Ex Parte Yoon et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 10, 2018

14272769 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 10, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/272,769 05/08/2014 Yongsik Yoon 000005-020701US 4803
58735 7590 01/12/2018
Fountainhead Law Group P.C.
Chad R. Walsh
900 LAFAYETTE STREET
SUITE 301
SANTA CLARA, CA 95050
EXAMINER
HOANG, HAU HAI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2167
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/12/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@fountainheadlaw.com
rbaumann@fountainheadlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YONGSIK YOON, CHANHO JEONG, JUCHANG LEE,
CHANG BIN SONG, YONG SIK KWON, and SANG KYUN CHA
Appeal 2017-008221
Application 14/272,7691
Technology Center 2100
Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, DENISE M. POTHIER, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection
of claims 1—18, which constitute all of the claims pending in this application.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify SAP SE as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2017-008221
Application 14/272,769
THE INVENTION
The disclosed and claimed invention is directed to a hybrid database
table stored as both a row and a column store. Spec. 2, 14.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A computer implemented method comprising:
a computer storing a first partition of a database on a
non-transitory computer readable storage medium using a row-
oriented storage model, the first partition comprising a plurality
of first records of the database;
the computer storing a remaining partition of the
database on the non-transitory computer readable storage
medium using a column-oriented storage model, the remaining
partition comprising a plurality of second records of the
database different from the plurality of first records;
the computer receiving a query on the database;
the computer making a first search on the first partition
of the database using the received query; and
the computer selectively making a second search on the
remaining partition of the database depending on an outcome of
the first search, wherein the computer makes the second search
on the remaining partition of the database in response to a first
outcome of the first search, wherein the computer does not
make the second search on the remaining partition of the
database in response to a second outcome of the first search.
App. Br. 18 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the
claims on appeal is:
Sah
Schmitt
Hermstadt
US 2003/0028509 A1 Feb. 6, 2003
US 2005/0289129 A1 Dec. 29, 2005
US 2009/0193006 A1 July 30, 2009
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Application 14/272,769
Ganesh US 2011/0029569 A1 Feb. 3, 2011
REJECTIONS
Claims 1—18 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Final Act. 2—5.
Claims 1—3, 7—9, and 13—15 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ganesh in view of Sah. Final Act. 6—22.
Claims 4, 10, and 16 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Ganesh in view of Sah and Hermstadt. Final
Act. 22—26.
Claims 5, 6, 11, 12, 17, and 18 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ganesh in view of Sah and
Schmitt. Final Act. 26—33.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellants’
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellants.
We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments regarding the written
description rejection that the Examiner erred. However, are not persuaded
by Appellants’ arguments directed to the unpatentability of the claims based
on the cited prior art.
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Section 112 Rejection
The Examiner finds that the Specification does not contain a written
description of “the remaining partition comprising a plurality of second
records of the database different from the plurality of first records,” as
recited in claim 1. Final Act. 2—5; Ans. 2-4. More particularly, the
Examiner finds that “[t]here is no evidence in the specification to prove that
the database is divided/partitioned into row store and column store.” Final
Act. 4. The Examiner’s finding is premised on a claim construction in
which all of the records in the remaining partitions “are DIFFERENT from
first records in the first partition.” Ans. 2; see also Ans. 2—3 (“Given [the]
broadest reasonable interpretation, all second records in the remaining
partitions are different from first records in the first partition.”).
Appellants argue the Specification contains a written description of
the claimed subject matter, including the disputed limitation. App. Br. 8—11;
Reply Br. 2—\. More specifically, Appellants argue the disputed limitation
is described in the Specification:
Fig. 1 (shown below) of the published application as filed
shows a hybrid table 100 having a row partition 102 and a
column partition 106. The figure also shows an asynchronous
transaction bulk data move of data from the row partition 102 to
the column partition 106. Paragraphs [0048—0050] in the
published application describe[] the data movement. Paragraph
[0050] explains that relevant data may be maintained in the row
store for OLTP performance, and stable aged data may be
maintained in the column store for aggregation performance.
Clearly, this describes that the column store portion stores data
in the database different from the row store portion.
App. Br. 8.
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Application 14/272,769
Regarding the Examiner’s claim construction, Appellants argue “[n]o
where [sic] in the claims is there a requirement that all data in the column
store is different from the data in the row store.” Id. at 10. More
specifically, Appellants argue that the Examiner’s claim construction ignores
the open-ended nature of the transitional phrase “comprising” recited in
claim 1. Reply Br. 2—3. Thus, according to Appellants, “[t]he claim
language only requires that the second records be different from the first
records, which is supported in the specification; the claim language does not
require that the remaining records also be different from the first records.”
Id. at 3.
During examination of a patent application, a claim is given its
broadest reasonable construction “in light of the specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). There is a presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and
customary meaning. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). An applicant may rebut this presumption, however, by acting as
his own lexicographer, providing a definition of the term in the specification
with “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” See In re Paulsen,
30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In the absence of such a definition,
limitations are not to be read from the specification into the claims. In re
Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). “[Although the
specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we
have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those
embodiments. . . . [CJlaims may embrace ‘different subject matter than is
illustrated in the specific embodiments in the specification.’” Phillips v.
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AWHCorp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (enbanc) (citations
omitted). Additionally, the “comprising” transitional phrase is “inclusive or
open-ended and does not exclude additional, unrecited elements.” Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see
also In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“the name of
the game is the claim”); Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“‘Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language
which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may
be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.”).
We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner’s
construction is not consistent with the broadest reasonable construction. The
Examiner has not identified any language in the claim that precludes an
overlap between the records in the first partition and the remaining partition.
Nor has the Examiner identified any language in the Specification indicating
the Appellants are acting as a lexicographer and limiting the scope of the
claim. Accordingly, in light of the language of the claim and the use of the
open-ended transition comprising, we conclude claim 1 is reasonably broad
to allow an overlap between the plurality of first records and second records
so long as the plurality of first and second records are not identical.
Because the Examiner’s findings were premised on an incorrect claim
construction, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of the claims under 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Section 103 Rejections
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Ganesh and Sah teaches “the computer making a first search ...” and “the
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computer selectively making a second search . . steps recited in claim 1.
App. Br. 11—13; Reply Br. 4—5. More specifically, Appellants argue “Sail
relates to storing table data by parsing the table data into columns of values,
and formatting each column into a data stream that is then stored on a
storage device as a continuous strip of data.” App. Br. 12 (citing Sah,
Abstract). However, according to Appellants, although “the data dictionary
303 contains rows of data, that in itself does not render Sah’s data dictionary
a row-oriented data store.” Id. Therefore, Appellants argue, “[t]he
erroneous conclusion that Sah’s data dictionary 303 teaches the claimed first
partition made in the Office action, improperly ignores the earlier made
claim recitation that limits the first partition to ‘row-oriented storage
model.’” Id. at 13; see also Reply Br. 5 (“The Examiner, by ignoring that
the claimed first partition of the database is a row-oriented storage model
and by ignoring that Sah’s data dictionary is part of a column data store and
focusing only on the row table format of the data dictionary, exalts form
over substance.”).
The Examiner finds Ganesh teaches “a first partition of a database on
a non-transitory computer readable storage medium using a row-oriented
storage model. . .” and “a remaining partition of the database on the non-
transitory computer readable storage medium using a column-oriented
storage model. . .,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 6 (citing Ganesh 134).
The Examiner further finds Sah teaches making a first search on a first
partition of a database and selectively making a second search of the
remaining partition. Final Act. 9—10 (citing Sah 143); see also Ans. 7 (“Sah
discloses the first search in row-oriented storage and second search in
column-oriented storage.”). The Examiner further finds that a person of
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ordinary skill in the art would have “combin[ed] the searching feature
disclosed by Sah into Ganesh so that the storage scheme 200 in fig. 3 of
Ganesh can perform a first search in row-oriented storage in the first
partition, and perform a second search in column-oriented storage in second
partition.” Ans. 7—8; see also Final Act. 10, 34—36.
Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references
individually when the rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art
disclosures. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The
test for obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly
suggested in any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject
matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light
of the combined teachings of those references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981). Because Appellants’ argument is directed to Sah alone
and not in combination with Ganesh’s teaching of the first partition and
remaining partition—which Appellants do not dispute—, we are not
persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred. Instead, we
agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as
unpatentable as obvious, along with the rejections of claims 7 and 13, which
are argued on the same grounds, and dependent claims 2, 3, 8, 9, 14, and 15,
which are not argued separately. See App. Br. 13—14.
With respect to dependent claims 4—6, 10-12 and 16—18, Appellants
merely contend that because the additional references used in the rejections
of these claims (Hermstadt and Schmitt) do not cure the shortcomings of the
other references applied against claim 1, the Examiner failed to make a
prima facie case of obviousness for these claims. App. Br. 15—16. Because
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we determine that the rejection of claim 1 is not erroneous for the reasons
discussed above, we sustain the rejections of these claims.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner’s decisions rejecting
claims 1—18 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s decisions rejecting
claims 1—18 as unpatentable under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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