Ex Parte YamadaDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 12, 201814329621 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 12, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 14/329,621 07/11/2014 Masatoshi Yamada 73109 7590 09/14/2018 Cuenot, Forsythe & Kim, LLC 20283 State Road 7 Ste. 300 Boca Raton, FL 33498 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. JP920130069US1_8134-0081 8658 EXAMINER AL HASHEM!, SANA A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2156 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/14/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ibmptomail@iplawpro.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MASATOSHI YAMADA 1 Appeal2018-002500 Application 14/329,621 Technology Center 2100 Before JASON V. MORGAN, SHARON PENICK, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. CUTITT A, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-5 and 8-17, all pending claims of the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 2 We REVERSE. 1 IBM Corporation ("Appellant") is the applicant, as provided for under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.46, and is also identified in the Brief as the real party in interest. See Appeal Br. 1. 2 Claims 6 and 7 are cancelled. See Appeal Br. 2. Appeal2018-002500 Application 14/329,621 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant's invention is directed to database "access control that is not dependent on rights of accounts." Spec. ,r 19. 3 Illustrative Claims Claims 1, 6, 7, 8, and 13 are independent. Claims 1 and 5 are illustrative of the claimed subject matter and are reproduced below with limitations at issue emphasized: 1. A method comprising: processing a database object m accordance with a processing request; determining a mode of processing from the processing request; and responsive to determining that the mode of processing satisfies an application condition, changing content of the processing in accordance with a rule associated with the application condition using a processor. 5. The method of claim 1, wherein, if the mode of the processing based on the processing request satisfies a predetermined application condition, the changing content of the processing comprises deleting data minus a predetermined amount from the data obtained as a result of the processing 3 Throughout this Decision, we refer to: (1) Appellant's Specification filed July 11, 2014 ("Spec."); (2) the Final Office Action ("Final Act.") mailed March 23, 2017; (3) the Appeal Brief filed August 8, 2017 ("Appeal Br."); (4) the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.") mailed November 3, 2017; and the Reply Brief filed January 2, 2018 ("Reply Br."). 2 Appeal2018-002500 Application 14/329,621 thereby to output the predetermined amount of data, m accordance with the rule. Appeal Br. 18-19. REFERENCE AND REJECTIONS Claims 5, 12, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. Final Act. 2-3. Claims 1-5 and 8-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I02(a)(l) as anticipated by Kudoh et al. (US 2002/0077803 Al; June 20, 2002) ("Kudoh"). Final Act. 3-5. Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and the issues raised by Appellant. ANALYSIS 35 USC§ l 12(a) Rejection The Examiner finds claim 5 "fail[ s] to comply with the enablement requirement" because "[t]he specification of the instant application fail to provide proper support to" the limitation at issue. Final Act. 2. Appellant argues "the Examiner has not explained why paragraphs [0024] and [0082] of Appellant's specification as well as Rule 7 illustrated in Figure 7 [ fail to] enable the claimed invention." Appeal Br. 9. Appellant further argues "Appellants have been unable to identify where the Examiner responded to these arguments." Reply Br. 2. 3 Appeal2018-002500 Application 14/329,621 We find Appellant's arguments persuasive. The Examiner merely states "the instant application fail[ s] to provide proper support" to the claim, without providing further analysis. Final Act. 2. The Examiner conflates § 112(a) enablement analysis with§ 112(a) written description analysis. More importantly, the Examiner fails to articulate, with sufficient findings or explanation, either a§ 112(a) enablement rejection or a§ 112(a) written description rejection. See id. at 2, 5. Consequently, we are constrained by the record before us to find that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) and we reverse the Examiner's§ 112(a) rejection of 5 and of claims 12 and 17, which are similarly rejected. 35 USC§ 102 Rejection The Examiner finds Kudoh discloses "responsive to determining that the mode of processing satisfies an application condition, changing content of the processing in accordance with a rule associated with the application condition using a processor," as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 2 ( citing Kudoh ,r,r 85, 87, 92). Specifically, the Examiner relies on Kudoh's "method of identifying name tag and access is enabled" to disclose the claimed "changing content of the processing." Final Act. 2-3 ( citing Kudoh i187). Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding Kudoh discloses the limitations at issue because: As discussed in Appellant's specification "if the content of processing based on a processing request satisfies an application condition for an access rule according to the present embodiment, the content of the processing is converted in accordance with an execution rule. Therefore, a processing 4 Appeal2018-002500 Application 14/329,621 result is different than would be obtained in the case where the access rule is not applied'' ( emphasis added). Based upon this interpretation, the permitting access does not change the processing result. Again, for purposes of clarifying the record, Appellant respectfully requested that the Examiner explicitly identify what feature within Kudoh corresponds to the claimed "processing." Appeal Br. 13 (citing Final Act. 3--4). Appellant further argues that Kudoh's "'method of identifying name tag and access"' does not teach or suggest changing content of the processing, as claimed, because "the limitations at issue refer to 'changing content of the processing' -not just changing content" and because "'identifying' [tags] is not 'changing."' Appeal Br. 13. The Examiner responds Examiner disagrees. Once again the specification of the instant application didn't define the "application condition" in any specific way, thus the term(s) was given the broadest reasonable interpretation in the light of the specification. The applied art discloses in Para. 93 the access condition tag represents a condition for applying the access control tagged objects which corresponds to application condition. Ans. 3--4 (citing Kudoh ,r 93). Appellant further argues that in the Answer "the Examiner has not addressed Appellant's arguments in the Appeal Brief that 'the permitting access does not change the processing result"' and "'the Examiner has still failed to adequately explain how Kudoh teaches that the content of the processing is changed in accordance with a rule associated with the application condition"' because the Examiner's response "does not address these arguments." Reply Br. 6. 5 Appeal2018-002500 Application 14/329,621 We are persuaded by Appellant's arguments. Although we agree with the Examiner that Kudoh's use of a tag to determine "whether the accessing of the object should be permitted" (see Kudoh ,r 85) discloses "determining that the mode of processing satisfies an application condition," the Examiner does not show how Kudoh discloses changing content of the processing in accordance with the access controller's access determination. As noted by Appellant, the Examiner does not respond to Appellant's arguments. Accordingly, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not shown how Kudoh' s discussion of a "method of identifying [a] name tag and access is enabled" (Final Act. 2) discloses "changing content of the processing in accordance with a rule associated with the application condition," responsive to determining that the mode of processing satisfies an application condition, as recited in illustrative claim 1. Thus, we are persuaded that the Examiner has not shown Kudoh anticipates claim 1. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868 F .2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[A]n invention is anticipated if the same device, including all the claim limitations, is shown in a single prior art reference. Every element of the claimed invention must be literally present, arranged as in the claim." (citations omitted)). Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced by Appellant for claim 1, we need not reach the merits of Appellant's other arguments. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we do not sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 102 rejection of independent claim 1, and of independent claims 8 and 13, which recite limitations commensurate to those discussed above, and, for the same reasons, dependent claims 2-5, 9-12, and 14--17. 6 Appeal2018-002500 Application 14/329,621 DECISION We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claims 5, 12, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-5 and 8-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l). REVERSED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation