Exterior Systems, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 22, 2002

338 N.L.R.B. 677 (N.L.R.B. 2002)

EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 677
Exterior Systems, Inc. and Operative Plasterers and
Cement Masons International Association of
United States and Canada, AFL–CIO, Local 8.
Case 4–CA–29852
November 22, 2002
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, COWEN, AND BARTLETT
On July 18, 2001, Administrative Law Judge D. Paul
Bogas issued the attached decision. The General Coun-
sel and the Charging Party filed exceptions and support-
ing briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions1 and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,2 and conclusions as modified below and to adopt
the judge’s recommended Order as modified.3
1. The General Counsel and the Charging Party except
to the judge’s findings that the Respondent did not vio-
late Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by failing to hire or consider
for hire James Kilkenny, a union organizer for the Opera-
tive Plasterers and Cement Masons International Asso-
ciation of the United States and Canada, AFL–CIO, Lo-
cal 8 (the Union), after he applied for work on August
16, 2000, and again on October 3, 2000.4
The credited facts relating to these allegations, which
are more fully set forth in the judge’s decision, are sum-
marized as follows. The Respondent is a subcontractor
that installs exterior insulation finish systems on com-
mercial buildings. Fred Cosenza, a union organizer, con-
tacted Mark Sanders, the Respondent’s manager, pursu-
ant to the Respondent’s newspaper advertisement seek-
ing laborers, stucco mechanics and carpenters, and ar-
ranged an interview for himself and “a couple of guys”
on August 16. Cosenza then asked six union organizers,
including Kilkenny, to accompany him to the Respon-

1 No exceptions were filed concerning the judge’s findings that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by instructing an employee not to
discuss his wage rate with other employees and by leaving telephone
messages that threatened the same employee because of his union sup-
port. In his exceptions, the General Counsel requests an additional
8(a)(1) violation based on these same telephone messages. We need
not pass on this request because such additional finding would be cu-
mulative and would not materially affect our Order in this case.
2 The General Counsel and the Charging Party have excepted to
some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy
is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions
unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us
that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully exam-
ined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
3 We will substitute a new notice in accordance with our recent deci-
sion in Ishikawa Gasket American, Inc., 337 NLRB 175 (2001).
4 All dates are in 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
dent’s jobsite at Children’s Hospital in Van Voorhees,
New Jersey, in order to apply for jobs.
Upon arriving at the jobsite, Cosenza presented the ap-
plicants to Mark and Sun Sanders and asked where they
wanted the applicants to start. Sun Sanders asked if any
of the applicants knew how to stucco. When Kilkenny
responded that he did, Cosenza informed Sun Sanders
again that they were ready to work and this time asked
her how many men she needed. She responded that she
was not ready and that she couldn’t hire “all these.” Sun
Sanders then asked Kilkenny about his stucco experi-
ence. After he explained that he had 10 or 11 years of
experience, Cosenza urged him to “get up on that wall”
and demonstrate his skill. Kilkenny volunteered to get
his tools, but stated, “I ain’t gonna rasp.”5
Cosenza first broached the subject of the applicants’
union affiliation and intent to organize the Respondent’s
workplace after Mark Sanders started to give Cosenza his
business card. Sun Sanders reiterated that she would let
them know and Mark Sanders provided a pad of paper to
Cosenza so that the applicants could write down their
contact information.
At about that point, Cosenza and Kilkenny asked two
onduty workers about their benefits and wages and solic-
ited them to join the Union. Sun Sanders attempted to
interrupt this conversation but Kilkenny then shouted to
the employees that the union rate was $24.35 an hour
with $7 in pension and annuity. Kilkenny then urged the
workers to “[g]ive the Local a call” so that he could ar-
range for them to work for a union contractor. When
Sun Sanders scolded him for doing so, Kilkenny mocked
Sun Sanders’ Asian accent.
Agitated by the applicants’ behavior, Sun Sanders told
them that she planned to talk to her lawyer and told them
that she did not want to hire them because they were “too
smart acting.” The Sanders then repeatedly asked the
applicants to leave the Respondent’s worksite but the
applicants refused to do so. Sun Sanders shouted “union
piece of shit” and “[g]et the Hell work other place.” Still
the applicants insisted that they wanted to work for the
Respondent, that they were there in response to the ad-
vertisement and were willing to start working. Sun
Sanders responded, “I’m sure you guys very good,” and
that she would “let them know.” Sun Sanders added that
the Respondent was planning to open a “big . . . panel
shop,” and would hire “lotta people” and “[m]ight go for
union so you never know.” The Respondent did not
thereafter contact any of the applicants or offer them jobs
and did not hire Kilkenny when he later applied again on
5 Rasping is a necessary task associated with applying exterior insu-
lation finish systems.
338 NLRB No. 82
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 678
October 3, 2000, at the Respondent’s jobsite in Berlin
Township, New Jersey.
The judge found that the General Counsel failed to
meet his initial evidentiary burden under FES6 of proving
that union animus was a motivating factor in the Re-
spondent’s decision not to hire Kilkenny or consider him
for hire on August 16 or October 3. Specifically, the
judge did find that the Respondent harbored union ani-
mus, as exhibited by Sun Sanders’ use of the antiunion
expletive referenced above. The judge found, however,
that such animus did not contribute to the Respondent’s
refusal to hire or consider Kilkenny for hire.
Rather, the judge credited Mark Sanders’ testimony
that he did not hire Kilkenny because the group came
“onto my jobsite, and was basically ordering us around,”
and engaged in behavior that was not “appropriate,” and
that Kilkenny intentionally misunderstood Sun Sanders’
speech, “making her look like a dummy.” According to
Mark Sanders, the group as a whole was “intimidating
us,” and Kilkenny “was going right along with them.”
The judge also credited Sun Sanders’ testimony that she
felt the applicants treated her like “a stupid woman.”
Citing Heiliger Electric Corp.,7 the judge found that the
Respondent refused to hire Kilkenny or consider him for
hire because he and the other applicants created an “in-
timidating” and “disrespectful” environment at the job-
site.
Moreover, the judge found that even if the General
Counsel had proven that union animus contributed to the
Respondent’s decision not to hire or consider Kilkenny
for hire on August 16 or October 3, the Respondent satis-
fied its burden of showing that it would have made the
same decision absent Kilkenny’s union affiliation. Spe-
cifically, the judge found that the Respondent proved it
would not have hired Kilkenny or considered him for
hire due to the “disruptive, intimidating, and disrespect-
ful” atmosphere created by the applicants on August 16.
The judge found it “not surprising” that Sun Sanders did
not forget or forgive that behavior when Kilkenny ap-
plied again on October 3.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend,
inter alia, that there was no credible evidence that the
applicants’ activity was disruptive. They argue that the
applicants were engaged in protected activity when they
solicited the onduty workers to join the union and en-
gaged them in discussion about wages and work. The
General Counsel and the Charging Party further contend

6 FES, 331 NLRB 9 (2000), enfd. 301 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002).
7 325 NLRB 966 fn. 3 and 968 (1998) (finding that union applicants’
creation of a “sufficiently intimidating and disrespectful” environment
“privileged a decision by [the employer] to not hire the . . . appli-
cants”).
that the Sanders’ antiunion animus, as evidenced by the
Respondent’s failure to give the organizers applications
and by the Sanders’ statements to the applicants, was the
true motive for the decision not to hire or consider Kil-
kenny for hire.
Based on the credited evidence, we agree with the
judge that the conduct of Kilkenny and the other appli-
cants was “disruptive” and “disrespectful.” Moreover,
based on the judge’s crediting of the testimony of Mark
and Sun Sanders as to their reaction to this conduct, we
adopt his finding that the Respondent would not have
hired or considered Kilkenny for hire regardless of his
union activity.8
As the Board explained in Heiliger Electric Corp., su-
pra, “there is no provision in the Act or in the law devel-
oped by the Board that would require an employer to . . .
[be] subjected to rude or intimidating conduct.”9 Kil-
kenny and the other applicants behaved in precisely such
a manner toward the Sanders at the Respondent’s jobsite
and, by doing so, effectively eliminated their opportunity
for employment by the Respondent. That they also en-
gaged in union activity by stating their intent to organize
the Respondent’s employees if hired does not require the
Respondent to disregard their misconduct.
We therefore affirm the judge’s dismissal of the dis-
criminatory refusal to hire and refusal to consider for hire
allegations.10
2. The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s finding
that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) when
Sun Sanders told Kilkenny on October 3 that she could
not hire him because he worked for the union office. The
facts relating to this allegation are briefly as follows.
Kilkenny called Feeley, an out-of-work plasterer and
union member, on August 16, after leaving the Respon-
dent’s Van Voorhees jobsite, and directed him to apply
with the Respondent. Feeley contacted the Respondent
and was hired on that same day after meeting with Sun
and Mark Sanders. After the Respondent hired Feeley,
8 We assume arguendo that the Respondent harbored antiunion ani-
mus, as the judge found. However, because we find that the Respon-
dent would not have considered or hired Kilkenny in any event, we find
it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s alternative findings as to whether
or not the Respondent’s action was motivated by animus. Member
Cowen would adopt the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent’s deci-
sion not to hire Kilkenny was not motivated by union animus.
9 325 NLRB at 968.
10 We unanimously agree that assuming, arguendo, the General
Counsel has established his initial burden under FES, the Respondent
has satisfied its rebuttal burden of showing that it would not have hired
Kilkenny or considered him for hire despite his union affiliation. How-
ever, we write separately to address our differing individual views on
the burdens of proof associated with the issue of applicant status under
the FES framework. These differing views have no impact on the
disposition of this case.
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 679
Kilkenny told Feeley to contact him if he learned that the
Respondent was hiring employees.
In mid-September, the Respondent advised Feeley that
it was hiring plasterers. Subsequently, Feeley informed
the Sanders that he knew someone who was interested in
the position. On October 3, Feeley and Kilkenny arrived
together at the Respondent’s Berlin Township jobsite and
Feeley introduced Kilkenny to Sun Sanders. Sun Sand-
ers stated that she recognized Kilkenny from his visit on
August 16 and would not employ him. She also stated
that she could not employ him because he worked for the
union office. Kilkenny then asked if Feeley also could
not work for the Respondent because he was a Union
member. Sun Sanders replied that Feeley could continue
working for her because “it’s a free country.” The Re-
spondent did not contact Kilkenny after his visit to the
jobsite.
The judge found that given the context of Sun Sanders’
statements, what she actually meant was that she would
not hire Kilkenny due to his rude and disruptive behavior
during his August 16 visit to the Respondent’s jobsite,
not because of his union affiliation. According to the
judge, a reasonable applicant who, like Kilkenny, was
cognizant of the surrounding facts would understand
what Sun Sanders meant.
The General Counsel argues that the Board should re-
ject the judge’s interpretation of Sun Sanders’ state-
ments. In the General Counsel’s view, the credited tes-
timony demonstrates what was actually said and does not
support the judge’s interpretation. For the reasons that
follow, we find merit in this argument.
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by making
statements to employees that union applicants will not be
hired.11 Such statements are clearly coercive and have a
reasonable tendency to interfere with employees’ rights
under the Act.12 The Board has also held that “the su-
pervisor’s motive or intent in making the statement has
no relevancy in an 8(a)(1) context.”13 Instead, “the test
to determine if a supervisor’s statement violated Section
8(a)(1) is whether under all the circumstances the super-
visor’s remark reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or
interfere with the employee’s rights guaranteed under the
Act. It is well established that this test does not depend
on motive or the successful effect of the coercion.”14

11 Lin R. Rogers Electrical Contractors, 328 NLRB 1165, 1167
(1999); see also GM Electrics, 323 NLRB 125, 126 (1997); Sunland
Construction Co., 311 NLRB 685, 704 (1993); J. L. Phillips Enter-
prises, 310 NLRB 11, 13 (1993).
12 Lin R. Rogers Electrical Contractors, supra at 1167.
13 GM Electrics, 323 NLRB at 127.
14 Id.
We do not rely on the judge’s interpretation of Sun
Sanders’ statements. Even if we were to agree with the
judge that Sun Sanders did not actually mean what was
said, and that Kilkenny understood the context in which
the statements were made, the judge does not properly
account for the fact that Sun Sanders made this statement
to Kilkenny in front of Feeley, a current employee.
There is no indication that Feeley was familiar with Kil-
kenny’s August 16 behavior. Under these circumstances,
Sun Sanders’ statement would reasonably tend to re-
strain, coerce, or interfere with employees’ exercise of
rights guaranteed under the Act, regardless of her intent
or motive in making the statement. Her clear words to
Kilkenny which were communicated in front of Feeley—
that she would not hire him because he worked for the
union office—would reasonably tend to restrain, coerce,
or interfere with employees’ rights in violation of Section
8(a)(1). There is nothing ambiguous about her statement
and what Sun Sanders may have really meant in making
it is beside the point.
The judge found it significant that Sun Sanders “did
not state, or imply, that she would consider Kilkenny for
hire if he abandoned his union affiliation or activity, or
took some other action, nor did she suggest that Feeley
would have to do anything, or refrain from doing any-
thing, if he wished to continue to work for the Respon-
dent.” The absence of these additional statements, how-
ever, provides no defense for the Respondent. Sun
Sanders’ statement is not rendered innocuous simply
because she did not make these additional statements,
which would have also been unlawful. We therefore find
that Sun Sanders’ statement that she would not hire Kil-
kenny because he worked for the union office is a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Exterior
Systems, Inc., Mount Laurel, New Jersey, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order as modified.
1. Add the following as paragraph 1(c) and reletter the
subsequent paragraph.
“(c) Threatening that applicants who are union organ-
izers will be refused employment.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

MEMBER LIEBMAN, concurring.
In line with the careful allocation of evidentiary bur-
dens under FES, 331 NLRB 9 (2000), enfd. 301 F.3d 83
(3d Cir. 2002), the Respondent has demonstrated that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 680
notwithstanding its antiunion animus, it refused to hire
union organizer James Kilkenny, and refused to consider
him for hire, because of his disruptive and disrespectful
conduct, not his union affiliation. Despite our agreement
on this point, Member Cowen and Member Bartlett have
each chosen, in concurring opinions, to address an issue
that was neither raised nor briefed by any party and that
we concededly need not examine here. My colleagues
separately argue that the Board must supplement or mod-
ify the FES framework in some fashion, to address what
each apparently believes should be an element of a re-
fusal-to-hire and a refusal-to-consider violation under
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. In their view, the General
Counsel has the burden of proving that the employee
alleged to have been discriminated against also had a
genuine interest in employment—however that may be
defined and demonstrated (my colleagues do not articu-
late a clear and common test). Member Cowen would
require this showing as part of the General Counsel’s
initial burden; Member Bartlett would not, but he would
still place the burden of persuasion on the General Coun-
sel, once the employer produced evidence on the issue
(as opposed to treating the matter as an affirmative de-
fense, on which the employer bears the burden of persua-
sion).
Needless to say, these arguments would be better ad-
dressed in a case where they had some bearing on the
outcome and where the Board had the benefit of briefing.
But because my colleagues have put their views forward,
because those views strike me as seriously flawed, and
because I am the sole remaining member of the Board
that decided FES, I feel compelled to speak to the issue
as well. In my view, FES clearly contemplates that the
issue of an applicant’s interest in employment will be
material only insofar as the employer can establish, as an
affirmative defense, that the applicant’s behavior or
manifested lack of interest in employment, was the actual
basis for refusing to hire or consider him. As this case
illustrates, the FES framework effectively permits em-
ployers whose actions were not, in fact, based on their
proven antiunion animus to defend against claims involv-
ing applicants whose own behavior belies a serious inten-
tion to secure employment.
The basic principles underlying FES are well estab-
lished. It is settled that a job applicant is an “employee”
under Section 2(3) of the Act. Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).1 It is settled, too, that union

1 The Court explained in Phelps Dodge that discrimination in hiring
on the basis of union status was one of the chief obstacles to collective
bargaining through self-organization and that removal of such obstruc-
tions was a driving force behind the enactment of the Act. 313 U.S. at
186. As the Court stated:
organizers who apply for work (salts) are also statutory
employees, immediately protected from discrimination
based on their union affiliation—unless it is proven that
they have engaged in (or, if hired, would engage in) acts
of disloyalty or other conduct inconsistent with the duties
of an employee. NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 516
U.S. 85 (1995).2 Apart from employee status, there is no
other status—such as being a “genuine applicant”—that
must be established to claim the protection of the Act.
Statutory employees, in turn, may not be discriminated
against. When antiunion animus was a substantial moti-
vating factor in an employer’s adverse actions toward an
employee, it is the employer’s burden to prove that it
would have acted in the same way, regardless of the em-
ployee’s union affiliation. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083
(1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied
455 U.S. 989 (1982).
The Board’s decision in FES is a particularized appli-
cation of Wright Line. There, after hearing oral argu-
ment, a full Board set forth a new analytical framework
for deciding discriminatory refusal-to-hire and refusal-to-
consider cases. The FES Board was able to strike a bal-
ance in determining not only the requisite legal elements
of refusal-to-consider and refusal-to-hire violations, but
also the respective burdens of the parties, as well as the
stage of the case at which issues are to be litigated. The
Board took a middle course, as reflected by its rejection
of the positions expressed in the concurring and dissent-
ing opinions for then-Members Brame and Fox. Al-
though the FES Board did not explicitly address the issue
raised by my colleagues, the decision’s careful crafting
obviously implies an intention to resolve all such issues.
I see no reason to tinker with the resulting framework.
Contrary to my colleagues, I believe that under current
law, the Board can and does appropriately address situa-
tions where salts are not pursuing legitimate objectives

[The Act] leaves the adjustment of labor relations to the free
play of economic forces but seeks to assure that the play of those
forces be truly free . . . . Discrimination against union labor in the
hiring of men is a dam to self-organization at the source of sup-
ply. The effect of such discrimination is not confined to the ac-
tual denial of employment; it inevitably operates against the
whole idea of the legitimacy of organization. In a word, it un-
dermines the principle which is recognized as basic to the attain-
ment of industrial peace.
Id. at 183–185.
2 The Court held that the language of the Act “is broad enough to in-
clude those company workers whom a union also pays for organizing”
and that the Board’s “broad literal interpretation of the word ‘em-
ployee’ is consistent with several of the Act’s purposes, such as protect-
ing the rights of employees to organize for mutual aid without em-
ployer interference,” and “encouraging and protecting the collective-
bargaining process.” 516 U.S. at 91.
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 681
using legitimate means. Such situations strike me as the
exception, not the rule.
My colleagues suggest that their approaches are con-
sistent with, or even compelled by, FES. I disagree. The
Board was well aware of the “genuine applicant” issue
when it decided FES. Member Brame’s concurrence—in
which he expressed his own view that the standard for
hiring discrimination cases must take into account
“whether the alleged discriminatee actually sought work
with the employer,” 331 NLRB at 26—was not endorsed
by the majority. At the same time, the majority’s opinion
made clear that it did “not address affirmative defenses to
allegations of discriminatory refusal to consider or to hire
applicants for employment and [did] not affect precedent
governing such defenses.” 331 NLRB at 12 fn. 6.
FES, then, teaches that an applicant’s lack of interest
in employment, however manifested to the employer,
may be raised by way of an affirmative defense, i.e., to
establish that the employer, notwithstanding its antiunion
animus, had a lawful reason for excluding the applicant
from the hiring process. In other words, the employer
may show that it honestly believed that the applicant was
not interested in being hired, or that, in the employer’s
view, the applicant’s behavior during the application
process demonstrated his unfitness as an employee, and
that this was the actual reason he was not hired or con-
sidered for hire. Just what evidence will satisfy the em-
ployer’s burden is necessarily a question to be decided
case-by-case, because it involves an inquiry into the mo-
tives of a particular employer in particular circumstances.
FES does not support—indeed, it does not permit—the
positions respectively taken by my colleagues. “Appli-
cant status,” as my colleagues describe it, is not an ele-
ment of the violation and is not an issue on which the
General Counsel bears the burden of persuasion. Cer-
tainly, FES assumes that the General Counsel can show
that the alleged discriminatee applied (or attempted to
apply) for a position. But there is nothing in the decision
to suggest that this means anything more than that the
employee has submitted an application or otherwise con-
veyed a desire to be hired.3
None of the other cases cited by my colleagues offer
the claimed support for their views.4 Sunland Construc-

3 FES does not clearly speak to situations where a potential appli-
cant takes no steps to apply because the employer has prevented him
from doing so or has otherwise made applying futile.
4 The Board’s pre-FES decision in Arrow Flint Electric Co., 321
NLRB 1208 (1996), meanwhile, is at odds with my colleagues’ ap-
proaches. There, the Board pointed out that the employer’s unlawful
conduct in discharging a union organizer before he could begin work
made it impossible to determine whether he “actually intended to carry
out his stated intent of working.” 321 NLRB at 1209. Had the burden
tion Co., 309 NLRB 1224 (1992), was decided before
FES and Town & Country Electric.5 Member Cowen
describes the decision as addressing “the appli-
cant/employee status of paid organizers.” But he cites
only a footnote in which the Board rejected the argument
of the amici “that paid union organizers are not ‘employ-
ees.’” 309 NLRB at 1229 fn. 35 (emphasis added).
Sunland did not require the General Counsel to prove
“applicant status”; it held, rather, that an employer could
refuse to hire a paid organizer who undeniably did seek
employment, but who did so while his union was on
strike—circumstances, the Board held, that established a
disabling conflict of interest for the organizer. In
Blaylock Electric, 319 NLRB 928 (1995), enfd. 121 F.3d
1230 (9th Cir. 1997), also decided before FES, the Board
denied an employer’s application for attorney’s fees and
expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),
following the General Counsel’s withdrawal of the com-
plaint after the trial in that case. The Board concluded
that the General Counsel’s position was substantially
justified. In a footnote, it rejected the employer’s argu-
ment “that the alleged discriminatees were not bona fide
applicants for employment.” 319 NLRB at 928 fn. 1.
Clearly, that issue was material to the EAJA claim only
insofar as it would support the employer’s affirmative
defense in the underlying case. Finally, HVAC Mechani-
cal Services, 333 NLRB 206 (2001), decided after FES,
used the phrase “genuine applicants” and “bona fide ap-
plicant” in describing the respondent employer’s argu-
ments, which it rejected. The decision nowhere suggests
that the General Counsel bore the burden of proof on this
point. Had the Board intended to depart from the FES
framework, it surely would have said so.
The shared flaw in the views of Member Cowen and
Member Bartlett is a focus not on the employer’s motive
in refusing to hire or consider a statutory employee, but
on the intentions of the employee with respect to actual
employment. A job applicant without the right inten-
tions, in their view, is not really an applicant at all and so
cannot be the victim of discrimination. At bottom, then,
my colleagues seek a way around the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Phelps Dodge and Town & Country Electric,
by effectively creating a new prerequisite for employee
status.
Such attempts are at odds with the Act and its policies.
Section 8(a)(3) provides that it is an unfair labor practice

of proof been on the General Counsel, of course, no violation could
have been established.
5 I have suggested elsewhere that Sunland Construction cannot be
easily reconciled with Town & Country Electric. See Aztech Electric
Co., 335 NLRB 260, 270 (2001) (concurring opinion of Members
Liebman and Walsh).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 682
for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire . . .
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor or-
ganization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Quite clearly an
employer may discriminate against an applicant for em-
ployment, in violation of Section 8(a)(3), even if the ap-
plicant has no intention of accepting the job if offered
and even if the applicant hopes to be rejected.6 Consider
an employer whose consistent policy is not to hire union
members, in order to prevent organization of the work
force. Following that policy, the employer will reject
any union member who applies, regardless of whether
the applicant has a genuine interest in obtaining em-
ployment. (Indeed, the employer may be entirely un-
aware of the applicant’s lack of interest.) The em-
ployer’s conduct was motivated solely by antiunion ani-
mus, discriminated against union members, and necessar-
ily discouraged union membership. It furthers the goals
of the Act to detect and redress such discrimination.7
In contrast, treating “applicant status,” as my col-
leagues describe it, as an element of an 8(a)(3) violation,
creates an obstacle to the effective enforcement of the
Act. Union members may wish to test their employabil-
ity—whether for purely personal reasons or as a means
of exercising their Section 7 rights, by uncovering anti-
union animus and pursuing legal relief—regardless of
any present intention of accepting a particular job.
Should their efforts produce evidence of unlawful dis-
crimination, there is no reason why the Board should fail
to intervene.
Ensuring that the Act protects all persons entitled to
protection means assuming, at least initially, that all ap-
plicants are genuine unless and until proven otherwise.
Member Cowen argues that the “Board should not as-
sume that salts intend to obtain employment, when many
times . . . they intend to provoke the employer into not
hiring them so that they can file unfair labor practice
charges.” But based on my experience at the Board, I
cannot subscribe to Member Cowen’s dire description of
the practice of salting and its effect on the administration
of the Act. The change in our law that Member Cowen
proposes would, I fear, discourage the prosecution of
many legitimate refusal-to-consider and refusal-to-hire
cases, in order to spare the Board from considerably
fewer problematic cases.
Somewhat obscured by my colleague’s rhetoric is a
point on which we both agree: the Board’s scarce re-

6 Compare, Kyles v. J. K. Guardian Security Services, 222 F.3d 289,
300 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding “no support in Title VII for a requirement
that a job applicant must have a bona fide interest in working for a
particular employer if she is to make out a prima facie case of employ-
ment discrimination”).
7 What relief is appropriate, of course, is another question.
sources should not be wasted on cases of little value in
promoting the goals of the Act. But unlike Member
Cowen, I see no “rising tide of cases” involving abusive
behavior by salts, no persuasive evidence that the
Board’s processes are being “co-opted” by unions, and
nothing in current law that encourages the General Coun-
sel to pursue meritless salting cases. Presumably if an
employer has persuasive evidence that an applicant was
not genuine, and that fact explains the employer’s ac-
tions, it will present that evidence to the Region during
the precomplaint investigation. I am inclined to confi-
dence that the General Counsel does not often issue
complaints in such cases.
There is no question that salting cases represent a sig-
nificant part of the Board’s docket. I am not persuaded
that this development reflects an abuse of process. What
strikes me, rather, is the energetic effort of at least some
employers to avoid considering or hiring union-affiliated
applicants, whatever the cost in litigation expenses or
backpay remedies. Whether or not this is common prac-
tice in the construction industry, it would help explain
the rise and persistence of salting campaigns.

MEMBER COWEN, concurring.
I agree with my colleagues that the Respondent estab-
lished that James Kilkenny’s misconduct was the basis
for the Respondent’s decision not to hire or consider him
for hire and therefore the Respondent did not violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1). However, I would also dismiss
these complaint allegations on another basis; that is, Kil-
kenny’s offensive conduct establishes that he was not an
applicant for employment and therefore the General
Counsel did not establish a prima facie case under FES,
331 NLRB 9 (2000), enfd. 301 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002).
In this significant respect, my position differs from that
of both of my colleagues.
Kilkenny and the group of organizers with whom he
associated revealed through their antics during their job
interview with the Respondent on August 16, that they
were not genuinely interested in obtaining employment,
but were simply at the jobsite to provoke the Respondent
into not hiring them so that a spurious unfair labor prac-
tice charge could be filed. Kilkenny’s offensive and dis-
ruptive behavior during the job interview included urging
onduty workers to leave the Respondent’s employment
and go to work for a union contractor, making fun of the
owner’s Asian accent, and refusing to leave the jobsite
despite repeated requests by the Respondent to do so.
After this display, which was captured covertly on audio-
tape by the organizers, the Union then had the audacity
to file an unfair labor practice charge on Kilkenny’s be-
half, alleging discriminatory failure to hire and failure to
consider for hire. In my view, this case strongly illus-
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 683
trates a significant problem that may result when the
Board is not attendant to the FES requirement that an
alleged discriminatee is in fact an applicant. By ignoring
this requirement, the Board may unwittingly allow its
processes to be co-opted in a union’s illegitimate and
unprotected effort to inflict substantial expenses on tar-
geted nonunion employers who fail to voluntarily recog-
nize the union.
A. FES Requires the General Counsel
to Prove Applicant Status
A claim of discrimination in regard to hire requires
that there be an applicant who was denied employment.
Accordingly, inherent in the FES framework is the re-
quirement that an alleged discriminatee be “an appli-
cant.” Specifically, with regard to a refusal-to-hire
claim, the General Counsel must show, inter alia, “that
the applicant had experience or training relevant to the
announced or generally known requirements of the posi-
tions for hire . . .” and that “antiunion animus contributed
to the decision not to hire the applicant.”1 With regard to
a refusal to consider for hire claim, the General Counsel
must show that the respondent “excluded the applicant
from the hiring process” and that “antiunion animus con-
tributed to the decision not to consider the applicant for
employment.”2
The Board’s decision in FES did not address the stan-
dard for determining applicant status. However, looking
to Board precedent, the Board has instructed that the in-
tent to obtain work with the employer is a necessary pre-
requisite to obtaining applicant status. Significantly, the
Board, in its 1992 decision of Sunland Construction Co.,
considered the applicant/employee status of paid organ-
izers and found that “as long as the organizer is able,
available, and fully intends to work for the employer if
hired, he will not be disqualified from ‘employee’
status.”3 Because FES did not overrule this precedent, it
must be incorporated into the Board’s examination of
applicant status in refusal to hire cases under FES. Con-
sistent with this precedent, in a post-FES case, HVAC
Mechanical Services, 333 NLRB 206 (2001), the Board
found that the alleged discriminatees were “genuine ap-
plicants” because there was no evidence that “they were
not interested in obtaining employment with the Respon-
dent, or that they did not intend to perform their assigned
duties if hired.”4 The reason for this genuine intent re-

1 FES, 331 NLRB at 12 (emphasis added).
2 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
3 Sunland Construction Co., 309 NLRB 1224, 1229–1230 fn. 35
(1992) (emphasis added).
4 333 NLRB 206 (2001); accord: Blaylock Electric, 319 NLRB 928
fn. 1 (1995), affd. 121 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the al-
leged discriminatees were “bona fide” applicants). In citing to these
quirement is simple: an individual cannot suffer a denial
of employment that he or she never actually sought.
Therefore, it is clear that a discriminatory hiring viola-
tion cannot be established unless there is proof that the
alleged discriminatee genuinely sought work with the
employer.
Consistent with these principles, administrative law
judges have issued findings in numerous post-FES cases
as to whether alleged discriminatees were bona fide ap-
plicants.5 In most of those cases, the judges have consid-
ered evidence regarding the intent of the organizer-
applicant at the time of application. However, the Board
has typically sidestepped the applicant status issue by
failing to pass or rely on these findings.6 In one such
case, Eckert Fire Protection, Inc., Judge Shamwell aptly

decisions, I do not pass on the Board’s findings as to the applicant
status issue in those cases.
5 See, e.g., B & C Contracting Co., 334 NLRB 218, 231 fn. 76
(2001) (judge dismissing refusal-to-hire claim on alternative basis but
noting that had he reached respondent’s defense that the organizer-
applicants were not “bona fide,” he would have agreed with respondent
because the applicants’ resumes were collected by the union “with little
or no input from the named applicants regarding their sincere interest in
working for the Respondent” and none of the “applicants” testified at
the hearing); Eckert Fire Protection, Inc., 332 NLRB 198, 221, 223–
224 (2000) (judge finding that alleged discriminatees were not bona
fide applicants because, inter alia, they applied based on an instruction
to do so by a union official, did not follow up on their applications, had
as their primary goal the filing of unfair labor practice charges, and
testified that they would have only “considered” going to work for the
respondent if selected for hire); Hartman Bros. Heating & Air Condi-
tioning, 332 NLRB 1343, 1348 (2000), enfd. 280 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir.
2002) (judge finding that an organizer-applicant was not a bona fide
applicant because, inter alia, he “rushed off” to file an application im-
mediately after another organizer was sent home from work by the
respondent, provided information in his application that raised substan-
tial doubts about its legitimacy, and had a track record of filing multi-
tudinous job applications with nonunion employers, working only
sparingly when offered jobs, and receiving significant amounts of
money in settlement of unfair labor practice charges).
6 See, e.g., B & C Contracting Co., supra at 218 fn. 3 (“In adopting
the judge’s finding that the Respondent did not violate Sec. 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act by failing to accept and consider the February 2 and 3
faxed applications, we find it unnecessary to rely on his statements . . .
regarding these applicants’ purported lack of bona fides”); Eckert Fire
Protection, Inc., supra at 198 fn. 4 (expressly declining to pass on the
judge’s findings that the alleged discriminatees were not “bona fidely
interested in gaining employment when they submitt[ed] applications”
and instead dismissing the refusal to hire allegations on the basis that
the General Counsel failed to establish that the respondents were hiring
at the time of the alleged unlawful conduct); Hartman Bros. Heating &
Air Conditioning, supra at 1343 fn. 9 (expressly declining to rely on the
judge’s finding that an organizer-applicant was not bona fide in affirm-
ing the judge’s dismissal of the complaint and instead relying on the
judge’s finding that the respondent did not hire him because he was
overqualified); but see Id. at 1346 (former Chairman Hurtgen dissent-
ing in part) (agreeing with the judge’s finding that the organizer-
applicant was not bona fide “because he applied for a job with the
Respondent in bad faith” as evidenced by information provided in his
application that raised substantial doubts about its legitimacy).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 684
explained the importance of alleged applicants being able
to show that they were genuinely interested in obtaining
work with the employer in light of the underlying poli-
cies and remedial nature or the Act:

Clearly, one of the broad purposes and functions
of the Act, as amended, is to protect the statutory
rights of employees, but also in the process those
rights must be balanced against the rights of em-
ployers. It is also the policy of the Act to promote
labor peace and reduce burdens on commerce occa-
sioned by labor strife. In light of these policies and
the remedial nature of the Act, applicants for em-
ployment in my view should be bona fidely inter-
ested in gaining employment when they submit ap-
plications, even where they also harbor an intention
from whatsoever source derived to organize or en-
gage in other protected activities if hired. In my
view, it is also consonant with the spirit of the Act
that such applicants should demonstrate that their
applications were submitted in a good-faith attempt
to secure employment and not for purposes that run
counter to the policies of the Act.7

The Board’s failure to articulate clear guidance in this area
has resulted in a rising tide of cases in which union salts
have behaved in a hostile, disrespectful, and/or intimidating
manner during the application process with a clear purpose
of inducing the employer not to hire them so that they could
file unfair labor practices with the Board.
In order to make out a prima facie case of discrmina-
tory refusal to hire, or refusal to consider for hire, in my
view, FES requires the General Counsel to show that the
alleged discriminatee applied for a position under the
terms held out by the employer to the public, with a
genuine interest in gaining employment with the em-
ployer, regardless of a concomitant interest in engaging
in lawful organizing. In my view, the crucial inquiry is
whether the alleged discriminatee actually intended to
gain employment regardless of the motivation for doing
so. In other words, regardless of the applicant’s particu-
lar reason for wanting the job, whether it be to obtain
better pay, a better work schedule, or to organize the em-
ployer’s work force, the applicant must have a genuine
intent to work for the employer under the same terms
generally offered to all applicants. In this vein, the intent
to work for the employer if hired is distinguishable from
the desire to organize or any other motivation that the
alleged discriminatee may possess.
Evidence of an alleged discriminatee’s conduct during
the application process is relevant to the determination of

7 332 NLRB at 208–209.
whether he or she is an applicant. This includes whether
an alleged applicant engages in offensive behavior incon-
sistent with a genuine intent to obtain employment.8
Evidence of this character strikes at the very core of the
General Counsel’s prima facie case. For example, no
one would argue that an individual who throws an appli-
cation attached to a rock through an employer’s window
is in fact an applicant. Accordingly, where an alleged
discriminatee behaves in an objectively offensive manner
that is antithetical to how one would expect a genuine
applicant to behave, the Board should infer that such an
individual is not genuinely interested in employment, and
dismiss the allegation on that basis.
It should be noted that nothing in the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941), and NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S.
85 (1995), compels a contrary approach. Phelps Dodge
addressed the question of whether applicants are consid-
ered statutory employees under the Act, and Town &
Country addressed the same question as to paid union
organizers. Neither decision addressed the definition of
“applicant” under the Act or took away defining appli-
cant status from the Board’s province and responsibility.
The FES burdens of proof are based on those estab-
lished in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662
F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989
(1982), for all cases alleging violations of Section
8(a)(3), or violations of Section 8(a)(1) turning on em-
ployer motivation.9 Under this burden shifting scheme,
the General Counsel must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence each and every element of his prima facie
case, including applicant status, before the burden will
shift to the Respondent to show that it would have taken
the same action despite the alleged discriminatee’s union
affiliation or activity.10 Accordingly, the requirements of
FES, consistent with the purposes of the Act, require the
General Counsel to prove that an alleged discriminatee is
in fact an applicant as part of his prima facie case. This
is not to say that the General Counsel must put on exten-
sive evidence to establish a genuine intent to obtain em-
ployment in every case. Where an alleged discrimina-
tee’s application appears genuine on its face, the em-
ployer must present evidence to show that the application
was not genuine if the employer wishes to challenge the
General Counsel’s prima facie case as to the alleged dis-
criminatee’s applicant status, but the ultimate burden of
proof remains with the General Counsel.
8 See FES, 331 NLRB at 27 fn. 68 (former Member Brame concur-
ring).
9 FES, 331 NLRB at 12 (“This framework for analysis appropriately
allocates the Wright Line burdens in a refusal-to-hire case.”).
10 FES, 331 NLRB at 12.
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 685
The Board should not assume that salts intend to ob-
tain employment, when many times, as is clear in this
case, they intend to provoke the employer into not hiring
them so that they can file unfair labor practice charges.
With such a faulty assumption, the door is left open for
salting campaigns to be able to enlist the Board’s proc-
esses in their efforts to pressure employers into voluntar-
ily recognizing the union and to financially punish unco-
operative employers. If the Board is not attendant to the
FES requirement that the General Counsel prove that the
alleged discriminatee is an applicant, the General Coun-
sel will be prompted to issue complaint in such spurious
cases, as is evidenced by this case itself.11 Even if the
Board ultimately finds no violation, the union’s objective
of inflicting financial harm on the employer will be satis-
fied and the Board will have allowed itself to be used as
the means by which this illegitimate and unprotected
objective is attained.12
In Jefferson Standard, the Supreme Court recognized
an employer’s right to insist on employee loyalty and a
cooperative employee-employer relationship. Jefferson
Standard made clear that even otherwise protected activ-
ity ceases to be protected if conducted in an excessive or
indefensible manner.13 In my view, a union’s litigation-
based strategy of filing unfair labor practice charges,
without regard for their merit, for the sole purpose of
inflicting serious economic injury on nonunion employ-
ers, is unrelated and unnecessary to any legitimate and
lawful organizing purpose.14 This litigation-based tactic
undermines the primary purpose of the National Labor
Relations Act, which is to eliminate obstructions to the
free flow of commerce by resolving labor disputes
through peaceful processes.15 Contrary to this underly-

11 Here, the General Counsel not only issued a complaint but also
filed exceptions—in the face of an audiotaped record and other credited
evidence of the alleged discriminatee’s egregious misconduct—to the
judge’s finding of no refusal to hire or consider for hire violation.
12 See FES, 331 NLRB at 29, 30 (former Member Brame concur-
ring) (advising the Board to take care not to be “co-opted” by salts who
employ the “ill-advised” tactic of “submit[ting] applications in the hope
of being rejected so that they can file unfair labor practice charges with
the Board and inflict legal expenses on the targeted employer in retalia-
tion for its failure to recognize the union”).
13 NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346
U.S. 464, 474–475 (1953).
14 See Aztech Electric Co., 335 NLRB 260, 275–276 (2001) (former
Member Truesdale concurrence) (finding that IBEW’s practice of filing
unfair labor practice charges, without regard to their merit, for the
destructive purpose of inflicting serious economic injury on nonunion
employers was unrelated to the organizing of nonunion forces and was
unprotected); Id. at 277–278 (former Chairman Hurtgen dissent) (find-
ing that where a union’s purpose is simply to injure and punish an
employer for its nonunion status, conduct in pursuit of that goal is
unprotected).
15 29 U.S.C. § 151.
ing policy, unions who employ this litigation-based salt-
ing tactic seek to provoke a labor dispute and cause dis-
ruption of commerce. As former Chairman Hurtgen has
noted, “although the filing of colorable unfair labor prac-
tice charges is protected, [the] filing of spurious charges
intended to harass is not protected.”16 The Board must
avoid being enlisted in such illegitimate tactics so that it
may conserve its limited resources for the adjudication of
colorable claims under the Act.
B. Kilkenny is not an Applicant
Here, James Kilkenny and the troop of organizers with
whom he associated revealed by their insulting, intimi-
dating, and disruptive behavior that they were not inter-
ested in obtaining employment with the Respondent.
This conduct included disrupting the workplace by
shouting to the working employees about their pay and
benefits, attempting to persuade them to leave the Re-
spondent’s employment and go to work for a union con-
tractor, bullying and insulting the Sanders, and refusing
to leave the jobsite after the Sanders repeatedly in-
structed them to do so. It is abundantly clear from this
record that the organizers were not acting with the objec-
tive of getting hired. The only reasonable interpretation
of their actions is that they intended to provoke the Re-
spondent not to hire them so that the Union could file a
spurious unfair labor practice charge.
Accordingly, I would find that the General Counsel
failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
Kilkenny was an applicant, and therefore failed to make
out a prima facie case of discrimination under FES.
C. Conclusion
Accumulated experience has demonstrated the merit in
prior warnings that the Board’s processes are being hi-
jacked by salting campaigns in pursuit of illegitimate
union objectives that are foreign to the policies the Act is
designed to promote. The Board’s past refusal to seri-
ously address these concerns has cost this Agency dearly
in lost credibility with reviewing courts and with the
public. Valid hiring discrimination cases may be re-
jected by the courts of appeal because they are viewed
with an unwarranted skepticism flowing from the
Board’s handling of spurious claims made in salting
cases. The Board has devoted precious administrative
resources to cases of this character, at the expense of
more promptly addressing other cases that do present the
problems Congress created this Agency to address.
To remedy this problem, the Board should expressly
decide, as is inherently required under FES, whether the
16 Aztech Electric Co., supra at 260 fn. 2 (former Chairman Hurtgen
dissent) (citing Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731
(1983)).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 686
General Counsel has proven as part of his initial eviden-
tiary burden that the alleged discriminatee was in fact an
applicant; that is, someone who applies for a position
under the terms held out by the employer to the public,
with a genuine interest in gaining employment with the
employer, regardless of a concomitant interest in engag-
ing in lawful organizing. Where the alleged discrimina-
tee’s words or conduct during the hiring process are in-
consistent with an intent to seek employment, the case
should be dismissed forthwith.

MEMBER BARTLETT, concurring.
Our holding today that an employer may refuse to con-
sider or hire applicants who engage in disruptive, intimi-
dating and disrespectful behavior represents an important
step in addressing the issue of inappropriate tactics em-
ployed by many job applicants in salting campaigns.
However, the type of conduct that James Kilkenny and
the other union organizers engaged in here is only one
way that an “applicant” can demonstrate a lack of bona
fides in seeking employment. Approaching the matter
more generally, I would find, consistent with FES,1 that
the General Counsel must prove that the alleged dis-
criminatee is an applicant for employment with the re-
spondent. In this regard, I would require the General
Counsel to prove initially that the individual applied for a
position. I would not require the General Counsel to
prove in all cases, as part of the prima facie case, that the
individual applied for a position with a genuine interest
in gaining employment with the respondent. However, if
the respondent in its case produced evidence that the
individual was not a bona fide applicant, I would require
the General Counsel to rebut this evidence. Thus, from
the outset and throughout the case, I would find that the
ultimate burden to prove this element of the violation
resides with the General Counsel.
A. Analytical Framework
The Board’s analytical framework for allegations in-
volving discriminatory refusal to hire or consider for hire
is set out in FES, supra. In that case, the Board held that,
in order to establish a discriminatory refusal to hire, the
General Counsel must first show

(1) that the respondent was hiring, or had concrete
plans to hire, at the time of the alleged unlawful con-
duct; (2) that the applicants had experience or training
relevant to the announced or generally known require-
ments of the position, or, in the alternative, that the em-
ployer has not adhered to such requirements, or that the
requirements were themselves pretextual or were ap-
plied as a pretext for discrimination; and (3) that anti-

1 FES, 331 NLRB 9 (2000), enfd. 301 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002).
union animus contributed to the decision not to hire the
applicants. Once this is established, the burden will
shift to the respondent to show that it would not have
hired the applicants even in the absence of their union
activity or affiliation.2

In cases alleging a discriminatory refusal to consider for
hire, the General Counsel must show

(1) that the respondent excluded applicants from a hir-
ing process; and (2) that antiunion animus contributed
to the decision not to consider the applicants for em-
ployment. Once this is established, the burden will
shift to the respondent to show that it would not have
considered the applicants even in the absence of their
union activity or affiliation.3

The burden-shifting framework delineated in FES ap-
plies by its terms both to cases alleging a refusal to hire
and to those involving a refusal to consider for hire. In-
deed, the statutory basis for undertaking the analysis is
the 8(a)(3) prohibition against “discrimination in regard
to hire.” Although not articulated in the Board’s deci-
sion, FES presupposes that the target of the alleged dis-
crimination presented himself to the respondent as an
applicant for a job. An individual cannot be discrimi-
nated against by being denied employment that he does
not actually seek.
For these reasons, I would find that FES implicitly and
necessarily requires the General Counsel to establish that
the individual applied or attempted to apply for work.4
Typically, the General Counsel’s burden as to this issue
would be satisfied by evidence that the alleged discrimi-
natee submitted a job application to the respondent or
appeared at the respondent’s workplace and requested
hire. In rare cases, when the General Counsel’s evidence
showed lesser measures to secure employment, or that
the individual’s efforts were thwarted by the respondent,
the Board would be required to evaluate on a case-by-
case basis the reasonableness of the individual’s actions
to determine whether the required showing has been met.
Moreover, not every individual who submits an appli-
cation or requests to be hired has a real interest in work-
ing for the employer. An alleged “applicant” might sim-
ply go through the motions of applying for reasons to-
tally unrelated to a desire to secure and perform an avail-
able job. For example, a laid-off employee might dem-
2 FES, 331 NLRB at 12.
3 Id. at 15.
4 See, e.g., B & C Contracting Co., 334 NLRB 218 (2001) (em-
ployer did not unlawfully refuse to accept faxed job applications from a
group of union supporters where the employer did not receive the ap-
plications).
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 687
onstrate to the employer that he is grudgingly applying
for a job in order to maintain eligibility for unemploy-
ment compensation. Obviously, an employer is not obli-
gated to offer a job to an individual who conveys a lack
of genuine interest in employment.
Section 8(a)(3) requires no different result where the
applicant supports or is affiliated with a union. Thus, an
employer does not discriminate in refusing to hire an
applicant on the basis of union affiliation if the applicant
informs the employer that he does not want to work for
the employer or is not interested in the available job. Of
course, such explicit expressions of lack of interest are
the exception. More commonly, an individual demon-
strates through less direct statements or through his be-
havior that he is not interested in the job at issue. Reason
dictates that at some point such statements or conduct
may also convey to the employer that the individual has
effectively removed himself from consideration for em-
ployment and thus that he is not a bona fide applicant.
In articulating the test in FES, the Board did not iden-
tify the bona fides of an applicant as a discrete element of
either the General Counsel’s or the respondent’s case.
Nevertheless, other Board decisions make clear the rele-
vance of such an inquiry. For example, in Blaylock Elec-
tric,5 the Board agreed with the judge that the alleged
discriminatees were bona fide applicants. The Board
explained its finding of bona fide applicant status, noting
that although the applicants were currently employed at
higher wage rates, the record showed that they antici-
pated being laid off soon, and that their testimony about
being unwilling to accept jobs with the employer per-
tained only to short-term jobs. Similarly, in HVAC Me-
chanical Services,6 the Board rejected the respondent’s
assertion that the alleged discriminatees were not bona
fide applicants, finding that “[t]here is no evidence in the
record to support the Respondent’s speculation that [the
applicants] were not interested in obtaining employment
with the Respondent, or that they did not intend to per-
form their assigned duties if hired.”7
Although the Board in these cases has recognized the
relevance of bona fide applicant status, it has not explic-
itly addressed the relative burdens of the General Coun-
sel and the respondent on this issue. Thus, the question
remains as to which party has the burden of coming for-

5 319 NLRB 928 (1995).
6 333 NLRB 206 (2001). In citing the Board’s consideration of the
bona fide applicant issue in that case, I do not pass on the conclusion or
its analysis.
7 In Hartman Bros. Heating & Air Conditioning, 332 NLRB 1343
(2000), and B & C Contracting Co., supra, the administrative law
judges also addressed the applicants’ bona fides, but the Board in those
cases found it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s findings, deciding the
cases on other grounds.
ward or producing evidence on the issue and which party
has the burden of persuasion. I would find that these
burdens are appropriately allocated as follows.
As stated above, the General Counsel initially would
have a burden of establishing that the alleged discrimina-
tee is an applicant for employment with the respondent.
Consistent with FES, this burden would require no more
of the General Counsel than to show that the individual
applied for or sought a job in the normal sense. The
General Counsel need not introduce evidence regarding
the alleged discriminatee’s intentions or bona fides in
seeking employment.
Assuming the General Counsel has presented suffi-
cient evidence that the alleged discriminatee is an appli-
cant, I would shift the burden of going forward with evi-
dence of a lack of bona fides to the respondent. At this
stage, the respondent could raise the issue of the individ-
ual’s status as a bona fide applicant by producing evi-
dence of any conduct or statements by the alleged dis-
criminatee, or other circumstances, that tend to contradict
a genuine desire to obtain employment. However, while
the respondent would have the initial burden of produc-
ing relevant evidence that the applicant was not bona
fide, I would allocate the burden of persuasion as to this
issue to the General Counsel. Thus, the General Counsel
would have the ultimate burden of establishing that the
applicant is bona fide. I would find it appropriate to
place this burden on the General Counsel because appli-
cant status is an essential element of the alleged viola-
tion, and because the General Counsel has access to the
alleged discriminatee for purposes of obtaining evidence
on this subject.
B. Kilkenny’s Status as a Bona Fide Applicant
Applying the above principles to the facts of this pro-
ceeding,8 I would find that the General Counsel produced
sufficient evidence that Kilkenny applied for work with
the Respondent. However, the Respondent produced
evidence that he was not a bona fide applicant. I would
find that the General Counsel has not satisfied the burden
of establishing that Kilkenny was a bona fide applicant,
and that the Respondent therefore did not violate Section
8(a)(3) and (1) by not hiring or considering him for hire.
The General Counsel produced evidence, relied on by
the judge, that Kilkenny appeared at the Respondent’s
jobsites on August 16 and October 3 seeking employ-
ment. The record shows that on August 16 Kilkenny
8 Although my formulation of the burdens of proof regarding an in-
dividual’s status as a bona fide applicant was not known to the parties
at the time of the hearing in this case, I would find it appropriate to
apply that formulation here because the issues regarding the conduct of
Kilkenny and his companions, as well as the Sanders, were fully liti-
gated.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 688
presented himself as an applicant for work, and briefly
discussed his qualifications with the Sanders. Kilkenny
visited the Respondent’s Berlin Township, New Jersey
jobsite on October 3 with employee Feeley to apply
again. Sun Sanders obviously perceived Kilkenny’s
presence as an attempt to secure work with the Respon-
dent. When Feeley introduced Kilkenny, Sun Sanders
promptly stated that she recognized Kilkenny and would
not employ him.
Although I would find that the above actions demon-
strate that Kilkenny applied for a job with the Respon-
dent, I would further find that the Respondent produced
evidence that Kilkenny’s conduct during the August 16
visit was inconsistent with any genuine desire to obtain
employment. Kilkenny and the other union organizers
who arrived together at the Respondent’s jobsite at-
tempted from the start to bully Sun and Mark Sanders,
ostensibly with the goal of being hired. While it was
Cosenza, the group’s leader, who began by telling an
employee that “we’ll probably take your job,” criticizing
the Respondent’s choice of equipment, opining that the
employees operating a lift “don’t know what they’re do-
ing,” and taking it upon himself to shout steering direc-
tions to them, Kilkenny himself engaged in the unruly
and disrespectful conduct toward the Respondent. When
Sun Sanders attempted to discuss qualifications for per-
forming stucco work, Kilkenny went along with
Cosenza’s urging to get his tools and get up on the wall
to demonstrate his skill. Kilkenny at first jokingly in-
sisted that he would not perform rasping, a necessary
task in plastering work, but later restated his distaste for
rasping by recommending that the Respondent “let the
guy without the shirt do all the rasping because that
stinks.” Kilkenny and Cosenza cajoled the Respondent
to allow them to begin work immediately, even after the
Sanders repeatedly stated that they did not need all of
them and that they did not want them that day. Kilkenny
disrupted the work of an employee on a lift at the jobsite
by shouting questions about his pay and benefits, and
encouraging him to come to the office of the local union,
promising that “I can put you out tomorrow.” He also
ridiculed Sun Sanders’ accent and “made her look like a
dummy,” according to Mark Sanders.
This evidence of “disruptive, intimidating, and disre-
spectful conduct,” as characterized by the judge, starkly
contradicts Kilkenny’s asserted desire to secure a job
with the Respondent. No applicant could reasonably
entertain an expectation of a job offer after engaging in
such a display of inappropriate conduct at a prospective
employer’s workplace. Instead, I would find that
through his blatant misconduct Kilkenny effectively re-
moved himself from consideration for employment by
the Respondent, both on August 16 and upon his return
with Feeley on October 3. Thus, considering the evi-
dence produced by the General Counsel and the Respon-
dent, I would conclude that the General Counsel has
failed to carry his burden of persuasion that Kilkenny
was a bona fide applicant. Accordingly, I would dismiss
the allegation that the Respondent unlawfully failed to
hire Kilkenny or consider him for hire.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT instruct employees not to discuss their
wages with other employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten any employee because he or she
supports a union.
WE WILL NOT threaten that applicants who are union
organizers will be refused employment.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.

EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC.

Bruce G. Conley, Esq. and Lance Geren, Esq., for the General
Counsel.
Thomas M. Barron, Esq. (Parker, McCay & Criscuolo), of
Marlton, New Jersey, for the Respondent.
Bruce E. Endy, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL BOGAS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on May 15 and 16, 2001.
The Operative Plasterers and Cement Masons International
Association of United States and Canada, AFL–CIO, Local 8
(the Union), filed the original charge on October 6, 2000, and
the amended charge on December 22, 2000. The Regional
Director for Region 4 of the National Labor Relations Board
issued the complaint on December 27, 2000. The complaint
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 689
alleges that Exterior Systems, Inc. (the Respondent), refused to
hire and consider for hire James Kilkenny because he is a
member of the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act. The complaint also alleges that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by, inter alia, disparaging the
Union to employees, instructing an employee not to discuss his
wages with other employees, interrogating an employee regard-
ing his membership in the Union, and threatening an employee
because of his support for the Union. The Respondent filed an
answer in which it denied the substantive allegations of the
complaint.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respon-
dent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, performs exterior insulation
finishing services in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Its princi-
pal place of business is in Mount Laurel, New Jersey.1 During
the year prior to the issuance of the complaint, the Respondent
performed services valued in excess of $50,000 outside the
State of New Jersey.
The Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act, and that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent is a subcontractor that installs exterior insu-
lation finish systems on commercial buildings. This work in-
volves insulating the outside walls of the building, placing a
base coat over the insulation and then applying a finish similar
to plaster or stucco over the insulation and base coat. Sun
Sanders (S. Sanders) and her husband, Mark Sanders (M. Sand-
ers), operate the Company, which has been in business for ap-
proximately 3 years. S. Sanders is the Respondent’s owner and
president, and M. Sanders is the Respondent’s general manager.
During the relevant time period the Respondent employed be-
tween four and nine persons in addition to S. Sanders and M.
Sanders. The Respondent’s work force has never been repre-
sented by a union.
1. August 16, 2000 incident
In August 2000, the Respondent placed a help-wanted adver-
tisement in a local newspaper. The advertisement read:

CONSTRUCTION Laborers, stucco mechs & carpenters.
Hlth bntfs. Work year-round [Respondent’s Telephone Num-
ber]

1 The record indicates that the Respondent relocated its office from
Cinnaminson, New Jersey, to Mount Laurel, New Jersey, on about
October 3, 2000.
The advertisement was drafted and submitted to the newspaper
by M. Sanders based on conversations with S. Sanders. At the
time the Respondent employed four or five persons.
Frederick Cosenza, a business representative for the Phila-
delphia Building Trades Council, and a member of Laborer’s
Local 332, observed this advertisement, and telephoned the
Respondent to inquire about possible employment. He spoke to
M. Sanders who informed him that the Respondent was inter-
ested in hiring two mechanics, two laborers, and one carpenter.2
Cosenza arranged to meet M. Sanders at one of the Respon-
dent’s jobsites—the Children’s Hospital in Van Voorhees, New
Jersey. Cosenza enlisted a number of other persons he knew as
union organizers to accompany him to the jobsite and also ap-
ply for work.
On August 16, 2000, Cosenza and six other applicants ar-
rived together at the Children’s Hospital jobsite. The other
applicants were James Kilkenny (organizer and funds collector
for the Union), John Simoncini (organizer for the Sheet Metal
Workers union), Charles Burkert (organizer for the Sheet Metal
Workers union), Robert DiOrio (organizer for the Sheet Metal
Workers union), John Kane (organizer for the Plumbers union),
and Jim Cunningham (organizer for the Asbestos Workers un-
ion).3 The applicants did not initially identify themselves as
persons affiliated with unions, and there is no evidence that
they were wearing or displaying any union insignias, emblems,
or slogans.
Cosenza spoke briefly to Tom Wilsey—one of the two indi-
viduals working for the Respondent at the site. Cosenza told
Wilsey, “[W]e’ll probably take your job—they’ll get rid of
you.” Burkert added “[i]f you’re lucky, right?” Cosenza lo-
cated M. Sanders and introduced himself. S. Sanders was also
present. During most of the ensuing conversation, Cosenza was
the primary spokesperson for the applicants, although Kil-
kenny, Burkert, and others also spoke. M. Sanders indicated
that he was surprised to see “all” of them, and Cosenza stated
that he had the whole crew ready to go. Cosenza stated that he
heard that the Respondent had a lot of work and asked “where”
the Respondent wanted them “to start.” Cosenza said that the
applicants were ready to work and S. Sanders responded, “[B]ut
2 M. Sanders testified that he told Cosenza that he was only inter-
ested in hiring one individual. Tr. 354. Cosenza testified that, to the
contrary, M. Sanders told him that he wanted to hire two laborers, two
plasterers, and one carpenter. Tr. 40. Cosenza testified that he memo-
rialized this in a written note. Id. I found Cosenza more credible than
M. Sanders regarding the question of how many persons M. Sanders
stated that he was interested in hiring. Cosenza’s account is consistent
with the wording of the advertisement placed by the Respondent, which
states that the Respondent was hiring laborers, mechanics, and carpen-
ters. M. Sanders’ testimony that only one employee was being sought
is at odds with that wording.
3 Simoncini made an audio recording of the applicant-organizers’
visit to the Children’s Hospital jobsite on August 16, and the General
Counsel introduced that recording as an exhibit at the trial. See GC
Exh. 4. Kilkenny prepared a transcript of the regarding and the General
Counsel also introduced that transcript as an exhibit. See GC Exh. 5.
My findings regarding what was said during the encounter are based on
the credible testimony, as well as on the audio recording and the tran-
script.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 690
I’m not [ready],” and then said, “I can’t hire all these.”4
Cosenza stated that the applicants would do “whatever [type of
work] you want” and would “work as hard as anybody you
got.” Cosenza interrupted the discussion to tell M. Sanders that
the Respondent was using a mechanical lift that was too big for
the work being performed.
S. Sanders asked if any of the applicants knew how to
“stucco” and Kilkenny responded that he did. S. Sanders asked
Kilkenny how long he had worked with stucco, and Kilkenny
answered 10 or 11 years, and identified several companies for
which he had worked. Kilkenny stated that he was certified to
work with various types of exterior insulation systems. S.
Sanders responded, somewhat skeptically, that “[e]verybody
talks good when they come here.” Cosenza urged Kilkenny to
“get up on that wall,” apparently meaning that Kilkenny should
immediately begin working to demonstrate his skill as a plas-
terer. Kilkenny offered to go get his tools, but stated, “I ain’t
gonna rasp.” Rasping is one of the less desirable, but neces-
sary, tasks associated with applying exterior insulation finish
systems.5
Although S. Sanders had already stated that the Respondent
was not ready to hire the applicants and could not hire all of
them, Cosenza asked, “[w]hen do we start . . . and what are we
getting paid?” S. Sanders stated, “I can’t hire everyone now.”
Cosenza said: “Who you gonna hire? Why don’t you go with
Jimmy [Kilkenny] first.” S. Sanders replied, “I will let you
know.” Cosenza persisted, “[p]ut him[, Kilkenny,] on the wall
now.” Burkert and Kilkenny both said they thought they were
going to start work “today,” but S. Sanders informed them that
they would not be starting that day. Cosenza asked, “[W]hat
are you paying,” apparently directing the comment to M. Sand-
ers, and S. Sanders replied that she was the boss and that she
was not prepared to discuss pay rates. Cosenza interrupted the
conversation to state that the employees on the mechanical lift
“don’t know what they’re doing.” He then shouted steering
directions to the workers on the lift. Burkert indicated that he
was a laborer and S. Sanders replied, “I don’t need a laborer.”
M. Sanders began to get a business card for Cosenza and at
this point the applicant-organizers first broached the subject of
their union affiliations. Cosenza stated, somewhat obliquely,
that “before we start work and during lunch time and after work
we’ll be the best organizers you ever saw.” S. Sanders replied,
“I’m sure you are very good—we’ll see what happens.” Then
Cosenza made the union affiliation explicit, stating, “[o]kay,
because we’re union organizers, you know that.” Sun re-
sponded that “everybody talks good as long as you can work.”
At this point, Cosenza again urged Kilkenny to get his tools and
go up on the wall and demonstrate his skills.

4 S. Sanders is of Asian descent and speaks English with an accent.
See GC Exh. 4, and GC Exh. 5 at p. 16 (S. Sanders states, “I am orien-
tal.”).
5 Kilkenny testified that he was joking when he said he would not
rasp, and that rasping is something that he does, and would “no doubt”
have to do in order to properly install exterior insulation finish systems.
I credit Kilkenny’s testimony that he was joking when he said that he
would not rasp. However, there was no testimony showing that either
S. Sanders or M. Sanders was aware that Kilkenny was joking.
Cosenza and Burkert reiterated their intention of engaging in
organizational activities, but M. Sanders apparently did not
fully comprehend, and asked, “[w]hat do you mean organize?”
Later S. Sanders stated, “I am organized alright.” Cosenza
explained that “[e]veryone here is a union organizer.” S. Sand-
ers stated that “[w]e are not union,”6 to which Burkert re-
sponded “[W]e’ll still come here to work,” and Cosenza stated
that they would “work hard and at lunch and before work . . .
try to organize all your men.” Cosenza asked, “[y]ou don’t
have a problem with that?” Explaining his intentions further,
Cosenza stated, “[W]e’ll have an election with your company,
whatever” and “[w]e’ll take all the men.” M. Sanders asked if
the applicants were working somewhere now, and Cosenza
replied, “[n]o, we’re not—I’m here for the ad.” M. Sanders
asked, “[a]re you here to work?” and Cosenza replied, “[w]e’re
here to work and organize.” S. Sanders said: “I let you know . .
. . You give me your number. You know how to do it, I’ll call
you.” The Sanders did not dispense application forms to the
applicants, however, M. Sanders provided a pad of paper to
Cosenza so that the applicants could write down their names
and contact information. S. Sanders indicated that the Respon-
dent had already hired new workers and did not need “this
many people.”
At about this point, some of the applicants tried to engage
the Respondent’s employees, who were on duty, in a conversa-
tion about their terms and conditions of employment, and about
the prospect of joining a union. Cosenza shouted up to the
employees on the mechanical lift, “[y]ou guys . . . ever think
about getting in the union?” He asked if the Respondent
“pay[s] good.” Kilkenny asked the same employees if they had
health benefits, pension, and annuity. S. Sanders tried to pre-
vent this conversation, but Kilkenny went on to shout to the
employees that the union rate was $24.35 an hour with $7 in
pension and annuity. Kilkenny also urged the workers to
“[g]ive the Local a call” so that he could arrange a job with a
union contractor. These activities by the applicants interrupted
the work of the two employees during worktime.7
The interactions between the Respondent and the applicants
now became less polite. S. Sanders stated that she planned to
talk to her lawyer. When Cosenza asked how the Respondent
would get in touch with him, S. Sanders replied, “I don’t want
to get in touch with you.” M. Sanders said that the applicants
could write down their names and numbers. All seven eventu-
ally wrote down their names and phone numbers on a pad,
which Cosenza returned to M. Sanders. However, when
6 Cosenza testified that S. Sanders also said that the Company was
“staying nonunion.” Tr. 52. I do not credit this testimony, which is not
corroborated by other credible testimony and is not supported by the
audio recording of the conversation, or by the transcript of that re-
cording that was submitted as an exhibit by the General Counsel. See
GC Exh. 5. Indeed, the recording and transcript show that S. Sanders
indicated a willingness to consider becoming a union contractor. See
GC Exh. 5, p. 18 (S. Sanders: “We’re gonna hire lotta people need it—I
let you know guys, not gonna say where. Might go for union so you
never know, alright.”
7 M. Sanders testified that the work of the on duty employees was in-
terrupted by the applicant-organizers and there was no credible evi-
dence contradicting this.
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 691
Cosenza asked if the Respondent wanted to hire them, S. Sand-
ers replied, “I don’t think so.” She explained that they were
“too smart acting.”
Cosenza again stated that “we want to work for you” and that
the applicant-organizers were “answering the ad in the paper.”
At this point, S. Sanders shouted: “I don’t need people, alright.
Get out of . . . my place.” The applicant-organizers did not
leave, rather Cosenza stated again that he was answering the
advertisement, and S. Sanders again shouted, “[g]et out of here
now.” The applicants still did not leave, but remained and in-
sisted that they were all present to work in response to the ad-
vertisement. S. Sanders scolded Kilkenny for asking the
Respondent’s employee about wages and for offering to
arrange a job for him with another company. According to the
transcript that Kilkenny himself prepared, he and S. Sanders
had the following exchange:

S. Sanders: It’s none of your business how much he pay—
you know how much you paying.
Kilkenny: How much do I paint? . . . I don’t paint, I’m a
plasterer.
# # #
S. Sanders: You have no manners.
Kilkenny: I have very well manners.

M. Sanders believed that Kilkenny was “patronizing [his] wife
because he knows what she’s saying” and was “making her
look like a dummy.” S. Sanders felt that Kilkenny and other of
the applicants were laughing at her and treating her like she was
a “very stupid . . . woman.” I find that Kilkenny, by intention-
ally misunderstanding S. Sanders’ statement regarding “pay” as
a statement regarding “paint”8 and by mangling his own syntax
(“I have very well manners”), was mocking S. Sanders, who is
of Asian descent and speaks with an accent.
After S. Sanders told the applicants to leave repeatedly, they
still did not depart, but again stated that they were answering
the advertisement. S. Sanders shouted, “Union piece of shit”
and “[g]et the Hell work other place.” Cosenza persisted, stat-
ing, “I want to work for you,” and S. Sanders warned him
“don’t threaten,” but no threat was made against her or the
Respondent.9 S. Sanders said: “Life is short. Everybody al-

8 Kilkenny understood S. Sanders’ comment regarding “pay” well
enough to transcribe it correctly in GC Exh. 5, even though he gave the
impression of misunderstanding it at the time the conversation took
place. Moreover, given the context of the comment, I believe it was
clear to Kilkenny that S. Sanders was talking about “pay” not “paint.”
9 During her testimony, S. Sanders stated that Cosenza threatened
her by saying, “I’m going to get you guys real good,” and by pointing
at a scaffold and saying, “I’m [going to] get that scaffold tonight.” Tr.
326–327. She also testified that she told a police officer that Cosenza
said that the Respondent was going to “be out of business.” Tr. 348.
No other witness, including M. Sanders, corroborated S. Sanders’ claim
that Cosenza made the statement about the scaffold. M. Sanders did
state, very imprecisely, that “[s]omeone said something, you know,
about we’re going to get them or something to that effect.” Tr. 362.
M. Sanders’ testimony regarding this statement was vague and ambigu-
ous and I consider it unreliable. M. Sanders also pointed to the portion
of the transcript of the audio recording where Kilkenny states, “[g]ive
the Local a call, Dude, I can put you out tomorrow.” GC Exh. 4; GC
Exh. 5 at p. 9. Kilkenny testified that this was not a threat to the Sand-
lowed to work.” Cosenza responded “[i]t sounds like you’re
threatening me.”
Cosenza then stated that he came in response to the adver-
tisement to talk about a job, but “as soon as I brought up the
union everything changed, why?” S. Sanders said “I don’t
want to talk about it,” and told Cosenza to “talk to my lawyer.”
Cosenza asked if the Respondent’s “lawyer hire[d] everybody,”
and S. Sanders, no longer shouting, said, “[w]e’ll let you
know.” Kilkenny stated that “we’re very qualified,” and
Cosenza said, “[w]e’re willing to get up on the wall and start.”
S. Sanders said, “I’m sure you guys very good,” and that she
would “let them know.” M. Sanders stated that the Respondent
was going to hire one person at a time. S. Sanders added that
the Respondent was planning to open a “big . . . panel shop,”
and would hire “lotta people” and “[m]ight go for union so you
never know.” Kilkenny asked if the Respondent would call to
inform him whether or not he was hired, and M. Sanders agreed
to do so. The conversation ended.
During the exchange between the applicants and the Sanders,
Thomas Wilsey, a plasterer working for the Respondent at the
jobsite, became concerned that the applicant-organizers were
causing a disturbance and notified the police using a cell phone
that the Respondent kept at the jobsite.10 After the conversation
between the applicants and the Sanders ended, but before the
applicants left the jobsite, a number of officers of the Voorhees
Township Police Department arrived. Officer Thomas Lynch
spoke with M. Sanders who told him that Cosenza had acted in
a threatening manner. Officer Lynch was concerned about his

ers, but rather an offer to find one or more of the employees positions
with union contractors. Based on Kilkenny’s testimony and the context
of the statement, and after listening to the audio recording, I conclude
that the statement was an offer to the Respondent’s current employees.
I find that the applicants made none of the threatening statements re-
counted by S. Sanders. This is not to say, however, that S. Sanders,
who is four feet, nine inches tall and weighs approximately 110 pounds
did not feel intimidated and threatened by the seven men who came
onto the jobsite and refused her repeated requests to leave, and who
told her, inter alia, that they were going to “take all the men.”
10 The complaint alleges that S. Sanders called the police. Wilsey
testified credibly that he was the one who made the call to the police
and that he did so on his own initiative, not based on any instruction
received from S. Sanders or M. Sanders. S. Sanders also testified that
Wilsey placed the phone call to police and did so on his own initiative.
Wilsey was a very clear, direct, and credible witness. He no longer
works for the Respondent, or even in the exterior insulation field, and
was not shown to have any motive to give biased testimony. Officer
Lynch first stated that M. Sanders was the one who had called for the
police, and that he believed that M. Sanders confirmed this at the scene.
Tr. 189, 190, 204. Later, Officer Lynch stated that he thought it might
have actually been S. Sanders, not M. Sanders, who placed the call for
the police. Tr. 210. Officer Lynch’s confusion is not surprising given
that he was not the one who received the telephone call. Rather he was
informed by a police dispatcher that a call had been received from the
site. I consider Officer Lynch’s testimony regarding the identity of the
person who placed the call to be unreliable. Not only did he contradict
himself—first stating that it was M. Sanders and then that it was S.
Sanders who placed the call—but his testimony was, at best, uncor-
roborated hearsay. Whatever probative weight his testimony on this
subject might have is outweighed by the more reliable testimony of
Wilsey.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 692
own safety, in part because he believes that labor disputes are
prone to become violent. As a precaution, Officer Lynch told
Cosenza to empty his pockets and place his hands on a car, and
then Officer Lynch performed a “pat down” search of
Cosenza’s person. No weapon was found. Officer Lynch did
not make any arrests, but encouraged the applicants to leave the
jobsite, which they did.
The Respondent did not contact any of the applicants to offer
them jobs or to tell them that they were not being offered jobs.
2. Employment of Edward Feeley
Later on August 16, Kilkenny spoke to Edward Feeley, an
out-of-work plasterer who was an apprentice in the Union.11
Kilkenny told Feeley that the Respondent was hiring and that
he should apply. That same day, Feeley contacted the Respon-
dent by telephone and met in person with S. Sanders and M.
Sanders. Feeley completed an application and discussed his
qualifications. Neither S. Sanders nor M. Sanders asked Feeley
anything about unions; however, during the interview Feeley
volunteered that he had worked for the union, but that the union
had been unable to provide him with steady work. The Re-
spondent hired Feeley, and he started work the next day at the
Children’s Hospital jobsite. After the Respondent hired Feeley,
Kilkenny told Feeley to let him know when the Respondent
was seeking new employees. Within 30 days after August 16,
the Respondent also hired Les Throckmorton as a laborer.
During that same 30-day period the Respondent also hired
Dave Zelvis, who worked for the Respondent for 1 day and did
not return.
After S. Sanders and M. Sanders observed Feeley at work,
they set his pay at $18 per hour. They informed Feeley that his
rate of pay was higher than that of other employees and told
him not to discuss his wage rate with anyone else. Feeley did
not discuss his wages with any of the other workers during the
period of his employment with the Respondent.
One or 2 weeks after Feeley started working for the Respon-
dent, S. Sanders approached Feeley during lunch and asked if
he still had a union card, and Feeley said that he did and kept it
current. Then Sun asked Feeley if he was going to “stay” with
the Respondent. Feeley told her that he “would stay as long as
. . . they had work.”
3. Feeley refers Kilkenny
Feeley worked for the Respondent for approximately 7
weeks and by all accounts the Respondent was satisfied with
his work and had a good working relationship with him. Dur-
ing the time he was employed by the Respondent, Feeley never
tried to engage the Respondent’s other employees in organiza-
tional activities.
In mid-September, S. Sanders told Feeley that the Respon-
dent needed to hire one or more new employees. Subsequently,
Feeley informed S. Sanders and M. Sanders that he knew
someone who was interested in a position. They asked about
the individual’s skills and Feeley answered that the person he
had in mind possessed skills that were equal, or superior, to
Feeley’s own. The applicant Feeley had in mind was James

11 Feeley subsequently completed the apprenticeship program in No-
vember 2000.
Kilkenny, who was one of the applicant-organizers who met
with the Sanders on August 16, and the person who had in-
formed Feeley that the Respondent was hiring plasterers.
On the morning of October 3, 2000, Feeley and Kilkenny ar-
rived together at the Respondent’s jobsite in Berlin Township,
New Jersey. Feeley and Kilkenny traveled together in Kil-
kenny’s vehicle. Both had work clothes with them, but neither
was wearing the work clothes out of concern that they might
soil Kilkenny’s vehicle, which was new. Feeley introduced
Kilkenny to S. Sanders. S. Sanders stated that she recognized
Kilkenny from the August 16 incident and said that she would
not employ him. She stated that she could not hire him because
he worked for the union office. Then Kilkenny asked if Feeley
also could not work for the Respondent because he was in the
Union too, and S. Sanders said that Feeley could continue
working for her because “it’s a free country.” Kilkenny handed
S. Sanders a copy of a union pamphlet that, inter alia, discussed
the wages earned by plasterers who worked for union contrac-
tors. There was no discussion of Kilkenny’s qualifications or
of wage rates.12 Kilkenny was not contacted by the Respondent
after his visit to the jobsite.
During the 30-day period beginning on October 3, 2000, the
Respondent hired Michael Colston as a plasterer, and Steven
Jones and Adam Whitaker as laborers. The Respondent was
aware that Colston was a member of the Union.
4. Phone messages left for Feeley
After the meeting between Kilkenny and S. Sanders on Oc-
tober 3, Kilkenny departed the jobsite. Feeley left with Kil-
kenny because the two came in Kilkenny’s vehicle and Feeley
did not have another means of returning home. That afternoon,
Feeley received three recorded phone messages from S. Sand-
ers and one from M. Sanders. In the first message, S. Sanders
called Feeley a “spy,” and told him that her lawyer was going
to call him and that she could have him arrested.13 She said,
12 S. Sanders testified that Kilkenny told her that she had to pay him
the union rate of approximately $37 per hour. Tr. 336. I credit Kil-
kenny’s and Feeley’s contrary testimony that there was no discussion of
wage rates. Tr. 139, 267. I did not find S. Sanders a credible witness
regarding the October 3 incident. Her testimony was not only contrary
to the credible testimony of Feeley, but also at times contrary to other
portions of her own testimony. Cf. Tr. 339 (S. Sanders states that after
Feeley showed up with Kilkenny “I was very pissed off, very mad.”),
and Tr. 343 (S. Sanders denies that she was mad or angry when Feeley
brought Kilkenny to the jobsite).
13 The messages were recorded on a voice mail system. Feeley and
Kilkenny played the recorded voice mail messages over a speakerphone
system and made a tape recording. As memorialized on that tape re-
cording, the portion of the message that Feeley says mentioned possible
arrest is very distorted and cannot be understood. However, I found
credible Feeley’s testimony that this portion of the original voice mail
message was clearly audible and that it included a statement by S.
Sanders that she could have Feeley arrested. In general, I found Feeley
a credible witness. His testimony was direct and he did not seem dis-
posed to evade questions or to slant his testimony to favor either side in
the dispute. Although he testified for the General Counsel, Feeley gave
some testimony that he must have known was favorable to the Respon-
dent’s case. For example, he testified that during his interview with the
Sanders he volunteered that he had worked for the union, and that the
Sanders nevertheless hired him the same day. Although Feeley is a
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 693
“goes around and comes around” and “I get you very soon.” In
the third phone message, S. Sanders stated:

Ed, I know where you are living, alright? . . . You are spy.
You are too young for spy. Goes around and comes around.
Alright, Ed? We’ll see you later and see what’s gonna hap-
pen.

M. Sanders left a message, in which he stated:

I never thought that you were that kind of person to come out
and spy for the Union . . . . You should be ashamed of your-
self. I figured you and the Union would have better things to
do than this. Okay, our lawyer will be contacting you and the
Union. . . . And thanks for the work and thanks for helping us
out for the last several weeks—appreciate it. I guess you
were just there to drag our business down.

M. Sanders testified that he did not actually intend to have a
lawyer contact Feeley, and only said, “[O]ur lawyer will be
contacting you,” because he was upset about Feeley’s activity
in support of the Union.
When Feeley left the Respondent’s jobsite with Kilkenny it
was his intention to continue working for the Respondent.
However, Feeley considered the phone messages to be threats
of physical violence and he was not comfortable about return-
ing to work for the Respondent. He never did so. Feeley sub-
sequently visited the Sanders to have his final paycheck signed.
Feeley testified that he brought a friend with him when he did
this because “I had no idea . . . if I was walking into anything.”
S. Sanders signed the check and Feeley and his friend left with-
out incident.
B. The Complaint Allegations
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, by discriminatorily refusing to hire
Kilkenny, or consider him for hire, on two occasions because
Kilkenny was a member of the Union. The complaint further
alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by: dispar-
aging the Union to employees and calling the police regarding
the presence of the applicant-organizers; instructing an em-
ployee not to discuss wages with other employees; interrogat-
ing an employee about his union membership; telling an em-
ployee/applicant that it would not hire him because the appli-
cant worked for the Union and the Respondent does not “hire
union”; and, threatening an employee with unspecified reprisals
and arrest because the employee supported the Union and ac-
cusing the employee of being a “spy for the Union.”
Analysis
1. Kilkenny: Failure to Consider and Failure to Hire
The complaint alleges that because Kilkenny was a member
of the Union, the Respondent unlawfully failed to consider him
for employment, or to hire him, since about August 16, 2000,
and again since about October 3, 2000. Complaint paragraphs
7(a)–(c). In FES, 331 NLRB 9 (2000), the Board set forth the

union member, he is not an employee of the Union, or a professional
organizer, and by all accounts while employed by the Respondent he
performed his work well and had an amicable work relationship with
the Sanders.
framework for analyzing both refusal-to-consider allegations
and refusal-to-hire allegations. In order to establish a discrimi-
natory refusal-to-consider violation, the General Counsel must
show: (1) that the respondent excluded the applicant from a
hiring process; and (2) that antiunion animus contributed to the
decision not to consider the applicant for employment. Wayne
Erecting, Inc., 333 NLRB 1212 (2001) (citing FES, supra). If
the General Counsel makes these showings, then the burden
shifts to the Respondent to show that it would not have consid-
ered the applicant even in the absence of the applicant’s union
activity or affiliation. In order to establish a refusal-to-hire
violation, the General Counsel must show: (1) that the respon-
dent was hiring, or had concrete plans to hire, at the time of the
alleged unlawful conduct; (2) that the applicant had experience
or training relevant to the announced or generally known re-
quirements of the positions for hire, on in the alternative, that
the employer has not adhered uniformly to such requirements,
or that the requirements were themselves pretextual or were
applied as a pretext for discrimination; and (3) that antiunion
animus contributed to the decision not to hire the applicants.
Id. If the General Counsel makes these showings, then the
burden shifts to the Respondent to show that it would not have
hired the applicant even in the absence of the applicant’s union
activity or affiliation.
I turn first to the claim relating to Kilkenny’s attempt to ap-
ply on August 16, 2000. M. Sanders described the Respon-
dent’s general hiring process as beginning with an interview
that focuses on the applicant’s experience and prior employers.
“Most of the time,” M. Sanders stated, “we get back to them”
and say, “we would like to have you come out [and] work . . .
for a day.” Then, according to M. Sanders, if the individual
“likes us and we like” them, a rate of pay for continuing em-
ployment is negotiated. Feeley testified credibly that when he
applied, the Respondent had him complete an application.
I conclude that the General Counsel has shown that the Re-
spondent refused to consider Kilkenny when he applied on
August 16. The Respondent declined to provide an application
form to Kilkenny, but later that day provided one to Feeley.
Although the Respondent permitted Kilkenny to write his name
and phone number down, and although M. Sanders agreed to
inform Kilkenny whether he was hired or not, no one from the
company ever contacted Kilkenny. The Respondent did not ask
Kilkenny to work for a 1-day trial period even though M. Sand-
ers testified that the Respondent usually does that, and even
though Kilkenny had extensive relevant experience. It is true
that S. Sanders asked Kilkenny a few questions about his skills
and experience, however, she and M. Sanders excluded Kil-
kenny from subsequent stages of the consideration process.
Regarding the second element of a refusal-to-consider claim,
I conclude that while the record establishes that the Respondent
bears some animosity towards unions, the General Counsel has
failed to show that this animus contributed to the decision not
to consider Kilkenny for employment on August 16. That the
Respondent bore at least some antiunion animus is established
beyond any serious doubt by the fact, not denied by the Re-
spondent, that S. Sanders’ shouted, “union piece of shit” at
Kilkenny and the other applicant-organizers during the encoun-
ter on August 16. At the time she made this statement, S. Sand-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 694
Sanders was clearly agitated by the behavior of the applicants.
However, the fact that, once she lost her composure, S. Sanders
directed her vitriol at unions, rather than at the particular appli-
cants or some other target, shows that the Respondent bore
animus towards unions.
While the record establishes that the Respondent had some
hostility towards unions, I nevertheless conclude that the Gen-
eral Counsel has failed to show that either Kilkenny’s union
affiliation or his union activity were among the reasons for the
denial of consideration. It is clear that the Respondent became
less than enthusiastic about hiring these particular applicants,
including Kilkenny, well before the applicants revealed their
union affiliation. Early in the encounter Cosenza stated that he
had the whole crew ready to work, and S. Sanders replied, “but
I’m not [ready],” and told Cosenza she could not hire “all
these.” When Cosenza urged the Respondent to hire Kilkenny
first and that he start working immediately, S. Sanders, said, “I
will let you know.” When Kilkenny described his relevant
skills, S. Sanders expressed doubt, stating that “[e]verybody
talks good.” Burkert said he was a laborer and S. Sanders re-
plied, “I don’t need a laborer,” even though the help-wanted
advertisement mentioned laborers. Burkert said, “[w]e come
here to work,” and S. Sanders replied, “I don’t need it.”
Cosenza pressed on and S. Sanders said, “I’m sure you are very
good—we’ll see what happens.” Burkert and Kilkenny both
said they were under the impression that they would start work
that day, but S. Sanders informed them that they would not be
starting that day. These exchanges took place before the appli-
cants revealed their union status. Based on the testimony and
the tape recording of the meeting, I believe that S. Sanders was
trying to politely turn the applicants away even before she
knew that any of them were affiliated with unions. This con-
clusion is also supported by the evidence of the very different
treatment that Feeley received when he applied later that day.
Feeley was offered employment at his initial meeting with S.
Sanders and M. Sanders. There was no evidence that the Sand-
ers ever delayed consideration of Feeley’s application by telling
him that they were “not ready,” that they did not need someone
with his skills, that they would “let him know” or that they
would “see what happens.” The difference in the treatment
received by Feeley and that received by the seven applicant-
organizers who applied earlier that day cannot be reasonably
attributed to antiunion animus since the Sanders knew that
Feeley was a union member when they hired him, but at the
time of the comments recounted above did not yet know that
Kilkenny and the other applicants were affiliated in any way
with unions.
If antiunion animus did not account for the Respondent’s re-
fusal to consider Kilkenny, then what did cause it? My consid-
eration of the testimony and the tape of the August 16 meeting
leads me to conclude that the Respondent refused to consider
Kilkenny because of the disruptive, intimidating, and disre-
spectful conduct of Kilkenny and the group of applicants with
whom he associated himself. It is not clear to me that intimida-
tion was an objective of any of the applicant-organizers, or
whether they were merely behaving with what they viewed as
tenacity and good humor. Regardless of the applicants’ inten-
tions, I conclude that reasonable persons in the Sanders’ posi-
tions would have felt that they were being bullied.14 The Re-
spondent is a small company, employing only four or five
workers total at the time the seven applicants arrived together at
the jobsite on August 16. Almost immediately upon arriving,
Cosenza exhibited a cavalier attitude towards the prospective
employer, criticizing the Respondent’s decision to use a par-
ticular mechanized lift for the job, stating that the Respondent’s
employees on the lift “don’t know what they’re doing,” shout-
ing steering directions to the Respondent’s employees, and
telling one of the Respondent’s workers that “we’ll probably
take your job.” When S. Sanders stated that she was not ready
to hire any of the individuals immediately, and could not use all
of them, Cosenza essentially ignored her, asking, “[w]hen do
we start? . . . and what are we getting paid?” After S. Sanders
resisted, Cosenza attempted to unilaterally designate Kilkenny
for immediate hire and urged Kilkenny to “get up on that wall,”
although no representative of the company had invited Kil-
kenny to begin working. Kilkenny offered to get his tools, but
stated that he would not “rasp,” despite the fact that he knew
that rasping was an essential duty of the job for which he was
applying. It is not at all surprising that M. Sanders viewed the
applicants as disrespectful and undesirable before they ever
revealed their union affiliation. If union applicants create an
environment that is “sufficiently intimidating and disrespectful”
it “privilege[s] a decision by [the employer] to not hire the . . .
applicants.” Heiliger Electric Corp., 325 NLRB 966 fn. 3 and
968 (1998). I believe that Kilkenny and the other applicants
created such an environment in this case and that this was the
reason that the Respondent refused to consider Kilkenny.
After the applicants made clear that they were union organ-
izers and that one of their objectives was to organize the Re-
spondent’s work force, the applicants’ cavalier behavior toward
the Respondent continued. M. Sanders testified that Kilkenny
intentionally misunderstood his wife’s speech and “ma[de] her
look like a dummy.” As discussed above, I believe that Kil-
kenny did have some fun of this kind at the expense of S. Sand-
ers who speaks English with an accent. S. Sanders testified
credibly that she felt that the applicants treated her like “a stu-
pid woman,” and made her “feel down . . . like on the ground.”
In addition, Cosenza and Kilkenny began shouting questions to
the two on duty workers at the jobsite and Kilkenny invited
them to talk to him about leaving the Respondent to work for a
union contractor.15 These activities interrupted the work of the
employees during worktime, and there was no evidence that
such interruptions were tolerated when they pertained to mat-

14 Indeed, as discussed below, M. Sanders testified that such behav-
ior was the reason he was not interested in hiring Kilkenny. In addi-
tion, on August 16, S. Sanders told the applicant-organizers that she did
not want to hire them because they were “too smart acting.”
15 See Clinton Corn Processing Co., 194 NLRB 184 (1971) (em-
ployee of a third party was not engaged in protected activity when he
attempted to induce the employees to leave a respondent and work for
union contractors); but compare Arlington Electric, 332 NLRB 845,
852–853 (2000) (employee who solicits employees to work for a union-
contractor/competitor engaged in protected activity where he was at-
tempting to induce the employees to seek higher wages and better
working conditions and where he brought new employees to the com-
pany).
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 695
ters unrelated to union activity.16 One of the workers, Wilsey,
found the applicant-organizers so disruptive that he decided to
telephone the police.
The conclusion that antiunion animus did not contribute to
the Respondent’s refusal to consider Kilkenny for hire is also
lent some support by the fact that the Respondent hired Feeley
on the same day that it rejected Kilkenny even though the Re-
spondent knew that Feeley had been working as a union plas-
terer. Moreover, Feeley stated that during the time he was em-
ployed by the Respondent he had good working relationships
with both S. Sanders and M. Sanders despite the fact that they
knew he was a union member who possessed a union card and
kept the card current. There was no evidence that the Respon-
dent ever treated Feeley in an unfavorable manner because of
his union membership, or that it ever attempted to convince him
to relinquish his membership.17
I conclude that Kilkenny’s insulting behavior, and the in-
timidating and disrespectful behavior of the group of applicants
of which he was a part, were the reasons for the Respondent’s
refusal to consider Kilkenny, and that antiunion animus did not
contribute to the decision.
I recognize that S. Sanders made the statement “union piece
of shit” during the very encounter on August 16 at which Kil-
kenny was turned away. However, in light of the totality of the
evidence, I conclude that this is insufficient to show that anti-
union animus was a factor contributing to the refusal of consid-
eration. Not only does it appear that S. Sanders was not dis-
posed to hire the applicants before she found out about their
union status, but later that same day she and M. Sanders gave a
warm reception to another applicant even though he identified
himself as someone who had been working as a union plasterer.
Given this, and the other evidence discussed above, the General
Counsel has failed to establish that the Respondent violated the
Act when it refused to consider Kilkenny on August 16.

16 The General Counsel notes that M. Sanders testified that he talked
to Feeley at work about M. Sanders’ brothers and their membership in
the Union. However, the record does not show that these conversations
ever interrupted work.
17 The General Counsel notes that the Board has stated that an “em-
ployer’s failure to discriminate against all applicants” affiliated with a
union does not “negate[] a finding of unlawful motivation,” against
another union applicant. GC Br. at pp. 36–37. I agree that the Respon-
dent’s decision to hire a known union member instead of Kilkenny does
not, on its own, negate the possibility that Kilkenny was unlawfully
denied consideration. See H. B. Zachry Co., 332 NLRB 1178, 1183
(2000). This is particularly true because Kilkenny, unlike Feeley, indi-
cated that he was not only a union member, but a union member who
intended to engage in organizational activities. However, the hiring of
Feeley, as well as the treatment he received from the Respondent prior
to October 3, provides at least some support for the view that the Re-
spondent was not basing hiring decisions on union membership as
alleged in the complaint. I note that this is not a case where the Re-
spondent hired numerous plasterers after Kilkenny was rejected and
one or two of them happened to have some connection to unions. Just
one plasterer was hired by the Respondent when Kilkenny was denied
consideration on August 16, and that was Feeley—a known union
member. This evidence would not on its own have tipped the balance
in the Respondent’s favor, and, indeed, I would have found that the
General Counsel failed to carry its burden even if the Respondent had
not known that Feeley was a union plasterer.
Had I concluded that antiunion animus contributed to the de-
cision not to consider Kilkenny for employment beginning on
about August 16, the burden would have shifted to the Respon-
dent to show that it would not have considered Kilkenny even
in the absence of his union activity or affiliation. See Wayne
Erecting, supra. M. Sanders denied that he turned Kilkenny
away based on union status, and explained that he was not in-
terested in hiring Kilkenny because the group came “onto my
jobsite, and was basically ordering us around,” and engaging in
behavior that was not “appropriate.” Tr. 366.18 M. Sanders
stated that he felt intimidated, “like maybe this was Fred
Cosenza’s business, not our business.” Cosenza “was the one
telling . . . the other fellows there, you know, you start working
now here . . . I thought it would [be] our decision whether we
hired that particular person.” Tr. 362–363. He testified that the
group as a whole was “intimidating us,” and Kilkenny “was
going right along with them” as “part of the group.” Tr. 384.
To put it succinctly, M. Sanders felt that Kilkenny and the other
applicants were bullying him. I found this testimony credible
based on M. Sanders’ demeanor and testimony and on the re-
cord as a whole.
I conclude that even assuming arguendo that antiunion ani-
mus contributed to the decision not to consider Kilkenny, the
evidence shows that the Respondent would have made the same
decision based on the intimidating and impolite behavior of
Kilkenny and the group of applicants with whom he applied in
the absence of Kilkenny’s union activity or affiliation. In
reaching this determination, I am persuaded by M. Sanders’
credible testimony, as well as by Kilkenny’s insulting treatment
of S. Sanders, Kilkenny’s statement that he would not “rasp,”
the disruptive, intimidating, and disrespectful atmosphere cre-
ated by the seven union applicants, the fact that the Respondent
was unenthusiastic about hiring the applicants before they re-
vealed their union status, and the fact that a known union plas-
terer was considered and hired the same day that Kilkenny was
turned away.
For essentially the same reasons, I conclude that the General
Counsel failed to show that the Respondent violated the Act by
refusing to consider Kilkenny for hire when he tried to apply on
October 3, 2000, at a jobsite in Berlin Township, New Jersey.
Here again, the evidence established that the Respondent de-
nied Kilkenny consideration. S. Sanders turned Kilkenny away
without permitting him to complete an application, participate
in an interview, or work for a 1-day trial period. The evidence
also shows that the Respondent had not jettisoned its antiunion
animus. Later on October 3, M. Sanders left a message with
Feeley’s answering service calling him a union “spy,” and
scolding him for assisting the Union. I conclude, however, that
the Respondent’s animus was not the reason S. Sanders refused
to consider Kilkenny for employment on October 3. When
Kilkenny applied for employment, S. Sanders recognized him
from their previous encounter on August 16, 2000. Although
18 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct the transcript,
dated June 27, 2001, is granted and received into evidence as GC Exh.
16. The Charging Party also moved to make two corrections to the
transcript requested by the General Counsel. CP Br. at fns. 5 and 6.
The Charging Party’s unopposed motions are granted.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 696
Kilkenny did not reprise the behavior that led the Respondent
to deny him consideration on October 3, it is not surprising that
S. Sanders did not forget or forgive that behavior when Kil-
kenny applied again less than 2 months later. Shortly after
turning Kilkenny away on October 3, the Respondent hired
Michael Colston—a plasterer who M. Sanders knew was a
union member. I conclude that the disruptive, insulting, and
intimidating behavior of Kilkenny and the group of applicants
with whom he associated himself on August 16 was the reason
that Kilkenny was refused consideration for employment on
October 3, and that the Respondent’s antiunion animus played
no part in that decision.
In arriving at this conclusion, I am given some pause by the
fact that during the October 3 encounter, S. Sanders stated that
she could not hire Kilkenny because he worked for the Union
office. However, that statement, taken in context, falls short of
showing that antiunion animus was actually a factor in the deci-
sion not to consider Kilkenny. During the exchange on October
3, S. Sanders also stated that she recognized Kilkenny from the
August 16 incident and that she would not employ him. When
Kilkenny asked if Feeley was also disqualified from working
for the Respondent because he was in the Union, S. Sanders
said that Feeley could continue to work for the Respondent
because “it’s a free country.” The totality of the evidence leads
me to conclude that what S. Sanders, whose command of the
English language is somewhat limited, meant was that she was
still unwilling to hire Kilkenny because of his behavior when
applying with the other union organizers on August 16. It is
clear that she did not mean that persons affiliated with unions
could not work for the Respondent since she told Kilkenny that
Feeley could continue to work for the Respondent even though
he was a Union member.19
Turning to the refusal-to-hire claim, I conclude that the evi-
dence presented easily satisfies the General Counsel’s burden
regarding the first two elements of a violation. The Respondent
has not denied that it was attempting to hire a plasterer on Au-
gust 16. Indeed, Feeley was hired when he applied later that
very day, and the Respondent had placed a newspaper adver-
tisement seeking applicants. The record also leaves no doubt
that the Respondent was hiring when Kilkenny applied on Oc-
tober 3. M. Sanders had told Feeley that the company needed
to hire one or more employees and Feeley brought Kilkenny to
the jobsite after telling the Respondent that he would do so.
Within 30 days of when Kilkenny was rejected on October 3,
the Respondent hired a plasterer and two laborers. The General

19 Even assuming that antiunion animus contributed to the Respon-
dent’s refusal to consider Kilkenny on October 3, I would still find that
this refusal did not violate the Act, since the evidence shows that the
Respondent would have made the same decision absent Kilkenny’s
union status and activity. I base this on the totality of the evidence,
including Kilkenny’s insulting treatment of S. Sanders on August 16,
his statement that he would not “rasp,” the disruptive, intimidating, and
disrespectful behavior of the group with which Kilkenny previously
applied, the indications that the Respondent was less than enthusiastic
about the seven applicant-organizers on August 16 even before they
revealed their union affiliation, and the fact that both times Kilkenny
was rejected the Respondent hired plasterers who it knew were affili-
ated with the Union. See, supra fn. 17.
Counsel has also satisfied the second element of its initial bur-
den by showing that Kilkenny possessed experience and train-
ing relevant to the requirements of a plasterer position with the
Respondent. Kilkenny had over 10 years of experience as a
plasterer. He taught in the Union’s apprenticeship program and
had installed the types of insulation systems used by the Re-
spondent many times. The Respondent concedes that it
planned to hire a plasterer and that Kilkenny had the experience
and training necessary for the job. (R. Br. at 8.)
The General Counsel stumbles when required to show that
antiunion animus contributed to the Respondent’s decision not
to hire Kilkenny on August 16 and October 3. Instead, the
record leads me to conclude that the Respondent’s decision to
deny Kilkenny employment was based on the behavior of Kil-
kenny and the other applicant-organizers with whom he applied
on August 16. See Heiliger Electric Corp., 325 NLRB at 966
fn. 3 and 968 (intimidating and disrespectful atmosphere cre-
ated by union applicants privileges employer not to hire the
applicants). I am persuaded by the same evidence previously
discussed: Kilkenny’s insulting treatment of S. Sanders; Kil-
kenny’s statement that he would not “rasp”; the disruptive,
intimidating, and disrespectful attitude of the applicant-
organizers as a group; the fact that the Sanders were unenthusi-
astic about the applicant-organizers before the applicant-
organizers revealed their union affiliation; and the fact that both
times Kilkenny was rejected the Respondent hired a person it
knew was affiliated with the Union.
Even were I to conclude that the General Counsel showed
that antiunion animus was a contributing factor in the Respon-
dent’s decision, I would still conclude that there was no viola-
tion, since the evidence discussed above shows that the Re-
spondent would have made the same decision based on the
disruptive, intimidating, and disrespectful behavior of Kilkenny
and the group of applicants with whom he applied on August
16, absent Kilkenny’s union activity or affiliation.
For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that the allega-
tions that the Respondent’s refusals to consider and hire Kil-
kenny were based on union membership in violation of Section
8(a)(1) should be dismissed.
2. S. Sanders’ remarks to Kilkenny on October 3, 2000
The General Counsel alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) on October 3, 2000, when S. Sanders told an
employee-applicant (Kilkenny) that she would not hire him
because he worked for the Union and the Respondent did not
hire union. (Complaint par. 5(d).) I credited Feeley’s testi-
mony that S. Sanders made statements similar to these. In addi-
tion, I found that S. Sanders told Kilkenny that she recognized
him from the August 16 incident and said that she would not
employ him. During the same exchange Kilkenny asked if
Feeley was also prohibited from working for the Respondent
because he was in the Union, and S. Sanders replied that Feeley
could continue to work for the Respondent if he wished be-
cause “it’s a free country.”
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by making statements
to employees that union applicants will not be hired. Sunland
Construction Co., 311 NLRB 685, 704 (1993); J. L. Phillips
Enterprises, 310 NLRB 11, 13 (1993). As noted above, I be-
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 697
lieve that S. Sander’s allegedly unlawful statements, when
viewed in context, meant that Kilkenny was being rejected
because of the behavior on August 16, not because of his union
affiliation. Indeed, I believe that a reasonable applicant, who,
like Kilkenny, was cognizant of the surrounding facts, includ-
ing the incident on August 16, would understand that this was
what S. Sanders meant. S. Sanders’ statement does not, in my
view, suggest an element of coercion or interference with Sec-
tion 7 rights. S. Sanders did not state, or imply, that she would
consider Kilkenny for hire if he abandoned his union affiliation
or activity, or took some other action, nor did she suggest that
Feeley would have to do anything, or refrain from doing any-
thing, if he wished to continue to work for the Respondent. I
conclude that, under the circumstances, the allegation regarding
S. Sanders statement to Kilkenny on October 3, 2000, should be
dismissed.
3. Disparaging the Union
The General Counsel also alleges that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) when S. Sanders said “union piece of shit”
to the applicant-organizers on August 16, 2000. (See complaint
par. 5(a)(i).) In order to establish such a violation, the General
Counsel must show that the remark would tend to interfere with
the free exercise of employee rights under the Act. See Ameri-
can Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959). I conclude
that the General Counsel has failed to establish a violation. The
offensive remark was made to the applicant-organizers at a
point when S. Sanders had become exasperated with their be-
havior and unwillingness to leave the jobsite. The Respondent
did not prove that the statement was overheard by either of the
current employees who were at the jobsite.20 There was no
evidence that any other remarks disparaging unions were made
either to current employees or to the applicant-organizers. I
conclude that the isolated remark, made to professional union
organizers,21 was mere “name calling” and did not rise to the
level of a violation of the Act. See, e.g., Circuit-Wise, Inc., 306
NLRB 766, 788, (1992); Mademoiselle Knitwear, 297 NLRB
272, 278 (1989); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co., 305 NLRB
193 (1991) (“Words of disparagement alone concerning a union
or its officials are insufficient for finding a violation of Section
8(a)(1).”).22 Therefore, I conclude that the allegation that S.
Sanders disparaged the Union to employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) should be dismissed.

20 Although Wilsey, one of the two employees at the jobsite, was a
witness at the hearing, he did not testify that he heard the remark.
21 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that professional organizers,
when applying, are considered statutory employees. NLRB v. Town &
Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85 (1995). Nevertheless, the fact that the
statutory employees to whom S. Sanders directed the remark were
professional organizers is relevant to the question of whether that re-
mark would reasonably tend to interfere with the exercise of rights
under the Act. I believe that professional organizers would view the
isolated remark as “name calling” and would not reasonably tend to be
interfered with or coerced by it.
22 The Respondent argues that S. Sanders’ “union piece of shit,” re-
mark is protected employer speech under Sec. 8(c) of the Act. R. Br. at
6–7. Since I conclude that the remark was isolated name-calling that
does not rise to the level of a violation of Sec. 8(a)(1), I need not con-
sider whether Sec. 8(c) protects antiunion profanity of this kind.
4. The police call
The General Counsel also alleges that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) when S. Sanders called the police regard-
ing the presence of the seven union applicant-organizers at the
jobsite on August 16, 2000. (Complaint par. 5(a)(ii).) How-
ever, as discussed above, the credible evidence did not establish
that S. Sanders or any other agent of the Respondent called the
police or directed any employee to call the police. Rather the
evidence showed that the call to the police was made by the
Respondent’s employee, Wilsey, on his own initiative because
he was concerned that the encounter between the seven union
applicant-organizers and the Sanders was becoming dangerous.
Since the record does not show that the call to the police was
made by an agent of the Respondent, or at the direction or sug-
gestion of such an agent, I conclude that this allegation should
be dismissed.
5. Feeley instructed not to discuss wages
The General Counsel alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) when S. Sanders instructed Feeley not to dis-
cuss his wages with other employees. (Complaint par. 5(b).)
The Board has held that discussing compensation is “an inher-
ently concerted activity clearly protected by Section 7 of the
Act.” Automatic Screw Products Co., 306 NLRB 1072 (1992),
enfd. 977 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1992). Thus an employer violates
Section 8(a)(1) by prohibiting employees from discussing their
salaries, since such conduct “has a natural tendency to restrain
them in the exercise of their Section 7 right to learn about and
assess such a vital term and condition of employment as the
salaries paid by their employer.” Id. Consistent with the im-
portance of wages as a condition of employment, the Board has
held that, absent an overriding business justification, an em-
ployer policy against employees discussing their wages is
unlawful even if the employer only “requests” that employees
follow it, and even if the policy is not, in fact, heeded by em-
ployees. Radisson Plaza Minneapolis, 307 NLRB 94 (1992),
enfd. 987 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993). Such rules are unlawful
regardless of whether the employees are represented by a union
or are engaged in organizational activity. Automatic Screw
Products Co., supra (quoting Triana Industries, 245 NLRB
1258 (1979)).
The credible evidence established that the Respondent told
Feeley not to discuss his wage rate with anyone else. Imposing
such a prohibition on Feeley restrained him from participating
in “an inherently concerted activity.” The Respondent has
forwarded no overriding business justification that would jus-
tify such interference with employee Section 7 rights. The
Respondent’s witnesses did not explain why Feeley was told
not to discuss his wages, but in its brief the Respondent states
that “[f]rom the context, it is clear that the reason for the re-
quest was to avoid controversy about Mr. Feeley’s high
wages.” (R. Br. at 11.) This explanation is merely another way
of stating that the prohibition on discussion of Feeley’s wages
was designed to prevent employees from engaging in the pro-
tected activity of learning about and assessing their wages. I
conclude that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) when, on
about August 18, 2000, it prohibited Feeley from discussing his
wages with other employees.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 698
6. Interrogation of Feeley
The General Counsel alleges that the Respondent unlawfully
interrogated Feeley in violation of Section 8(a)(1) when, after
Feeley had worked for the Respondent for 1 or 2 weeks, S.
Sanders approached him during lunch and asked whether he
still had an active union card and whether he intended to con-
tinue working for the Respondent. (Complaint par. 5(c).)
A question is not coercive simply because it concerns an
employee’s union status. “‘Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits
employers only from activity which in some manner tends to
restrain, coerce or interfere with employee rights.’” Rossmore
House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177 (1984) (quoting Midwest Stock
Exchange v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1980)), enfd. sub
nom. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Local 11 v.
NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). “‘To fall within the
ambit of Section 8(a)(1), either the words themselves or the
context in which they are used must suggest an element of co-
ercion or interference.’” Id. Among the factors considered in
determining whether an interrogation is unlawful are the back-
ground of the questioning, the nature of the information sought,
the identity of the questioner, the place and method of the ques-
tioning, Id. at 1178 fn. 20, and whether the person being ques-
tioned is an open union adherent, Id. at 1177–1178.
In this case, I conclude that S. Sanders’ questioning of
Feeley did not “suggest an element of coercion or interference,”
and was not violative of Section 8(a)(1). In planning its hiring
and deciding what projects to accept, the Respondent would
reasonably need to determine who among its current workers
would likely be available to work on those projects. This is
especially vital information for an employer that, like the Re-
spondent, has few employees. Moreover, S. Sanders’ questions
merely followedup Feeley’s own statement, volunteered during
his application interview, that he was a union plasterer tempo-
rarily out of work. The questioning took place against a back-
ground of good relations between the Respondent and Feeley.
Feeley knew that the Respondent had hired him even though it
was aware that he had worked as a union plasterer in the past.
The exchange itself was very brief, friendly enough in tone, and
not, it appears, repeated. The information sought was minimal.
S. Sanders asked the questions during a lunch break and there
was no evidence that she summoned Feeley to an office or
some other location that he would be likely to find intimidating.
There was no suggestion in the questioning that Feeley’s union
status might lead the Respondent to take adverse action against
him.
The questioner, S. Sanders, was the Respondent’s owner and
president, and had authority to discharge or otherwise discipline
Feeley. The fact that an official in that position asked the ques-
tions provides some support for the view that the questioning
was coercive. However, I believe that support is blunted here
since the Respondent is a very small employer and S. Sanders
routinely works with tools at jobsites alongside the Respon-
dent’s employees. Thus she was not some distant presence that
employees rarely encountered and with whom any conversation
would be inherently intimidating to employees. Furthermore,
as already noted, S. Sanders and Feeley had a good working
relationship and it is apparent that S. Sanders was hoping that
the Respondent would be able to retain Feeley as an employee.
To whatever extent the identity of the questioner in this case
weighs in favor of concluding that the questioning was coer-
cive, that is outweighed by the other evidence, discussed above,
which supports the conclusion that the questioning was not
coercive.
Under all the circumstances, I conclude that S. Sanders’
questioning did not reasonably tend to restrain, coerce, or inter-
fere with Feeley’s Section 7 rights. Sunnyside Health Care
Project, 308 NLRB 346 fn. 1 (1992). Based on the record as a
whole, I conclude that the allegation regarding S. Sanders inter-
rogation of Feeley should be dismissed.
7. Threats against Feeley
The complaint alleges that on about October 3, 2000, the Re-
spondent threatened an employee with unspecified reprisals,
legal action, and arrest, and accused him of being a union spy
because the employee supported the Union. (Complaint pars.
5(e) and 6.) I conclude that the General Counsel has proven
that the Respondent, by S. Sanders and M. Sanders, made
threats against Feeley in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
On October 3, 2000, Feeley responded to the Respondent’s
invitation to refer new employees, by arriving at work with
applicant-organizer Kilkenny. Feeley’s referral of a union
member and organizer to apply for the opening was protected
activity. The Respondent turned Kilkenny away, and later that
day Feeley received the phone messages from S. Sanders and
M. Sanders, which are alleged to contain threats that violate
Section 8(a)(1).
In deciding whether a remark is threatening in violation of
Section 8(a)(1), the Board applies the objective standard of
whether the remark would reasonably tend to interfere with the
free exercise of employee rights, and does not look at the moti-
vation behind the remark, or rely on the success or failure of the
such coercion. Joy Recovery Technology Corp., 320 NLRB
356, 365 (1995), enfd. 134 F.3d 1307 (7th Cir. 1998); Miami
Systems Corp., 320 NLRB 71 fn. 4 (1995); American Freight-
ways, 124 NLRB at 147. I conclude that S. Sanders’ state-
ments, especially that she was going to “get” Feeley “very
soon,” that she knew where he lived, and that what “goes
around” “comes around” are reasonably construed as threats of
violence or other harm. See Letter Carriers (Postal Service),
333 NLRB 343, 344 (2001) (statement that “what goes around
comes around” reasonably construed as threat and violated
Section 8(a)(1)); Delco Electronics Corp., 325 NLRB 653, 656
(1998) (threat to “get” employee for having called in the Union
violative of Section 8(a)(1)); Local Joint Executive Board of
Las Vegas, 323 NLRB 148, 160–161 (1997) (statements “we
know where you live” and “we’re going to get you” were im-
plicit threats of bodily harm and were violative of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act).
S. Sanders and M. Sanders also both said that their lawyer
was going to contact Feeley, and S. Sanders added that she
could have Feeley arrested. Feeley reasonably understood this
to mean that “some type of action was going to be taken
against” him. I conclude that these remarks regarding legal
action also constitute threats. See Indio Grocery Outlet, 323
NLRB 1138, 1142–1143 (1997) (employer violated Sec. 8(a)(1)
by threatening to have union representatives arrested for con-
EXTERIOR SYSTEMS, INC. 699
duct that was exercise of Sec. 7 rights), enfd. 187 F.3d 1080
(9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1098 (2000); Holy Cross
Hospital, 319 NLRB 1361, 1366 (1995) (employer violated
Sec. 8(a)(1) by threatening that it would take legal action
against union members if they engaged in certain Sec. 7 activ-
ity); Carborundum Materials Corp., 286 NLRB 1321, 1322–
1323 (1987) (employer violated Sec. 8(a)(1) when supervisor
threatened employee with lawsuit).23
A reasonable person in Feeley’s position would view these
threats as being in retaliation for the fact that he assisted the
Union by referring a union member and organizer to the Re-
spondent as an applicant. The threatening messages were left
the same day that Feeley appeared at the jobsite with Kilkenny,
and there was no prior history of conflict between Feeley and
the Respondent that would explain their harsh tone. There is no
evidence that Feeley was aware of the specifics of what had
transpired when Kilkenny applied on August 16, or believed
that the Respondent considered Kilkenny an undesirable appli-
cant for reasons other than Kilkenny’s union affiliation. In the
threatening messages, both M. Sanders and S. Sanders referred
to Feeley as a spy, and M. Sanders specifically called him a spy
for the Union. M. Sanders stated that Feeley and the Union
should have “better things to do” and that the Respondent’s
lawyer would “be contacting [Feeley] and the Union.” Given
the content of the threatening messages as well as the surround-
ing circumstances, the recipient of such messages would rea-
sonably conclude that the threats were made because of activity
in support of the Union and such threats would tend to coerce
and intimidate the recipient in the exercise of his Section 7
rights. Indeed, Feeley testified credibly that because he felt
threatened he never returned to work for the Respondent after
hearing the messages.24
For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that the General
Counsel has succeeded in showing that on October 3, 2000, the
Respondent threatened retaliation against Feeley in violation of
Section 8(a)(1).25

23 The Respondent argues the Respondent’s statements that their
lawyer was going to contact Feeley cannot be unlawful threats because
employers have a right to consult their lawyers. R. Br. at 18. This is a
“straw man” argument. The General Counsel has not suggested that the
Respondent could not consult with its own lawyer. What the General
Counsel alleges is that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by threat-
ening to take legal action against Feeley because of his Sec. 7 activity.
Indeed, M. Sanders testified that he made the remark that his lawyer
would be contacting Feeley and the Union because he was angry.
24 In its brief, the Respondent contends that “[i]n light of Ms. Sand-
ers diminutive stature it is truly inconceivable that Mr. Feeley feared
any harm from Ms. Sanders.” R. Br. at 17. This argument lacks merit.
Feeley had no assurance that if S. Sanders wished to carry out her
threats she would do so personally. In any case, there are any number
of ways in which S. Sanders could have harmed Kilkenny without
physically overpowering him, especially given the hazards present at
construction sites.
25 In the same complaint paragraphs in which the General Counsel
alleges that the Respondent threatened an employee by telephone on
October 3, 2000, the General Counsel also alleges that the Respondent
accused the employee of being a spy for the Union by telephone on that
date. I consider the Respondent’s use of the derogatory term “spy” as
contributing to the threatening import of the telephone messages left by
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by in-
structing employee Feeley not to discuss his wages with other
employees.
4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
making threats against employee Feeley because he supported
the Union.
5. The Respondent did not commit the other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended Order26
ORDER
The Respondent, Exterior Systems, Inc., of Mount Laurel,
New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Prohibiting any of its employees not to discuss their
wages with other employees.
(b) Threatening any of its employees because they support a
union.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Post at its office in Mount Laurel, New Jersey, copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”27 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by

the Respondent. Since I conclude that the term “spy” was part of the
unlawful threats, I do not consider the question of whether the use of
that term would independently rise to the level of a violation of Sec.
8(a)(1), given the facts of this case.
26 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
27 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 700
any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respon-
dent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since August 18, 2000.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.