14283486 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 25, 2017)

Ex Parte ZENG

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardJul 25, 2017

14283486 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 25, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/283,486 05/21/2014 SHUQING ZENG P023197-RD-SDJ 1777 72823 7590 Quinn IP Law 21500 Haggerty Road Suite 300 Northville, MI 48167 EXAMINER LIN, ABBYYEE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3664 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/27/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): amb@quinnlawgroup.com U S Docketing @ quinnlawgroup.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SHUQING ZENG Appeal 2017-000352 Application 14/283,4861 Technology Center 3600 Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-19, which are all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellant identifies GM Global Technology Operations LLC, as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2017-000352 Application 14/283,486 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant’s application relates to creating a local obstacle map for a vehicle and using this map to detect collision threats. Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed subject matter and reads as follows: 1. A method of detecting and tracking objects for a vehicle traveling in a narrow space, the method comprising the steps of: estimating a vehicle motion of travel; detecting objects exterior of the vehicle utilizing object sensing devices; determining whether each of the objects is stationary; generating a static obstacle map in response to determining each of the stationary objects; constructing a local obstacle map utilizing the static obstacle map; estimating a pose of the vehicle relative to obstacles within the local obstacle map; fusing the local obstacle map on a vehicle coordinate grid; performing threat analysis between the vehicle and the stationary objects; actuating a collision prevention device in response to a collision threat detected. The Examiner’s Rejections Claims 2-8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. §112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor regards as the invention. Final Act. 7-8. 2 Appeal 2017-000352 Application 14/283,486 Claims 1,2, 4-6, 10-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable overNoda (US 2012/0283895 Al; Nov. 8, 2012) and Shimizu etal. (US 2013/0223686 Al; Aug. 29,2013). Final Act. 9-13. The Examiner adds Takenaga et al. (US 2007/0008091 Al; Jan. 11, 2007) to reject claim 3 (Final Act. 13-14); Lee et al. (US 2010/0070125 Al; Mar. 18, 2010) to reject claim 7 (Final Act. 14); Lee and Allard et al. (US 2007/0193798 Al; Aug. 23, 2007) to reject claim 8 (Final Act. 14-15); Biggs (US 2004/0232329 Al; Nov. 25, 2004) to reject claim 9 (Final Act. 16); and Allard to reject claims 17-19 (Final Act. 16-18). ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s contentions. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following additional points. Indefiniteness The Examiner rejects claims 2-8 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor regards as the invention. Final Act. 7-8. Appellant offers no argument regarding this rejection. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the indefmiteness rejection of claims 2-8. 3 Appeal 2017-000352 Application 14/283,486 Obviousness — Independent Claim 1 Appellant argues the Examiner erred because Noda and Shimizu fail to teach or suggest a vehicle traveling in a “narrow space,” as recited in the preamble of claim 1. App. Br. 6-7; Reply Br. 2. In particular, Appellant argues Noda and Shimizu both teach vehicles traveling on roads, while the Specification defines “narrow space” to be narrowed/confmed spaces where objects are readily moving in and out of the sensed field due to a vehicle’s close proximity to objects. App. Br. 7. Appellant argues the Examiner only speculates that a road is a narrow space. Id. Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. As an initial matter, “narrow space” is only recited in the preamble of claim 1. If the claim preamble, when read in the context of the entire claim, recites limitations of the claim, or, if the claim preamble is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claim, then the claim preamble should be construed as if in the balance of the claim. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett- Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999). If the body of a claim fully and intrinsically sets forth all of the limitations of the claimed invention, and the preamble merely states, for example, the purpose or intended use of the invention, rather than any distinct definition of any of the claimed invention’s limitations, then the preamble is not considered a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction. Id. In this case, the “narrow space” limitation merely states the intended use of the invention—detecting and tracking objects for a vehicle traveling in a narrow space. Accordingly, the preamble is not a limitation of the claim. Even if the preamble were considered a limitation, we agree with the Examiner that Noda and Shimizu teach or suggest a vehicle traveling in a 4 Appeal 2017-000352 Application 14/283,486 “narrow space.” The Examiner finds, and we agree, a road is a limit on space that places boundaries around where a vehicle may travel and, therefore, is a “narrow space.” Ans. 4. An ordinarily skilled artisan would understand that some roads, such as small mountain rounds, are particularly “narrow spaces.” Id. Moreover, Appellant’s Specification does not define “narrow space” in a manner to exclude a road. See Spec. 2, 18. Appellant further argues Noda and Shimizu do not teach or suggest “generating a static obstacle map in response to determining whether each of the objects is stationary.” App. Br. 7-8. Specifically, Appellant argues Noda teaches identifying and storing both static and dynamic objects in memory, instead of generating a static obstacle map based only on stationary, static objects. Id. at 7. Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error because the claim does not preclude creation of a static obstacle map that includes static and dynamic objects. Claim 1 recites a method “comprising the steps of. . . detecting objects[,] . . . determining whether each of the objects is stationary; [and] generating a static obstacle map in response to determining each of the stationary objects.” Claim 1 does not recite generating a static obstacle that only includes the objects determined to be stationary. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Noda teaches the disputed limitation. Moreover, the Examiner finds Noda teaches detecting all objects (stationary and moving) in a region and, if all objects are stationary (e.g., pedestrians in the area are standing still, not walking), then only stationary objects are included. Ans. 7-8. Thus, even accepting Appellant’s proposed claim construction, we agree with the Examiner that it is sufficient that Noda teaches performing the method steps in some circumstances, even if Noda 5 Appeal 2017-000352 Application 14/283,486 also teaches generating an obstacle map that includes both stationary and moving objects in some circumstances. See Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“It does not matter that the use of alphabetical order for locations would not always result in farther-over- nearer ordering. It is enough that the combination would sometimes perform all the method steps, including farther-over-nearer ordering.”) (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Appellant additionally argues Noda and Shimizu fail to teach or suggest “constructing a local obstacle map. . .” and “estimating a pose of the vehicle . . . .” App. Br. 8-9. These arguments rely on the same reasoning as the “generating” limitation discussed above. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Noda and Shimizu teach or suggest these limitations. Obviousness — Dependent Claims Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding the cited combinations of references teach or suggest various limitations of certain dependent claims. Appellant’s arguments for some dependent claims (e.g., claims 4 and 5) rely on the same arguments presented for claim 1. We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons set forth above. We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments for the remaining dependent claims, and adopt the Examiner’s findings from the Final Action and the Answer regarding the dependent claims. 6 Appeal 2017-000352 Application 14/283,486 DECISION We affirm the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-19. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 7