Ex Parte Zawacki et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 23, 2016

12552417 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 23, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
12/552,417 0910212009 Jennifer Greenwood Zawacki
63203 7590 06/27/2016
ROGITZ & AS SOCIA TES
750B STREET
SUITE 3120
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
RPS920090027-US-NP 4588
EXAMINER
LE, THU NGUYET T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2162
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/27/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
Noelle@rogitz.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
J ohn@rogitz.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JENNIFER GREENWOOD ZAWACKI, WSTIN
TYLER DUBS, HOW ARD JEFFREY LOCKER, JULIE
ANNE MORRIS, STEVEN RICHARD PERRIN, AXEL
RAMIREZ FLORES, JAMES JOSEPH THRASHER, and
SEAN MICHAEL ULRICH
Appeal2014-009889
Application 12/552,417
Technology Center 2100
Before JON M. JURGOVAN, JOHN F. HORVATH, and
ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
JURGOVii .. N, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, and22-29. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm-in-part.2
1 Appellants identify Lenovo Singapore PTE. Ltd. as the real party in
interest. (App. Br. 2.)
2 Our decision refers to the Specification filed Sept. 2, 2009 ("Spec."), the
Final Office Action mailed Nov. 22, 2013 ("Final Act."), the Appeal Brief
filed Feb. 26, 2014 ("App. Br."), and the Reply Brief filed Sept. 10, 2014
("Reply Br.").
Appeal2014-009889
Application 12/552,417
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims are directed to reconstructing an application session when
changing between devices. (Spec. Title, Abstract.) Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A machine-implemented method comprising:
receiving captured session data generated by a first device
at a second device, the captured session data including one or
more session data records that each correspond to one or more
application sessions executing on the first device, the captured
session data being established in response to a triggering event at
the first device, the triggering event being a change in the power
state of the first device;
selecting, at the second device, at least one of the session
data records and extracting data from the selected session data
record; and
reconstructing, at the second device, at least one of the
application sessions that corresponds to the at least one selected
session data record using the extracted data.
(App. Br. 16-Claims App'x.)
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 6, 7, 12, 13, 18, 23, 25, and 29 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) based on Arling (US 2005/0097618 Al, May 5, 2005).
(Final Act. 2---6.)
Claims 22 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on
Arling and Fogle (US 2003/0074590 Al, Apr. 17, 2003). (Final Act. 6-7.)
Claims 26 and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on
Arling and Bryar (US 2006/0168510 Al, July 27, 2006). (Final Act. 8-9.)
Claim 28 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Arling
and Song (US 2005/0066037 Al, Mar. 24, 2005). (Final Act. 9-10.)
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Application 12/552,417
ANALYSIS
§ 102(b)
"A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference." Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d
628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). To establish anticipation, every element and
limitation of the claimed invention must be found in a single prior art
reference, arranged as in the claim. Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf
Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign,
Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Claim 1
Appellants argue Arling fails to disclose the limitation of claim 1
reciting "the captured session data being established in response to a
triggering event at the first device, the triggering event being a change in the
power state of the first device." (App. Br. 5-7; Reply Br. 1-2 citing Arling
i-fi-13, 19.) Specifically, Appellants argue that Arling's appliances do not
change their power state when playing, pausing, or resuming media
playback. (Id.) Thus, according to Appellants, Arling does not disclose a
triggering event that is a change in power state causing saving of media,
device, or content states for later playback on a different appliance, as
required by the claim. (Id.)
Claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the Specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As the Examiner correctly notes, the claimed phrase
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Application 12/552,417
"power state" does not appear in Appellants' Specification.3 (Ans. 3.) The
Examiner further notes the Specification mentions hibernation mode,
suspend mode, and low battery mode, and finds these are examples of power
states. (Ans. 3--4 citing Spec. i-fi-f 18, 27.) The Examiner interprets the
"suspend mode" to encompass Arling's pausing of playback on an
appliance, concluding Arling anticipates claim 1. (Ans. 4 citing Arling i-fi-13,
18.)
We agree with Appellants' argument that claim 1 is not anticipated by
Arling. The Examiner does not show that Arling discloses, explicitly or
inherently, that pausing an appliance changes its power state as claimed.
Although it is possible Arling's appliance consumes less power when
paused, the cited paragraphs of Arling do not establish this proposition, and
the Examiner makes no finding that a person skilled in the art would
understand Arling' s appliance consumes less power when paused.
Furthermore, the Examiner does not show that entry into the pause state by
Arling's appliance triggers capture of session data. Thus, we do not sustain
the anticipation rejection of claim 1.
Claims 7 and 13
Claim 7 recites "the captured session data that is received includes
data only for applications executable by the information handling system as
determined by the external device." (App. Br. 16-17 - Claims App'x.)
Claim 13 recites "the captured session data that is received includes data
only for applications executable by the second device as determined by the
3 The Examiner is advised that a claimed phrase lacking written description
or enablement in the Specification is properly rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph (pre-AIA).
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Application 12/552,417
first device." (App. Br. 17-18 -Claims App'x.) Appellants argue these
limitations require the captured session data that is received includes data (1)
only for applications executable by the second device (2) as determined by
the first device. (App. Br. 8, Reply Br. 2-3.)
We note that Arling mentions a user may initiate a save state
command for saving and recalling state data for media and appliances, and
further mentions the save state command may apply to a particular media
rendering system from which a movie, music, television broadcast, slide
show, image, or other media element is being played. (Arling i-f 6; see also
Final Act. 4.) Arling's media elements may be regarded equivalent to the
claimed application data.
As the Examiner notes, Arling teaches that a recall state command
may be issued to a set of appliances, and if a determination is made the
recall operation is to apply to the same or analogous set of appliances, then
no significant data conversion is necessary. (Ans. 5-7 citing Arling i-fi-16, 18,
28, 31, 37, 38, see also i-f 20.) Thus, in the case of state recall involving the
same or a similar set of appliances, the source appliance( s) determines media
state (including the application state) for the same or analogous appliance(s)
on which recall is effected. Thus, we agree with the Examiner Arling
anticipates claims 7 and 13.
§ 103(a)
"Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when 'the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains."' KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
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Application 12/552,417
(2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). An
obviousness rejection under§ 103(a) requires that "there must be some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness." KSR at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441F.3d977,
988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
Claims 22 and 24
Claim 22 recites "the change of the power state is entering a
hibernation mode," and claim 24 recites "the change of the power state is
entering a low battery mode." (App. Br. 18-19 - Claims App'x.) Appellant
argues the Examiner admits these claims are not disclosed by Arling, and
that Fogle mentions hibernation and low battery "modes," but in the simple
context that computers can hibernate and enter low battery modes. (App. Br.
10-12.) To the contrary, the Examiner finds the claims obvious over the
combination of Arling and Fogle, stating Fogle teaches hibernation mode,
including a low battery state, which involves saving hardware state
information and memory contents. (Ans. 8-9 citing Fogle i-f 5.) Fogle also
teaches that the hibernation mode can be activated by the computer due to a
critically low battery condition, which triggers the saving of hardware state
information and memory contents. (See Fogle i-f 5.) Thus, in Fogle, the
entry into hibernation mode due to a critically low battery condition is a
"triggering event" causing the saving of state information as claimed. This
teaching of Fogle overcomes the deficiency of Arling as applied to claim 1.
We agree with the Examiner that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would realize that Arling and Fogle similarly teach saving state information
in response to a triggering event (namely, Arling's pause feature and Fogle's
hibernation mode) and would thus be led to combine these references. Also,
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Application 12/552,417
as the Examiner notes, Arling and Fogle are from the same field of endeavor
and address similar problems relating to saving state information upon the
occurrence of a triggering event. Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner
errs in the rejection of claims 22 and 24.
Remaining Claims
Our decision on the foregoing arguments renders it unnecessary to
reach Appellants' remaining arguments. The claims for which no arguments
were presented stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. 3 7
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv).
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 6, 23, 25, and
29 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 7, 12, 13, and 18
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claims 26-28 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 22 and 24 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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