EXCALIBUR IP, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 12, 2020

14497760 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 12, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/497,760 09/26/2014 Daniele Quercia Y10149US00 4617
150131 7590 03/12/2020
Cooper Legal Group LLC
6505 Rockside Road Suite 330
Independence, OH 44131
EXAMINER
SHANMUGASUNDARAM, KANNAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2158
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/12/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@cooperlegalgroup.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DANIELE QUERCIA, MOUNIA LALMAS, and
EDUARDO GRAELLS
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
Technology Center 2100

Before JEREMY J. CURCURI, HUNG H. BUI, and RUSSELL E. CASS,
Administrative Patent Judges.

CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We heard the appeal on February 7, 2020.
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Excalibur IP, LLC
and/or Yahoo!, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “techniques for recommending content
items that present a different perspective from that of the user, and from
individuals who share a similar profile to the user (e.g., alternative opinions
from other individuals within the user’s social circle or community).”
Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method of recommending a content item to a
user having a user background, comprising:
identifying a user perspective of the user about a topic;
selecting, from an individual set, an individual having an
individual background that is similar to the user background of
the user;
identifying a content item associated with the individual
and presenting an individual perspective about the topic that
differs from the user perspective of the user about the topic; and
presenting the content item to the user.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
O’Malley US 2008/0147645 A1 June 19, 2008
Finley US 2007/0192345 A1 Aug. 16, 2007
Engle US 2008/0097867 A1 Apr. 24, 2008
Gou US 2015/0095311 A1 Apr. 2, 2015
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more. Final Act. 2–3.
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
3
Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite. Final Act.
3.
Claims 1–4, 6–9, and 11–14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
as anticipated by O’Malley. Final Act. 4–8.
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over O’Malley
and Finley. Final Act. 8–9.
Claims 10 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
O’Malley and Engle. Final Act. 9–11.
Claims 16 and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
O’Malley and Gou. Final Act. 12–13.
OPINION
The Judicial Exception Rejection of Claims 1–20
The Examiner determines claims 1–20 are directed to a judicial
exception without significantly more. Final Act. 2–3. In particular, the
Examiner determines the following:
Claims 1-20 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed
invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature,
a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly
more. Claim(s) 1, 8 and 13 is/are directed to comparing
information regarding test subject to a target data by obtaining
information about users and their perspective (test subjects) and
determining target data that differs. The claim(s) does/do not
include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to
significantly more than the judicial exception because all other
limitations assist in the scoring of content and determine
perspective. Claims 2-7, 9-12 and 14-20 do not cure the issue by
including any additional information, are dependent on claims 1,
8 and 13 and are rejected for the same rationale and reasoning.
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
4
Final Act. 2–3 (emphasis added); see also Ans. 5–7 (“perspective
information is collected and analyzed and certain results that differ from the
user perspective are displayed”), 8–9.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
5
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr,
450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also
indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and
Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that
recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the
[claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract
idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic
computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention.” Id.
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
6
Last year, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”); USPTO’s October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility (Oct. 17, 2019). Under that guidance, we first look
to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. 2018)).
See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception
and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we
then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Are the claims patent-eligible?
Step One
Claim 1 is a method claim, which falls within the “process” category
of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 8 is a non-transitory memory device claim, which
falls within the “manufacture” category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 13 is a
server claim, which falls within the “machine” category of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Thus, we must determine whether the claims recite a judicial exception, and
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
7
fail to integrate the exception into a practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55. If both elements are satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial
exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id.
Step 2A—Prong One
Independent claim 1 recites the following steps:
[i.] identifying a user perspective of the user about a
topic;
[ii.] selecting, from an individual set, an individual
having an individual background that is similar to the user
background of the user;
[iii.] identifying a content item associated with the
individual and presenting an individual perspective about the
topic that differs from the user perspective of the user about the
topic; and
[iv.] presenting the content item to the user.
Steps i–iv describe identifying content for presentation to a user. In
particular, steps i–iv describe receiving information (user backgrounds,
perspectives, and content), processing the information (comparing user
backgrounds and user perspectives to identify a content item), and
presenting the results (the content item), and are thus one or more of
“observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion,” which are examples of
“mental processes”—“concepts performed in the human mind or by a human
using a pen and paper,” and therefore, an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Further, the Federal Circuit has held that if a method can be
performed by human thought alone, or by a human using pen and paper, it is
merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101. CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A]
method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
8
idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.”). Similarly, the Federal Circuit
has found claims directed to “collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” as directed to a
patent-ineligible abstract idea. Electric Power Group, LLC, v. Alstom, 830
F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Accordingly, the various steps i–iv recited
in independent claim 1 all describe a series of “mental processes” and, as
such, an abstract idea. The mental processes remain patent-ineligible even
when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have
been done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely
mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer,
was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Thus, under Step 2A, Prong One, we agree with the Examiner that
claims 1, 8, and 13 recite a series of mental processes as identified in the
2019 Revised Guidance, and thus, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised
Guidance (Revised Step 2A, Prong One), 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54.
Step 2A, Prong Two
Because claims 1, 8, and 13 recite a judicial exception, we next
determine if the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54.
In addition to the limitations of claim 1 discussed above that recite
abstract concepts, claim 1 does not recite additional limitations. However,
claim 8 further recites a “non[-]transitory memory device,” a “processor,”
and a “server.” Claim 13 further recites a “server,” a “processor,” a
“memory,” a “user perspective determiner,” a “content item recommender,”
and a “content item presenter.”
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
9
Regarding the “non[-]transitory memory device,” the “processor,” and
the “server,” the Specification does not provide additional details that would
distinguish these additional limitations from generic computer components.
See Spec. ¶¶ 30–32 (discussing the “server” and the “processor,” and the
“memory”), 62 (discussing the “non[-]transitory memory device”).
Regarding the “user perspective determiner,” the “content item
recommender,” and the “content item presenter,” the Specification also does
not provide additional details that would distinguish these additional
limitations from a generic computer implementation. See Spec. ¶ 61
(discussing the “user perspective determiner,” the “content item
recommender,” and the “content item presenter”).
There also is no indication that the computers used in the invention
are anything other than general purpose computers. See Spec. ¶¶ 30–32, 61,
62.
We do not find the additional limitations are sufficient to integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. Specifically, there is no
improvement to the functioning of the computer, but, instead, the computer
is merely used as a tool to implement the abstract idea. In this case, we do
not see any particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim;
nor do we see any transformation. That is, we do not see any of the
additionally recited elements applying or using the judicial exception in any
meaningful way beyond generally linking the judicial exception to the
recited elements.
Accordingly, we determine that (1) Appellant’s “additional elements”
recited in claims 1, 8, and 13 do not integrate the recited judicial exception
into a practical application and, as such, (2) claim 1, 8, and 13 are directed to
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
10
an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance (Revised Step 2A, Prong Two),
84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
Is there something else in the claims that ensures that they are
directed to significantly more than a patent ineligible concept?
Step 2B
Because claims 1, 8, and 13 are directed to a judicial exception, we
next determine, according to Alice, whether these claims add a specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood,
routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, instead,
simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The conventional or generalized functional terms by which the
computer components are described reasonably indicate that Appellant’s
Specification discloses conventional components. See Spec. ¶¶ 30–32, 61,
62. Further, the Specification does not provide additional details about the
computer that would distinguish the recited components from generic
implementation individually and generic implementation in the combination.
See Spec. ¶¶ 30–32, 61, 62.
In view of Appellant’s Specification, the claimed computer
components are reasonably determined to be generic, purely conventional
computer elements. Thus, the claims do no more than require generic
computer elements to perform generic computer functions, rather than
improve computer capabilities.
Accordingly, we determine that claims 1, 8, and 13 are not directed to
significantly more than a patent ineligible concept.
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
11
Appellant’s principal arguments
Appellant presents the following principal arguments:
i. The Examiner fails to properly identify an abstract idea. See
Appeal Br. 26–27; see also Reply Br. 5–6.
ii. The Examiner fails to identify a similar concept that the courts
have identified as an abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 28–32; see also Appeal
Br. 33 (arguing the dependent claims), Reply Br. 7–12.
iii.
It is submitted that identifying this particular user, and
presenting the content item to that particular user, are not merely
“insignificant extra-solution” steps. Rather, these steps are
provided in order to solve a specific problem - i.e., the “echo
chamber” effect discussed at length in the specification as the
motivation for the presented techniques.
Appeal Br. 32; see also Reply Br. 10–11.
iv.
It is submitted that neither the Final Rejection nor the
Examiner’s Answer presents any such evidentiary support for the
“significantly more” portion of the § 101 analysis. On the
contrary, the sole basis for the examiner’s determination in this
regard – presented anywhere to date – is the examiner’s
subjective conclusion that it is so. Indeed, it is respectfully
submitted that the Federal Circuit, in Berkheimer, intended to
characterize as invalid the precise type of generic, boilerplate,
content-free “conclusion” that the examiner has presented in this
matter to date.
Reply Br. 13.
We have considered Appellant’s arguments. We determine that claims
1–20 are directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
12
Regarding Appellant’s arguments i and ii, this argument does not
show any error because we have analyzed the claims in accordance with the
current USPTO guidance and determine that claims 1–20 are directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more. Further, regarding the
dependent claims, we determine that these claims are directed to the same
abstract idea, and are not directed to significantly more than a patent
ineligible concept. See Ans. 7 (discussing the dependent claims). Appellant
has not made any particularized arguments with respect to the eligibility of
the dependent claims.
Regarding Appellant’s argument iii, this argument does not show any
error because, as we explain above, the argued elements of claims 1, 8, and
13 are the abstract concepts of one or more of “observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion,” which are examples of “concepts performed in the
human mind.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We also explain that the claims do not
recite additional elements that integrate the recited judicial exception into a
practical application, and are not directed to significantly more than a patent
ineligible concept. Appellant’s identified improvements are improvements to
the abstract idea because, for example, presenting the content item to the
particular user (having the identified user perspective) describes a part of the
overall process of receiving information, processing the information, and
presenting the results and is thus one or more of “observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion,” which are examples of “concepts performed in the
human mind.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Such processing can be done by human
thought and a pen and paper, and is not an improvement to a technology or
computer functionality. Thus, on the record before us, the claim limitations
do not improve the functionality of the various hardware components, nor do
they achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
13
practice. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016). More particularly, we do not agree the claimed
invention improves the technology as a whole.
Regarding Appellant’s argument (iv), this argument does not show
any error because we have analyzed the claims in accordance with the
current USPTO guidance and determine that, in view of Appellant’s
Specification, the claimed computer components are reasonably determined
to be generic, purely conventional computer elements, and the claims do no
more than require generic computer elements to perform generic computer
functions, rather than improve computer capabilities. See Spec. ¶¶ 30–32,
61, 62.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
of claims 1–20.

The Indefiniteness Rejection of Claim 20
The Examiner concludes claim 20 is indefinite, referring to “the
limitation ‘the polar coordinate’ in line 3.” Final Act. 3.
Appellant does not present any arguments with respect to this
rejection of claim 20. See Appeal Br. 25 (“[T]he rejection of claim 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 112. . . [is] not raised for appeal at this time.”).
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) of claim 20.

The Anticipation Rejection of Claims 1–4, 6–9, and 11–14 by O’Malley
The Examiner finds O’Malley describes all limitations of claim 1.
Final Act. 4 (citing O’Malley ¶¶ 30, 45, 53).
Appellant presents the following principal arguments:
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
14
i.
It is respectfully submitted that applying a user-specified
filter to a data set is materially different than automatically
selecting particular items from the data set for presentation to the
user, according to criteria utilized by the selection process and
not specified by the user. The distinction of these techniques
reflects the materially different scenarios in which such
techniques are described as applicable: a content system that
recommends content items to users (as currently presented), vs.
a user-filterable database of content (as provided in O’Malley).
Appeal Br. 34; see also Reply Br. 14–15.
ii. “Nothing in O’Malley discusses how [the presented] content
items particularly relate to the opinion of the user – rather, both [‘Pro’ and
‘Against’] categories are presented, irrespective of the user’s opinion.”
Appeal Br. 35. “Nothing in O’Malley involves identifying individuals with a
similar background to the current user – indeed, O’Malley does not even
appear to solicit, receive, or utilize any information indicating the user’s
background.” Appeal Br. 36; see also Reply Br. 15–16.
iii.
The only circumstance in which a user of the O’Malley
content database would be presented with the specific types of
content items that are the subject matter of the present application
– those that are both (1) contrary to the perspective of the user
about a particular topic, and (2) associated with an individual
with a similar background to the user – is the circumstance where
the user actively sought out this content by deliberately
generating a filter with both criteria. The only users who are
sufficiently interested in these specific types of content items are
users who are not subject to the “echo chamber” effect.
Appeal Br. 37 (citing O’Malley ¶ 61); see also O’Malley ¶ 61 (“[A] user
may search for items based on ‘conservatives that support stem cell
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
15
research,’ when the user is actually a liberal, not a conservative.”), Reply Br.
16–17.
In response, the Examiner explains “[t]he opposite correlated content
in O’Malley is the content associated with the individual, which presents an
individual perspective about a topic that differs from the user perspective
about that topic.” Ans. 4. The Examiner further explains “O’Malley allows
the profiles searched to be filtered by an age that is the same as the user.
People with a similar age are of similar background.” Ans. 4.
The Examiner further explains “[w]hen given their broadest
reasonable interpretation, a user prompting a computer to select and identify
an individual or a content item discloses the claim language.” Ans. 10; see
also Ans. 11–12 (citing O’Malley ¶¶ 51, 77) (“The opposite correlated
content or the content that differs from the user perspective will be from
those who are against stem cells research, but belong to an age range that is
similar to the user.”), 12–13 (citing O’Malley ¶ 75) (“As the O’Malley
reference discloses displaying the content items under the ‘opposite
correlated content’ in Fig. 10 that are both associated with individuals of a
similar background (same age range) and presenting a different perspective
about a topic than the opinion of that user (against stem cell research), the
reference discloses the claims as filed.”).
We do not see any error in the contested findings of the Examiner. We
concur with the Examiner’s fact findings and conclusion of obviousness.
O’Malley discloses the following:
FIG. 8 illustrates a web screen of the user selecting the
response form 118. For example, the user selected “stem cell
research” as the condensed statement 115 under the at least one
topic 114, “Polar,” and is presented with a “pro” or “against”
response form 118. In this example, the user selected “pro.”
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
16
O’Malley ¶ 51. Thus, O’Malley’s disclosure of the user identifying “pro”
about “stem cell research” describes “identifying a user perspective of the
user about a topic” as recited in claim 1.
O’Malley discloses “[t]he user can add in filters for gender or age to
further find interests and views of like-minded people (the user’s age).”
O’Malley ¶ 77. Thus, O’Malley’s disclosure of filtering by age (selecting
individuals of the same age) describes “selecting, from an individual set, an
individual having an individual background that is similar to the user
background of the user” as recited in claim 1.
O’Malley also discloses:
Another aspect of this unique social search is that the
results of answering a question from the list of questions, not
only shows what “like-minded” people with the same beliefs to
a particular issue or question have said, but also what the
complete opposite had to say (referred here as to the “polar
opposite”).
O’Malley ¶ 75. Thus, when considering these disclosures together, O’Malley
describes “identifying a content item associated with the individual”
(filtering by age to identify content items associated with individuals of the
same age (O’Malley ¶ 77)) “and presenting an individual perspective about
the topic that differs from the user perspective of the user about the topic”
(identifying the user as “pro” about “stem cell research” and showing results
associated with “against” individuals of the same age (O’Malley ¶¶ 51, 75,
77)); “and presenting the content item to the user” (showing the results
(O’Malley ¶¶ 51, 75, 77)) as recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, O’Malley describes all limitations of claim 1 for the
reasons explained above. See O’Malley ¶¶ 51, 75, 77.
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
17
Regarding Appellant’s argument i, this argument does not show any
error because the broad claim language does not preclude findings that
O’Malley describes the claim limitations, as explained above.
Regarding Appellant’s argument ii, this argument does not show any
error because by presenting both “pro” and “against” content, O’Malley is
presenting content from a perspective that differs from the user perspective
(and is also presenting content from a perspective that is the same as the user
perspective). Further, by filtering presented content by age, O’Malley is
presenting content associated with individuals similar (same age) to the user.
Regarding Appellant’s argument iii, this argument does not show any
error because, as explained above, O’Malley describes presenting content
associated with individuals of the same age as the user, and the presented
content includes both “pro” and “against” content. See O’Malley ¶¶ 51, 75,
77.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) and similarly, claims 2–4, 6–9, and 11–14, which are not
separately argued. See Appeal Br. 25 (“[T]he rejection of the dependent
claims [is] not raised for appeal at this time.”).

The Obviousness Rejection of Claim 5 over O’Malley and Finley
The Examiner finds O’Malley and Finley teach all limitations of claim
5. Final Act. 8–9.
Appellant does not present any arguments with respect to this
rejection of claim 5. See Appeal Br. 25 (“[T]he rejection of the dependent
claims [is] not raised for appeal at this time.”).
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103
of claim 5.
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
18

The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 10 and 15 over O’Malley and Engle
The Examiner finds O’Malley and Engle teach all limitations of
claims 10 and 15. Final Act. 9–11.
Appellant does not present any arguments with respect to this
rejection of claims 10 and 15. See Appeal Br. 25 (“[T]he rejection of the
dependent claims [is] not raised for appeal at this time.”).
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103
of claims 10 and 15.

The Obviousness Rejection of Claims 16 and 19 over O’Malley and Gou
The Examiner finds O’Malley and Gou teach all limitations of claims
16 and 19. Final Act. 12–13.
Appellant does not present any arguments with respect to this
rejection of claims 16 and 19. See Appeal Br. 25 (“[T]he rejection of the
dependent claims [is] not raised for appeal at this time.”).
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103
of claims 16 and 19.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
20 112(b) Indefiniteness 20
Appeal 2018-005766
Application 14/497,760
19
1–4, 6–9,
11–14
102(a)(1) O’Malley 1–4, 6–9,
11–14

5 103 O’Malley, Finley 5
10, 15 103 O’Malley, Engle 10, 15
16, 19 103 O’Malley, Gou 16, 19
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2016).
AFFIRMED