Ex Parte Zukowski et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 30, 201310710295 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DEBORRA J. ZUKOWSKI, JAMES R. NORRIS JR., ARTHUR J. PARKOS, and JOHN W. ROJAS ____________ Appeal 2011-001462 Application 10/710,295 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD, JR., ERIC S. FRAHM, and ANDREW J. DILLON, Administrative Patent Judges. DILLON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-6, 13-23, 25, and 26. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants describe the invention as follows: Appeal 2011-001462 Application 10/710,295 2 In the illustrative embodiments, systems provide an environment where the focus is on a user’s interaction with a document. In this environment, the response to such interactions should be agnostic to whether the document and sensing are virtual or physical. For example, four representative actions are considered. First, a user touches a physical document as sensed by a physical document sensor (physical document and physical sensor). Second, a user touches a token that represents a virtual document as sensed by a physical sensor (virtual document and physical sensor). Third, a user clicks on a document in a document list as sensed by a virtual sensor (virtual document and virtual sensor). Fourth, a user touches a smart wall that is displaying a document list (virtual document and physical sensor). The environment of the system is capable of responding to the following four interactions in the same manner: For all four interactions, the environment is able to determine that the user is actively using the document. Spec., ¶ 23. Independent claim 1 is illustrative: 1. A method for processing a physical token in a responsive environment having a processor to provide an association with a virtual document comprising: attaching a physical sensor to the physical token, wherein the physical sensor is associated with the physical token; sensing the presence of the physical token in an instrumented association bin; launching a document browser application in response to sensing the presence of the physical token in the instrumented association bin; obtaining user selection data from the document browser application identifying the virtual document to register with the physical token; and Appeal 2011-001462 Application 10/710,295 3 creating a sensor model instance associating the physical sensor with the physical token, the user and the virtual document using the processor. The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence of unpatentability: Gossweiler US 7,089,288 B2 Aug. 8, 2006 Thorman US 2005/0131959 A1 Jun. 16, 2005 Want et al., “Bridging Physical and Virtual Worlds with Electronic Tags” CHI ‘99, 370-377, May 1999. REJECTION The Examiner rejected claims 1-6, 13-22, 25, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Gossweiler and Thorman. Ans., pp. 3-7.1 The Examiner rejected claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Gossweiler, Thorman, and Want. Ans., pp. 7-8. ANALYSIS Turning to illustrative claim 1, the method requires: (i) attaching a physical sensor to a physical token; (ii) launching a browser in response to sensing the physical token; (iii) using the browser to identify a document; and (iv) associating the physical sensor with the physical token, browser user, and document. The Examiner finds these steps are obvious over Gossweiler’s use of RFID tags. Ans., pp. 8-10. Particularly, the Examiner finds Gossweiler’s use of RFID tags entails: attaching an unregistered RFID tag (claimed sensor) to a navigational card (claimed token) (step (i)); 1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Appeal Brief filed May 4, 2010 (“App. Br.”) and Examiner’s Answer mailed July 22, 2010 (“Ans.”). Appeal 2011-001462 Application 10/710,295 4 opening a dialog box (claimed browser) in response to sensing a registered RFID tag of a user ID card and the unregistered tag of the navigational card (step (ii)); using the dialog box to associate the unregistered tag with the navigational card, person of the user ID (claimed browser user), and a command for opening a specific electronic document (claimed document) (steps (iii) and (iv)). Id. Appellants argue: “Gossweiler ‘288 apparently describes only a tag associated with a type of action, but not a particular document and not a particular user.” App. Br., p. 10. The Examiner responds with citations allegedly teaching a database record that corresponds the “tag identification number” of a navigational card, a “personal identification number that is used to link to commands,” and a “virtual document.” Ans., p. 9. We agree with the Examiner’s findings. Gossweiler teaches that the tags of a user ID card and navigational card can be collectively sensed as a “sentence” command to open a particular document. Gossweiler, col. 2, l. 56 – col. 6, l. 67. And, Gossweiler further teaches that the tags’ identification numbers are “associated with an action in the ASCII database.” Gossweiler, col. 2, ll. 47-60. Based upon these teachings, some form of database record clearly corresponds a user ID’s tag and navigational card’s tag with a command/action to open a document, which in turn corresponds the navigational tag with the person of the user ID card and the document of the command/action. Appellants argue that Gossweiler’s multi-tag sentence command does not associate one particular card/tag with both a user and document, stating “one separate authentication card (not associated with any document) is used for authenticating the user and the other cards are not associated with any Appeal 2011-001462 Application 10/710,295 5 particular user.” App. Br., p. 11. The Examiner responds that “the claim language does not limit to only one tag.” Ans., p. 10. The Examiner’s claim interpretation is correct. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo the claimed method is restricted to one tag, Gossweiler’s above-described sentence command (and corresponding database record) associates a single navigational card/tag with both a user and document. Finally, Appellants argue: [T]he combination of Thorman ‘959 and Gossweiler ‘288 is not proper because . . . Thorman’959 does not involve associations with physical tokens. Moreover, . . . the entire purpose of the reference is to permit display of the contents of multiple file systems. It is important to note that different files may have the same name. Here, the combination as proposed by the Examiner would be inoperative, because the selection process would require that a single unique file name be selected to permit the association. App. Br., p. 12. The Examiner responds: The fact that Thorman discloses a user interface that displays files/documents from a plurality of locations in a single window and that the different files may have the same names does not prevent the user from selection a document and file for further manipulating (e.g., see Fig. 7) because the computer will treats [sic] those as if they are different files because they are in different locations . . . . Ans., p. 11. As to Appellants’ contention that Thorman does not “involve” tokens, Appellants neglect to consider that Gossweiler is relied on as teaching that subject matter. Appellants’ argument accordingly fails to address the rejection. Appeal 2011-001462 Application 10/710,295 6 As to Appellants’ contention that the proposed combination of features would be inoperative, we agree with the Examiner’s response. Even assuming arguendo the features cannot be bodily integrated, a skilled artisan would identify and fill the alleged need for unique file names, i.e., design around the problem. See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . .”). Appellants do not present reasoning or evidence disproving such skill in the art. For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 1 over Gossweiler and Thorman. As Appellants do not present additional arguments for claims 2-6, 13-23, 25, and 26 (App. Br., p. 13), we also sustain the obviousness rejections of: claims 2-6, 13-22, 25, and 26 over Gossweiler and Thorman; and claim 23 over Gossweiler, Thorman, and Want. ORDER For the above reasons, the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-6, 13-23, 25, and 26 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED peb Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation