasively argued that making computing means, i.e,
CPU 304, and display panel 102 “integral” would change the function of
Laves’s display device. See e.g., Larson at 968 (“No difference in structure
has been pointed out [by Appellant] that would afford an unobvious
improve[ment].”). Moreover, in light of the well-known feature of tablets
and smart phones of having display panels with integrated computing means,
making computing means, i.e, CPU 304, and display panel 102 “integral” in
Laves’s display device is merely “[t]he normal desire of artisans to improve
upon what is already generally known.” In re Ethicon, Inc., 844 F.3d 1344,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Finally, in regards to the third missing limitation, the Examiner finds
Muller discloses first panel 50, second panel 26, third panel 40, and fourth
panel 30, wherein third and fourth panels 40, 30 are connected by first hinge
38, first and third panels 50, 40 are connected by second hinge 46, and
second and fourth panels 26, 30 are connected by third hinge 22. Id. at 6
(citing Muller, Fig. 5). Accordingly, the Examiner concludes that it would
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to “combine the
references since they are in the same field of endeavor of folding displays”
and “Mu[]ller is merely providing details that are missing from Laves.” Id.
Appellant argues that “Muller does not disclose how the panels may
be closed in the manner claimed by applicant.” Appeal Br. 13. According
to Appellant, “a close review of Muller reveals that it is not at all evident
how or whether the device in Figure 5 of Muller may be placed into a closed
or fully folded position.” Id. at 14. In particular, Appellant contends that it
is not clear how to fold panels 52 and 28 when “panels 50 and 26 of Muller
are folded to cover panels 40 and 30.” Id. Appellant also asserts that it is
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not clear “how are the six panels of Muller, assuming they can be folded in a
stacked configuration, [and] then folded via hinges 20 into a closed position
onto base 10.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because obviousness
does not require that all of the features of the secondary reference be bodily
incorporated into the primary reference In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425
(CCPA 1981). Moreover, the artisan is not compelled to blindly follow the
teaching of one prior art reference over the other without the exercise of
independent judgment. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733
F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In this case, the Examiner is correct that
“the fact that [A]ppellant’s device is limited to four panels does not render
the teaching in Muller irrelevant merely because it has more panels.”
Ans. 7. In particular, the Examiner is not employing Muller’s disclosure of
six foldable panels. Rather, the Examiner employs Muller’s four panels 26,
30, 40, 50, which are foldable using hinges 22, 38, 46, to illustrate how
Laves’s four panels A, B, C, D would fold using hinges 1615. Compare
Laves, Fig. 16D with, Muller, Fig. 5. Hence, we agree with the Examiner’s
determination that the four display panels of Laves would fold in the same
manner as disclosed by Muller, and thus, “Mu[]ller is merely providing
details that are missing from Laves.” Ans. 7; Final Act. 6.
In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 14, 21, and 25 as unpatentable over
Laves and Muller.

Claims 3, 4, 6, 9, 13–15, 17–9, and 21–27
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Appellant relies on the arguments discussed supra. See Appeal Br. 15
(“The dependent claims are patentable at least for the reasons set forth
above.”). Therefore, for the same reasons discussed above, we also sustain
the rejection of claims 3, 4, 6, 9, 13–15, 17–9, and 21–27 as unpatentable
over the combined teachings of Laves and Muller.

Claims 2, 10, and 16
Each of claims 2, 10, and 16 recites coupling, in response to a locator
signal, to an external display via a single user action. See Appeal Br. 17–18
(Claims App.).
The Examiner previously took “Official notice that a computer may
wirelessly couple to a display by a Wi-Fi transceiver by either turning on the
device or the device may present a selection of possible connections which
the user selects by a single action,” and, as Appellant did not timely traverse,
considers such features as “admitted prior art.” Final Act. 7. The Examiner
explains that because “a device may couple with a plurality of available
devices, the device is made aware of available coupling units by receiving a
‘locator’ signal that identifies the device to the user so that he may select
which device a coupling is desired.” Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added).
According to the Examiner, “[t]his selection constitutes a single action.” Id.
at 8. Thus, the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious for a
skilled artisan to employ “conventional means,” such as Google’s
Chromecast or Bluetooth connections, as disclosed in Laves, to couple
Laves’s device to an external display “to gain the advantage of a larger
screen.” Id. at 7–8.
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Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection does not take into
account that the features of claims 2, 10, and 16 permits a “user . . . to easily
move from a fully closed device, to a partially open one to a fully
open one to one coupled, in either of three modes, to a separate display.”
Appeal Br. 15. According to Appellant, the Examiner’s rejection “ignores
not only the single action claimed coupling capability but also the further
extensibility capability noted above.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because the Examiner
is correct that “Laves also teaches that the disclosed device may be used in
various open and partially opened configurations.” Ans. 8; see also Laves,
para. 38. The Examiner is also correct that Google’s Chromecast or
Bluetooth connections constitute “conventional means” to couple a device to
an external display. Final Act. 8. As such, in the Examiner’s rejection
Laves’s display panels are employed in various open and partially opened
configurations to couple to an external display using “conventional means,”
such as, Google’s Chromecast or Bluetooth connections. Lastly, as
Appellant has not adequately challenged the Examiner’s finding regarding
the limitation of a single user action discussed supra, we adopt this finding.
See Ans. 8 (“[A]ppellant states that the claims recites a locator signal but
entirely ignores how it is addressed in the rejection.”).
In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 2, 10, and 16 as unpatentable over Laves
and Muller.

CONCLUSION

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Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
2–4, 6, 9,
10, 13–19,
21–27
103(a) Laves, Muller 2–4, 6, 9,
10, 13–19,
21–27

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED