Ex Parte YangDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 29, 201713236784 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/236,784 09/20/2011 Morris Yang PPC5365USNP 7486 27777 7590 01/03/2018 JOSEPH F. SHIRTZ JOHNSON & JOHNSON ONE JOHNSON & JOHNSON PLAZA NEW BRUNSWICK, NJ 08933-7003 EXAMINER PHILIPS, BRADLEY H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3778 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/03/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): j nju spatent @ corn s .j nj. com lhowd@its.jnj.com pair_jnj @ firsttofile.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MORRIS YANG Appeal 2017-000899 Application 13/236,784 Technology Center 3700 Before LYNNE H. BROWNE, JEFFREY A. STEPHENS, and GORDON D. KINDER, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) rejecting claims 1, 3—7, 10— 12, 14—16, and 20—22.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. 1 The real party in interest is identified as McNeil-PPC, Inc., which is identified as a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson. Br. 2. 2 Claims 2 and 13 are cancelled, and claims 8, 9, and 17—19 are withdrawn from consideration. Br. 9, 11; Final Act. 1. Appeal 2017-000899 Application 13/236,784 Claimed Subject Matter Claim 1, the sole independent claim on appeal, is reproduced below and illustrates the claimed subject matter. 1. An absorbent article comprising: a liquid permeable cover layer; a liquid impermeable barrier layer; and an absorbent composite material arranged between the cover layer and the barrier layer; wherein the absorbent composite material comprises: a) a fibrous material having a density lower than 0.05 g/cc, the fibrous material including a plurality of individual fibers forming a fiber matrix and a latex binder material present in an amount from about 40% by to about 60% by weight of the fibrous material, the fibrous material having first and second opposed surfaces, b) superabsorbent polymer dispersed within the fiber matrix, and c) an absorbent mixture covering the first surface of the fibrous material, the absorbent mixture comprising between about 90% and about 98% superabsorbent polymer by weight and between about 10% and about 2% adhesive by weight, wherein the adhesive in the absorbent mixture is a hot melt adhesive. Rejection3 I. Claims 1, 3—7, 10-12, 14—16, and 20—22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Toro (US 7,462,755 B2, issued Dec. 9, 2008), Ouedemi (US 2003/0003830 Al, published Jan. 2, 2003), and Chakravarty (US 2005/0148258 Al, published July 7, 2005). Final Act. 3— 11. 3 The Examiner withdraws the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, in the Answer. Ans. 2. 2 Appeal 2017-000899 Application 13/236,784 DISCUSSION The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Toro teaches “an absorbent mixture covering the first surface of the fibrous material,” as recited in claim 1. Appellant argues Toro’s edge barrier elements 20 are not “covering” the first surface of the fibrous material because they do not fully span the surface and are only narrow stripes running along the edge of the absorbent structure. Br. 5. Appellant cites a dictionary defining “cover” to mean “to place something on or over, so as to protect or conceal,” and argues “cover” requires much more than “partial overlying.” Id. We note that Appellant’s argument implicitly interprets the claimed “first surface” to mean the entire face of the fibrous material on the side that is adjacent the absorbent mixture. The Examiner does not dispute Appellant’s interpretation of the “first surface,” but determines that the claim term “covering” does not require “fully spanning.” Ans. 4. The Examiner finds Toro’s absorbent mixture “extends over or overlays the first surface, thus covering the first surface” in a manner consistent with Appellant’s cited dictionary definition. Id. The Examiner also finds “Toro explicitly discloses that the absorbent mixture covers the first surface.” Id. (citing Toro col. 14,11. 8—14). Appellant’s Specification does not use the term “cover” to describe the relation between the absorbent mixture and the first surface of the fibrous material. In our view, however, the ordinary meaning of “to cover” is not broad enough to encompass only partially overlaying a surface. We determine that, without a qualifier such as “partially,” one of ordinary skill in the art would understand “covering” a surface to mean the entire surface is covered. Although the dictionary definition offered by Appellant is not 3 Appeal 2017-000899 Application 13/236,784 explicit as to this point, it is consistent with this understanding because an object will not generally protect or conceal another object unless it entirely covers it. Our interpretation is also consistent with Toro’s use of the terms “to cover” and “covered” because Toro refers to covering a specific area (e.g., 60 cm2 or 35% of a total area) of a surface, and does not indicate that the surface itself is “covered” if only a portion of it is covered. Toro col. 14, 11. 8—17. The Specification’s use of the term “cover layer 82” (see, e.g., Spec. 17:8) and description of a positioning adhesive that is “covered” with removable release paper (Spec. 20:19—21) are not dispositive, but are also consistent with our understanding of the term “cover.” Under our interpretation of “covering,” and accepting the Examiner’s and Appellant’s interpretation of the “first surface” as the entire face of the fibrous material on the side that is adjacent the absorbent mixture, we agree with Appellant that Toro does not teach covering the first surface of the fibrous material with the absorbent mixture. As noted by Appellant, Toro’s edge barrier elements, which the Examiner considers to be the claimed absorbent mixture, do not cover more than 35% of the total area of the respective surface of the core. Toro col. 14,11. 12—17; Br. 5. Because Toro does not teach the “covering” limitation under our interpretation of the term, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Toro, Ouedemi, and Chakravarty. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the rejections of dependent claims 3—7, 10-12, 14—16, and 20-22, which are rejected on the same ground. 4 Appeal 2017-000899 Application 13/236,784 Our decision is based on the rejection before us, and does not preclude further examination of the claims consistent with our interpretation of the claim terms discussed herein.4 DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3—7, 10—12, 14—16, and 20—22. REVERSED 4 Although the Board is authorized to enter a new ground of rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02. 5 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation