Ex Parte Yang et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 12, 2016

13075958 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 12, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/075,958 03/30/2011
23117 7590 08/16/2016
NIXON & V ANDERHYE, PC
901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11 TH FLOOR
ARLINGTON, VA 22203
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Yong Yang
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
JRL-2380-2130 2703
EXAMINER
MORLAN, ROBERT M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2475
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/16/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com
pair_nixon@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YONG YANG, GUNNAR RYDNELL,
and ANN-CHRISTINE SANDER
Appeal2015-001653
Application 13/075,958 1
Technology Center 2400
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, SHARON PENICK, and
AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.
PENICK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final
Rejection of claims 1-21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(l).
We affirm-in-part.
Invention
Appellants' invention relates to a wireless communications network
which may include low mobility user equipment, and detachment of a user
from the wireless communications network, including detaching user
equipment from the wireless communications network without
1 Appellants identify Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson as the real party in
interest. (Appeal Br. 1.)
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providing any signaling towards the user. (Spec. Abstract, 10:4--30, Fig. 5.)
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1, 3, and 8, reproduced below with certain key limitations
emphasized, are exemplary:
1. A method for detaching a low mobility user from a
wireless network, the method comprising:
identifying a user as a low mobility user; and
removing a Packet Data Network (PDN) connection
between the low mobility user and the network, without signaling
the low mobility user.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein identifying the user as a
low mobility user further comprises identifYing the user is
associated with an Access Point Name (APN) designated for low
mobility communications.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein removing the PDN
connection between the low mobility user and the network
further comprises partially removing mobility management
content from a mobility management node.
Rejections
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 11, 12, 15, 20, and 21 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Jeong et al. (US 2007/0287476 Al; Dec.
13, 2007) in view ofMaggenti et al. (US 2003/0012149 Al; Jan. 16, 2003).
(Final Action 2--4.)
The Examiner rejects claims 3 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Jeong, Maggenti, and Corneille et al. (US 7,239,877 B2; July
3, 2007). (Final Action 4--5.)
The Examiner rejects claims 4, 6, 14, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as obvious over Jeong, Maggenti, and Faccin (US 2008/0320149 Al; Dec.
25, 2008). (Final Action 5-6.)
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The Examiner rejects claims 7 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Jeong, Maggenti, and Giaretta et al. (US 2009/0182883 Al;
July 16, 2009). (Final Action 6-7.)
The Examiner rejects claims 8 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Jeong, Maggenti, and Khouri et al. (US 2011/0034152 Al;
Feb. 10, 2011). (Final Action 7.)
The Examiner rejects claims 9 and 192 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Jeong, Maggenti, and Echavarri et al. (US 2003/0198198 Al;
Oct. 23, 2003). (Final Action 7-8.)
Issues
(A) Did the Examiner err in finding Jeong to be analogous art to the
invention?
(B) Did the Examiner err in combining Jeong and Maggenti in the
rejection of claim 1?
(C) Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Jeong and
Maggenti teaches or suggests "removing a Packet Data Network (PDN)
connection between the low mobility user and the network, without
signaling the low mobility user," as recited in claim 1?
(D) Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Jeong,
Maggenti, and Corneille teaches or suggests "wherein identifying the user as
a low mobility user further comprises identifying the user is associated with
an Access Point Name (APN) designated for low mobility communications,"
as recited in claim 3?
2 While identification of claim 19 in this rejection is omitted in the Final
Action, Appellants note the similarity of claim 9 to claim 19 (Appeal Br. 16)
and the Examiner acknowledges that the omission of claim 19 in the Final
Action was a typographical error. (Answer 12.)
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(E) Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Jeong,
Maggenti, and Khouri teaches or suggests "wherein removing the PDN
connection between the low mobility user and the network further comprises
partially removing mobility management content from a mobility
management node," as recited in claim 8?
ANALYSIS
Claim 1
The Examiner finds claim 1 obvious over the combination of Jeong
and Maggenti. (Final Action 3.)
(A) Jeong as Analogous Art
Appellants argue that Jeong is directed to an unrelated and different
problem to the problem the invention addresses and solves. (Appeal Br. 4--
8; Reply Br. 1.) We understand Appellants to be arguing that Jeong is not
analogous art.
We consider two criteria in determining whether prior art is
analogous: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor as the
invention, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not
within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is
reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is
involved. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Supreme
Court directs us to construe the scope of analogous art broadly, stating that
"familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and
in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle" and that it is "error ... to
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foreclose [an obviousness] reasoning by holding that courts and patent
examiners should look only to the problem the [applicant] was trying to
solve." KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007).
The Examiner finds, without elaboration, that Jeong and Maggenti are
"from the same or a similar field of endeavor." (Final Action 3.) Appellants
argue that a problem addressed by the invention is "a significant risk of
overloading radio networks with unnecessary network use such as when
large groups of radio terminals ... try to access the radio network." (Appeal
Br. 5.) Appellants argue that:
Jeong is directed to unrelated and different problem-
"degradation in the quality of a high quality data service ...
caused mainly by the channel environment" [0007], and
"overcome[ s] fading in a typical OFDM system" using
"Modulation and Coding (AMC) scheme" [0008] and HARQ
[0016].
(Appeal Br. 7.) However, Jeong's Abstract sets out that "[i]n the method, a
UE [(user equipment)] reports mobility information to a network; and the
network performs according to the mobility information of the UE," in order
to "reduce complexity of the UE and reduce the waste in power consumption
thereof, and reduce the signaling overhead of the network." (Jeong,
Abstract.) Thus, we find the Jeong reference to be analogous to the claimed
invention, as either from the same field of endeavor or reasonably pertinent
to the problem addressed by Appellants.
(B) The Combination of Jeong and Maggenti
Appellants argue that "[ t ]here is no reasonable basis for the
combination of Jeong and Magg en ti," that the Examiner has not articulated
"any reasoning" for the combination, and that modifying Jeong according to
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the teachings of Maggenti would render Jeong inoperable. (Appeal Br. 11-
13.)
However, the Examiner does articulate reasoning for the combination,
finding that "[t]he motivation is that a low mobility user that is not using
data is still consuming resources by maintaining unnecessary connections"
and that "[t]erminating those connections increases available bandwidth to
other users." (Final Action 3, citations omitted.)
Appellants argue that the use of the teachings of Maggenti with the
system of Jeong would render Jeong inoperable. (Appeal Br. 12-13; Reply
Br. 2--4.) Regarding the operability of the combination, "[t]he test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference .... Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted).
On this record, we are not convinced that there is error in the
Examiner's articulated reasoning for combining Jeong and Maggenti, or that
a skilled artisan would have been dissuaded from combining the teachings of
Jeong and Maggenti to arrive at a method as recited in claim 1.
(C) "removing a Packet Data Network (PDN) connection between the low
mobility user and the network, without signaling the low mobility user"
The Examiner finds claim 1 obvious over the combination of Jeong
and Maggenti, including the recited limitation of "removing a Packet Data
Network (PDN) connection between the low mobility user and the network,
without signaling the low mobility user," which the Examiner finds is taught
or suggested by Maggenti. (Final Action 3.)
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Appellants argue that:
Maggenti's dormant communications device (CD) does not
teach removing a Packet Data Network (PDN) connection
between an identified low mobility user and the network
without signaling the low mobility user. Instead, this text in
Maggenti explains that a base station can drop a call when base
station resources are at a premium and a communications
device (CD) is dormant. Neither a current demand on base
station resources nor a dormancy of a UE leading to a dropped
call is the same as a user that is identified as a low mobility
user. Indeed, a dormant UE could be highly mobile.
(Appeal Br. 10-11.) Appellants appear to be arguing that the disputed
limitation regarding the removal of a connection should be interpreted as
occurring as a result of the identification of the user as low mobility. This
relationship, however, is not present in the disputed limitation. Appellants'
Specification in part provides that, "[t]he decision to detach the UE 101 from
the network may be based on the mobility of the UE." (Spec. 9:33-34,
emphasis added.) The claim itself describes the removal of the connection
as occurring to a connection between an identified low-mobility user and the
network, it does not require that only connections to identified low-mobility
users be removed, or state any causal relationship between the identification
of a user and the removal. In our view, Appellants' arguments regarding the
scope of the invention are not commensurate with the scope of the claims.
Thus, the argued deficiencies in Maggenti do not convince us of error in the
Examiner's rejection.
Additionally, we agree with the Examiner that "Jeong explains a small
list of different resources that could be withheld from an idle low mobility
[user equipment] in i-f [0055]" and that "[e]xtending this list to other items
would be a natural application of the Jeong reference." (Answer 8.) We
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agree that one of ordinary skill in the art might combine the removal of a
connection (as taught by Maggenti) with the disparate treatment of low
mobility equipment in Jeong, thus teaching or suggesting the subject matter
of claim 1.
Claim 1 - Conclusion
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in the rejection
of claim 1 as obvious over the combination of Jeong and Maggenti, or the
rejections of independent claims 11and21 and dependent claims 2, 4--7, 10,
12, 14--17, and 20, all argued on substantially the same basis. (Appeal Br.
13-15.)
Therefore, we affirm the rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 11, 12, 15, 20
and 21under35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Jeong and Maggenti; the
rejection of 4, 6, 14, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Jeong,
Maggenti, and Faccin; and the rejections of claims 7 and 17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Jeong, Maggenti, and Giaretta.
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Claim 3
The Examiner finds that the combination of Jeong, Maggenti, and
Corneille teaches or suggests "wherein identifying the user as a low mobility
user further comprises identifying the user is associated with an Access
Point Name (APN) designated for low mobility communications." (Final
Action 4--5.) Appellants argue that Corneille does not teach or suggest the
disputed limitation: "[ s ]imply ascertaining a device type based on an APN
being used is not a teaching of identifying that a low mobility user is
associated with an Access Point Name (APN) designated for low mobility
communications." (Appeal Br. 13-14.)
Appellants' contentions focus on the references separately and ignore
the fact that the proposed rejection is based on the combination of Jeong and
Maggenti with Corneille. Each reference must be read, not in isolation, but
for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole. See
Keller, 642 F.2d at 425; see also In re Merck & Co. Inc., 800 F.2d 1091,
1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Corneille teaches that the type of a device can be ascertained based on
an APN. (Corneille 15: 10-15, cited in Final Action 4 and Answer 10.)
Jeong teaches that mobility may be discerned based on device type. (Jeong
i-f 48, cited in rejection of claim 1, from which claim 3 depends, Final Action
3.) Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in the rejection of
claim 3 as obvious over the combination of Jeong, Maggenti, and Corneille,
or the rejection of claim 13, argued on substantially the same basis.
Therefore, we affirm the rejection of claims 3 and 13 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Jeong, Maggenti, and Corneille.
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Claim 8
The Examiner finds that the combination of Jeong, Maggenti, and
Khouri teaches or suggests "wherein removing the PDN connection between
the low mobility user and the network further comprises partially removing
mobility management content from a mobility management node," as recited
in claim 8. (Final Action 7.) Appellants argue that Khouri discloses a
contact center obtaining mobility information, including location, speed, or
acceleration information, and that no disclosure is made of partially
removing mobility management content from a mobility management node.
(Appeal Br. 15-16.) In response, the Examiner explains, "the device is not
moving, therefore the storing of speed and acceleration information would
be redundant and unnecessary" and "[i]t would have been obvious to not
store such information for a device that is not moving." (Answer 12.)
The portions of Khouri cited by the Examiner include no disclosure of
removing of mobile agent information when a connection to the mobile
agent is removed. Khouri discloses determining a classification for a mobile
agent based on whether the mobile agent is moving or non-moving. (Khouri
Fig. 2, i-fi-127-32.) There is no indication of deleting the information by
which this determination is made, and, in fact, Khouri indicates that
"[m]obility information may be historical and/or relatively current." (Id. i1
35.) Additionally, while the Examiner finds that "the device is not moving,"
we note that Appellants' low mobility users are not necessarily non-moving.
(See Spec. 2:32-3:2.)
Thus, we are persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Khouri
discloses the subject matter recited in claim 8, independent claim 18 which
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recites substantially similar limitation, and claims 9 and 19, which depend
from these claims.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 8, 9, 18, and 19.
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-7, 10-17, 20
and 21.
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv), no time period for taking any
subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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