Ex Parte Yan

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 19, 2016

12731791 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
121731,791 03/25/2010
11764 7590
Ditthavong & Steiner, P,C,
44 Canal Center Plaza
Suite 322
Alexandria, VA 22314
02/23/2016
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Qifeng Yan
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
P3825USOO 1803
EXAMINER
BLACK-CHILDRESS, RAJSHEED 0
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2684
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/23/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docket@dcpatent.com
Nokia.IPR@nokia.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte QIFENG YAN
Appeal2014-002078
Application 12/731,791
Technology Center 2600
Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and
DENISE M. POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judges.
JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
decision to reject claims 1-20. App. Br. 5. 1 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's invention remotely locates an item using a local sensor.
Spec. i-f 22. In one embodiment, user equipment (UE) tracks sensors
1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed
December 7, 2012 ("Final Act."); (2) the Appeal Brief filed June 10, 2013
("App. Br."); (3) the Examiner's Answer mailed October 15, 2013 ("Ans.");
and (4) the Reply Brief filed November 25, 2013 ("Reply Br.").
Appeal2014-002078
Application 12/731,791
positioned outside of the UE's tracking range by communicating with other
UEs. Id. For example, the other UEs can relay the out-of-range sensor's
tracking information over a network. Id. Claim 11 is illustrative:
11. An apparatus comprising:
at least one processor; and
at least one memory including computer program code,
wherein the at least one memory and the computer
program code configured to, with the at least one processor,
cause the apparatus to perform at least the following:
cause, at least in part, pairing of a device and a local
sensor;
determine when the local sensor is beyond a
predetermined distance from the device for more than a
predetermined time; and
cause, at least in part, a change in a profile status of the
local sensor based on the determination,
wherein the profile status specifies, at least in part, a
visibility of the local sensor to one or more other devices.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Markhovsky (US 2006/0012476 Al; published Jan. 19,
2006) and Demirbasa (US 2008/0014869 Al; published Jan. 17, 2008).
Ans. 2-9.
CONTENTIONS
The Examiner finds that Markhovsky discloses every recited element
of claim 11 except for determining when the local sensor is beyond a
predetermined distance from the device for more than a predetermined time,
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but cites Demirbasa as teaching this feature in concluding that the claim
would have been obvious. Ans. 4--5. In the proposed combination, the
Examiner maps Markhovsky' s monitoring unit to the recited device, the
master units other than the monitoring unit to the recited "other devices,"
and the target to the recited local sensor. Id. 3, 11. Furthermore, the
Examiner finds that Markhovsky' s monitoring unit queries other master
units when a target is out of range. Id. at 3. According to the Examiner, this
query results in location status information corresponding to the recited
profile status specifying visibility. Id. at 13.
Appellant argues that Markhovsky and Demirbasa lack the recited
determination and corresponding change in profile status. App. Br. 4.
According to Appellant, Markhovsky makes a request to other master units
when the tracked target moves out of range but this request is not a profile-
status change. Id. at 7. Appellant contends that the other master units
determine whether the target is in the vicinity. Id. at 10. But in Appellant's
view, a vicinity change is not a visibility change because the tracked targets
were always detectable, or visible, to other master units. Id. Moreover,
Appellant contends that the status of a target's visibility to one of
Markhovsky's master units is not a visibility status for "other devices," as
required by the claim. Reply Br. 4.
Appellant further contends that Demirbasa only issues an alarm, not a
profile change, if a device is out of range for a time. App. Br. 7. According
to Appellant, the Markhovsky-Demirbasa combination is improper because
the Examiner engages in impermissible hindsight reasoning, there is no
reason to combine in the references, and the references are non-analogous to
each other and the claim. Id. at 8-9; Reply Br. 4--5.
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Application 12/731,791
ISSUES
I. Under§ 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by finding
that Markhovsky and Demirbasa collectively would have taught or
suggested:
(1) "the profile status specifies, at least in part, a visibility of
the local sensor to one or more other devices," as recited in claim 11?
(2) "cause, at least in part, a change in a profile status of the
local sensor based on the determination," as recited in claim 11?
(3) "determine when the local sensor is beyond a
predetermined distance from the device for more than a predetermined
time," as recited in claim 11?
II. Is the Examiner's combining the teachings of these references
supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
justify the Examiner's obviousness conclusion?
ANALYSIS
A key aspect of the disputed limitations is the recited "profile status."
The Examiner interprets the recited profile status to mean location status
information that corresponds to information describing a particular target.
See Ans. 13. Appellant argues for a narrower construction, pointing to
paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Specification. App. Br. 10.
Although Appellant defines other terms, 2 we do not find any
definition for "profile status" in the cited paragraphs. Id. In paragraph 24,
Appellant discusses visibility rights, but does not discuss how those rights
2 See, e.g., Spec. i-f 22 (defining "remotely locate").
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are represented as a profile status. Spec. if 24. Likewise, paragraph 25 states
that "the profile or status may include a private profile," a public profile, or a
detectable profile. Id. if 25 (emphasis added). But we emphasize "may"
here because the profile status is not limited to these examples. See also
id. if 97 (stating that the invention is not limited to the exemplary
embodiments). So although these examples inform our construction of
"profile status," they do not define the term. Rather, a broad, but reasonable,
interpretation encompasses a variety of ways to represent a tracked target's
status.
The Examiner's interpretation of "profile status" (Ans. 13) is also
consistent with the term's use in the context of claim 11. Claim 11 requires
that the "profile status" must specify, at least in part, visibility. Appellant
does not dispute that visibility means the ability to recognize the device's
presence. Reply Br. 4. Appellant, however, points to the additional
requirement that the recited sensor visibility must be "to one or more other
devices." Id. (emphasis in original); see also App. Br. 10-12.
We also find no error in the Examiner's position that Markhovsky's
profile status also specifies the sensor's visibility "to one or more other
devices" (Ans. 13). Specifically, Markhovsky's tracking-and-locating
system uses master units operating as transceivers and slave units operating
as transponders. Markhovsky if 63. These units have a unique identification
(ID) to permit monitoring, tracking, and locating as "targets." Id. To
perform these functions, Markhovsky designates one master unit a searching
monitor. Id. Each master unit has a communication range. Id. if 66. If a
target moves out of the monitor's range, the monitoring unit requests queries
other master units for information. Id. if 7 6. In response, the other master
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units send a list of target IDs in their range. Id. The searching monitoring
unit then derives tracking information about the target from this list. See id.
(noting that the monitoring unit can locate a target from the query response).
The Examiner finds that the information about the target sent to the
monitoring unit (id. i-f 76) corresponds to the target's profile status. Ans. 12-
13.
That is, Markhovsky' s profile status reflects what the monitoring unit
knows about the target's visibility to the other master units. For example, if
"visibility" is the ability to recognize a device's presence (Reply Br. 4), then
Markhovsky' s monitoring unit gathers information about another master
unit's ability to recognize a target's presence in their range
(Markhovsky i-f 76). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner's finding
(Ans. 13) that Markhovsky's target information (Markhovsky i-f 76) is "a
profile status specifies, at least in part, a visibility of the local sensor to one
or more other devices."
Appellant further argues that Markhovsky lacks causing a change in
visibility, or more specifically, a profile-status change based on a
determination that the sensor is beyond a predetermined distance.
App. Br. 9-12; see also Reply Br. 4. However, the Examiner reasons that a
target exiting the searching monitoring unit's range will cause the
monitoring unit to collect new information about the target. Ans. 12-13.
Further, the Examiner finds that this new information, corresponding to the
changed profile status, is different from the old information. Id.
We find no error in the Examiner's position (id.). Regardless of the
target's prior visibility to the other master units, the target's exit from the
monitoring unit's range changes the monitoring unit's information about the
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target, namely whether the target is visible to other master units (i.e., within
their range). See Markhovsky i-f 7 6. Specifically, the monitoring unit
changes the target's information, or profile status, by recalculating tracking
information. See id. Moreover, the monitoring unit calculates position by
correlating the tracking ID with a master unit's identity. See id.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant's argument
(App. Br. 9-12; Reply Br. 4) that the Examiner erred in finding that
Markhovsky causes "a change in a profile status of the local sensor based on
the determination" (Ans. 3--4).
We also find unavailing Appellant's argument that Markhovsky and
Demirbasa are not combinable allegedly because the references are "non-
analogous to each other" (App. Br. 9). Prior art is analogous if it is (1) from
the same field of endeavor as that of Appellant's invention regardless of the
problem addressed, or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with
which the inventor is involved. In re Bigio, 381F.3d1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2004 ). The analogous art test, then, does not ask whether the prior art
references are analogous to each other as Appellant suggests (see
App. Br. 9-12), but rather asks whether the references are analogous to the
claimed subject matter. See id.; see also In re Kahn, 441F.3d977, 986-87
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
We are also not persuaded by Appellant's argument that Markhovsky
and Demirbasa are not analogous to the claimed subject matter (App. Br. 9).
For example, Markhovsky pertains to determining the location of a sensor
(Markhovsky, Abstract}-a functionality that is not only in Appellant's field
of endeavor, but also reasonably pertinent to Appellant's problem of
changing a profile status as discussed previously. Likewise, Demirbasa's
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criterion based on determining the time that the device is out of range
(Demirbasa i-f 34) is at least reasonably pertinent as a criterion for solving the
problem of changing a profile status and locating objects. Specifically,
Demirbasa's time-based criterion would merely provide another basis to
judge whether the tracked object is lost or out of range.
In Appellant's view, one of ordinary skill would not have looked to
Demirbasa's teaching of using alarms in Markhovsky's system.
App. Br. 11-12. But the Examiner is not suggesting bodily incorporating
Demirbasa's method into Markhovsky. That is, Demirbasa's alarms (id. at 7;
Reply Br. 3) and rendering the object operable (App. Br. 11-12) are not part
of the Examiner's proposed combination. Rather, the Examiner proposes
adding Demirbasa's time criterion to Markhovsky's out-of-range condition.
Ans. 10. Ultimately, combining Demirbasa and Markhovsky in this way
yields no more than a predictable result of having an additional basis for
judging whether a target is out of range-an obvious improvement. See KSR
Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416-17 (2007).
Despite Appellant's contentions to the contrary (App. Br. 8-9, 11-12;
Reply Br. 4--5), we find that the Examiner has not relied on impermissible
hindsight, but rather has provided a rational basis for supporting the
obviousness conclusion. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Specifically, the
Examiner's rationale is that skilled artisans would recognize Demirbasa
would improve Markhovsky's system by limiting the number of out-of-
range conditions by time. See Ans. 10. For example, the Examiner's finds
that one of ordinary skill would not want the out-of-range condition
triggered when the target is out of range momentarily. Id.
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On this record, the Examiner's obviousness conclusion (Ans. 4--5) is
not taken solely from the Appellant's disclosure, but drawn from reasonable
inferences and knowledge available to those of ordinary skill in the art. Nor
has Appellant shown that the prior art teaches away from such a
modification, or that this combination would somehow render Markhovsky
unsatisfactory for its intended purpose of tracking targets. See In re Gordon,
733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 11, and claims 1-10 and 12-20, not argued separately with
particularity (see App. Br. 3; Reply Br. 5).
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-20 under§ 103(a).
DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-20 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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