EZ PARK, INC.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Aug 13, 2013

04-CA-092571 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 13, 2013)

JD–54–13
Philadelphia, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
EZ PARK, INC.
and Case No. 04-CA-92571
TEMESGEN DASA, AN INDIVIDUAL
Donna Brown, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Daniel J. Sobol, Esq. and Whitney Kummerow, Esq.
(Sobol & Sobol, P.C.),
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Robert A. Giannasi, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, on July 8, 2013. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by coercively interrogating an employee and Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discharging
employee Temesgen Dasa for engaging in union activities. The Respondent filed an answer
denying the essential allegations in the complaint. It asserts Dasa was discharged for cause—
reusing parking tickets that suggested theft.
After the trial, the Acting General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs, which I have
read and considered. Based on the entire record, including the testimony of the witnesses, and
my observation of their demeanor, I make the following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation with an office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
operates some 21 parking lots throughout the city of Philadelphia. In a representative 1-year
period, Respondent purchased and received, at its Philadelphia location, goods valued in excess
of $50,000 directly from points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, I
find, as Respondent admits, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
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2
I further find, as Respondent also admits, that Laborers’ International Union of North
America, Local 332 ( the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices5
A. The Facts
Background
10
As indicated above, Respondent operates some 21 parking lots throughout Philadelphia.
The lots are ground level lots and customers pay in advance, often in cash. Respondent employs
a total of about 60 parking lot attendants. Respondent’s management includes the owners,
Harvey Spear and Robert Spear, as well as Robert’s children, Gregg Spear, who identified
himself simply as a supervisor, and Ashley Spear. From about late 2006 or early 2007 until 15
September 12, 2012, when he was separated from his position by Respondent, David App served
as general manager with responsibility over all of the parking lots and the attendants working
there. Immediately beneath App in the management hierarchy were two assistant or area
managers, Nathan Potts and Zawdu Mengesha.
20
Temesgen Dasa worked as a parking lot attendant for the Respondent from 2008 until his
discharge on October 6, 2012. During the last period of his employment, he worked at the
Respondent’s lot on Chestnut Street Monday through Friday from 3 – 8 pm, and, at
Respondent’s Bainbridge Street lot on Fridays and Saturdays from 3 pm to about 2 am in the
morning. He was the sole attendant at the Chestnut Street lot and he worked with Ebbsa Muktar 25
at the Bainbridge Street lot.
Dasa’s duties included acting as cashier and valet. He would utilize a three part
numbered parking ticket, the first portion of which he gives to the customer. The second part has
a space for the car’s control number, either the license plate number or the vehicle identification 30
number, as well as a list of color and make of the car, which is to be circled. This part of the
ticket is placed on the car’s windshield, after Dasa fills it out. Dasa testified that he always
entered the license plate number, but did not always identify the color and make of the car, in
part because he was often too busy to enter that information. The third part of the ticket is the
office copy, kept by the parking lot attendant and placed in Respondent’s office.35
Respondent’s ticket identification process is important in assuring that payment is
accounted for in all parking situations, particularly because payment is often made in cash. If
tickets are not filled out correctly, the tickets can be used on different vehicles and the revenue
misappropriated, a common way for attendants to steal. (Tr. 96.) App, who was called as a 40
witness by the Acting General Counsel, testified that Respondent has had problems with theft by
attendants. During his tenure as general manager, especially at the beginning of that tenure, he
fired between 40 and 60 attendants for theft and related offenses. (Tr. 51, 77–79, 80.) One of
the means of theft was for an attendant to take money from a customer, issue him a blank ticket,
and reuse it for another customer. (Tr. 84, 99.) According to App, it was “inexcusable” for an 45
attendant to put a blank ticket on a car, unless he was very busy. (Tr. 70.) The record includes
evidence of other discharges of attendants for theft, including several for cash shortages, issuing
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a daily ticket to a second car, and not turning in revenue, stamping tickets out while cars were
still in the lot, and switching tickets. (Exh. F to GC Exh. 5.)
The Union Campaign
5
The union campaign in this case began in a somewhat unusual way. General Manager
App testified that he noted employee complaints about working conditions and he discussed
bringing a union into the operation with Area Manager Mengesha. After talking to employees
about their interest in having a union represents them, App and Mengesha decided to contact the
Union. According to App, they selected 4 employees, none of whom was Dasa, to go with them 10
to meet with representatives of the Union. (Tr. 55–57.) Mengesha testified that he never
participated in organizing the employees. (Tr. 129.)
Among the employees with whom App spoke about a union was Dasa. App first
approached Dasa on June 12, 2012, and asked if Dasa was interested in being represented by a 15
union. Dasa replied that he was, and, a couple of weeks later, Dasa was contacted by a
representative of the Union, whom he could not name or identify. Dasa was working alone at
Chestnut Street when he spoke with the union representative. At that time, Dasa signed a union
authorization card and obtained several blank cards to distribute to other employees. Over the
next few weeks, Dasa obtained signed cards from 7 other employees, including Muktar, who 20
worked with Dasa at Bainbridge Street. Dasa returned the other signed cards to the union
representative and never had any further contact with him. (Tr. 19.)
On August 6, 2012, the Union filed an election petition in a unit of Respondent’s full and
part-time parking attendants. A stipulated election was held on September 12, 2012, which the 25
Union lost by a vote of 48 to 11. It does not appear that objections to the election were filed.
Respondent vigorously contested the election, hiring an outside consultant and labor
counsel to aid in the campaign. App testified that the Spears solicited and even paid some
employees to campaign against the Union. Among the employees who campaigned against the 30
Union was Maktar, who had earlier signed an authorization card given to him by Dasa. App also
offered uncontradicted testimony that he was separated from his employment after he refused to
provide the names of union supporters to the Spears.1
The Alleged Interrogation of Dasa35
Dasa testified that, on October 3, 2012, some 3 weeks after the election, he was
approached by Area Manager Mengesha at the Chestnut Street lot. According to Dasa, after
some general conversation about how business was going, Mengesha asked him about the
Union—“how many people signed and how I got them to sign.” Mengesha then asked Dasa for 40
“their names and I refused to give them.” According to Dasa, after that, Mengesha left (Tr. 20–
21).

1 None of the incidents related by App in his testimony set forth above were alleged as unfair labor
practices.
JD–54–13
4
Mengesha denied that he had any such conversation with Dasa. He testified that his shift
overlapped with Dasa on October 3 for only about one hour and he never spoke to Dasa at all on
that day. (Tr. 128–129.)
Neither Dasa nor Mengesha was cross examined about his testimony concerning the 5
alleged October 3 conversation. Such a bare one-on-one conflict presents a difficult credibility
determination for a trier of fact. But the Acting General Counsel has the burden of proving the
allegation of coercive interrogation. That includes proof of the credibility of the witness whose
account supports the allegation. As between Mengesha and Dasa, I find that Mengesha was the
more reliable witness. Dasa’s testimony was incomplete because he did not testify what his 10
answers were to the first two questions allegedly posed by Mengesha. Moreover, there is no
proper context supplied for why Mengesha would ask Dasa any union related questions,
particularly well after the election, which the Union lost by a wide margin. Neither Mengesha
nor any other supervisor had expressed an interest in Dasa’s union activities even before the
election, when that interest would have been more pertinent. App’s conversation with Dasa in 15
June was not coercive because, at that point, App favored bringing a union in; it was simply an
effort to see whether Dasa was interested in having a union. Nor were there any other allegations
of unlawful threats or interrogations during the union campaign. In addition, as noted below (fn.
3), I found one aspect of Dasa’s testimony about the circumstances of his discharge not entirely
credible. Thus, I find Mengesha’s denial more convincing than Dasa’s testimony about the 20
October 3 conversation. Accordingly, I shall dismiss the allegation that Respondent violated the
Act by coercively interrogating Dasa.
The Discharge of Dasa
25
On October 6, 2012, when Dasa reported for work at Bainbridge, both Muktar and a new
employee, David Mikonnen, who had just started work the week before, were also on duty.
Supervisor Mengesha testified that, on that day, he stopped by the Bainbridge lot and was asked
by Muktar to be removed from that location. According to Mengesha, Muktar said that there
was “funny business going on . . . during the night time and I don’t want to work with it.” (Tr. 30
129.) On cross examination, Mengesha testified that “funny business” is a term he understood—
and is understood in the industry—to suggest theft. He also testified that Respondent always
treats theft as a dischargeable offense. (Tr. 131.) As a result, Mengesha notified his superior,
Gregg Spear, of Muktar’s report; and he transferred Muktar to another parking lot, leaving only
Dasa and Mekonnen at the Bainbridge lot. Since Dasa was the more experienced of the two, he 35
handled the cashier and ticketing function the rest of the shift.2
Thus alerted, Spear went to the Bainbridge Street lot with another supervisor, arriving at
about midnight, with the purpose of making a parking lot inspection. Such inspections are not
unusual and involve checking whether the parking tickets match the cars on whose windshields 40
they appear. (Tr. 99–100.) Dasa admitted that mismatched tickets are problems and could result
in discipline. (Tr. 42.) He also admitted that he had been told in the past that he should not be
putting mismatched tickets on cars. (Tr. 44.) In this connection, before Spear started the
inspection, Dasa volunteered to Spear, according to Dasa’s own testimony, that, earlier that
night, he had scratched off information on a completed ticket and put the ticket on another car. 45

2 Mengesha’s testimony about Muktar’s report to him is uncontradicted.
JD–54–13
5
According to Dasa, he had done this because the customer changed his mind after paying him
and after Dasa had filled out the ticket. Dasa then gave the customer his money back and reused
the scratched out ticket on another car. (Tr. 23.)3
During his inspection, Spear found that, in several instances, the license numbers on the 5
tickets on car windshields did not match the license plates on the cars, thus indicating that the
tickets may have been reused and that the attendant had pocketed the money from the first use of
the ticket. The record shows that 5 such tickets were found during the lot inspection. (Exh. C to
GC Exh. 5.) None had the color and make of the car on them, and 4 had a mismatched license
plate number; one had no indentifying information on it at all, not even a license plate number. 10
Dasa admitted that his handwriting is on all except the blank ticket. (Tr. 30.) There is no
evidence that Mekonnen was responsible for the blank ticket. Dasa testified that Mekonnen did
very little that night (Tr. 22–23). And Spear testified that he spoke with Mekonnen and was
satisfied that he had nothing to do with the improper ticketing. Mekonnen was being trained by
Dasa and was not handling revenue or ticketing on the night in question. (Tr. 107–108, 110, 15
115–116.)4
After finding what he considered improper tickets and suspecting theft of money from
customers that had not been accounted for in the documentary record, Spear asked Dasa for an
explanation. Dasa did not respond. (Tr. 101, 11, 119–120.) Dasa testified he did not want to 20
argue with Spear (Tr. 43). But I find it significant that Dasa did not offer an explanation for the
improper tickets at the time, especially after he had earlier volunteered to Spear that he scratched
off a ticket and reused it. Spear then asked Dasa to leave the premises. Dasa was later
discharged. The termination notice states that Dasa’s last day was October 6, 2012, and that he
was terminated for “willful misconduct, re-used tickets found on other cars.” Dasa refused to 25
sign the termination notice. (Exh. D to GC Exh. 5.)
According to App and Spear, Dasa was a good employee, who was trusted enough to
work at a relatively busy parking lot and to train a new employee. But App testified that Dasa
would not always fill out his tickets and would sometimes put blank tickets on cars. App also 30
testified that Dasa, like other attendants, did not always indicate the color and make of a car on
his parking ticket; and he was cautioned about that. App further testified, as did Spear, that that
information is not as important as placing the correct license number on the ticket. (Tr. 73–74,
98.)
35

3 I found Dasa’s testimony on this point revealing and his explanation unconvincing. It was an
attempt to give an innocuous explanation for what turned out to be the offense for which Dasa was fired.
The testimony not only bears unfavorably on Dasa’s credibility as a witness, but it supports the notion
that Dasa knew he was doing something wrong and Spear would uncover damaging evidence in his lot
inspection. There is no need to scratch out information on a ticket and reuse it since there are large
quantities of blank tickets available for use by attendants. Moreover, Dasa’s testimony is internally
inconsistent. He claimed that he did not have time to complete the information on the tickets because he
was busy. Yet, according to Dasa, he had the time to fill out a ticket and take a customer’s money and
also to scratch out the information and return the customer’s money. I find the latter account implausible.
4 Spear’s testimony as set forth above was uncontradicted and was supported in part by the supervisor
who accompanied him and helped with the lot inspection.
JD–54–13
6
B. Discussion and Analysis
Motive-based allegations of discrimination are decided under the framework of the 5
Board’s Wright Line decision.5 Under Wright Line, the General Counsel must make out an initial
showing that the employee’s protected or union activity was a motivating factor in the adverse
employment action. That burden may be satisfied by showing that the employee engaged in
union activity, and that the employer knew about those activities and bore animus toward the
employee’s union activities. Other factors supporting an initial showing of discrimination are the 10
timing of the adverse action and proof that the proffered reason for the adverse action was a
pretext. Vision of Elk River, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 5, slip op. 3–4 (2012), and cases there cited.
Once the General Counsel makes an initial showing of discrimination, the burden of persuasion
“shift[s] to the employer to demonstrate that the same action would have been taken even in the
absence of the protected conduct.” Bally’s Atlantic City, 355 NLRB 1319, 1321 (2010).15
Applying the above principles, I find that the Acting General Counsel has not shown that
Dasa’s union activities were a motivating factor in his discharge. I also find that, even if that
showing had been made as an initial matter, the Respondent has shown that it would have
discharged Dasa for valid reasons unrelated to his union activities.20
Respondent undoubtedly harbored animus against the Union, as shown by the testimony
of App, whom it dismissed after he refused to provide the names of union supporters. But there
is no evidence that such animus was directed towards Dasa for his union activities. Indeed, there
is no specific evidence that the Spears knew whether Dasa even supported the Union. App 25
refused to give the Spears Dasa’s name or the names of any of the union supporters when asked.
Dasa did, of course, sign an authorization card and distributed several others to fellow employees
and turned them in to a representative of the Union. But he was not otherwise a particularly
active union supporter. He was, for example, not among the four employees who first were
brought to the Union to initiate the union organizing campaign. And Dasa could not even name 30
the representative of the Union in charge of the organizing campaign, with whom he met on only
two occasions. Nor is there any evidence that Respondent’s union animus lingered after the
election. There were no other contemporaneous unfair labor practices committed by
Respondent; indeed, none at all either before or after the election. Finally, the timing of Dasa’s
discharge was well removed from the union campaign. He was discharged almost a month after 35
the election, which had resulted in a resounding loss for the Union. It defies belief that
Respondent would have waited so long to discharge Dasa if indeed it did so because of his union
activities. Thus, I cannot make the inference that his discharge was motivated by discriminatory
reasons.
40
Nor do I buy the Acting General Counsel’s attempt to show that Dasa’s termination for
improper ticketing was a pretext. Dasa was indeed responsible for improper ticketing on the
night of October 6. Even before the lot inspection, Dasa admitted to Spear that he had reused a
ticket after scratching out previously written information on it. His testimonial explanation for

5 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989
(1982).
JD–54–13
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that was unconvincing. Dasa was also responsible for 4 mismatched tickets and one blank ticket
uncovered during the lot inspection. He could offer no legitimate explanation for the improper
ticketing when confronted by Spear after the lot inspection. Moreover, there is no evidence that
the report of impropriety that caused the lot inspection was not legitimate.6
5
In these circumstances, it would have been irresponsible for Respondent not to check out
the accuracy of the report. There is no doubt that the improper ticketing suggested theft and
there is likewise no doubt that Respondent viewed such conduct seriously and discharged other
attendants for such improprieties. Contrary to the contention of the Acting General Counsel (Br.
at 33), there is no evidence of disparate treatment; indeed, the evidence is that Respondent 10
routinely fired attendants for improper ticketing that amounted to suspicion of, or actual, theft.
Accordingly, I find that the reason offered by Respondent for the discharge was not a pretext.
The improprieties really happened and they were not a cover up to mask a discriminatory reason
for the discharge.7
15
For the reasons stated above, I find that, even if the Acting General Counsel had satisfied
the initial burden of showing discrimination in this case, the Respondent has shown that it would
have fired Dasa for reasons unrelated to union activities. Accordingly, I will dismiss the
complaint allegation that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
20
Conclusion of Law
The Respondent has not violated the Act as alleged in the complaint.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the 25
following recommended8

6 Contrary to the Acting General Counsel’s contention (Br. at 25), no adverse inference may be
charged against Respondent for the failure to call Muktar as a witness. As an employee and not a
supervisor or agent of Respondent, Muktar was equally available to either side. Neither side chose to call
him. Indeed, the prosecution had more reason to call Muktar because, without his testimony, Mengesha’s
testimony about his conversation with Muktar was uncontradicted.
7 In her brief (Br. at 15, 28–29, 32), counsel for the Acting General Counsel alleges that Respondent’s
position statement offered other reasons for the discharge—including that Dasa’s settlement sheets
showed cash discrepancies. Thus, according to the Acting General Counsel, Respondent offered shifting
reasons for the discharge, a factor supporting a finding of pretext. I reject that contention. Spear’s
testimony and the termination notice make clear that the mismatched and blank tickets discovered during
the lot inspection were the reasons for the discharge; in neither Spear’s testimony nor the termination
notice was there mention of settlement sheet disparities. Nor does Dasa’s failure to note the color and
make of the cars on his tickets amount to shifting reasons. Indeed, Spear candidly testified that Dasa’s
omission in that respect did not enter into his decision to discharge Dasa (Tr. 109–110).
8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions and recommended order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–54–13
8
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
5
Dated, Washington, D.C., August 13, 2013.
10
_________________________
Robert A. Giannasi
Administrative Law Judge